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ANITA MARTIN, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Marlene Hill, deceased, Plaintiff, v. PETERSEN HEALTH OPERATIONS, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Corporation d/b/a Bloomington Rehabilitation & Health Care Center, Defendant.

G. MURRAY SNOW, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER

G. MURRAY SNOW, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

At issue is the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of Plaintiff Kelly Richardson's (“Plaintiff”) application for disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial. For the following reasons, the Court affirms the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) decision (Doc. 23-3 at 32-41), as upheld by the Appeals Council, (Doc. 23-3 at 10-15.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an Application for Disability Insurance benefits in January 2017 for a period of disability beginning November 1, 2008. His claim was denied initially in March 2017 and upon reconsideration in June 2017. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, where he amended his onset date of disability to December 31, 2013. (Doc. 23-2 at 32). On September 9, 2019, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff's claim. In May 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the agency's final decision. (Doc. 23-3 at 10).

Upon considering the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's disability based on the following severe impairments: morbid obesity, hypertension, and hypothyroidism (Doc. 23-3 at 35). Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged disability onset date through the date of the decision (Doc. 23-3 at 41). The ALJ found that Plaintiff could still perform sedentary work, including his past relevant work as a user support agent (Doc. 23-3 at 40). Therefore, the ALJ denied his claim.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Because the severity of an impairment may be greater than what can be shown by objective medical evidence alone, the ALJ considers a claimant's subjective testimony regarding pain and symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). The claimant, however, must still show objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Although such evidence is required to show the existence of an underlying impairment, “the [ALJ] may not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence.” Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the ALJ evaluates the testimony in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence in determining the extent to which the pain or symptoms affect her capacity to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).

II. Analysis

At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff and his wife testified that due to his disabilities, Plaintiff needs assistance taking care of himself in the bathroom, including for bowel movements and showering. (Doc. 24 at 5.) Despite this testimony, the ALJ opined that Plaintiff's “subjective complaints were not fully consistent with the evidence[, ] and the objective medical evidence [did] not support the alleged severity of symptoms.” (Doc. 23-3 at 39.) Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ failed to specifically reject his testimony about needing assistance in the bathroom; and (2) even if the ALJ did specifically reject this testimony, she failed to provide adequate reasoning for doing so.

Although Plaintiff did not raise these issues during the administrative hearing, his failure to do so does not preclude him from raising them on appeal. Milne v. Berryhill, No. 5:17- cv-01042-SHK, 2018 WL 3197749, at *5-6 (June 27, 2018 C.D. Cal.) (reviewing Ninth Circuit precedent regarding waiver); Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2017) (narrowly holding that forfeiture applies when claimants fail to challenge vocational experts' job estimates during the administrative hearing).

A. The ALJ Specifically Rejected Plaintiff's Testimony

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by not specifically rejecting Plaintiff's testimony about needing assistance in the bathroom. General findings pertaining to a claimant's credibility are not sufficient to support rejecting his testimony. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, “the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). In doing so, the ALJ need not engage in “extensive” analysis but should, at the very least “provide some reasoning in order for [a reviewing court] to meaningfully determine whether [the ALJ's] conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015).

Here, the ALJ's decision begins by reviewing Plaintiff's and his wife's testimony- which included the testimony at issue-and by concluding that Plaintiff's statements “concerning the intensity, persistence[, ] and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence.” (Doc. 23-3 at 37.) The ALJ then specifically rejects Plaintiff's testimony regarding the “severity of symptoms” caused by his “morbid obesity.” (Doc. 23-3 at 37.) That sentence is followed by two paragraphs of support. (Doc. 23-3 at 38.) The statement recounting Plaintiff's issues in the bathroom- which is closely followed by a rejection of his symptom testimony altogether-is sufficiently specific. The ALJ need not provide “extensive” analysis-only enough for a court to discern what testimony is being rejected. Clearly, a recounting of testimony followed by a rejection of that testimony is sufficient to meet this standard. This is especially true, where, as here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff discussed this specific problem as causing difficulties with any of his medical providers prior to the date he was last insured. (Doc. 23-3 at 39.) The ALJ, therefore, sufficiently rejected Plaintiff's specific testimony relating to the hygiene difficulties caused by his obesity.

B. Specific, Clear, and Convincing Reasons

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not provide “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” to reject his testimony. Unless there is evidence of malingering by the claimant, the ALJ may only reject symptom testimony for reasons that are specific, clear, and convincing. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony, the ALJ may consider any cause of action (let alone an exclusive, federal one) for any claim other than willful misconduct, such as negligence. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d, 247d-6e. Naturally, the Act also does not set forth procedures and remedies for a nonexistent cause of action. With regard to such claims, the PREP act is merely “an immunity statute; it does not create rights, duties, or obligations.” See Dupervil v. All. Health Operations, LLC, 516 F.Supp.3d 238, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-505 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2021). Thus, the PREP Act is clearly not a completely preempting statute for any claim other than willful misconduct-ending the inquiry for Count I.

Contra Garcia v. Welltower OpCo Grp. LLC, SACV 20-02250, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25738, 2021 WL 492581, at *7 (CD. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-55224 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2021); Rachal v. Natchitoches Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105847, at * 12-13 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2021). Garcia and Rachal followed OGC's Fifth Advisory Opinion, (doc. 19-1), finding it persuasive and deferring to it according to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). However, every other court to address the issue has disagreed: “Other than two outlier cases, [Garcia and Rachal, ] courts have consistently held that [OGC's Fifth Advisory Opinion] does not show that the PREP Act completely preempts state claims . . . .” Lollie v. Colonnades Health Care Ctr. Ltd., No. H-21-1812, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172981, at *7 n.1, *13 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 2021) (collecting 46 such cases).

ii. The PREP Act Does Not Apply to Plaintiffs Willful Misconduct Claim

The Seventh Circuit has not yet decided whether the PREP Act completely preempts willful misconduct claims within its scope. Assuming arguendo that it does, the PREP Act can only completely preempt the class of “willful misconduct” claims “for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1), (d)(1).

Because Plaintiffs claims fall outside the PREP Act's scope, as discussed infra, the issue is not necessary to the instant holding, and the Court need not decide it. However, the Court includes the following discussion regarding whether the PREP Act completely preempts willful misconduct claims.

Yet Plaintiff does not allege her mother's “injuries arose from, e.g., Defendant['s] administration to [her] of vaccines or medicines (or for that matter protective gear) . . . .” Estate of Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehabilitation Ctr., 478 F.Supp.3d 518, 532 (2020) (emphasis in original). Rather, Plaintiff argues that use of countermeasures could have prevented her mother's injuries. (See doc. 1-1 at 3-4, 14, 15-16, 18, 20-21, 25, 27, 29-31, 34-35, 39-41, 43-46).

In response, Defendant argues Count II falls within the class of claims preempted by the PREP act because it believes the Act applies to the nonuse of covered countermeasures. (Doc. 19 at 3, 9-14).

The Court rejects Defendant's argument for the same reasons the District of Kansas remanded an identical case (in which the plaintiff sued a nursing home for alleged failure to take adequate COVID-19 precautions, resulting in her mother's death):

Defendants generally argue that Plaintiff's allegations fall within the scope of the PREP Act. But in doing so, they generally just re-write Plaintiff's allegations using the language of the PREP Act-language never actually used in Plaintiff's complaint. They also argue that allegations that the facility failed to provide adequate protections invokes all devices and other interventions that the facility did use. But . . . there are no allegations that the administration or use of any of those things caused the death of the decedent. Again, the allegations are the opposite-that Defendants' failure to act caused the decedent's death. To the extent Defendants want to argue that the PREP Act applies, they must do so based on the complaint as it is-not as Defendants would prefer it to be. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 396-97 (noting that a defendant cannot ignore the allegations in the complaint and argue “that there are different facts [Plaintiff] might have alleged that would have constituted a federal claim” so that it can “justify removal on the basis of facts not alleged in the complaint”).
. . . .
Suffice it to say that the Court is not convinced that a facility using covered countermeasures somewhere in the facility is sufficient to invoke the PREP Act as to all claims that arise in that facility. The PREP Act still requires a causal connection between the injury and the use or administration of covered countermeasures, and that link is not present under Defendants' interpretation.
. . . .
Indeed, if Congress intended the PREP Act to apply as broadly as Defendants advocate, it certainly could have written it to clearly apply to inaction as much as action. Instead, the PREP Act addresses the administration or use of covered countermeasures. There is simply no room to read it as equally applicable to the non-administration or non-use of covered countermeasures. See Estate of Maglioli, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145055, 2020 WL 4671091, at *9 (finding that “the PREP Act . . . is designed to protect those who employ countermeasures, not those who decline to employ them”).

Brown v. Big Blue Healthcare, 480 F.Supp.3d 1196, 1205-07 (D. Kan. 2020).

In making this determination, the Court acknowledges the Secretary's Fourth Amended Declaration included a small subset of nonuse claims:

It's true that the Secretary has indicated “that an ‘inaction claim' is not necessarily beyond the scope of the PREP Act.” Reed, et al. v. Sunbridge Hallmark Health Servs., LLC, No. CV 21-3702, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119092, 2021 WL 2633156, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2021). However, immunity for such claims is the exception, not the rule. The Secretary's December 3, 2020 Amendment makes clear that inaction claims fall within the scope of the PREP Act only where: “(1) there are limited covered countermeasures; and (2) there was a failure to administer a covered countermeasure to one individual because it was administered to another individual.” Id. (citing Fourth Amendment, 85 Fed. Reg. at 79, 197). In other words, “[p]rioritization or purposeful allocation of a Covered Countermeasure, particularly if done in accordance with a public authority's directive, can fall within the PREP Act and th[e] Declaration's liability protections.” Reed, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119092, 2021 WL 2633156, at *4 (quoting Fourth Amendment, 85 Fed. Reg. at 79, 197). For example, the Act could immunize a pharmacy that chooses to administer vaccines to people in Group 1 from a lawsuit brought by someone in Group 2 alleging that the pharmacy wrongfully denied him a vaccine shot. “This specific example makes clear that the non-administration of a vaccine in limited supply necessarily arises from the decision to administer the vaccine to others first.” Lopez v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. CV 20-0958, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56102, 2021 WL 1121034, at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 24, 2021).

Ruiz v. ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC, No. 21-CV-387, 2021 WL 3056275, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134677, at *10-11 (E.D. Wis. July 20, 2021) (alterations in original). However, that subset of nonuse clearly does not apply here. The Complaint nowhere alleges Plaintiff's mother contracted COVID-19 as a result of Defendant's purposeful allocation of countermeasures to other individuals. (Doc. 1-1).

Undeterred, Defendant relies on OGC's Fifth Advisory Opinion, which argues the PREP Act covers all nonuse except for the “failure to make any decisions whatsoever, thereby abandoning [the] duty to act as a program planner or other covered person.” (Doc. 19-1 at 4).

However, that Advisory Opinion lacks binding legal authority. It disclaims as much, stating, “This Advisory Opinion sets forth the current views of the Office of the General Counsel. It is not a final agency action or a final order. It does not have the force or effect of law.” Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). Moreover, “informal agency interpretations such as those contained in ‘opinion letters . . . policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference.' ” AFGE, Local 2119 v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).

Under Chevron, Inc. v. NDRC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), federal courts must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). “Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.” Id. at 227. When Chevron deference is inapplicable, Skidmore permits federal courts to defer to an agency's statutory interpretation to the extent they find the agency's rationale persuasive. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

“Nevertheless, given the specialized experience and broader information available to such an agency, these informal interpretations are ‘entitled to respect' to the extent that they have the ‘power to persuade.' ” Id.; see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). OGC's Fifth Advisory Opinion has failed to persuade this Court or any other-save two:

[N]early every district court to consider whether the PREP Act completely preempts similar state-law claims against nursing homes “has concluded the PREP Act is not a complete preemption statute, or at least does not have such an effect on claims like those presented here.” See, e.g., Winfred Cowan, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61708, 2021 WL 1225965, at *4 (collecting cases); see also (Doc. No. 46 at 1). Indeed, the only case[s] to conclude otherwise [are Rachal v. Natchitoches Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105847 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2021) and] Garcia v. Welltower OPCo Grp. LLC, No. SACV 20-02250, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25738, 2021 WL 492581, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-55224 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2021). Critical to [ Rachal's and] Garcia's holding, however, was the court's deference to the HHS's January 8, 2021 [Fifth] Advisory Opinion (Doc. No. 32 at 3-7), which opined that the PREP Act is a complete preemption statute because it establishes both “a federal cause of action, administrative or judicial, as the only viable claim [and] vests exclusive jurisdiction in a federal court.” (See Doc. No. 32 at 3-7); see also Garcia, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25738, 2021 WL 492581, at *7 (“Given this recent guidance, the Court finds that the PREP Act provides for complete preemption.”).
But Garcia is nonbinding, and this Court joins the other district courts that have unanimously concluded that the HHS's Advisory Opinion should not receive unfettered deference. First, to the extent Garcia gave Chevron deference to the Advisory Opinion, that would have been clear error because the Advisory Opinion itself expressly states that “[i]t is not a final agency action or a final order” and “does not have the force or effect of law.” (Doc. No. 32 at 7); see Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (“only those administrative interpretations that Congress and the agency intend to have the ‘force of law,' as opposed to those merely characterized as ‘authoritative,' qualify for Chevron deference”) (citations omitted). Second, “[e]ven if the [Advisory Opinion] did not include the clear disclaimer language, the authority Congress delegated to HHS to make rules carrying the force of law did not include authority to interpret the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Estate of Jones v. St. Jude Operating Co., LLC, No. 3:20-cv-01088, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43876, 2021 WL 900672, *6 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 2021) (citations omitted).

Bolton v. Gallatin Ctr. for Rehab. & Healing, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-00683, 2021 WL 1561306, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76193, at *19-21 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2021) (cleaned up).

The Court agrees with and adopts the reasoning in Bolton. The OGC's Fifth Advisory Opinion (doc. 19-1) is unpersuasive and merits no deference under Chevron or Skidmore, as it has neither a legal nor logical basis for reading wholesale nonuse into the statute. If Congress intended the PREP Act to apply to nonuse generally, it would have simply added one word to the detailed statute: “nonuse.” However, doing so would defeat the basic purpose of the statute. It is obvious “the PREP Act . . . is designed to protect those who employ countermeasures, not those who decline to employ them.” Estate of Maglioli, 478 F.Supp.3d. at 531.

Thus, Plaintiff's willful misconduct claim falls outside the PREP Act's scope because Plaintiff does not allege loss from the administration or use of a covered countermeasure-but rather from the general nonuse of countermeasures. Regardless of whether the PREP Act completely preempts willful misconduct claims within its scope, Count II is not within the scope of preempted claims.

Given that the PREP Act does not completely preempt either of Plaintiff's claims, Defendant cannot establish federal question jurisdiction on that basis.

2. State Claims with Embedded Federal Questions

Defendant next argues Plaintiff's state law claims are subject to federal question jurisdiction because a necessary element of each claim is an embedded federal question. (See Doc. 19 at 4, 7).

Federal-question jurisdiction can apply to state-law claims in “a special and small category of cases.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (citations omitted). A well-pleaded complaint can present a federal question if “plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). “A plaintiff's complaint is said to present an ‘embedded' federal issue supporting federal-question jurisdiction if it raises a federal issue that is ‘(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.' ” Sarauer v. Int'l Ass'n & Aero. Workers, Dist. No. 10, 966 F.3d 661, 673 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013)). “If any of the four requirements is not satisfied, the exception does not apply.” Dupervil v. All. Health Operations, LLC, 516 F.Supp.3d 238, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citations omitted), appeal docketed, No. 21-505 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2021).

Here, the analysis starts and ends with Grable element one. “A state-law claim ‘necessarily' raises federal questions where the claim is affirmatively ‘premised' on a violation of federal law.” New York ex rel. Jacobson v. Wells Fargo Nat'l Bank, N.A., 824 F.3d 308, 315 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 314). The “substantial, disputed question of federal law [must be] a necessary element” of Plaintiff's well-pleaded state-law claim. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added).

Defendant cannot satisfy the first element of the Grable test. Consequently, the Court need not analyze whether the latter elements are met.

As the Seventh Circuit held in Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., “Grable does not alter the rule that a potential federal defense is insufficient to create federal jurisdiction under § 1331.” 680 F.3d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006)). “Grable has nothing to do with using federal defenses to move litigation to federal court. In . . . Grable, the federal issue was part of the plaintiff's own claim.” Id.

The following examples make clear the difference between a federal question embedded in (i.e., necessarily raised by) a well-pleaded state complaint and a federal question raised by an affirmative defense. In Grable, the plaintiff had to prove inadequate notice under federal law as an element of his state quiet title claim against the IRS, who had seized his real property. 545 U.S. at 314. Similarly, in Gunn v. Minton, as an element of his state malpractice claim, the plaintiff had to demonstrate he would have prevailed on his federal patent claim but for the defendant's malpractice. 568 U.S. 251, 259 (2013). Finally, in Dillon v. Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff had to prove a violation of a federal duty to establish negligence per se. 992 F.Supp.2d 751, 756 (E.D. Ky. 2014)). In each case, the “claims [were] affirmatively premised on, or on their face necessarily require[d] resolution of, ” federal law. Dupervil, 516 F.Supp. at 257.

In contrast, the federal issue here is not a necessary element of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's two claims for gross negligence and willful misconduct require her to establish elements like duty, breach, cause, and harm under state statutory and common law. (See Doc. 1-1 at 19-32, 35-48); 210 ILCS 45/1-128.5 (“A ‘Type “AA” violation' means . . . a facility that proximately caused a resident's death.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff need not and did not rely on federal law to establish any element of her claims (such as a violation of federal law to establish negligence per se). Defendant's allegation that the PREP Act gives it immunity is merely an affirmative defense; there is no part of Plaintiff's claims that requires her to rely on the PREP Act.

So, while Defendant “may have a federal defense to the [Plaintiff's] claim, it is blackletter law that a federal defense differs from a claim arising under federal law.” Chi. Tribune Co., 680 F.3d at 1003. If defendants could use removal jurisdiction by merely pleading federal defenses, as Defendant proposes, Mottley's well-pleaded complaint rule would be stripped of all meaning, and “the plaintiff would be master of nothing.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399.

It is worth noting Defendant's invocation of the Secretary's Fourth Amended Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 79, 190 (Dec. 9, 2020), and OGC's Fifth Advisory Opinion (doc. 19-1) do not change this analysis. “Although the Secretary's view on the federal interests underlying the PREP Act [is] compelling, neither the Fourth Amended Declaration nor the Advisory Opinion address [Grable element one, ] whether . . . a ‘disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims . . . .' “ Estate of Winfred Cowan v. Lp Columbia Ky, No. 1:20-CV-00118, 2021 WL 1225965, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61708, at *19-20 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2021) (quoting Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2007)) (emphasis in original).

Furthermore, as analyzed in Dupervil, the Advisory Opinion misinterprets Grable and proposes a radical use of diversity jurisdiction in cases lacking diversity:

The recent Advisory Opinion, previously discussed, opining that the Secretary's Fourth Amended Declaration supports the Grable doctrine is unpersuasive. ( See Advisory Opinion 21-01, Dkt. 17-1, at 4-5 (opining, inter alia, that the Secretary's determination that the Act implicates a “substantial” federal question “provides the underlying basis for invoking the Grable doctrine”).) The Advisory Opinion's only guidance on the “necessarily raised” factor is a selective (mis)quotation from Grable: “Thus, a substantial federal question is implicated, for example, where ‘the interpretation of a federal statute [ ] actually is in dispute in the litigation and is so important that it sensibly belongs in federal court.' ” ( Id. at 4-5 (alteration in original) (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 315).) The plaintiff in Grable, however, “premised its superior title claim [ i.e., its well-pleaded state-law claim] on a failure by the IRS to give it adequate notice, as defined by federal law.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis added). The Grable Court therefore concluded: “Whether Grable was given notice within the meaning of the federal statute is thus an essential element of its quiet title claim[.]” Id. at 315. By contrast, here, the PREP Act, a statute affording immunity, is not an essential element of any of Plaintiff's claims. The Advisory Opinion is thus unhelpful. It, moreover, takes the incredible position that once Grable is invoked, “the court retains the case to decide whether the immunity and preemption provisions apply; if they do not apply, then the court would try the case as it would a diversity case” (Dkt. 17-1, at 5), presumably even if the parties, as here, are not diverse. The Court declines to accept this effective rewriting of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and principles of subject-matter jurisdiction more generally. Cf. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990) (“Since its enactment, we have interpreted the diversity statute [28 U.S.C. § 1332] to require ‘complete diversity' of citizenship.” (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806))); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1996) (“[I]f, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated.” (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3))). Rather, the Court follows every district court to have considered the Grable exception in this context, and concludes that federal-question jurisdiction does not “lie over” Plaintiff's state-law claims. See Anson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17056, 2021 WL 308156, at *11 n.7; Smith, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5210, 2021 WL 100376, at *2; Saldana, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216490, 2020 WL 6713995, at *2 n.3; Martin, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165874, 2020 WL 5422949, at *2-3.

Dupervil, 516 F.Supp. at 258-59.

As it is not entitled to Chevron deference and is entirely unpersuasive-thus not meriting Skidmore deference-the Court declines to defer to OGC's Fifth Advisory Opinion (doc. 19-1). Because Plaintiff's claims do not necessarily raise a federal issue, this case falls outside “the ‘special and small category of cases' where the embedded-federal-question doctrine applies, and it would therefore be improper to remove [the] case on that basis.” Bolton v. Gallatin Ctr. for Rehab. & Healing, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-00683, 2021 WL 1561306, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76193, at *13-14 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2021).

3. Artful Pleading

Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiff artfully pleaded her Complaint to avoid stating a federal claim. (Doc. 19 at 14-15).

The Court notes Defendant did not raise this argument in its Notice of Removal (doc. 1)-only in its Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (doc. 19). This technically runs afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), which requires “a notice of removal [contain] a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” (emphasis added). However, as Defendant's argument is toothless, and as Plaintiff was able to reply to the argument (doc. 25), it matters little.

Plaintiffs . . . may not avoid removal to federal court by omitting necessary federal questions from their complaints through artful pleading. While plaintiffs are entitled to omit federal claims from their complaints so as to avoid federal jurisdiction, they may not omit necessary federal elements of an included claim. See Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). Put another way, a “plaintiff cannot frustrate a defendant's right to remove by pleading a case without reference to any federal law when the plaintiff's claim is necessarily federal.” 14B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3722 (4th ed.). When a plaintiff omits from its pleadings federal questions that are necessary elements of a claim, courts will read the necessary federal elements into the complaint. See Hays v. Cave, 446 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (“What is true is that if federal law creates the claim on which the plaintiff is suing, the fact that he has omitted from his complaint any reference to federal law will not defeat removal.”)

Ne. Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, Inc., 707 F.3d 883, 890-91 (7th Cir. 2013), as amended (Apr. 29, 2013).

Nothing indicates that Plaintiff avoided pleading a necessary federal element of her claims. Her two claims arise solely under state statute. See Nursing Home Care Act, 210 ILCS 45/1-101 et seq. They are tort claims with elements such as duty, breach, cause, and harm, which are elucidated by state law; they have no necessary federal element. See id.; Section II(A)(2) supra. Thus, Defendant's argument that its PREP Act affirmative defense somehow requires Plaintiff to plead a federal element is entirely unpersuasive. There was no artful pleading to Plaintiff's Complaint; her claims simply did not contain any necessary federal element.

Furthermore, the artful pleading corollary appears to only apply when complete preemption or an embedded federal question are also present, making it unclear what work the doctrine does, if any. As the Court found that neither complete preemption nor embedded federal question jurisdiction apply here, it should come as no surprise that artful pleading also does not apply.

The Eastern District of Kentucky articulated the conundrum:

For the reasons discussed above, especially given that any doubt about federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 should be resolved in favor of remand, Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009), the Court finds Defendant has failed to demonstrate this action was properly removed. The Motion to Remand must therefore be granted.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (docs. 16, 21) is GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Illinois in McLean County.

SO ORDERED.

For willful misconduct claims within its scope, the PREP Act provides a federal forum after administrative exhaustion. There is a circuit split over whether complete preemption requires a federal court hear the claim in the first instance or whether a federal forum provided after administrative exhaustion suffices. The Second and Ninth Circuits hold the former position, while the Seventh Circuit holds the latter. Compare Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2005) (Disputes that “cannot be filed in the first instance in federal court [because they must be filed first with an administrative agency] are therefore not removable to federal court. . . . Because such disputes cannot be brought in federal court in the first instance, federal courts may not take jurisdiction over them simply to dismiss them on the basis that they are defensively preempted and belong before arbitral panels.”), and Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (“[T]he RLA does not provide an exclusive federal cause of action. Rather than allowing disputes . . . to be filed initially in federal court, the RLA instead requires submission of such disputes to internal dispute-resolution processes and then to a division of the National Adjustment Board or an arbitration board selected by the parties.”), with Hughes v. United Air Lines, Inc., 634 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[F]ederal courts do not entertain suits about unfair labor practices; only the National Labor Relations Board can adjudicate disputes under sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA. A suit alleging an unfair labor practice filed in state court, and removed to federal court, will be dismissed rather than resolved on the merits. This establishes that complete preemption does not depend on the ability of the federal courts to supply a remedy.”).

Artful Pleading: . . . What, if any, independent work this doctrine does, however, remains a mystery. The Supreme Court in Rivet explained that complete preemption is an application of artful pleading doctrine. 522 U.S. at 475. The doctrine might also encompass “situations in which federal issues are embedded within state law causes of action, ” but even if that is correct, Grable's four-part test still limits which of these situations confer jurisdiction. Wright & Miller § 3722.1. Moreover, like complete preemption, jurisdiction based on a strategically pled complaint is only possible when the plaintiff's claims “actually implicate a federal cause of action” that might have been invoked absent artful pleading. Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 561-63. Otherwise, without an alternative federal cause of action there would be nothing to plead around. There is no artifice in failing to plead a claim that does not even exist. Artful pleading doctrine thus appears to have nothing to add beyond serving as an umbrella term or underlying theory for other rules.”)
Dillon v. Medtronic, Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 751, 758 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (emphasis in original).

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