PER CURIAM.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Harold E. Flaigle, Judge.
Peter C. Hagan, of Wichita, for appellant natural father. David Lowden, chief attorney, appellate division, Nola Tedesco Fouhton, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GREENE, C.J., STANDRIDGE and Bruns, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
N.S. (Father), the natural father of H.L.S., K.S.S., and S.T.D.S., appeals from the decision of the district court to terminate his parental rights. We have reviewed the record on appeal and find the district court's decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
Facts
In April 2011, the State filed a petition seeking to have H.L.S., K.S.S., and S.T.D.S. adjudicated children in need of care (CINC). The petition was filed based on numerous allegations that the children's mother, J.S. (Mother), was neglecting the children. The allegations included claims that Mother was not properly caring for K.S.S., who is diabetic, that the children were not attending school on a regular basis and were beginning to fall behind in their classes, and that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The State noted in the petition that Father was not an appropriate placement for the children due to mental health issues and the fact that he was homeless and unemployed. Father also had an extensive criminal history and had just been released from custody approximately 1 month prior to the filing of the CINC petition.
The district court entered an order of temporary custody, and the children were removed from the home in April 2011. The district court entered orders for Father, which included a clinical interview and assessment, parenting classes, and random urinalysis tests.
Mother did not appear at the CINC hearing on June 29, 2011, and was found to be in default. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court adjudicated the children to be in need of care as to Father.
Over the course of the case, the district court entered new orders for Father, which included obtaining both a psychological and a psychiatric evaluation and signing releases that would allow Youthville to obtain information from providers.
In September 2011, the State filed a motion to terminate parental rights. In the motion, the State alleged that Father had not seen the children for approximately 5 years preceding the filing of the CINC petition. During visits after the CINC petition was filed, the children did not seem to want to interact with Father, and Father was unable or unwilling to control their behavior. The motion also alleged that Father's case worker was unable to help Father obtain services because of Father's inability to focus on completing court orders.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the State's motion. Mother did not appear at the hearing, and her parental rights were terminated by default. After hearing the evidence, the district court concluded by clear and convincing evidence that Father was unfit pursuant to several of the statutory factors and that his unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. After determining that termination was in the children's best interests, the court terminated Father's parental rights.
Analysis
The district court is required to make three findings before terminating parental rights. The court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit, the conduct or condition which renders the parent unfit is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, and that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(a), (g)(1). When this court reviews a district court's termination of parental rights, we consider “whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found it highly probable, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, that [the parent's rights should be terminated].” In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 705, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). In In re B.D.-Y., the court explained that “clear and convincing evidence” requires the factfinder to believe “that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” 286 Kan. at 697.
In this case, the district court relied on the following statutory provisions to find that Father was unable to properly care for his children and that his inability to do so was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future:
• Emotional illness, mental illness, mental deficiency, or physical disability of the parent, of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child, K.S.A. 38–2269(b)(l);
• Physical, mental, or emotional abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child, K.S.A. 38–2269(b)(4);
• Failure of reasonable efforts made by appropriate public or private agencies to rehabilitate the family, K.S.A. 38–2269(b)(7);
• Lack of effort on the part of the parent to adjust the parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to meet the needs of the child, K.S.A. 38–2269(b)(8); and
• Failure to carry out a reasonable plan approved by the court directed toward the integration of the child into aparental home, K.S.A. 38–2269(c)(3).
Father's sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred in relying on K.S.A. 38–2269(b)(7) to find him unfit, because the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children. Specifically, Father asserts he is a mentally ill person under K.S.A. 59–2946(e) and (f)(1) and, given that fact, the State should have filed a petition for his care and treatment under K.S.A. 59–2957, which would have alleviated those symptoms of his mental illness that rendered him unfit to care for his children. Father maintains that the law requires a “much greater effort” than what was put forth in this case.
We begin our analysis by noting that Father challenges only one of the provisions upon which the court relied to find him unfit: that the State made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family but the efforts failed. K.S.A. 38–2269(b)(7). Significantly, Father does not dispute the court's finding of unfitness based on other provisions of the statute, any one of which would support the court's finding that he was unable to properly care for his children and that his inability to do so was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we move on to address Father's claim of error.
The issue of Father's competency was discussed extensively at an August 2011 disposition hearing. At that time, Father's counsel noted that Father was unable to “help in his own defense” and that communication was very difficult. Counsel conceded it would be difficult to force Father to be evaluated. At this hearing, the district court ordered Father to complete an extensive psychiatric evaluation; however, Father was reluctant to agree to the evaluation. The district court made it clear that the evaluation would be free of charge and that transportation would be provided for Father. Father's counsel agreed that an in-depth evaluation was the best course of action but that he was not trying to “force” Father into any treatment scenario.
Father was the only witness at the November 15, 2011, termination hearing. His testimony is difficult to follow. Father testified that he doubted that K.S.S. is diabetic. Father confirmed that he has been unemployed for longer than 5 years and that he was homeless. Father refused to sign any informational releases. Father admitted he had not seen his children in more than 5 years, and he still believed that they were living with Mother. Father testified that he could not complete his court orders because people “in the social networking” were holding him back. Father refused to apply for disability because he felt he was “quite capable of working.”
Father denied having any mental health issues. Father did claim that he tried to get a mental health evaluation, but that “nobody wants to touch it.” Father also acknowledged that he had offers to help him with transportation but that he wanted to do things on his own, and he indicated that he was hoping the district court would reconsider the need for the evaluation. Father refused an evaluation from one staff member because “his card said something different,” the staff member was from the “offender's office,” and it was “not the world's best thing to be putting on your record .” Father testified that he did not know if his circumstances would change in the future.
During closing argument, Father's counsel stated that Father's mental condition prevented him from taking the steps necessary to accomplish any of the outstanding court orders but that this condition could improve if Father sought out and participated in mental health treatment and medication. Although counsel asked the district court for additional time so Father could pursue that course of action, neither Father nor his counsel suggested, let alone requested, that it would be reasonable for the State to force Father into such care and treatment by filing a petition for involuntary commitment under K.S.A. 59–2957.
Based on the facts presented in this case, we find K.S.A. 38–2269(b)(7) did not require the State to request that Father be involuntarily committed in order for the court to find clear and convincing evidence under that provision that the State made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family.
Affirmed.