Ferguson v. Carnes

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Docket Number

No. 4D12–54.

Attorney(S)

Joshua D. Lanning of Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, Charlotte, NC, and Craig A. Rubinstein of Katzman, Waserman, Bennardini & Rubinstein, Boca Raton, for appellant. Ashley N. Crispin and Brian M. O'Connell of Casey Ciklin Lubitz Martens & O'Connell, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Judges

Dorian K. Damoorgian

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Thomas C. Ferguson filed a breach of contract claim against his sister, Theresa F. Carnes, seeking to enforce an alleged oral agreement. Both siblings were the only living children of a wealthy mother who had threatened to disinherit them. Ferguson alleged that he and Carnes entered into an oral agreement to protect against disinheritance, agreeing that if one sibling was disinherited, they would evenly divide any inheritance received from their mother's estate. The mother ultimately disinherited Ferguson and named Carnes as the sole beneficiary. Carnes refused to share her inheritance, prompting Ferguson to sue for breach of contract. Carnes moved for summary judgment, arguing the oral agreement lacked consideration. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carnes, finding no consideration supported the contract. Ferguson appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the alleged oral agreement between Ferguson and Carnes constituted a valid contract supported by consideration.
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the absence of consideration for the oral contract.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellee's Arguments (Carnes)

The oral agreement failed for lack of consideration and therefore was unenforceable.

Appellant's Arguments (Ferguson)

The oral agreement was supported by mutual promises constituting valid consideration.
Each sibling promised to share any inheritance received, thereby giving up the chance to inherit more individually in exchange for mutual assurance.
The trial court improperly viewed the promises in isolation rather than as mutual and corresponding promises forming a bilateral contract.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Corya v. Sanders, 76 So.3d 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)	Standard of review for summary judgment is de novo; view facts in light most favorable to non-moving party.	Guided the court’s review of the summary judgment ruling.
Fini v. Glascoe, 936 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)	Standard of review for summary judgment and requirements for summary judgment under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).	Supported the court’s legal standard for summary judgment analysis.
St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So.2d 375 (Fla. 2004)	Oral contracts must meet contract requirements: offer, acceptance, consideration, and specificity.	Confirmed that oral contracts are enforceable if these elements are met.
Diaz v. Rood, 851 So.2d 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)	A promise, even slight, can constitute sufficient consideration.	Supported the court’s finding that mutual promises here constituted valid consideration.
Ashby v. Ashby, 651 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)	Mutual promises are valid consideration for each other.	Used to illustrate the mutual nature of the promises in the oral agreement.
Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So.2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)	Mutual promises constitute consideration.	Reinforced the bilateral nature of the contract formed by mutual promises.
Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 160 So. 215 (Fla. 1935)	Mutually enforceable promises may serve as valid consideration.	Supported the principle that mutual promises create enforceable contracts.
McIntosh v. Harbour Club Villas Condo. Ass'n, 468 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)	Bilateral contracts arise from mutual promises where each party is both promisor and promisee.	Applied to characterize the oral agreement as a bilateral contract.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the standard of review for summary judgment, which is de novo, requiring the facts to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The court then examined the elements of an oral contract, emphasizing that such contracts must satisfy the same requirements as written contracts, including offer, acceptance, consideration, and sufficiently specific terms.

The court analyzed the nature of consideration in the alleged oral agreement, concluding that the mutual promises between Ferguson and Carnes to share any inheritance constituted valid consideration. Each sibling gave up the possibility of receiving a greater individual inheritance in exchange for assurance that neither would be wholly disinherited. The court found that the trial court erred by isolating each promise rather than considering them as mutual and corresponding promises forming a bilateral contract.

Based on this analysis, the court held that Ferguson had alleged sufficient facts to establish the existence of an enforceable oral contract and that summary judgment in favor of Carnes was improper.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the summary judgment entered in favor of Carnes and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

The direct effect of this decision is to allow Ferguson's breach of contract claim to proceed beyond summary judgment. The court did not establish new precedent but clarified the application of consideration principles to mutual oral agreements in the context of inheritance disputes.

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Thomas C. FERGUSON, Appellant, v. Theresa F. CARNES, Appellee.

DAMOORGIAN

Joshua D. Lanning of Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, Charlotte, NC, and Craig A. Rubinstein of Katzman, Waserman, Bennardini & Rubinstein, Boca Raton, for appellant. Ashley N. Crispin and Brian M. O'Connell of Casey Ciklin Lubitz Martens & O'Connell, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
DAMOORGIAN, J.

In this breach of contract claim, Thomas C. Ferguson (“Ferguson”) appeals a final summary judgment entered against him and in favor of his sister, Theresa F. Carnes (“Carnes”). We reverse.

The genesis of this appeal is a complaint to enforce an oral contract filed by Ferguson against Carnes. In his complaint, Ferguson alleged that he and Carnes are the only living children of a wealthy mother, who frequently threatened to disinherit both siblings. The complaint further alleged that Ferguson and Carnes entered into an oral agreement in order to afford each other assurance against disinheritance. The oral agreement provided that if one sibling were disinherited, Ferguson and Carnes would divide evenly between them whatever property either received from their mother's estate. Eventually, the mother disinherited Ferguson and designated Carnes as her sole beneficiary.

Carnes refused to divide her inheritance with Ferguson. After Ferguson filed his breach of contract claim, Carnes moved for summary judgment, claiming that the alleged oral agreement failed for lack of consideration. The trial court agreed with Carnes, finding that the agreement was an unenforceable promise because there was no consideration.

“ ‘The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.’ ” Corya v. Sanders, 76 So.3d 31, 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Fini v. Glascoe, 936 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). “When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, an appellate court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. Further, in the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the moving party must show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see alsoFla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).

An oral contract must meet the requirements of a written contract, including offer, acceptance, consideration, and sufficiently specific terms. St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So.2d 375, 381 (Fla.2004). Promises have long been recognized as valid consideration in forming a contract. Diaz v. Rood, 851 So.2d 843, 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“ ‘[A] promise, no matter how slight, can constitute sufficient consideration so long as a party agrees to do something that they are not bound to do.’ ” (quoting Ashby v. Ashby, 651 So.2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995))); Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So.2d 623, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (“[M]utual promises constitute considerations for each other.”); Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Fla. 795, 160 So. 215, 218 (1935) (“[M]utually enforceable promises may constitute a valid consideration for each other.”). A bilateral contract results from “mutual promises to do something in the future, in which the consideration of the one party is the promise on the part of the other, each party being both a promisor and a promisee.” McIntosh v. Harbour Club Villas Condo. Ass'n, 468 So.2d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

The oral agreement between Ferguson and Carnes did not lack consideration. Essentially, the terms of the oral agreement as pleaded, which Carnes admitted for purposes of her motion, delineated mutual promises. In other words, Ferguson and Carnes each promised the other to split their respective inheritances with the other, so that each would receive equal shares of whatever amount their mother willed to one or both of them. The consideration lies in the fact that each gave up the possibility of inheriting more than the other in return for insuring that neither would be disinherited in whole or in part. See Ashby, 651 So.2d at 247. The trial court erred by viewing each promise in isolation of the other, rather than viewing them as mutual corresponding promises.

We conclude that Ferguson alleged sufficient facts to establish the creation of an oral agreement and to withstand summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed.

POLEN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.