Shields v. State

¶ 1. Clonelle Shields appeals the Madison County Circuit Court's judgment denying his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). Shields argues he should not have been sentenced as a habitual offender due to the reversal of one of his prior felony convictions. However, we find that Shields had two prior felony convictions, in addition to the felony conviction that was reversed; thus, sentencing was proper under the habitual-offender statute. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's denial of his PCR motion.

¶ 2. In 1996, Shields was convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to serve two years. On January 23, 1998, Shields was convicted of aggravated assault and subsequently sentenced to twelve years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Later, the 1998 aggravated-assault conviction was affirmed by this Court. In addition to these two felony convictions, Shields was convicted of another felony for aggravated assault on April 4, 1997, but the Mississippi Supreme Court, applying the direct-remand rule, reversed Shields's conviction as to aggravated assault and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing under the simple-assault statute.

¶ 7. The circuit court's denial of a PCR motion will not be reversed unless its decision was clearly erroneous. Martin v. State, 66 So.3d 1288, 1289 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citing Smith v. State, 806 So.2d 1148, 1150 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2002)). “However, when issues of law are raised, the proper standard of review is de novo.” Id. (citing Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999)).

¶ 8. Our habitual-offender statute states:

Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation. Miss.Code Ann. § 99–19–81 (emphasis added). Sentencing under this statute is not discretionary. Courtney v. State, 704 So.2d 1352, 1360 (¶ 34) (Miss.Ct.App.1997). Rather, “[i]f a defendant is a repeat offender falling within the provisions of [section] 99–19–81[,] the trial judge has no alternative but to sentence him under said statute.” Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 527 So.2d 647, 651 (Miss.1988)).

¶ 9. Shields argues the circuit court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender because his 1997 aggravated-assault conviction, a felony, was reversed by our supreme court and remanded for sentencing under the simple-assault statute, a misdemeanor. While this is true, Shields had two other felony convictions that were properly used to sentence Shields as a habitual offender. Specifically, the conviction of aggravated assault on January 23, 1998, was affirmed by this Court, and his 1996 conviction for grand larceny was never appealed, vacated, or otherwise reversed. Therefore, under our habitual-offender statute, Shields was required to be sentenced as a habitual offender because he had two prior felony convictions at the time of his guilty plea. As such, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying Shields's PCR motion.

¶ 10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST–CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY.

-------- Notes:

1. See Shields v. State, 751 So.2d 476, 481 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.1999).

2. See Shields v. State, 722 So.2d 584, 587 (¶ 19) (Miss.1998).