SALERNO v. AM. LEAGUE OF PROF. BASEBALL CLUBS

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs, former umpires in the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, were discharged by the League's president, who publicly stated the reason was incompetence. Plaintiffs alleged the true reason was their attempt to organize umpires for collective bargaining. Following their unfair labor practice charge, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a complaint and referred the matter for hearing. Prior to this, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York against the American League, its president, the Commissioner of Baseball, and an attorney, asserting claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts and for defamation. Only the Commissioner was served. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction, leaving only the antitrust claim after abandonment of diversity jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiffs' complaint stated a valid claim under the federal antitrust laws against professional baseball entities and officials.

Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the antitrust claim given ongoing NLRB proceedings addressing the same conduct.

Whether professional baseball is subject to the federal antitrust laws, considering the precedent established by Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs-Appellants' Arguments

Their discharge was motivated by efforts to organize umpires, constituting an unfair labor practice and an antitrust violation.

Professional baseball's immunity from antitrust laws should be reconsidered due to changed economic conditions, especially the significance of interstate television revenues.

They contended federal jurisdiction existed based on federal question and diversity grounds, though diversity was later abandoned.

Defendant-Appellee's Arguments

Argued for dismissal based on lack of federal jurisdiction.

Maintained that professional baseball remains exempt from antitrust laws pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.

Contended that the plaintiffs failed to establish a clear causal connection between any antitrust violation and their alleged injury.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)	Requirement of a clear causal connection between alleged antitrust violation and injury.	Used to emphasize that plaintiffs must show direct injury from antitrust violations to state a claim.
Tepler v. Frick, 204 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1953)	Clarification that wrongful discharge alone does not constitute an antitrust violation.	Supported the court’s view that employment disputes do not automatically implicate antitrust laws.
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)	Standards for establishing antitrust violations involving group boycotts and restraint of trade.	Referenced to highlight the difficulty of sustaining the plaintiffs’ antitrust claim under established standards.
Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)	Prohibition of conspiracies in restraint of trade under antitrust laws.	Used to illustrate the legal framework governing alleged conspiracies like group boycotts.
Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)	Preclusion of federal court jurisdiction during active NLRB proceedings on related labor issues.	Applied to question whether federal court should proceed with antitrust claims while NLRB investigation is ongoing.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)	Federal labor law preemption of state and federal court jurisdiction in certain labor disputes.	Supported the principle that NLRB has primary jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims.
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)	Established baseball’s exemption from federal antitrust laws.	Foundational precedent that the court acknowledged as controlling unless overruled by the Supreme Court.
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)	Reaffirmed baseball’s exemption from antitrust laws and emphasized Congressional intent.	Reiterated as binding precedent despite criticism and plaintiffs’ arguments for reconsideration.
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)	Criticism of the baseball antitrust exemption and comparison with other professional sports.	Quoted to underscore the court’s recognition of the exemption’s illogical nature but maintained adherence to precedent.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)	Overruled prior labor law precedent, suggesting potential shifts in judicial attitudes toward labor-related issues.	Referenced as a recent development that may signal future changes but does not yet affect baseball’s antitrust exemption.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)

Requirement of a clear causal connection between alleged antitrust violation and injury.

Used to emphasize that plaintiffs must show direct injury from antitrust violations to state a claim.

Tepler v. Frick, 204 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1953)

Clarification that wrongful discharge alone does not constitute an antitrust violation.

Supported the court’s view that employment disputes do not automatically implicate antitrust laws.

Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)

Standards for establishing antitrust violations involving group boycotts and restraint of trade.

Referenced to highlight the difficulty of sustaining the plaintiffs’ antitrust claim under established standards.

Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)

Prohibition of conspiracies in restraint of trade under antitrust laws.

Used to illustrate the legal framework governing alleged conspiracies like group boycotts.

Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)

Preclusion of federal court jurisdiction during active NLRB proceedings on related labor issues.

Applied to question whether federal court should proceed with antitrust claims while NLRB investigation is ongoing.

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)

Federal labor law preemption of state and federal court jurisdiction in certain labor disputes.

Supported the principle that NLRB has primary jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims.

Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)

Established baseball’s exemption from federal antitrust laws.

Foundational precedent that the court acknowledged as controlling unless overruled by the Supreme Court.

Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)

Reaffirmed baseball’s exemption from antitrust laws and emphasized Congressional intent.

Reiterated as binding precedent despite criticism and plaintiffs’ arguments for reconsideration.

Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)

Criticism of the baseball antitrust exemption and comparison with other professional sports.

Quoted to underscore the court’s recognition of the exemption’s illogical nature but maintained adherence to precedent.

Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)

Overruled prior labor law precedent, suggesting potential shifts in judicial attitudes toward labor-related issues.

Referenced as a recent development that may signal future changes but does not yet affect baseball’s antitrust exemption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged an antitrust violation. It emphasized that a mere allegation of wrongful discharge by a monopolist does not constitute an antitrust claim without a clear causal link to a prohibited restraint of trade. The complaint lacked allegations of trade-restrictive practices directed at umpires as a class, and the asserted conspiracy and group boycott claims were insufficiently supported. The court noted the ongoing NLRB proceedings addressing the labor dispute, which further complicated federal court intervention. Most critically, the court reaffirmed the binding precedent that professional baseball is exempt from federal antitrust laws under Federal Baseball and Toolson, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ arguments that changed economic circumstances warrant reconsideration. The court recognized the criticisms of these precedents but concluded that only the Supreme Court should overrule them. Thus, the court found no basis to entertain the antitrust claims in this case.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

The court upheld the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, effectively maintaining baseball’s long-standing exemption from federal antitrust laws. The decision leaves the plaintiffs’ labor dispute to be resolved through the National Labor Relations Board’s processes. No new precedent was established, and the ruling reinforces the principle that only the Supreme Court may overturn its prior decisions exempting professional baseball from antitrust scrutiny.

Alexander J. SALERNO and William Valentine, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMERICAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS, an unincorporated association, Joseph E. Cronin, indi

FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs, former umpires in the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, were discharged by the president of the League. Although he announced that this was for incompetence, plaintiffs claim "the true and only reason" was their endeavor to organize the American League umpires for collective bargaining. Following an unfair labor practice charge on their part, the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint under §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act, Case No. 1-CA-6581, on March 26, 1970, and this has been referred to a Trial Examiner for hearing. See 180 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Dec. 15, 1969), 38 L.W. 2351.

Before that the plaintiffs had filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. They named as defendants the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs; Joseph E. Cronin, its president; Bowie Kuhn, the Commissioner of Baseball; and Paul Porter, a well-known Washington attorney. Only Kuhn was served. The complaint contained two counts. The first alleged a claim under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 15; the second asserted a claim for defamation. When Kuhn moved to dismiss for want of federal jurisdiction, plaintiffs maintained there was both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Finding neither, the district court granted the motion. Since the diversity claim has now been abandoned, all that is left is the claim under the antitrust laws.

Even if we were sure that professional baseball will be held subject to the antitrust laws, we would entertain serious doubt whether the complaint here stated a claim under them. Combining an assertion of general antitrust violation with a claim of injury from breach of contract or tort does not automatically make the latter a claim arising under the antitrust laws. As Judge Kaufman observed in a rather similar context, Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), a plaintiff in a civil antitrust action "must establish a clear causal connection between the violation alleged and the injuries allegedly suffered." See also Tepler v. Frick, 204 F.2d 506 (2 Cir. 1953). Wrongful discharge of an employee does not become an antitrust violation simply because the employer is a monopolist; the private right of action is conferred only for an injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," 15 U.S.C. § 15. Although the complaint has elaborate allegations of conspiracy in restraint of trade, there is nothing to indicate restrictive trade practices directed at umpires. In the nature of things these must be employed — and discharged — by a league rather than by a single club. The only pertinent allegations going beyond discriminatory discharge by the President of the American League are that Kuhn is employed as Commissioner by both the American and the National Leagues, that plaintiffs' discharge was with Kuhn's "knowledge, permission and consent," and that defendants "did, in fact, restrain and monopolize * * * trade and commerce in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by means of a group boycott against plaintiffs." Even the requisite liberal interpretation of these allegations does not overcome the great difficulty in finding that a claim was stated under such cases as Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959), and Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949 (1941). Moreover, plaintiffs' real grievance is their alleged discriminatory discharge in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and this is being considered by the agency appointed for the purpose by Congress. Even assuming this claim somehow also encompasses a violation of the antitrust laws, which is highly doubtful, we would have the further question whether a federal court could consider it once the NLRB has begun proceedings. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, and Butcher Workmen of No. America, AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 85 S.Ct. 1596, 14 L.Ed.2d 640 (1965); cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).

Apart from these exceedingly serious obstacles, plaintiffs recognize that they can prevail only if we should be willing to predict the likely overruling of the holdings in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 66 L.Ed. 898 (1922), and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed. 64 (1953), that professional baseball is not subject to the antitrust laws. Cf. Green v. Board of Elections of City of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 448 (2 Cir. 1967), and cases there cited. They say that changes in the economics of the sport even since Toolson, especially the increasing importance of revenues from interstate television broadcasts, make baseball's immunity from the antitrust laws more anomalous than ever. But the ground upon which Toolson rested was that Congress had no intention to bring baseball within the antitrust laws, not that baseball's activities did not sufficiently affect interstate commerce. Cf. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 407-408 (2 Cir. 1949). We freely acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days, that the rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious and that, to use the Supreme Court's own adjectives, the distinction between baseball and other professional sports is "unrealistic," "inconsistent" and "illogical." Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452, 77 S.Ct. 390, 1 L.Ed.2d 456 (1957). We add that Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199, decided June 1, 1970, overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8 L.Ed.2d 440 (1962), despite Congress' failure to act on invitations to do so, may presage a change from the attitude with respect to such inaction that was expressed in Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357, 74 S.Ct. 78, which Mr. Justice Black in dissent invoked to no avail, 398 U.S. at 255, 90 S.Ct. at 1595. However, putting aside instances where factual premises have all but vanished and a different principle might thus obtain, we continue to believe that the Supreme Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions, save perhaps when opinions already delivered have created a near certainty that only the occasion is needed for pronouncement of the doom. While we should not fall out of our chairs with surprise at the news that Federal Baseball and Toolson had been overruled, we are not at all certain the Court is ready to give them a happy despatch.

Affirmed.