STATE EX REL. MASLAN v. PIERCE

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Docket Number

No. 24729. Department One.

Attorney(S)

H.E. Foster, for appellant. Robert M. Burgunder and Ben A. Maslan, for respondents.

Judges

MILLARD, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On May 3, 1933, Max Sidell was adjudged guilty by Clarence W. Pierce, a justice of the peace for Morningside precinct, King County, Washington, of violating the traffic law. Sidell was sentenced to pay a fine or serve time in the county jail. Sidell gave oral notice of appeal to the superior court at the time of sentencing. The justice of the peace issued a commitment order to the sheriff, who took custody of Sidell and booked him as a jail inmate. On advice of Ben A. Maslan, deputy prosecuting attorney, the sheriff paroled Sidell to Maslan's custody until Sidell posted an appeal bond within two days.

Subsequently, Constable E.L. Holmes filed an affidavit charging the sheriff and Maslan with contempt of court for resisting and disobeying an order issued by the justice of the peace. Warrants were issued for their arrest. Maslan petitioned the superior court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the justice of the peace from proceeding with contempt charges, arguing the justice lacked jurisdiction. The superior court granted the writ, and the justice of the peace appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a justice of the peace retains jurisdiction to proceed with contempt proceedings after a defendant has given oral notice of appeal to the superior court.
Whether the release of a prisoner on parole after an appeal divests the justice of the peace of jurisdiction and renders any contempt arising from such release punishable only by the superior court.
The scope and effect of the statutory provisions governing appeals from justices of the peace to superior courts, including the effect of oral notice of appeal and the nature of bonds required.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

The appeal of Sidell divested the justice of the peace of jurisdiction over the case.
If the release of the prisoner was contemptuous, it was contempt of the superior court, which had exclusive jurisdiction after the appeal.

Appellant's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State ex rel. Egbert v. Superior Court, 9 Wn. 369, 37 P. 489	Jurisdictional basis for granting writ of prohibition when inferior tribunal lacks jurisdiction.	Supported the principle that a writ of prohibition is proper if the justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction to punish contempt.
State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court, 101 Wn. 81, 172 P. 257, 4 A.L.R. 572	Jurisdictional limits of inferior courts and grounds for prohibition.	Reinforced the established rule that prohibition applies when jurisdiction is exceeded.
State ex rel. Maurer v. Superior Court, 122 Wn. 555, 211 P. 764	Limits on jurisdiction of justices of the peace regarding contempt proceedings.	Used to affirm the superior court's authority to issue prohibition.
State ex rel. Dysart v. Cameron, 140 Wn. 101, 248 P. 408, 54 A.L.R. 311	Clarification that jurisdiction ceases in inferior courts once appeal is perfected.	Confirmed that the justice of the peace loses authority to act after appeal is taken.
State v. Zounick, 133 Wn. 638, 234 P. 659	Jurisdiction of appellate courts over contempts after appeal has been taken.	Supported the conclusion that contempt related to proceedings post-appeal lies within superior court jurisdiction.
Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087, 156 S.E. 574	Appellate court's exclusive jurisdiction over contempt after appeal.	Affirmed the principle that contempt jurisdiction transfers with the case on appeal.
Lacey v. Hendricks, 164 Ala. 280, 51 So. 157, 137 Am. St. 45	Effect of appeal on jurisdiction and contempt proceedings.	Used as authority that contempt must be addressed by the appellate court after appeal.
Adkinson v. City of Andalusia, 22 Ala. App. 131, 113 So. 469	Jurisdictional effect of appeal on contempt powers.	Supported the court’s holding on jurisdictional limits post-appeal.
State v. McElroy, 23 Ala. App. 301, 124 So. 502	Contempt jurisdiction following appeal.	Reinforced the transfer of contempt jurisdiction to appellate court.
Ex parte Bathurst, 94 Cal.App. 641, 271 P. 781	Jurisdiction over contempt after appeal.	Supported the conclusion that contempt jurisdiction lies with appellate court post-appeal.
City of Holton v. Stanley, 6 Kan. App. 103, 49 P. 679	Effect of appeal on jurisdiction to punish contempt.	Affirmed that contempt jurisdiction transfers to appellate court after appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory framework governing appeals from justices of the peace to superior courts, emphasizing that an oral notice of appeal divests the justice of the peace of jurisdiction over the case, except to certify the appeal. The appeal vacates the judgment and transfers jurisdiction to the superior court, which then possesses exclusive authority over the matter.

The court noted that the bond required by the justice to assure the defendant's appearance at trial is not a prerequisite to the appeal and is not itself an appeal bond. Thus, the defendant's right to appeal is not conditioned on posting bond.

Because the justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction to proceed with contempt proceedings after the appeal was taken, any contempt arising from the sheriff's release of the prisoner was contempt of the superior court, not the justice's court. The court supported this conclusion with multiple precedents establishing that contempt jurisdiction follows the case to the appellate court once an appeal is perfected.

Accordingly, the superior court's issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain the justice of the peace from proceeding was proper and affirmed.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the superior court granting the writ of prohibition is affirmed.

The decision holds that a justice of the peace loses jurisdiction to proceed with contempt proceedings after a defendant has properly taken an appeal to the superior court. Consequently, any contempt related to the case after the appeal lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the superior court. This ruling directly prevents justices of the peace from exercising contempt powers once an appeal is pending, but the opinion does not establish any broader precedent beyond the jurisdictional limits between justices of the peace and superior courts in such contexts.

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THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of Ben A. Maslan, as Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Respondent, v. CLARENCE W. PIERCE, as Justice of the Peace, Appellant.

PROHIBITION (20) — GROUNDS FOR GRANTING — WANT OF JURISDICTION. Prohibition lies to prevent a justice of the peace from proceeding with contempt proceedings of which the justice had no jurisdiction.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (21) — APPELLATE JURISDICTION — NOTICE OF APPEAL DIVESTING JUSTICE OF JURISDICTION. An oral notice of appeal, given at the time of the entry of the judgment and sentence of a justice of the peace, divests the justice of authority to take any further action, except to certify the appeal as required by Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1921; and the bond to assure the prisoner's appearance for trial under § 1919, is not an appeal bond or a prerequisite to the appeal.

CONTEMPT (6) — ACTS CONSTITUTING — DISOBEDIENCE OF MANDATE, ORDER OR JUDGMENT. If the sheriff's release of a prisoner, after appeal to the superior court and commitment by the justice to stand trial, constituted contempt of court, it was contempt of the superior court of which the justice had no jurisdiction.

MILLARD, J.

The petition of Ben A. Maslan, deputy prosecuting attorney for King county, to the superior court for King county, for a writ of prohibition to prevent Clarence W. Pierce, a justice of the peace for Morningside precinct, King county, from holding the petitioner in contempt of court, was granted. The justice of the peace has appealed.

On or about 7:30 p.m., May 3, 1933, one Max Sidell was, by Clarence W. Pierce as justice of the peace for Morningside precinct, King county, adjudged guilty of violating the traffic law. The defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of fifteen dollars, or, in default thereof, to serve such sentence in the county jail at the rate of three dollars per day. Sidell immediately gave oral notice of appeal to the superior court, and his appeal bond was fixed by the justice of the peace at fifteen dollars in cash or a surety bond in the amount of twenty-five dollars.

The justice of the peace issued, and delivered to the sheriff, process entitled "Commitment upon Sentence." The commitment was received about midnight, in the absence of the sheriff, by the sheriff's deputies. On the advice of Ben A. Maslan, deputy prosecuting attorney for King county, the sheriff's deputies took Sidell into custody and duly booked and listed him as an inmate of the jail, placing in the records his weight, height and description in the same manner as is done in cases of all prisoners. Upon advice of Maslan, the sheriff paroled the prisoner to the custody of Maslan until he should post an appeal bond, which was furnished within two days thereafter.

Upon the affidavit of Constable E.L. Holmes charging the sheriff and Maslan with contempt of court

". . . by resistance and disobedience to a lawful order or process made and issued by the said Clarence W. Pierce while engaged as a Justice of the Peace in a judicial capacity,"

warrants were issued by the justice of the peace for the arrest of the sheriff and Maslan, who were ordered to show cause why they should not be convicted of contempt. Upon Maslan's petition therefor, on the ground, among others, "that such contempt proceedings are without and in excess of the jurisdiction of said justice of the peace," the superior court for King county granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the justice of the peace from holding the petitioner in contempt of court.

Respondent contends that the appeal of Sidell divested the justice's court of jurisdiction; and that, if the release of the prisoner constituted contempt, it was contempt of the superior court, which alone has jurisdiction after the prisoner's appeal has divested the justice's court of jurisdiction.

[1] If the appellant, as justice of the peace, did not have jurisdiction to punish the sheriff and/or deputy prosecuting attorney for contempt for the releasing of the prisoner on parole or on his own recognizance after the prisoner had been placed in the custody of the sheriff and duly listed as an inmate of the jail, the writ of prohibition should have been granted.

"As to the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant a writ of prohibition in case an inferior tribunal is without jurisdiction, that has been well settled in State ex rel. Egbert v. Superior Court, 9 Wn. 369; 37 P. 489; State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court, 101 Wn. 81, 172 P. 257, 4 A.L.R. 572; State ex rel. Maurer v. Superior Court, 122 Wn. 555, 211 P. 764. Hence, if respondent had no jurisdiction as such police judge to punish for contempt, a writ of prohibition should have been granted. If he had such jurisdiction, it should be denied." State ex rel. Dysart v. Cameron, 140 Wn. 101, 248 P. 408, 54 A.L.R. 311.

[2] After an appeal has been properly perfected by taking the steps required by the statute, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace ceases, and that of the appellate court attaches. The justice loses authority to thereafter take further action, except to certify the appeal. The appeal vacates the judgment of the justice of the peace, and the case stands as though brought in the appellate court in the first instance. 16 C.J. 376.

Sidell's oral notice of appeal at the time the judgment was rendered was in compliance with the statutory provision, reading as follows, and divested the justice's court of authority to take further action, except to certify the appeal as required by Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1921:

"Every person convicted before a justice of the peace of any offense may appeal from the judgment, within ten days thereafter, to the superior court. The appeal shall be taken by orally giving notice thereof at the time the judgment is rendered, or by serving a written notice thereof upon the justice at any time after the judgment, and within the time allowed for taking the appeal; when the notice is given orally, the justice shall enter the same in his docket." Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1919.

The remainder of the section reads as follows:

"The appellant shall be committed to the jail of the county until he shall recognize or give a bond to the state, in such reasonable sum with such sureties as said justice may require, with condition to appear at the court appealed to, and there prosecute his appeal, and to abide the sentence of the court thereon, if not revised by a higher court." Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1919.

The bail bond which the justice may require of the defendant to assure his appearance for the trial de novo in the superior court is in no sense an appeal bond. A bond is not a prerequisite to the appeal. If the defendant chose, he could refuse to give a bail bond and remain in jail. He would not thereby be deprived of the right to prosecute his appeal.

Sidell's exercise of his statutory right of appeal to the superior court from his conviction in the justice's court invested the superior court with jurisdiction of the case and divested the justice's court of further jurisdiction thereof.

[3] It follows that, if the releasing of the prisoner constituted contempt, it was, as respondent insists, contempt of the superior court, which alone has jurisdiction after the prisoner's appeal has divested the justice's court of jurisdiction. See State v. Zounick, 133 Wn. 638, 234 P. 659; Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087, 156 S.E. 574; Lacey v. Hendricks, 164 Ala. 280, 51 So. 157, 137 Am. St. 45; Adkinson v. City of Andalusia, 22 Ala. App. 131, 113 So. 469; State v. McElroy, 23 Ala. App. 301, 124 So. 502; Ex parte Bathurst, 94 Cal.App. 641, 271 P. 781; City of Holton v. Stanley, 6 Kan. App. 103, 49 P. 679.

"Where an appeal has been taken to a higher court, and such court obtains jurisdiction, all contempts committed thereafter relating to such proceeding are punishable by the latter court, .. ." 13 C.J. 54.

Affirmed.

BEALS, C.J., STEINERT, MAIN, and MITCHELL, JJ., concur.