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Docket Number

No. 9273.

Attorney(S)

D.B. Chapin, of San Antonio, Tex., for appellants. Grover Sellers and George S. Terry, both of Dallas, Tex., and Geo. M. Conner, T.R. James, and Joe Ewing Estes, all of Fort Worth, Tex., for appellees.

Judges

Rufus Edward Foster

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Williams et al. v. Tooke et al., No. 9273 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 1940; reh'g denied Mar. 18, 1940)

Factual and Procedural Background

The following narrative is drawn exclusively from the allegations and procedural history recited in the opinion.

On March 14, 1917, B.F. Phillips conveyed 102.26 acres in Gregg County, Texas, to Porter Williams. The conveyance retained a vendor's lien securing three promissory notes aggregating $800; Williams paid $785 in cash. Porter Williams died intestate on December 11, 1917.

On November 6, 1918, Phillips filed suit in the District Court of Gregg County, Texas, against Susie Williams (Porter Williams' widow) and their eight minor children to foreclose the vendor's lien. Susie Williams appeared and answered; a guardian ad litem was appointed for the minors and answered for them. Judgment was entered for Phillips. Execution issued, the land was sold by the sheriff to John T. Buckley, and on March 4, 1919, the sheriff's deed was delivered; Buckley took immediate possession. Allen Tooke later acquired the land on February 10, 1926, through mesne conveyances and executed oil leases leading to development and substantial oil production.

On November 14, 1933, Susie Williams and her children filed a suit in the 71st Judicial District Court of Gregg County to cancel the 1918-19 foreclosure judgment, alleging among other things that the state petition failed to allege Porter Williams died intestate and that administration of his estate was unnecessary. That state-court case was decided against the plaintiffs, affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals (116 S.W.2d 1114), and a writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court was denied.

Thereafter the plaintiffs filed the present suit in the United States District Court seeking a decree that the foreclosure judgment was void and alleging the Texas courts deprived them of property without due process and equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the federal suit for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appealed, and this opinion affirms the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the complaint presented a substantial federal question sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the federal District Court.
Whether a federal District Court has jurisdiction to review and set aside a state-court judgment on the ground that the state courts denied the plaintiffs due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

That the Texas courts (trial court, Court of Civil Appeals, and the Texas Supreme Court by denial of writ) committed numerous errors in the foreclosure litigation, and that those errors were deliberate, arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory.
That the state judicial action effectively took the plaintiffs' property and awarded it to the defendants without consideration and without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and denied them the equal protection of the laws.
The bill sought a federal decree voiding the state-court foreclosure judgment, declaring purchasers and successors trustees accountable, and declaring that state courts had denied due process.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any appellees' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269, 47 S.Ct. 353, 71 L.Ed. 639	The proposition that mere errors of state courts do not amount to a denial of due process of law.	The court cited this case to explain that allegations of mere error in the state proceedings would not establish a Fourteenth Amendment denial of due process supporting federal jurisdiction.
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, Ky., 247 U.S. 464, 38 S.Ct. 566, 62 L.Ed. 1215	The principle that if a case between private parties is arbitrarily and capriciously decided in violation of settled law and undisputed facts, the judgment may violate the Fourteenth Amendment.	The court acknowledged this principle but noted that it did not aid the appellants with respect to the jurisdiction of the District Court to review state-court judgments.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362	The rule that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments; review of state-court judgments lies with the United States Supreme Court.	The court applied this rule to conclude the District Court had no authority to review or overturn the decisions of the Texas courts and therefore correctly dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.
Court of Civil Appeals decision affirming the state judgment, 116 S.W.2d 1114	Demonstration that the state appellate process had affirmed the trial-court judgment against the plaintiffs.	The opinion notes that the state appellate court affirmed the plaintiffs' state-court defeat and that the Texas Supreme Court denied review, facts relevant to the federal suit's attempt to obtain review of those state-court decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from jurisdictional principle to application of precedent:

Jurisdictional inquiry: The court identified that federal jurisdiction in this case depends on whether the complaint presents a substantial federal question (a claim arising under the Constitution) suitable for decision by the federal District Court.
Summary of plaintiffs' case: The complaint alleged that state courts committed errors and that the state judicial actions amounted to an unconstitutional taking or denial of due process/equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Distinguishing mere error from constitutional deprivation: Citing American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky, the court explained that mere errors by state courts do not constitute a denial of due process. Thus, allegations that the state courts erred in applying state law would not, by themselves, create a federal constitutional controversy for district-court resolution.
Recognition of an exception for arbitrary, capricious decisions: The court acknowledged Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, Ky., which holds that an arbitrary and capricious decision contrary to settled law and undisputed facts might amount to a Fourteenth Amendment violation. However, the opinion states that this doctrine did not assist the appellants in the present context because the federal District Court's jurisdiction is strictly original and does not encompass review of state-court judgments.
Application of the Rooker principle: The court relied on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. to state the controlling jurisdictional rule—that errors in state-court judgments can be reviewed only by the United States Supreme Court, and that the federal District Court lacks authority to reverse or modify state-court decisions.
Conclusion on jurisdiction: Because the plaintiffs' suit was directed at seeking review and reversal of the decisions of the Texas courts (even framed as constitutional violations), the District Court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought and therefore properly dismissed the case. The opinion cites 28 U.S.C.A. § 80 in noting the duty to dismiss.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The judgment of the District Court dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.

Implications and direct effect:

The federal appellate court affirmed that the federal District Court lacked jurisdiction to review or set aside the state-court foreclosure judgment even though the plaintiffs alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from the state proceedings.
The decision enforces the principle that challenges to state-court judgments must be pursued through the United States Supreme Court (as articulated in Rooker), not by an original action in a federal District Court seeking to reverse state-court rulings.
The opinion does not announce or rely upon any new federal-law precedent; its effect is confined to affirming dismissal of this particular federal suit and reiterating established jurisdictional rules.

End of summary based solely on the text of the provided opinion.

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WILLIAMS et al. v. TOOKE et al.

FOSTER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment dismissing a suit for want of jurisdiction. The suit is by Susie Williams and some 18 others against Allen Tooke and some 40 others. Many of the parties on both sides are citizens of Texas. Jurisdiction depends upon whether a substantial Federal question is properly presented for decision. The complaint is very lengthy, occupying, with exhibits, 153 pages of the printed transcript. However, the case as disclosed by the allegations of the complaint, may be somewhat briefly stated, as follows:

On March 14, 1917, B.F. Phillips conveyed to Porter Williams 102.26 acres of land out of the W.C. Wakeland Survey, situated in Gregg County, Texas. Williams paid $785 in cash out of his separate funds, and executed in further payment three promissory notes, payable in 1, 2 and 3 years, aggregating $800.00. The conveyance retained a vendor's lien securing the notes and provided for acceleration on default in payment of interest or principal.

Porter Williams died intestate on December 11, 1917. On November 6, 1918, Phillips filed suit in the District Court of Gregg County, Texas, against Susie Williams, his widow, and their eight minor children, as sole surviving heirs of Porter Williams, to foreclose his vendor's lien against the land. Susie Williams appeared by attorney and filed answer. A guardian ad litem was appointed by the court to represent the minors and filed answer for them. Judgment was entered in favor of Phillips. Execution issued. The land was sold by the sheriff to John T. Buckley, and on March 4, 1919, a deed was executed by the sheriff and delivered to him. Buckley immediately entered into possession of the land. On February 10, 1926, Allen Tooke acquired the land through mesne conveyances. Thereafter Tooke executed oil leases to various other parties named as defendants, the land was developed and large quantities of oil have been produced from it.

On November 14, 1933, about 15 years after the judgment of foreclosure, Susie Williams and her children filed suit in the 71st Judicial District Court for Gregg County against practically all the defendants in this case to cancel the judgment of foreclosure above referred to, on the grounds, among others, that the court was without jurisdiction because the petition failed to allege Porter Williams had died intestate and administration of his estate was unnecessary. The case was decided against plaintiffs and on appeal the judgment was affirmed by a Court of Civil Appeals, 116 S.W.2d 1114. An application to the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of error was denied.

The complaint alleges numerous errors committed by the Texas courts dealing with the case and that they deliberately, arbitrarily, capriciously and intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs and refused to award them relief, which under the settled laws of the state they were entitled to; and further, the state of Texas, acting by its said judicial departments, in effect, took plaintiffs' said property and gave it to the defendants without consideration, and without due process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A.

The bill prays for judgment decreeing the judgment in the foreclosure suit to be void; that the original purchaser and those holding under him be declared trustees and held to account; that the District Court, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Texas be held to have denied plaintiffs due process of law; and the state of Texas gave plaintiffs' property to the defendants without consideration, without due process of law, and denied them the equal protection of the law. Other relief prayed for requires no discussion.

If all the judgments complained of were merely erroneous that would not amount to a denial of due process of law. American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269, 47 S.Ct. 353, 71 L.Ed. 639. However, if a case between private parties is arbitrarily and capriciously decided, in violation of settled principles of law and contrary to undisputed facts, though the court so deciding had jurisdiction over the suit, the judgment may be in violation of the 14th Amendment. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, Ky., 247 U.S. 464, 38 S.Ct. 566, 62 L.Ed. 1215. But that does not help appellant in this case. We are dealing solely with the jurisdiction of the District Court. The purpose of the suit is clearly to seek a review of the decisions of the Texas courts and the reversal of those decisions for error. The jurisdiction of the District Court is strictly original. It has no jurisdiction to reverse or modify the judgment of a state court. The errors complained of could be reviewed only by the Supreme Court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362. It was the duty of the District Court to dismiss the suit. 28 U.S.C.A. § 80.

The judgment is affirmed.

WILLIAMS v. TOOKE