Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
It is well settled that the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is generally a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, e.g., Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., 147 A.D.2d 690, 691; Associated Mut. Ins. Co. v Dyland Tavern, 105 A.D.2d 892, 893). Moreover, the drastic sanction of striking a pleading should not be invoked unless the resisting party's default is shown to be deliberate and contumacious (see, Read v Dickson, 150 A.D.2d 543; Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., supra; Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 A.D.2d 580). Contrary to the defendants' contentions, our review of the record discloses that the Supreme Court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint constituted a proper exercise of discretion under the circumstances. Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.