The chancellor erred in granting a complainant summary judgment without an evidentiary hearing, under the circumstances of this case.
Practice and Procedure — Summary Judgment — Rule 2:21 — Financial Institutions — Code Sec. 6.1-125.3 — Securities
Complainant sought a declaratory judgment against his daughter, alleging that he was the sole owner of certain securities titled in both their names as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The chancellor found, from the pleadings and admissions, that complainant had paid all the funds used to purchase the securities and entered a final decree declaring that pursuant to Code Sec. 6.1-125.3 he was the sole owner. His daughter appeals.
1. It was error for the court not to hear evidence of gift, since there was a material question of fact.
2. It was also error for the court to find that the stock brokerage firm is a financial institution within the meaning of Virginia Code Sec. 6.1-125 and that the securities are accounts as defined in the statute since that, too, involved a question of fact.
3. Rule 2:21 provides that summary judgment shall not be entered if any material fact is genuinely in dispute.
Senior Justice Poff delivered the opinion of the Court.Page 163
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the chancellor erred in granting a complainant summary judgment without affording the respondent the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.
Irvin P. Alley filed a bill of complaint against his daughter, Dianna Alley Stone, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Alley alleged that he was the sole owner of certain "Paine Webber securities" titled in his name and his daughter's name as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and that Stone had "refused to execute a release of those . . . securities to plaintiff". Stone filed an answer and responses to Alley's requests for admissions.
In support of a motion for summary judgment, Alley submitted an affidavit attesting, as alleged in the bill of complaint, that he had supplied all the funds used to purchase the securities. The chancellor, finding "from the pleadings and admissions that Irvin P. Alley made all of the net contributions of the funds" used to purchase the securities, entered a final decree declaring that, "pursuant to Virginia Code Sec. 6.1-125.3(A) , Irvin P. Alley is the sole owner of those securities" and ordering Stone to "cause the removal of her name from all of the certificates".
That subsection provides that "[a] joint account belongs, during the lifetimes of all Parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on deposit. . . ."
11-2] On appeal, Stone argues that "[i]t was error for the Circuit Court to not hear evidence of a gift [and] . . . to find that Paine Webber is a financial institution . . . [and] that the securities are accounts" as those terms are defined in the chapter of which the statute applied by the chancellor is a part.
We agree. The question of gift vel non was drawn in issue by the pleadings. That was a material question of fact. The same was true of the two definitional questions underlying application of the statute. Rule 2:21 provides that "[s]ummary judgment shall not be entered if any material fact is genuinely in dispute." See Blair, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 200 Va. 815, 818-19, 108 S.E.2d 259, 261-62 (1959) (action at law). The chancellor failed to comply with that rule, and we will reverse the decree and remand the cause for further proceedings.
In his bill of complaint, Alley alleged that "no present gift from plaintiff to defendant of any of the securities . . . was ever intended by plaintiff"; in her answer, Stone denied the allegation. Again, in Alley's requests for admissions, he asked Stone to admit that he "has never indicated any intention of making a present gift to defendant of any interest in the securities"; Stone denied the request.
Reversed and remanded.