Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that his conviction should be reversed by reason of the cumulative prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's misconduct. Reversal for prosecutorial misconduct is not called for "`when the misconduct has not substantially prejudiced [the] defendant's trial [since] [r]eversal is an ill-suited remedy for prosecutorial misconduct [because] it does not affect the prosecutor directly, but rather imposes upon society the cost of retrying an individual'" (People v Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 401, quoting United States v Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184, cert denied 456 U.S. 989; see also, People v Gordon, 180 A.D.2d 748). In any event, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the claimed errors, both those preserved and those unpreserved for appellate review, was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt (see, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230).
Moreover, the court's charge to the jury, viewed as a whole, adequately conveyed the proper standards for evaluating the evidence presented and eliminated any danger that a conviction would be based upon the defendant's mere retention of a single vial of crack cocaine (see, People v Johnson, 190 A.D.2d 753). Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter and Copertino, JJ., concur.