Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
On August 15, 1990, the petitioner appeared before a Judge of the Family Court, Queens County, and executed a surrender agreement pursuant to Social Services Law § 384 (5). Approximately 18 months later, the petitioner apparently suffered misgivings and moved for leave to revoke her consent. The Family Court, upon reviewing the transcript of the surrender proceeding over which it had presided, determined that the petitioner received a thorough explanation of the gravity of her consent and that, contrary to her contentions, was represented by counsel and had been advised of her right to counseling. The court found no evidence of duress, fraud, or coercion, and further found that the petitioner's signing of the surrender agreement, made after full disclosure of all relevant facts and with full understanding of its legal consequences, was voluntary.
Under the circumstances, we find that the Family Court did not err in denying the application without a hearing. The surrender agreement, which was effectuated in the manner required by statute, was valid and irrevocable (see, Matter of Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, cert denied sub nom. Kosher v. Stamatis, 475 U.S. 1108; see also, Matter of Baby Girl J., 192 A.D.2d 533; Matter of Baby Girl Z., 154 A.D.2d 471; Matter of E.W.C., 89 Misc.2d 64, 71-73; Social Services Law § 384). Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Pizzuto and Altman, JJ., concur.