Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court properly concluded that this proceeding is untimely. It is clear from the Department of Correctional Services' letter dated January 28, 1992, that the petitioner's so-called supplemental appeal was considered a request for reconsideration by the Department of Correctional Services (hereinafter the Department). There is no evidence to support the petitioner's contention that the Department conducted a de novo review of the Hearing Officer's determination (see, Matter of Rapuzzi v. City of N.Y., Civ. Serv. Commn., 161 A.D.2d 715; cf., Matter of Delbello v. New York City Tr. Auth., 151 A.D.2d 479, 480). Because an application for reconsideration will not extend or toll the applicable Statute of Limitations (see, Matter of Lubin v. Board of Educ., 60 N.Y.2d 974, 976; Matter of De Milio v Borghard, 55 N.Y.2d 216, 222), this proceeding should have been commenced within four months of the administrative affirmance, on November 22, 1991, of the Hearing Officer's determination. Thus, it was untimely commenced in May of 1992 (see, CPLR 217). Bracken, J.P., Copertino, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.