BALLENGER v. CITY OF INMAN

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Docket Number

No. 3008.

Attorney(S)

Kenneth C. Anthony, Jr., of Spartanburg, for appellant. William E. Walsh, of Gaines, Walsh Chapin, of Spartanburg, for respondent.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Peggy Ballenger initiated a declaratory judgment action challenging the annexation of her property into the City of Inman. The case was referred to the master-in-equity with a direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The master-in-equity held that the annexation was valid and effective. Ballenger appealed that decision.

In 1995, the City sought to annex property, including Ballenger’s, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 5-3-150. The statute required at least 75% of freeholders owning 75% of the assessed valuation in the area to petition for annexation. Tax records identified one parcel as owned by Vester and Clara Kelly; however, Vester Kelly had died in 1991, leaving intestate heirs Clara Kelly, Florine Rookard, and Douglas Wright. The estate was unprobated.

City employee Larry Bagwell brought the annexation petition to Florine Rookard’s house, where Clara Kelly resided. Kelly, bedridden and in her late nineties, placed an “X” on the petition after Rookard explained it. Rookard then signed Kelly’s name beside the “X,” and both Rookard and Wright signed the petition. Although Rookard and Wright were not listed on the tax records, they owned a greater than one-tenth undivided possessory interest in the property with Kelly.

Ten freeholders appeared on the tax records, and ten people including Rookard and Wright signed the petition. The City accepted the petition and annexed the area by ordinance on September 25, 1995.

Ballenger challenged the annexation on two grounds: (1) that Rookard and Wright were not freeholders under the statute because their names were absent from tax records, and (2) that Kelly lacked mental capacity to validly sign the petition. Ballenger argued that without Kelly’s valid signature, the petition did not meet the statutory 75% threshold. The City contended Rookard and Wright qualified as freeholders and thus the petition was valid even excluding Kelly’s signature. The master found insufficient evidence to establish Kelly’s incompetency and upheld the annexation, declining to address the City’s argument regarding Rookard and Wright’s status.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Clara Kelly possessed the mental capacity to validly sign the annexation petition.
Whether the annexation petition satisfied the statutory requirements under S.C. Code Ann. § 5-3-150, particularly regarding the status of Rookard and Wright as freeholders.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Rookard and Wright were not freeholders under the annexation statute because their names did not appear on the tax records.
Clara Kelly lacked the mental capacity to sign the annexation petition, rendering her signature invalid.
Without Kelly’s valid signature, the petition failed to meet the statutory requirement of at least 75% of freeholders consenting.

Respondent's Arguments

Rookard and Wright should be considered freeholders despite their absence from the tax records because they owned a possessory interest in the property.
Even if Kelly’s signature were invalid, the petition met the statutory requirements under § 5-3-150 (1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Felts v. Richland County, 299 S.C. 214, 383 S.E.2d 261 (Ct.App. 1989), aff'd 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991)	Determining whether a declaratory judgment suit is legal or equitable in nature based on the underlying controversy.	Used to establish that the standard of review depends on the nature of the underlying controversy, guiding the court to treat this action as equitable.
Pinckney v. City of Beaufort, 296 S.C. 142, 370 S.E.2d 909 (Ct.App. 1988)	Clarifies that relief seeking invalidation of an ordinance based on boundary lines is an issue at law.	Referenced to support the standard of review analysis for declaratory judgment actions.
Shepard v. First American Mortgage Company, 289 S.C. 516, 347 S.E.2d 118 (Ct.App. 1986)	Equity courts provide special protection for persons non compos mentis (of unsound mind) regarding their legal transactions.	Supported the court’s characterization of the action as equitable and the protection afforded to mentally incapacitated persons.
Vereen v. Bell, 256 S.C. 249, 182 S.E.2d 296 (1971)	Actions to rescind or cancel deeds on grounds of mental incapacity are equitable.	Used to illustrate the equitable nature of challenges based on mental capacity.
Atkinson v. Belser, 273 S.C. 296, 255 S.E.2d 852 (1979)	Actions to set aside conveyances alleging fraud, undue influence, or incapacity are equitable.	Supported the court's approach to mental capacity issues as equitable matters.
In re Estate of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 495 S.E.2d 454 (Ct.App. 1997)	Actions to set aside wills on grounds of incapacity are legal actions.	Distinguished from the instant case to clarify the nature of the proceeding.
Townes Assoc., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976)	Appellate courts may find facts in accordance with their view of the preponderance of the evidence in equity cases.	Supported the appellate court’s authority to review factual findings but defer to the master’s credibility assessments.
Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C. 229, 391 S.E.2d 538 (1989)	Appellate courts defer to the findings of the master or trial court who observed witness credibility firsthand.	Justified affirming the master’s findings regarding Kelly’s capacity based on witness credibility.
Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988)	Annexation is a legislative function with limited judicial interference.	Supported the presumption of validity of the annexation ordinance.
Elwood Construction Co. v. Richards, 265 S.C. 228, 217 S.E.2d 769 (1975)	Annexation proceedings are presumptively valid; burden is on challenger to prove noncompliance.	Placed the burden of proof on Ballenger to show the annexation was invalid.
Eagles v. South Carolina National Bank, 301 S.C. 402, 392 S.E.2d 187 (Ct.App. 1990)	Burden on party challenging mental capacity to prove incapacity at the time of the transaction.	Applied to require Ballenger to prove Kelly lacked capacity to sign the petition.
Rogers v. Nation, 284 S.C. 330, 326 S.E.2d 182 (Ct.App. 1985)	Similar principle regarding burden of proof on mental incapacity.	Reinforced the burden of proof standard for incapacity claims.
Lewis v. Lewis, 199 S.C. 490, 20 S.E.2d 107 (1942)	Mental incapacity is a matter of degree; infirmity alone does not invalidate transactions.	Guided the court’s evaluation of Kelly’s mental capacity and the sufficiency of evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first determined the nature of the action as equitable because it concerned the mental capacity of a person signing a legal petition. This characterization allowed the court to review the facts according to the preponderance of the evidence but gave deference to the master-in-equity’s credibility determinations, who had the advantage of observing witnesses firsthand.

The court emphasized that annexation is a legislative function, presumptively valid, placing the burden on the challenger to prove noncompliance with statutory requirements.

Regarding Kelly’s mental capacity, the court noted that mental incapacity must be sufficiently severe to prevent comprehension of the nature of the act. The evidence consisted solely of Rookard’s testimony, which was inconsistent and inconclusive about Kelly’s understanding of the petition. Rookard admitted uncertainty about whether Kelly comprehended the explanation. The court found this insufficient to meet the burden of proving incapacity.

Because the court affirmed the master’s finding that Kelly was competent, it did not address the City’s alternative argument concerning Rookard and Wright’s status as freeholders.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision is AFFIRMED, upholding the validity and effectiveness of the annexation ordinance.

The direct consequence is that the annexation of Ballenger’s property into the City of Inman stands as lawful and binding. The court did not establish any new precedent or broader legal implications beyond confirming the application of existing principles regarding mental capacity and annexation procedures.

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Peggy Ballenger, Appellant v. City of Inman, Respondent.

HUFF, J.:

Peggy Ballenger brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the annexation of her property into the City of Inman. The matter was referred to the master-in-equity with direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The master held the annexation was valid and effective. Ballenger appeals. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1995, the City sought to annex property, including that owned by Ballenger, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 5-3-150. To annex the property, the Town needed at least 75% of the freeholders within the area to be annexed, who owned at least 75% of the assessed valuation of the property in the area, to petition the City for annexation. See S.C. Code Ann. § 5-3-150 (1) (Supp. 1998). The tax records indicated one parcel of property in the area to be annexed was owned by Vester and Clara Kelly. Vester Kelly, however, had passed away in 1991, before the annexation attempt. He left as his intestate heirs his wife, Clara Kelly, his daughter, Florine Rookard, and his grandson, Douglas Wright. His estate had not been probated. Larry Bagwell, an employee of the City of Inman, brought the petition to the house of Florine Rookard, where Clara Kelly resided.

At the time of the attempted annexation, Kelly was in her late nineties and was bedridden. Rookard took the petition to her mother in the bedroom, while Bagwell waited in the living room. Bagwell knew Kelly was too feeble to come to the living room, but he did not know her state of mind that day. Rookard explained the petition to her mother. Kelly placed an "X" on the signature line. Rookard returned to the living room and signed Kelly's name beside the "X." Rookard and her nephew, Douglas Wright, then signed the petition. Although Rookard and Wright's names were not listed on the tax records, they owned a greater than one-tenth undivided possessory interest in the property with Kelly.

Kelly died in January of 1996, at the age of ninety-nine.

There were ten freeholders whose names appeared on the tax records as owning property in the area to be annexed. Ten people, including Rookard and Wright, signed the petition. The City accepted the petition and annexed the area in an ordinance ratified September 25, 1995.

In her challenge to the annexation, Ballenger asserted, because Rookard and Wright's names were not included in the tax records, they did not qualify as freeholders under the statute. She further asserted Kelly lacked mental capacity, making her signature invalid. Ballenger argued, if Kelly's signature were invalid, the petition would contain only seven of the ten freeholders and would not meet the seventy-five percent criteria of the statute. The City argued that Rookard and Wright should be considered freeholders. Accordingly, even if the court determined Kelly's signature should be excluded, the petition met the requirements of § 5-3-150 (1). The master found the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that Kelly was incompetent, and held the annexation ordinance was valid. He declined to address the City's argument on Rookard and Wright's status as freeholders.

LAW/ANALYSIS 1. Standard of Review

Section 5-3-150 (1)(5) provides in part that a person owning property or residing in the area to be annexed, such as Ballenger, "may institute and maintain a suit in the court of common pleas, and in that suit the person may challenge and have adjudicated any issue raised in connection with the proposed or completed annexation." S.C. Code Ann. § 5-3-150 (Supp. 1998). The characterization of a declaratory judgment suit as either equitable or legal depends on the nature of the underlying controversy. Felts v. Richland County, 299 S.C. 214, 383 S.E.2d 261 (Ct.App. 1989), aff'd 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991). In order to determine the standard of review to apply, we must look to the kind of action in which the issue involved would have been decided if there were no declaratory judgment procedure. Id.; see also Pinckney v. City of Beaufort, 296 S.C. 142, 370 S.E.2d 909 (Ct.App. 1988) (where relief sought was invalidation of an ordinance based on boundary line, court must determine boundary line, an issue at law; accordingly, action was reviewed as one at law).

Ballenger seeks a determination that Kelly lacked mental capacity when she signed the petition. It is a well-settled doctrine in this state that the courts of equity take special charge of persons non compos mentis. Shepard v. First American Mortgage Company, 289 S.C. 516, 347 S.E.2d 118 (Ct.App. 1986). "Persons of unsound mind, like infants, are under the special protection of the courts of equity with respect to their persons, property, and legal transactions." Id. at 518, 347 S.E.2d at 119; see, e.g., Vereen v. Bell, 256 S.C. 249, 182 S.E.2d 296 (1971) (action to rescind and cancel a deed on the ground of mental incapacity of grantor is equitable); Atkinson v. Belser, 273 S.C. 296, 255 S.E.2d 852 (1979) (action to set aside conveyances alleging fraud, undue influence and inadequate consideration reviewed as action in equity); but see In re Estate of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 495 S.E.2d 454 (Ct.App. 1997) (action to set aside will on ground of testator's incapacity is at law).

The dispositive question in this case concerns whether Kelly was competent to sign the petition for annexation. We thus find this action sounds in equity. Accordingly, we may find facts in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Townes Assoc., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976). However, we will not disregard the findings of the master who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a better position to judge their credibility. Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C. 229, 391 S.E.2d 538 (1989).

2. Validity of Kelly's Signature

A municipal corporation's annexation of land is a legislative function with which the courts rarely interfere. Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988). A proceeding resulting in annexation is presumptively valid. Elwood Construction Co. v. Richards, 265 S.C. 228, 217 S.E.2d 769 (1975). The burden is upon the party attacking the annexation to show that there has not been a compliance with the law.

In addition, as the party challenging Kelly's capacity, Ballenger has the burden of proving Kelly lacked capacity at the time she signed the annexation petition. Eagles v. South Carolina National Bank, 301 S.C. 402, 392 S.E.2d 187 (Ct.App. 1990); Rogers v. Nation, 284 S.C. 330, 326 S.E.2d 182 (Ct.App. 1985). The concept of mental incapacity is one of degree. A person may have sufficient mental capacity to transact some types of business and not others. Lewis v. Lewis, 199 S.C. 490, 20 S.E.2d 107 (1942). The mere fact that a person's mind has been weakened by old age, accident, or disease is not sufficient to show that he or she lacks mental capacity. Id.; see also Vereen, 256 S.C. at 251-252, 182 S.E.2d at 297 ("Mere infirmity of mind or body, not amounting to incapacity to understand the nature of the act, is insufficient to render a deed void."). In order to warrant the cancellation of a legal transaction on the basis of the grantor's mental incapacity, it must appear that the grantor was so incompetent as to fail to comprehend the nature of his act. Atkinson v. Belser, supra.

Rookard's testimony was the only evidence of Kelly's capacity at the time she placed her mark on the annexation petition. Rookard stated several times that her mother's mind "was going." She also explained that her mother was worried a lot because of several deaths in the family. Rookard testified that she explained the petition to her mother and her mother "[sat] there and listened." Kelly nodded at the explanation, but did not comment on the petition. When asked if her mother understood the explanation, Rookard responded, "Well I thought that she did. I explained it to her real good." Rookard later testified that she did not know if her mother understood her explanation. Ms. Rookard was 79 years old at the time of the hearing and admitted to having a hard time remembering.

We agree with the master that Rookard's testimony was inconclusive regarding her mother's capacity to understand the petition for annexation. We find Ballenger failed to meet her burden of proving Kelly's lack of capacity to sign the petition for annexation.

Because we affirm the master's decision, we do not address the City's argument for alternate sustaining ground.

AFFIRMED.

HOWELL, C.J., and HOWARD, J., concur.