SANDRA BECKWITH, United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs Timothy Delgado and Linda Delgado initiated this action by filing a complaint on March 31, 2000. By orders dated July 20, October 17, and November 15, 2000, this Court dismissed the claims of Linda Delgado and all of Timothy Delgado's claims with the exceptions of his Third and Seventh Causes of Action against Defendant Susan Vaughn. This matter is now before the Court upon Defendant Vaughn's motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims (Doc. 17)
1. Background
In early 1999, a female Miami University student accused Plaintiff Timothy Delgado, a fellow student, of making unwanted sexual advances toward her. While a Butler County, Ohio, grand jury refused to indict Mr. Delgado, the University's Disciplinary Board sustained the female student's charges, and its Appeals Board affirmed that decision. The University's President refused to intervene on behalf of Mr. Delgado, who alleges that the female student fabricated the story in order to prevent her boyfriend from finding out that she had engaged in consensual sexual conduct with Mr. Delgado. Mr. Delgado was suspended from the University. He and his mother, Linda Delgado, then initiated this action.
Plaintiff Timothy Delgado asserted four claims against Defendant Vaughn, the University's Director of Judicial Affairs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court has dismissed two of those claims, one based upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence upon which Mr. Delgado's suspension was based and one based upon the University's alleged failure to comply with procedures set forth in the Ohio Revised Code.
Plaintiff Timothy Delgado's two remaining claims against Defendant Vaughn are as follows:
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
34. Defendants [sic] Vaughn's action of failing to permit an extension of time on the disciplinary proceedings to provide Plaintiff Delgado an opportunity to gather evidence and defend himself, constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, due process clause.
* * * SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
38. Defendant Susan Vaughn's participation or membership on the disciplinary board constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution due process clause, in that it resulted in a non-impartial hearing and decision.
Complaint, ¶¶ 34, 38. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Vaughn acted as both the hearing officer at his procedural interview and a member of the Disciplinary Board that heard the case against him. See Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 11. He also alleged that Defendant Vaughn denied his request for an extension of the disciplinary hearing to prepare evidence and ensure the attendance of his parents. See id., ¶ 10.
Defendant Vaughn contends that she is entitled to summary judgment with respect to both of Plaintiff Timothy Delgado's remaining claims because he has not introduced evidence in support of the allegations underlying those claims. Mr. Delgado opposes her motion.
2. The Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence presented on a motion for summary judgment is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, who is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (emphasis in original).
The Court will not grant summary judgment unless it is clear that a trial is unnecessary. The threshold inquiry to determine whether there is a need for trial is whether "there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id.
The fact that the weight of the evidence favors the moving party does not authorize a court to grant summary judgment. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 472 (1962). "[T]he issue of material fact required by Rule 56(c) . . . to entitle a party to proceed to trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or a judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First National Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).
Moreover, although summary judgment must be used with extreme caution since it operates to deny a litigant his day in court, Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 986 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has stated that the "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). According to the Supreme Court, the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict, and thus summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party establishes that there is insufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
Accordingly, summary judgment is clearly proper "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Significantly, the Supreme Court also instructs that the "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion" against a party who fails to make that showing with significantly probative evidence. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
Further, there is no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. Rule 56(a) and (b) provide that parties may move for summary judgment "with or without supporting affidavits." Accordingly, where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, summary judgment may be appropriate based solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.
3. Analysis
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the district of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
To succeed on a claim brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that he was denied a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation was committed under color of state law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), ovrl'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-157 (1978); Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987)
The Due Process Clause "provides that certain substantive rights — life, liberty, and property — cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures." Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). "An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
Plaintiff Timothy Delgado's Third Cause is based upon an allegation that Defendant Vaughn denied his request for an extension of the disciplinary hearing against him. He alleges that he requested the extension in order the gather evidence, prepare a defense, and ensure the attendance of his parents.
The evidence of record demonstrates unequivocally that Defendant Vaughn did not deny a request for an extension of the disciplinary hearing. Rather, Mr. Delgado asked Defendant Vaughn to extend a preliminary hearing, at which no evidence was to be presented, from March 17 to March 30. See Vaughn affidavit, ¶ 5. The disciplinary hearing occurred on April 6, as scheduled, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Vaughn denied a request for an extension of the evidentiary hearing at which his guilt of the charges against him was at issue and he was entitled to present evidence. Plaintiff has not argued that Defendant Vaughn's denial of the request for an extension of the preliminary interview was a violation of due process, and the Court is aware of no authority that would support such a position. Because Plaintiff has not identified any issue of material fact that might be resolved in his favor, Defendant Vaughn is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the Third Cause of Action.
Plaintiff Timothy Delgado's Seventh Cause of Action is based upon Defendant Vaughn's participation in or membership on the Disciplinary Board that heard and decided the case against him. The evidence of record demonstrates unequivocally that Defendant Vaughn was not a member of the Disciplinary Board and did not participate in its deliberations. See Vaughn affidavit, ¶ 9. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot prove his Seventh Cause of Action, and Defendant Vaughn is entitled to summary judgment with respect to that claim.
4. Conclusion
For those reasons, Defendant Vaughn's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) is hereby GRANTED. This action is CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.