ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the appellants appealing separately and filing separate briefs, the motions are granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, the action against the remaining defendant is severed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of the amount of costs and attorney's fees.
While working on a construction project for the appellant E.C.C.O. III Enterprises, Inc., sued herein as ECCO Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter ECCO III), the plaintiff's decedent suffered personal injuries from which he subsequently died when he was crushed by a crane operated by a co-worker, the appellant Walter E. Dreeland. Although she collected Workers' Compensation benefits in connection with the incident, the plaintiff commenced the instant action in Supreme Court, Kings County, against multiple defendants, including the appellants herein.
Prior to serving their respective answers, each of the appellants requested that the plaintiff discontinue the action against it, but she refused. Then, before any discovery had taken place, the appellants separately moved for a change of venue to Westchester County, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them and for an award of costs and an attorney's fee against the plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 8303-a. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the motions which were for a change of venue to Westchester County, but otherwise denied the motions, except with respect to the appellants Halmar Builders of New York and Halmar Construction Corp. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Halmar). The court dismissed the action insofar as asserted against Halmar, but did so "without prejudice to recommencing against Halmar * * * at the close of discovery and contingent upon [plaintiff's] good faith showing of Halmar's nexus to" the construction project at issue. These appeals ensued. We reverse insofar as appealed from by each of the appellants, and grant the motions, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint and for awards of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to CPLR 8303-a.
The appellants Yonkers Contracting Company (hereinafter Yonkers Contracting), Halmar, Ventura Leasing Company, and Briarwood Contracting Group each established a prima facie case that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In short, each established that it was neither a contractor nor a subcontractor, and performed no work on the construction project at which the decedent was working when he was injured (see, Feis v. A.S.D. Metal Mach. Shop, 234 A.D.2d 504; Andino v. Stahl, 248 A.D.2d 338; Cruz v. Otis El. Co., 238 A.D.2d 540).
Similarly, ECCO III and Walter E. Dreeland established a prima facie case that they were entitled to summary judgment based on the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Law. Here, the plaintiff admitted that she had received Workers' Compensation benefits as a result of the accident and that ECCO III was her decedent's employer. Thus, Workers' Compensation was her exclusive remedy (see, Quito v. Guarino, 287 A.D.2d 554; Fucile v. Grand Union Co., 270 A.D.2d 227; Zimmerman v. Optica Mfg. Corp., 268 A.D.2d 584).
The plaintiff's claim that it is premature to dismiss the complaint because no discovery has taken place is without merit. Although no discovery has yet occurred, summary judgment should not be denied where "there was only hope and speculation as to what additional discovery would uncover" (Rodgers v. Yale Univ., 283 A.D.2d 415, 416; see, Martinez v. City of New York, 276 A.D.2d 756, 757; Moriello v. Stormville Airport Antique Show Flea Market, 271 A.D.2d 664).
Finally, we agree with the appellants that the action insofar as asserted against each of them was frivolous, in that "the action * * * was commenced or continued in bad faith without any reasonable basis in law or fact" (CPLR 8303-a[c][ii]). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have awarded them costs and attorney's fees pursuant to CPLR 8303-a.