The action, commenced in November 2000, was properly dismissed as barred by the six-year statute of limitations insofar as plaintiff seeks to recover upon a demand loan agreement, entered into and memorialized in 1989, and subsequent demand loan agreements, allegedly entered into orally between 1989 and 1993 (see Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Westreich, 213 A.D.2d 238; CPLR 213; UCC 3-122). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, no triable issue has been raised as to whether there were partial loan payments by defendants that revived the statutory period. Plaintiff's self-serving affidavit submitted in opposition to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and in support of his cross motion for leave to amend the amended complaint contradicts all of plaintiff's previous filings in this matter and is thus insufficient to raise any triable issue (see Perez v. Bronx Park S. Assocs., 285 A.D.2d 402, 404, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 610) as to whether any payments made by defendants were made under circumstances permitting the inference that such payments amounted to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment that additional loan payments were due (see Lew Morris Demolition Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 40 N.Y.2d 516).
Plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend, relying on the same affidavit, was properly denied (see Non-Linear Trading Co. v. Braddis Assocs., 243 A.D.2d 107, 117-118).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.