DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated January 25, 2002, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated March 7, 2002; and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeal by the Town of Huntington from so much of the order dated March 7, 2002, as "reserved for decision" stated portions of its motions is dismissed, as those portions of the motions remain pending and undecided ( see Katz v. Katz, 68 A.D.2d 536); and it is further,
ORDERED that on the court's own motion, the notice of appeal of the Board of Trustees of the Town of Huntington is deemed to be an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted ( see CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the seven orders dated March 6, 2002, are affirmed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated March 7, 2002, is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiffs.
Those branches of the motions of the Town of Huntington which were to dismiss the complaints in each of the six actions in which the Town is a defendant for failure to join the Board of Trustees of the Town of Huntington (hereinafter the Board) as a necessary party were properly denied. Although the Supreme Court erred in leading the Town to believe at a fact-finding hearing that it need not prove that the Board was a separate and distinct entity from the Town because this was not disputed by the parties, and then finding in its order dated January 25, 2002, that the Town failed to prove that the Board was a separate and distinct entity, this error was harmless. In order to prevail on those branches of its motions which were to dismiss the complaints insofar as asserted against it for failure to join the Board as a necessary party, the Town was required to show that the Board was necessary for complete relief to be provided and that the Board would be inequitably affected by the judgment ( see Tindell v. Koch, 164 A.D.2d 689). While the Board does exist as a separate entity, its powers and duties have been devolved upon the Town ( see L 1962, ch. 865, § 4-a). Under the circumstances of these actions, where the Board and the Town Board of the Town of Huntington are comprised of the same individuals, are represented by the same counsel, and the Town failed to delineate any difference between its interests and the Board (other than its allegation that the Board of Trustees owns the subject property, which is completely at odds with the Town's counterclaims in many of these actions, in which the Town asserts that the Town "by its Trustees" owns the subject property), the Town should not be permitted to use an archaic dual political system to its procedural advantage. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the Town's motions which were to dismiss the complaints insofar as asserted against it for failure to join the Board as a necessary party.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's determination, sua sponte, to add the Board as a party defendant in the six actions in which the Town was named as a defendant was, under the particular circumstances of this case, a provident exercise of its discretion.
To the extent that the Town appeals from the court's determination to reserve decision on the remainder of the branches of the Town's motions until the completion of all six trials, the appeal must be dismissed, as these branches of the motions remain pending and undecided ( see Katz v. Katz, supra; see also Fiorenti v. Central Emergency Physicians, 305 A.D.2d 453 [2d Dept, May 12, 2003]; Pacheco v. City of New York, 300 A.D.2d 554; All Waste Sys. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 295 A.D.2d 379). We note, however, that certain branches of the Town's motions, such as those branches which were for leave to amend the pleadings to add affirmative defenses, and that branch which was to quash a trial subpoena, would be best addressed prior to completion of the trials.
We perceive no reason to disturb the orders dated March 6, 2002, amending the captions of all seven actions to add new plaintiffs. The court is authorized, pursuant to RPAPL 1511(2), to, sua sponte, add parties to these actions if it appears to the court that such entities may have an estate or interest in the real property which may be affected by a judgment.
SMITH, J.P., LUCIANO, H. MILLER and ADAMS, JJ., concur.