Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The right of a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the sentencing court ( see People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780; People v Mann, 32 AD3d 865; People v Kucharczyk, 15 AD3d 595), and this determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion ( see People v DeLeon, 40 AD3d 1008). In this case, the record reveals that the defendant entered his plea of guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, having reached a favorable plea bargain with the assistance of competent counsel with whose representation the defendant was satisfied ( see People v Mann, 32 AD3d 865). The defendant's generalized and unsubstantiated claim of innocence at the time of sentencing was not sufficient to warrant the vacatur of the plea ( see People v De Jesus, 199 AD2d 529, 530; People v Carter, 191 AD2d 640; People v Stephens, 175 AD2d 272; People v Williams, 156 AD2d 497). Nor did the defendant's subsequent expression of unhappiness with the length of the sentence to which he had agreed require a vacatur of his plea ( see People v Hagzan, 155 AD2d 616, 617; People v Morris, 118 AD2d 595). Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's arguments on appeal, "[a]n attorney assigned to represent a defendant in a criminal case has no duty to participate in a baseless pro se motion to withdraw a plea of guilty which was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made" ( People v Caple, 279 AD2d 635, 635; see People v Rodriguez, 181 AD2d 643; People v Glasper, 151 AD2d 692, 693).