| SECTIONS IN THE PETITION OF COMPLAINT |
SECTIONS IN THE ORDER DATED 17.01.2020 |
SECTIONS IN THE FORMAL CHARGE |
| Companies Act, 1956 |
Companies Act, 1956 |
Companies Act, 1956 |
| Section 56 |
Section 56, 56(3) |
Section 56, 56(3) |
12
| Section 60 |
Section 60, 60(5) |
Section 60, 60(5) |
| Section 70 |
Section 70, 70(4) |
Section 70, 70(4) |
| Section 2(36) |
Section 2(36) |
Section 2(36) |
| Section 73 |
Section 73, 73 (1A) |
Section 73, 73(1A) |
| Section 465 |
NIL |
NIL |
| Section 55A |
Section 55A |
Section 55A |
| Section 67 |
Section 67 |
Section 67 |
| Section 621 |
NIL |
NIL |
| NIL |
Section 68 |
Section 68 |
| NIL |
Section 117B |
Section 117B |
| NIL |
Section 117C, 117C(5) |
Section 117C, 117C(5) |
| NIL |
Section 40 |
Section 40 |
| NIL |
Section 629A |
Section 629A |
| General Clauses Act, 1857 |
General Clauses Act, 1857 |
General Clauses Act, 1857 |
| NIL |
Section 6 |
Section 6 |
| SEBI ACT, 1992 |
SEBI ACT, 1992 |
SEBI ACT, 1992 |
| Section 11, 11A, 11B |
NIL |
NIL |
| Section 24 |
Section 24(1), 24(2) |
Section 24(1), 24(2) |
| Section 27 |
Section 27 |
Section 27 |
| Section 26A, 26B, 26E |
NIL |
NIL |
| NIL |
Section 12(1) |
Section 12(1) |
| SEBI (PFUTP) REGULATIONS |
SEBI (PFUTP) REGULATIONS |
SEBI (PFUTP) REGULATIONS |
| NIL |
Regulation 3 |
Regulation 3 |
| SEBI (ILDS) REGULATIONS, 2008 |
SEBI (ILDS) REGULATIONS, 2008 |
SEBI (ILDS) REGULATIONS, 2008 |
| NIL |
Regulation 4(2) |
Regulation 4(2) |
| NIL |
Regulation 4(4) |
Regulation 4(4) |
| NIL |
Regulation 5(2) |
Regulation 5(2)(b) |
| NIL |
Regulation 6 |
Regulation 6 |
| NIL |
Regulation 7 |
Regulation 7 |
| NIL |
Regulation 8 |
Regulation 8 |
| NIL |
Regulation 9 |
Regulation 9 |
13
| NIL |
Regulation 12 |
Regulation 12 |
| NIL |
Regulation 13 |
Regulation 13 |
| NIL |
Regulation 14 |
Regulation 14 |
| NIL |
Regulation 15 |
Regulation 15 |
| NIL |
Regulation 16 |
Regulation 16 |
| NIL |
Regulation 17 |
Regulation 17 |
| NIL |
Regulation 19 |
Regulation 19 |
| NIL |
Regulation 26 |
Regulation 26 |
19. The framing of charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure is a pivotal stage in criminal proceedings where a court formally accuses an individual (the accused) of committing a specific offence based on evidence and allegations presented by the prosecution. This process plays a crucial role in the criminal justice system, by informing the accused of the charges against them, establishing the legal foundation for a trial and promoting transparency and fairness in legal proceedings. In essence, a charge is a legal term used to describe an allegation.
20. Framing of charges in a criminal case is the formal accusation of an individual committing a specific offence or crime. This ensures that
the accused is aware of the nature of the accusation and the accused can prepare their defence. The primary requirement under the Cr.P.C. for a fair and just trial is to ensure that the accused is precisely and accurately informed of the offence with which they are charged.
14
21. Sections 211 and 212 of the CrPC:-
These sections prescribe the forms and contents of the charge in criminal cases. They establish the framework for drafting charges in a manner that clearly describes the offence to the accused.
Section 211(3) Cr.P.C, lays down:-
"211.Contents of charge.-
(1) ……………
(2) ……………
(3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged." Section 211(5) Cr.P.C, lays down:-
"211.Contents of charge.-
(1) ……………
(2) ……………
(3) …………..
(4) …………..
(5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case."
22. The Supreme Court of India, in Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (Supra), held:-
"18. The purpose of framing a charge is to intimate to the accused the clear, unambiguous and precise nature of accusation that the accused is called upon to meet in the course of a trial. [See : decision of a four-Judge Bench of this Court in V.C.
15
Shukla v. State [ V.C. Shukla v.State, 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695] ].
19. The case may be a sessions case, a warrant case, or a summons case, the point is that a prima facie case must be made out before a charge can be framed. Basically, there are three pairs of sections in the CrPC. Those are Sections 227 and 228 relating to the sessions trial; Sections 239 and 240 relatable to trial of warrant cases, and Sections 245(1) and (2) with respect to trial of summons case.
21. This Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] considered the scope of enquiry a Judge is required to make while considering the question of framing of charges. After an exhaustive survey of the case law on the point, this Court, in para 10 of the judgment, laid down the following principles :
"10. … (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
16
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."
23. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of Sections 227 and 228CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under :
"21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
17
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."
27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of
18
Section 173CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution. [See: Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam [ Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 581] ]."
23. The Supreme Court of India, in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, held:-
"7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.
8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only.
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record
19
need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima- facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.
13. The power and jurisdiction of Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes,
20
but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.""
14. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr. P.C. is sought for as under:
"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal
21
proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie."
24. In the present case, it prima facie appears that the order under revision framing charges and the formal charges framed are not in
22
accordance with law. The said order and the formal charge framed both suffer from patent defects and error of law. The trial Judge framed charges in respect of sections beyond the contents of the petition of complaint. And while doing so did not state the substance of accusations in its order or the formal charge,
thereby prima facie the accuseds are not aware of the offences that they are charged with, which goes against the principles of natural justice and fair trial.
25. The accuseds/petitioners thus prima facie did not have sufficient notice of the contents of accusation with which they are charged.
Section 211 (3) Cr.P.C, lays down:-
"211.Contents of charge.
(1) ……………
(2) ……………
(3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged." The omission in this case is sufficient to mislead the accuseds, thus causing a failure of Justice. The contents of charge to be read over and explained to the accused is to be sufficient, so as to let the accuseds know the nature of accusation
23
and understands with what offence he is charged with (absent in this case).
26. The order under revision and the resulting formal charge, in the present case have not been passed and framed in compliance with the provisions of law. The accusations are not based on the materials on record, and also beyond the case of the complainant in the petition of complaint and thus judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily/ perversely. (Amit Kapoor Vs Ramesh Chander & Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein scope of Section
397 Cr.P.C (revisional jurisdiction) has been considered and explained).
27. Thus, the order under revision and the formal charge framed, if allowed to remain shall cause severe prejudice to the petitioners herein, the same being an abuse of the process of the court/law and thus against the Interest of Justice. The same are thus liable to be set aside and quashed.
28. CRR 242 of 2021 is accordingly allowed.
29. The order dated 17.01.2020, passed by the Learned 5thSpecial
24
the date of communication of this order, keeping in mind the observations made in this Judgment and then, proceed in accordance with law, on hearing both sides.
31. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
32. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
33. Copy of this judgment to be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance.
34. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)