1. Matter is heard through video conferencing.
2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by three petitioners who have applied pursuant to an advertisement issued in August-September 2020, prescribing last date for submission of application forms as 08.10.2020 for the post of Community Health Officer, vide Annexure P-1.
3. The grievance of the petitioners is that though they possess the qualification of Post Basic B.Sc (nursing) course but without integrated CCH curriculum. Pertinently, the advertisement Annexure P-1 inter-alia prescribes the said Post Basic B.Sc nursing course without integrated CCH curriculum as a disqualification under clause 6.2 of Annexure P-1, which is reproduced below:
“6. Disqualifications:
6.1.….xx …..
6.2.Candidates who have passed B.Sc Nursing or Post Basic B.Sc Nursing course without integrated CCH curriculum.”
4. As such, petitioners do not dispute that they are disqualified to be considered and appointed for the said post.
5. On direction of this Court, Shri Sankalp Sharma, Advocate who normally appears for National Health Mission, appeared and informs that an instruction has now been issued by the National Health Mission on 23.11.2020 to allow even those persons having post basic B.Sc nursing course without integrated CCH curriculum to be eligible. However, Shri Sharma informs that Mission has decided to apply this amendment in the requisite qualification for the subsequent selection process and not for the current process which had already begun.
6. It is trite principle of service jurisprudence that once process of recruitment commences on issuance of advertisement which was in August-September 2020 in the present case, no changes in the essential qualification/disqualification can be made during subsistence of the said recruitment.
7. The said principle of service jurisprudence is that the rules of game cannot be changed, once it has begun. The aforesaid time tested principle is based on sound reasoning that in case such change in the rules of recruitment is permitted then large number of persons who had not applied for being not eligible as per the recruitment and who would become eligible based on the relaxation made, would be deprived of their right to be considered for public employment which would amount to violation of their fundamental right under Article 16 of Constitution of India.
8. This Court is bolstered in its view by decisions of Apex Court in case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Coporation v. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve, (2001) 10 SCC 51, wherein it has been held:
“5. The serious dispute and controversy raised relates to the claim of the Corporation that the Circular No. 17 of 1996 dated 24-6-1996, only came to be issued by way of clarification and it was not only necessary to be issued but also governed the selection of Drivers in question. The Writ Petitioners, who were unsuccessful, asserted that it is the Circular dated 4-4-1995 which should govern the selection and consequently the selections ought to have been made by assigning 87 ½% marks for written/trade test and 12 ½% for the oral test (personal interview) and results declared, accordingly. On going through the above circular orders, we find that the procedure for recruitment of Drivers is separate from recruitment for other categories where written test/trade test has been specifically laid down and that it is only where the written test and interview are stipulated, the percentage of weightage for written test/interview has been resolved by the Board, under the directions of the State Government, to be fixed at 87.5% and 12.5% respectively. The directions of the State Government in their letter dated 2.1.1995 only fixes the weightage to be given between marks obtained in written Test and those in Interview and no reference is found therein of any trade test or driving test. The resolution of the Board dated 21.3.1995 also seems to be on the same lines and is with reference to marks obtained in written test and interview respectively and not otherwise. Apparently, in view of the above and in the absence of reference to driving test or other trade test too, that the Corporation claims to have issued the Circular Order No. 17/1996 dated 24.6.1996, on the basis of the earlier Circular Nos. 52/80 for pass in driving test to be presented to the ST Committee and No. 25/90 dated 2-7-1990 pertaining to award of marks in the Interview, by fixing the average of the marks awarded by the S.T. Sub-Committee to be the final and deciding factor in the matter of selection of a candidate. Therefore, the High Court cannot be said to be correct in holding that the Circular Order dated 24.6.1996 is illegal or arbitrary or against the orders of the State Government or the resolution of the Board of the Transport Corporation. Instead, it would have been well open to the High Court to have declared that the criteria sought to be fixed by the Circular dated 24.6.1996 as the sole determinative of the merit or grade of a candidate for selection long after the last date fixed for receipt of application and in the middle of the course of selection process (since in this case the driving test was stated to have been conducted on 27.11.1995) cannot be applied to the selections under consideration and challenged before the High Court. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the rules of the game meaning thereby, that the criteria for selection cannot be altered by the authorities concerned in the middle or after the process of selection has commenced. Therefore, the decision of the High Court, to the extent it pronounced upon the invalidity of the Circular Orders dated 24.6.1996, does not merit acceptance in our hand and the same are set aside.”
9. In case of Zonal Manager, Bank of India, Zonal Office, Kochi v. Aarya K. Babu (2019) 8 SCC 587, the Apex Court has held as under:
“12. Though we have taken note of the said contention we are unable to accept the same. We are of such opinion in view of the well-established position that it is not for the Court to read into or assume and thereby include certain qualifications which have not been included in the Notification by the employer. Further the rules as referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents is pointed out to be a rule for promotion of officers. That apart, even if the qualification prescribed in the advertisement was contrary to the qualification provided under the recruitment rules, it would have been open for the candidate concerned to challenge the Notification alleging denial of opportunity. On the other hand, having taken note of the specific qualification prescribed in the notification it would not be open for a candidate to assume that the qualification possessed by such candidate is equivalent and thereby seek consideration for appointment nor will it even be open for the employer to change the requirements midstream during the ongoing selection process or accept any qualification other than the one notified since it would amount to denial of opportunity to those who possess the qualification but had not applied as it was not notified.”
10. In view of above, the subsequent relaxation in the essential qualification/disqualification notified by advertisement Annexure P-1 cannot be made applicable to the on-going recruitment in question and thus petitioners cannot reap advantage of the same.
11. In view of above discussion, this Court is afraid that no writ or direction can be issued in favour of the petitioners.
12. Accordingly, petition stands dismissed.