This is an application for bail by Accused 1, and Accused 3 who have been committed to take their trial in the Sessions Court of Ramanathapuram by the Sub Magistrate, Aruppukkottai in P.R.C No. 9 of 1957 and in which the trial is pending.
The case for the prosecution is that Accused 11, 31, 47, 12 and 30 came and found a kisan sangam in Chinnakannanoor Village. The sangam was communist in character. Certain persons of the locality refused to become members of the sangam. P.W 1 is one among such. After the advent of the sangam there was trouble and discontent in what was otherwise a quiet village. There were false petitions to the authorities by these accused that they were cultivating pannai lands and hence entitled to occupancy rights. Their contentions were negatived by the authorities. Later proceedings under S. 144 Cr.P.C were instituted against the accused who were prohibited in such lands as were cultivated in pannai. Pottal chei and Ammayar chei, two plots belonging to Seshadri Iyengar, Advocate, Manamadurai and to Natarajan Chettiar and Valliammai Achi of Virudhunagar respectively were cultivated in Pannai by the respective owners. While so, all the accused 47 in number along with others numbering about hundred and twenty, destroyed the crops in Pottal chei and were likewise engaged in Ammayar chei on 7-11-1956 at about 8 A.M Their object was to destroy the paddy crops in the said place and they were variously armed with vel-sticks, aruvals, sticks, slings and bows. They caused injuries on the prosecution witnesses who pleaded with them to desist from the act of destruction.
The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and dispensed with four witnesses cited in the charge sheet as having turned hostile, and, filed Exs. P-1 to P-18. The learned Sub Magistrate committed the present bail applicants and others to sessions discharging a number of others under s. 207A (6) Cr.P.C
The case against Accused 1 is that he attempted to murder P.W 2, inflicted injuries upon him to which reference will be made, and, he was one of the persons who participated in the rioting armed with deadly weapons, and, that in pursuance of the common object injuries were inflicted on a number of persons.
The case against Accused 3 is that he was a member of an unlawful assembly who committed rioting and that in the course, of that rioting he, along with 6 others caused hurt to P.W 9 with vel-sticks and that in as much as this amounted to an attempt on Page: HC184the life of P.W 9 with such intention or knowledge and under circumstances that if P.W 9 had died, Accused 3 would have been guilty of an offence under s. 307 and therefore guilty of punishment under s. 149 read with s. 307 I.P.C
The medical evidence gives the following information viz., on P.W 2 who is alleged to have been injured by Accused 1 there were 8 injuries of which six were incised and the most grave of which was injury No. 1, an incised circular wound, 2″ in diameter on the head and a part of the skull had been severed off and was hanging down along with skin and other tissues. During the treatment the doctor removed the cut piece of bone and preserved it. (M.O 4) The doctor states that by severance of the bone there would be a depression on the top of the skull and this portion will be more tender than the surrounding portions, and, if a little more pressure had been exerted death would have necessarily resulted and that even now the injured man must be careful to avoid any pressure on that part of the head. On P.W 9 the doctor found seven incised injuries of which the most serious was injury No. 2 where a fissured fracture was seen.
The section governing grant of bail in non-bailable offences which is exhaustive and constitutes a complete code is s. 497 Cr. P.C But this section is controlled by three important qualifications, viz.,
(1) Where the prosecution can satisfy the court that there are reasonable grounds that the accused is guilty of a serious offence which is punishable with death or transportation for life, the court has no discretion; it shall refuse bail. There is no scope in a case of such non-bailable offences for considering any other general or special consideration. Some sessions Judges appear to think that they can salve their judicial conscience when they irregularly and in violation of the clear statutory restriction release such person on bail even if there are reasonable grounds for finding them guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life by imposing restrictions as if restrictions will regularise otherwise wholly irregular, nay illegal, orders. This practice cannot be sufficiently condemned and, in fact, would constitute on the part of those Sessions Judges a serious dereliction of duty inviting correction and admonition by a court of revision. The only exceptions are those contained in the proviso that even in such cases punishable with death or imprisonment for life a court may direct that any person under the age of 16 years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail. I must not be however understood as meaning that in fitting cases of non-bailable offences not punishable with death or life imprisonment and where on account of general or special considerations notwithstanding reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty it is decided to grant bail, suitable restrictions cannot be imposed. They can be imposed; Huchinson, Manikkam, Gulam Jilane (see below); Narendra 36 Cal 366; Jangbahader 52 Crl. L.J 1080; Kamba Pandey 50 Cr. L.J 1009 Cal; In re Appalakonda AIR 1942 Mad 740; AIR 1952 M.B 189. AIR 1956 M.B 103 (F.B)
(2) On the other hand, where the defence can satisfy the court that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed any non-bailable offence or where after trial and before judgment there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty the court has no option but shall grant bail. (sub-s. 2 and 3).
(3) In non-bailable offences not punishable with death or transportation for life, courts are bound to grant bail where there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, and may release such accused even if there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty of such non-bailable offence if there exists other considerations both in favour of and against the accused. It would be hopeless to attempt to draw up an exhaustive list.
These general and special considerations, both in favour of and against the accused have been set out by me in Cr. M.P No. 597 of 1957 and Cr. M.P 617 of 1957.
The English law is practically the same. But by reason of the fact that s. 497 Cr.P.C constitutes a complete code by itself it has been laid down in several decisions that English decisions cannot be invoked either to extend or curtail the powers conferred on courts by chapter 39 of the Cr.P.C (Jai-Ramdas v. Emperor A.I.R 1945 P.C 94; Gul v. Emperor A.I.R 1928 Sind 142). In Halsbury's Laws of England (Simonds edition), Vol. 10, at page 374, it is stated,
In cases of treason no person can be admitted to bail except by order of the Secretary of State or a judge of the High Court. (Magistrates' Courts' Act, 1952 Page: HC185(15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c. 55) S. 8. It is not usual to grant bail in cases of murder, or in cases of attempted murder, unless the prosecution consents. (H.M Advocate v. Saunders, (1913) S.C (J) 44. See Lord Mohun's Case (1697), 1 Salk. 104; R. v. Barronet and Allain (1852), Dears C.C 51; R. v. Barthelemy and Morney (1852), Dears C.C 60; and R. v. Andrews (1844), 2 Dow. & L. 10; and Short and Mellor's Practice of the Crown Office (2nd edn. 282). In exercising their discretion with regard to bail the justices must consider the nature of the offence, the strength of the evidence, the character or behaviour of the accused, and the seriousness of the punishment which may be awarded if the accused is found guilty. (R. v. Barronet and Allain (1852), Dears. C.C 51; R. v. Barthelemy and Morney (1852), Dears C.C 60; R. v. Robinson (1854), 23 L.J.Q.B 286; R. v. Rose (1898), 67 L.J.Q.B 289, C.C.R, at p. 292; H.M Advocate v. Saunders, (1913) S.C (J) (44). In deciding questions relating to the granting of bail justices act judicially, and not ministerially. (Linford v. Fitzroy (1849), 13 Q.B 240, at p. 247. A justice may be indicted, if he refuses bail from improper motives (R. v. Banger (1843) 4 Q.B 468 at 472), or sued, if he does so maliciously (See Linford v. Fitzroy (1849), 13 Q.B 240).
Excessive bail ought not to be required. (Bill of Rights (1688) (1 Will & Mar. Sess 2c 2), s. 1). It is undesirable to grant bail on a charge of housebreaking where there is a likelihood of the offence being repeated pending trial. (R. v. Phillips (1947), III J.P 333, C.C.A) It is proper for justices to be told of a prisoner's previous convictions when considering bail. R. v. Fletcher (1949), 113 J.P 365, C.C.A Though it is very undesirable that a newspaper should disclose information about the accused's previous convictions, the mere fact of publication is no ground for quashing the later conviction (R. v. Armstrong, (1951) 2 All. E.R 219, C.C.A) ”.
10. In Stone's Justices' Manual, 88th Edition (1956), Vol. I, in page 45 it is mentioned,
If the committal is for an offence other than reason or murder, a person committed in custody must be informed of his right to apply for bail to a judge of the High Court (Magistrates' Courts' Rules, 1952, r. 9 in App. IV post).
Where the crime is of a nature that there is a likelihood of its being repeated if the accused is released pending trial, particularly where the evidence indicates that there is no defence to the charge preferred (e.g, where the accused was arrested in the act of housebreaking) the granting of bail pending trial “is a very wrong step to take”; there should be taken into consideration the nature of the accusation, the evidence in support of it, and the severity of punishment which conviction will entail (see observations of Atkinson, J. in C.C.A in R.V Phillips (1947), J.P 333); there may also be taken into consideration previous convictions recorded against the accused (R.V Fletcher (1949), 113 J.P 365), in which case Humphreys, J., commented that it is desirable that if newspapers are reporting the case, they should not include in the report any mention of previous convictions. It is recommended that information of previous convictions, when advanced in opposition to an application for bail, be submitted in writing rather than given viva voce in open court (see R.V Dyson (1943), 107 J.P 178). In R.V Armstrong, (1951) 2 All. E.R 219, the C.C.A reaffirmed that “It is clear that it is the duty of the justice to inquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying to them for bail,” and that it is undesirable that a newspaper should disclose such evidence, but such publication by itself is not a ground for quashing a conviction; and see R.V Wharton (1955), a copy of the judgment in which case is contained in Home Office Circular No. 132/1955.”
See also C.C.H Moriarty Police Law (thirteenth edition) Butterworth (1954) P. 55 on “Bail.”
The American law is practically the same, 6, Corpus Juris at pages 953 and 954 mentions,
The constitution of the United States and the constitution of many of the states provide that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences, where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great.
Primarily the prisoner cannot demand bail as a matter of right where the offence is a capital one, since upon ascertaining the character of the charge against him, the next question would be as to the decree of proof and the nature of the presumption of guilt. Therefore the power to admit to Page: HC186bail generally becomes a matter of judicial discretion in this class of cases, and, although the exercise of this discretion will not be controlled unless manifestly abused, it should be exercised with great caution.”
The discretion exercised by the Court in granting or refusing bail is not an arbitrary but a judicial one; it is governed or directed by known and established rules, and in truth cannot be otherwise applied than to decide whether or not the facts bring the case within their operation.
Where the proof is not evident or the presumption of guilt not great, bail should be allowed, even in capital cases, as a matter of right. Where, however, such proof is evident or the presumption is great, as shown by the evidence, bail in capital cases is not a matter of right, but a matter of judicial discretion, and is usually denied, except under special and extraordinary circumstances.”
[These extraordinary circumstances are set it in the proviso to S. 497 (1)].
Just what probative force evidence must have in order to bring the case within the exemptions mentioned in the constitutions and to exclude bail has been the subject of much judicial discussion. The character and extent of the proof to make the necessary sufficiency depend largely upon the circumstances of each case; and the most generally adapted has been to refuse bail in all cases in which the trial court would sustain a capital conviction if it was pronounced by a jury on such evidence of guilt as was exhibited to the court on the hearing of the application for bail. This rule, however, is not always strictly followed for the rule has been otherwise stated that bail should be allowed where, upon a consideration of the whole evidence a reasonable or well founded doubt of the accused's guilt exists or can be entertained; or that bail should be refused, unless a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt of a capital offence is shown or there are exceptional circumstances justifying bail; and that, even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, if upon an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that the accused is guilty of a capital offence, bail should be refused.” (6, Corpus Juris, page 956, 957.)
See also 6 American Jurisprudence (Revised edn. 1950) s. 26 p. 72 extracted in C.M.P 618 of 57.
The degree of proof is also the same in India and these principles will be found embodied in the following Madras decisions and the decisions of other High Courts. Manikkam, (6 Mad. 63); Ponnuswami (6 Mad. 69); Kamaraya (FB) (2 Weir 657); Engadu (11 Mad. 98); Thimma Reddi (10 M.L.J 411); Chengalroya (2 M.W.N 138); Narayanaswami (36 M. 474); Sanyasayya (22 M.L.W 156); Public Prosecutor v. George Williams 1951 M.W.N 199. The important decisions of other High Courts embodying these principles and which may usefully be referred to are State v. Mahomed Ali Khan (AIR 1956 Bom. 548); Ramachandra v. The State (AIR 1952 Madh. 203); Nawaz Jung v. The State of Hyderabad (AIR 1953 Hyd. 30); Emperor v. Hutchinson (Meerut Conspiracy case) (AIR 1931 All. 356); King-Emperor v. Nga San (AIR 1927 Rang. 205); King-Emperor v. Bashiram (AIR 1923 All. 479); Nagendra Nath v. Emperor (AIR 1924 Cal. 476 - 25 Crl. L.J 732); Naranji (30 Bom. L.R 622 - 29 Cr.L.J 94 - Ramchand 1929 Lah. 284; Jogelkar 33 Cr. L.J 94; Ghulam Jilani (82 I.C 755 - 25 Cr. L.J 1363 - 1925 Nag. 228); Tularam (97 I.C 39 - 27 Cr. L.J 1063 - 1927 Nag. 53); Fateh Singh (51 All. 603 - 30 Cr. L.J 697 - 1929 All. 320); Eusoof (3 Rang. 538 - 27 Cr.L.J 501 - 1929 Rang 51). For an exposition of the principles governing grant of bail in non-bailable offences see s. 497 N.3 pt. 1d of the A.I.R commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure Fifth edition (1956) Vol. 4 and M.L.J Commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure third edition (1956) Vol. II P. 1798 and their companion volume V.V Chitaley and S. Appu Rao's monumental A.I.R publication, The fifty years Criminal Digest (1904-1953) Vol. 4 P. 2963 and following.
Bearing these principles in mind, on an examination of the facts of this case I find that there are prima facie reasonable grounds for believing that the first accused is guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. There are no grounds to grant bail in his case and his petition is dismissed.
In the case of the third accused, at this stage and on the limited record before me, it cannot be said that the evidence on record is such that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with life imprisonment. On the other hand, the offence may also fall under one of the lesser categories not punishable with imprisonment Page: HC187for life. The persons accused along with accused 3 under charges 4 and 5 have been allowed to be on bail and there are no distinguishing circumstances for meeting out a different treatment to this accused at this stage and before the evidence is tested in the Sessions Court : Veeran Kutty v. Cochin Sirkar (DLR Cochin 91). Certain special circumstances favourable to the accused have also been pressed by the learned advocate. Therefore, a case has been made out for the third accused being released on bail. He is directed to be let on bail on his furnishing a bond for a sum of Rs. 1,000 with two sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Sub Magistrate of Aruppukkottai.
N.T.R