K.N Singh, J.:— This petition is directed against the order of the State Government dated 28-6-1977 issued under S. 6(4) of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act 1947, remitting the award to the Industrial Tribunal for reconsideration.
2. Briefly, the facts giving rise to this petition are that the Government of India constituted a Central Wage Board for Electricity Undertakings. The Wage Board made its recommendations in 1971 relating to scales of pay for different categories of skilled, semi-skilled, highly skilled and supervisory workmen employed in the various electricity undertakings. The U.P State Electricity Board accepted the recommendations of the Wage Board and implemented the same. Accordingly, it fixed the pay scales of its employees in various categories as indicated in the award of the Wage Board. The fitment of the various employees in the new scales of pay gave rise to a number of Industrial disputes. The petitioners who have been in the employment of the U.P Electricity Board as routine grade clerks raised a dispute that they were entitled to fitment in the pay scale of Rs. 190-375 as applicable to highly skilled ‘B’ grade employees. The State Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal (V), Lucknow. The Tribunal by its award dated 12-8-1975 held that the petitioners were not entitled to any relief as they had rightly been fitted in the pay scale of Rs. 110/- to Rs. 250/-. The petitioners challenged the validity of the award before this Court in Writ Petition No. 1223 of 1975. A Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition on 5-10-1976 and quashed the award. The Division Bench held that the case of the workmen before the Tribunal was that they were entitled to be categorised as highly skilled employees along with the time keepers, but the Tribunal wrongly assumed that they had raised a claim for being categorised in skilled category along with the Accounts Clerks. The Tribunal therefore omitted to consider the case set up by the petitioners.
3. The Division Bench remanded the matter to the Tribunal for reconsidering the petitioners' claim. After remand the Industrial Tribunal (V) reconsidered the dispute and it submitted its award to the State Government for publication. The State Government however instead of publishing the award passed an order on 28th June, 1977, under S. 6(4) of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) remitting the award to the Industrial Tribunal for reconsideration. The petitioners have by means of the present petition challenged the order of the State Government.
4. Sri S.C Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that since the State Government had taken a decision to publish the award on 21st May, 1977 and in furtherance to that it had sent the requisite notification to the Government Press for publication, it had no authority in law to revise its order and to remit the award for reconsideration to the Industrial Tribunal. He placed reliance on the uncontroverted averments contained in the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners. The averments contained therein allege that the State Government had taken a decision to publish the award vide its notification dated 21st May, 1977 and the award had been sent to the Government Press for publication. Before the award could be published, the State Government on 24th May, 1977, sent a telegram to the Government Press and Industrial Tribunal not to publish the award. Under S. 6(1) of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, a labour court or Tribunal is required to submit its award to the State Government as soon as the proceedings before it are concluded. The award must be in writing and signed by the Presiding Officer. Sub-section (3) lays down that the award shall be published by the State Government in such manner as it may think fit within a period of 30 days from the date of its receipt. This provision is, however, subject to sub-sec. (4) which lays down that the State Government may, before publication of award remit the same for reconsideration to the adjudicating authority. If the award is remitted to the adjudicating authority, it is required to reconsider the matter and submit its award again to the State Government. Thereupon, the latter shall publish the award in the manner provided in sub-sec. (3). The State Government has two options open to it on the receipt of an award. It may publish the same in the manner it thinks fit, or it may remit the award for reconsideration to the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. The nature of the function performed by the State Government under sub-sec. (4) is administrative. The State Government is free to reconsider or revise its opinion before the award is published. An administrative order is liable to be revised by the administrative authority. Section 6(4) does not place any limitation on the power of the State Government to reconsider the matter. Since the award had not been published it was open to the State Government to revise its opinion and to remit the award for re-consideration to the Industrial Tribunal. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the petitioner's contention.
5. Learned counsel further urged that the State Government was bound to take a decision under S. 6(4) within 30 days of the receipt of the award. In the instant case, since the State Government took a decision to remit the award for reconsideration to the Industrial Tribunal beyond 30 days from the date of receipt of the award, the impugned order was Illegal. On a plain reading of S. 6(4), we find no justification to uphold the petitioner's contention. Section 6(3), no doubt, requires the State Government to publish award of the Labour Court or Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of its receipt but this provision is subject to sub-sec. (4) which confers power on the State Government to remit the award for re-consideration of the Adjudicating Authority. Section 6(4) does not prescribe any period of limitation of 30 days for the exercise of the power to remit the award for re-consideration to the Adjudicating Authority. It was, therefore, open to the State Government to remit the award for re-consideration even after 30 days from the date of the receipt of the award.
6. Learned counsel then urged that since the award which had been submitted to the State Government for publication was in favour of the petitioner they had acquired a legal right to the relief granted by the Industrial Tribunal, the State Government could not remit the award for re-consideration without recording any reasons or without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. He further urged that the impugned order dated 28th June, 1977 was issued in violation of principles of natural justice. As discussed earlier, while exercising power under S. 6(4) of the Act, the State Government performs an administrative function. The Legislature has not circumscribed the power of remitting an award for reconsideration to the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court to any reasons or grounds. In the absence of any such necessity, the State Government is not under any obligation to record reasons and the absence of the same does not render the impugned order illegal. In Star Paper Mills Mazdoor Sangh v. Star Paper Mills (1974 All LJ 71), a Division Bench of this Court held that the Legislative intent did not suggest that the order of remission under S. 6(4) of the Act must stats the reasons to sustain it.
7. The contents of the award are confidential as the same has not been published. The petitioner could not derive any right under the said award unless it is published and enforced. On the receipt of an award, if the same is published by the State Government under S. 6(3) of the Act, the award becomes enforceable after the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under S. 6-A of the Act. Unless the award is published, it is not enforceable and no party can derive any benefit under the unpublished award. The petitioners have no right to claim any opportunity of hearing before the State Government. The nature of the power which the State Government is required to exercise under S. 6(4) of the Act and the provisions contained therein do not attract the principles of natural justice. The State Government was not under any legal obligation to grant any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, before remitting the award for re-consideration. The State Government, in remitting the award for re-consideration to the Industrial Tribunal has put the award in abeyance temporarily. In the circumstances, it is difficult to infer that the power of remission is quasi-judicial in nature. None of the petitioner's rights have been affected. The Industrial Tribunal shall re-consider the matter and submit its award to the State Government again. In our opinion, the impugned order of the State Government is not vitiated on the ground of its being issued without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.
8. Lastly, the learned counsel urged that S. 6(4) of the Act was ultra vires as it confers a blanket power on the State Government to remit the award for reconsideration without laying down any guiding principles for the same. It was urged that in the absence of any guiding principles, the State Government may act arbitrarily in remitting the award for reconsideration to the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. The power of remission is excessive and arbitrary. He cited a number of cases in support of his contention. We do not, however, consider it necessary to deal with the same in detail as in our opinion, the Act does not confer any unguided and unfettered discretion on the State Government. The U.P Industrial Disputes Act was enacted “to provide for power to prevent strikes and lock-outs to settle industrial disputes and for other incidental matters”, as stated in the preamble of the Act. While exercising power, under the provisions of the Act, the preamble furnishes guidance to the State Government under the various provisions of the Act. The provisions of the Act are designed to ensure social justice to the industrial workers and to keep harmony to ensure industrial peace so that production may increase and the workmen may not be exploited by the employers. The concept of social justice is inherent in the various provisions of the Act. While exercising powers under Section 6(4) of the Act in remitting an award to the Industrial Tribunal, the State Government is guided by the aforesaid considerations. There is no warrant for any presumption that the discretion conferred on the State Government under Section 6(4) of the Act shall be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
9. The power of remission to Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court for reconsideration of award does not affect the power of the Industrial Court. The nature of the order is temporary. Once the award is remitted for re-consideration, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is required to re-consider the same but it may re-affirm its earlier findings and submit the same for publication to the State Government. Thereupon, it is obligatory on the State Government to publish the award in the manner provided in sub-sec. (3). The power of remission of award, therefore, does not affect the findings which may have been recorded by the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the ultimate power to adjudicate a dispute vests in the Industrial Courts. We are, therefore, of the opinion that S. 6(4) of the Act does not suffer from any vice of excessive delegation and the preamble as well as the provisions of the Act provide sufficient guidance to the State Government exercising its power of remission under S. 6(4) of the Act. In Niemla Textile Finishing Mills limited v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal (AIR 1957 SC 329), constitutional validity of S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act) was challenged on the ground that it conferred as unguided and unfettered discretion on the appropriate Government. The Supreme Court repelled the contention and observed (at p. 337):
“The basic idea underlying all the provisions of the Act is the settlement of industrial dispute and the promotion of industrial peace so that production may not be interrupted and the community in general may be benefited. This is the end which has got to be kept in view by the appropriate Government when exercising the discretion which is vested in it in the matter of carrying out the various provisions contained in the other sections of the Act including the curtailment or extension of the period of operation of the award of the Industrial Tribunal. We are of opinion that there is no substance in the contention urged before us that the relevant provisions of the Act in particular S. 10 thereof are unconstitutional and void as infringing the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 14 and Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.”
10. In view of the above discussions, we find no illegality in the impugned order warranting interference.
11. In the result, the writ petition fails and accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The interim order stands discharged.
12. Writ petition dismissed.