KH. Nobin Singh, J.:— Heard Shri M. Rarry, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; Shri M. Devananda, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents, Shri R.K Umakanta, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Shri S. Jhalajit, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 8 in WP(C) No. 120 of 2014.
2. Since the writ petitions being WP(C) No. 366 of 2013 and WP(C) No. 120 of 2014 have arisen out a similar set of facts, the same are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
W.P (C) No. 366 of 2013:
3.1 By the instant writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of Certiorari for quashing the order dated 17-05-2013 issued by the Deputy Secretary (DP), Government of Manipur and for issuing a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent Nos. I and 2 to publish the seniority list of Manipur Police Service Grade-II Officers (hereafter referred to as “the MPS Grade-II Officers” by adhering the Office Memorandum dated 07-02-1986 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievance and Pension (Department of Training), Government of India and adopted by the Government of Manipur vide its Office Memorandum dated 13-11-1987. In the recast petition, one more prayer has been added challenging the final seniority list dated 20-01-2014 as on 01-10-2013 published by the State Government.
3.2 According to the petitioners, they were at the relevant time working as Inspectors of Police and were appointed on promotion to the post of MPS Grade-II vide order dated 01-03-2007 issued by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Manipur on the recommendation of a duly constituted DPC associated with the Manipur Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the MPSC”). On the recommendation of the MPSC, the private respondent Nos. 3 to 32 were also appointed to the post of MPS Grade-II vide order dated 14-08-2007 issued by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Manipur and the private respondent No. 33 was appointed to the said post vide order dated 24-11-2007.
3.3 The Government of Manipur made a rule called the Manipur Police Service Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the MPS Rules, 1965”) which deal with the appointment and seniority in respect of Manipur Police Services under the direct recruitment as well as by promotion. As mandated by Rule 28 of the MPS Rules, 1965, a final seniority list of MPS Officers as on 01-03-2007 came to be published vide Government order dated 11-11-2008 after having considered the objections from all concerned wherein the names of the petitioners figured. Acting upon the said final seniority list dated 11-11-2008, as many as 26 MPS Grade-II Officers were appointed on promotion to the post of MPS Grade-I vide various orders dated 28-02-2009, 08-04-2009, 27-07-2009 and 27-04-2011 issued by the State Government.
3.4 On 19-12-2009 the Government of Manipur published a tentative seniority list of MPS Officers, purportedly by following the principle of dovetailing, by which objections were called for from the concerned officers and in response thereto, the petitioners submitted their objections. Despite their objections being made by the petitioners, the said tentative seniority list dated 19-12-2009 remained unmodified and therefore, a writ petition being WP(C) No. 6 of 2010 came to be filed which was withdrawn on 23-08-2010 with a liberty to file a fresh petition and accordingly, a writ petition being WP(C) No. 138 of 2012 was filed wherein the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court was pleased to direct the State respondents not to disturb the seniority position of the petitioners.
4. The private respondents also filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 235 of 2012 praying for quashing the seniority list dated 11-11-2008 and also the tentative seniority list dated 19-12-2009 wherein the State Government took a stand that the seniority is purely based on the date of which the person is appointed to the service and not according to the year of vacancy. The said writ petition being WP (C) No. 235 of 2012 was disposed of by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court on 18-02-2013 with a direction to the State Government to finalise the inter-se seniority list of MPS Grade-II Officers in accordance with law and also in the light of the Office Memorandum dated 07-02-1986 adopted by the State of Manipur on 13-11-1987. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 published a tentative inter-se seniority list dated 11-03-2013 of MPS Grade-II Officers by following the principle of dovetailing system which was superseded by another tentative seniority list dated 12-03-2013 and objections were called for from the concerned officers. In response thereto, the petitioners filed their objections and in spite of the said objections being made by them, the State Government did not modify the said tentative seniority list and as the State Government was going to finalise the tentative seniority list without any modification, some of the petitioners filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 222 of 2013 praying for quashing the tentative seniority list dated 12-03-2013 and for publishing the same by adhering to the Office Memorandum dated 07-02-1986. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Hon'ble High Court on 05-04-2013 directing the respondents therein to consider all the relevant materials including the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court relating to the claim of the MPS officers in respect of the seniority list. Without considering all the materials on record, the respondent No. 2 issued an order dated 17-05-2013 thereby publishing the final seniority list of MPS Officers as on 01-04-2013. Being aggrieved by the said inter-se seniority list dated 17-05-2013, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners on the following inter-alia grounds:—
(a) As per Office Memorandum dated 29-04-1999 and Notification dated 24-02-1977 notifying the Act called “The Manipur Reservation of Vacancies in posts and Services (For SCs and STs) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the Reservation Act”), the expression “recruitment year” means the financial year and therefore, the private respondents who were appointed against the carried forward vacancies as well as in the subsequent year, should be placed en-bloc below the last promotees;
(b) The insertion of the word “year” as calendar year in Rule 2(g) of the MPS Rules, 1965 by way of an amendment vide Notification dated 18-12-2009 is prospective in its operation and has no application to the cases of the petitioners;
(c) While notifying the inter-se tentative seniority list dated 17-05-2013 by the State Government, it has completely ignored the directions given by the Hon'ble High Court in WP(C) No. 235 of 2012 and WP(C) No. 222 of 2013 which mandated that the O.M dated 07-02-1986 be followed;
(d) The Notification of seniority list in the manner that the State Government desired, tantamount to violation of the interim order dated 07-03-2012 passed by the Hon'ble High Court in WP(C) No. 138 of 2012 by which the State Government was directed not to disturb the seniority positions of the petitioners;
(e) If the seniority list is given effect to, it will amount to appointment of the direct recruits before their selection:
(f) At the time when the final seniority list as on 01-03-2007 was published vide order dated 11-11-2008, the private respondents who were not yet borne in the cadre, were not included therein;
(g) The final seniority list dated 17-05-2013, if given effect to, will unsettle the settled position in as much as the final seniority list dated 11-11-2008 has been already been acted upon;
(h) The State Government which took a stand in WP(C) No. 235 of 2012 that seniority is purely based on the date on which the person is appointed to the service and not according to the year of vacancy, has changed its stand without any valid reasons.
5. The stand of the State Government as reflected in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 & 2, is that the petitioners and the private respondents were appointed to the posts of MPSC Grade-II in the same year and the principle of dovetailing ought to be applied in the fixation of inter-se seniority list. As per the recruitment rules, since the appointment to the post of MPS Grade-II is from two sources; 50% by promotion and 50% by direct recruitment, the seniority is to be fixed by rotation of vacancies by applying Rota Rule against the vacancies occurred in the year. There was nothing in the MPSC Rules, 1965 to suggest that the term “year” would mean “financial year” and therefore, in order to clarify it, Rule 2(g) has been inserted by way of an amendment in the year 2009 and the inter-se seniority has been fixed thereafter. The OM dated 29-04-1999 provides only the method of calculation of vacancies by the Department concerned for preparation of a select panel financial year wise for reporting to the DPC but it does not mention anything about the inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees. It has no relevance so far as the present case is concerned. The Reservation Act is a totally different Act meant for reservation in posts and services and will have no application to the present case and it cannot override the MPS Rules, 1965. The term “year” may be interpreted as the recruitment year by the Departments and there is no provision which prohibits defining the term “year” to mean calendar year. The final seniority list was published in compliance with the court's order dated 18-02-2013 passed in WP(C) No. 235 of 2012. The seniority list needs to be updated from time to time so as to incorporate new inductees and to remove retired/expired officers and therefore, the claim of the petitioners that the seniority list dated 11-11-2008 has attained finality, is not sustainable. An affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of about 18 private respondents is in line with that of the State Government and in addition to what has been stated by the State Government, it is stated therein that in the recruitment rule itself, there is a provision for determination of relative seniority of direct recruits and the promotees. The private respondents, though appointed in the year 2007, have been appointed against the vacancies of 2004-05 and therefore, the question of carry forward does not arise. The order dated 01-03-2007 by which the petitioners were appointed against the vacancies 2006-07, has been quashed vide judgment and order dated 12-03-2010 passed in WP(C) No. 265 of 2007, a writ appeal preferred against it, was dismissed on 13-09-2012 and this fact has been suppressed by the petitioners. The fact that in terms of the seniority list dated 11-11-2008, 26 MPS Grade-II have been promoted to MPS Grade-I, is not denied but they were senior to the both the petitioners and the private respondents. Being aggrieved by the seniority list dated 11-11-2008, the private respondents raised objections thereto, because of which the tentative seniority list dated 19-09-2009/19-12-2009 was published which came to be challenged in WP(C) No. 235 of 2012 which was disposed on 18-02-2013 directing the respondents therein to finalise the inter-se seniority list in accordance with law as well as in the light of the submission of Shri Kh. Tarunkumar, Advocate. The interim order dated 07-03-2012 passed in WP(C) No. 138 of 2012 was vacated by the Hon'ble High Court on 09-05-2013 resulting in the withdrawal of the writ petition with a liberty to question the Notification dated 18-12-2009. Since the order dated 01-03-2007 having been dismissed, the petitioners have no locus to question the seniority list dated 17-05-2013 as long as their appointment was not restored. The seniority list dated 20-01-2014 has been acted upon by giving promotions to the MPS Grade-I including some of the promotees and they have not been made party in the present writ petition. Since the petitioners have not come to this court with clean hands, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. In the rejoinder, it has been stated that the Office Memorandum dated 29-04-1999 is being followed by all the Departments till today except some Departments for which the relevant service rules provide otherwise. In compliance with the judgment and order dated 23-10-2015 passed by this court in WP(C) No. 618 of 2013, a DPC meeting was held on 19-08-2016 and on the recommendation thereof, the State Government issued an order dated 15-09-2016 appointing as many as 40 Inspectors including some of the petitioners, on promotion to the posts of MPS Grade-II with effect from 01-03-2007 and therefore, those petitioners be placed in the seniority list by accepting the date of appointment as 01-03-2007.
W.P (C) No. 120 of 2014:
6.1 By this present writ petition, the petitioners who are also the petitioners along with others in WP(C) No. 366 of 2013, have prayed for issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the entire proceedings of the DPC in its meeting held on 18-02-2014 and the order dated 19-02-2014 issued by the State Government.
6.2 During the pendency of the writ petition being WP(C) No. 366 of 2013 questioning the validity and correctness of the final seniority list dated 17-05-2013, the State Government published another final seniority list dated 20-01-2014, by following the principles of dovetailing, on the basis of which the State Government was to hold a DPC for promotion to the posts of MPS Grade-I. An application being MC (WP(C)) No. 15 of 2014 came to be filed in the WP(C) No. 366 of 2013 wherein an order dated 19-02-2014 was passed directing the respondents to convene a DPC and to keep the proceedings thereof in sealed cover. However, without keeping proceedings in sealed cover, the result of the DPC was declared and an order dated 19-02-2014 was issued promoting the private respondents and being aggrieved by it, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the private respondents which is line with their affidavit filed in WP(C) No. 366 of 2013 and it has been stated therein that the said final seniority list dated 17-05-2013 was published in compliance with the order dated 18-02-2013 passed by the Hon'ble High Court in WP(C) No. 235 of 2012, on the basis of which the order dated 19-02-2014 was issued by the State Government. So is the case with the State Government when an affidavit is filed on its behalf.
7. The subject-matter in issue relates to the determination of inter-se seniority between the petitioners and the private respondents and so far as the basis on which their seniority is to be determined, is concerned, there is no much controversy for the reason that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied upon the Office Memorandum dated 13-11-1987 while the learned counsels appearing for the respondents have relied upon the provisions of Rule 28(iii) of the MPS Rule, 1965 as substituted vide MPS Rules, 1988 under order dated 21-6-1988 and while issuing the said order dated 21-06-1988, the Office Memorandum dated 13-11-1987 appears to have been taken into account because their wordings are almost similar. Moreover, in the writ petition being WP(C) No. 235 of 2012, the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court has directed that the inter-se seniority list of MPS Grade-II be finalised in accordance with law as well as in the light of the submission made by Shri Kh. Tarunkumar, i.e, in the light of the aforesaid Office Memoranda. Para 3 of the Office Memorandum dated 13-11-1987 is reproduced herein below:
“3. This matter, which was also discussed in the National Council has been engaging the attention of the Government for quite some time and it has decided that in future, while the principle of rotation of quotas will still be followed for determining the inter-seniority of direct recruits and promotes, the present practice of keeping vacant slots for being filled up by direct recruits of later years thereby giving them unintended seniority over promotes who are already in position, would be dispensed with. Thus if adequate number of direct recruits do not become available in any particular year, rotation of quotas for purpose of determining seniority would take place only to the extent of the available direct recruits and the promotes. In other words, to the extent direct recruits not available, the promotees will be bunched together at the bottom of the seniority list, below the last position upto which it is possible to determine seniority, on the basis of rotation of quotas with reference to the actual number of direct recruits vacancies would, however, be carried forward and added to the corresponding direct recruitment vacancies of the next year (and to subsequent years where necessary) for taking action for direct recruitment for the total number according to the usual practice. Thereafter, in that year while seniority will be determined between direct recruits and promotees, to the extent of the number of vacancies for direct recruits and promotees as determined according to the quota for that year, the additional direct recruits selected against the carried forward vacancies of the previous years would be placed en-bloc below the last promotees (or direct recruits as the case may be) in the Ministry of Finance etc. are requested to bring these instructions to the notice of all the attached/subordinate offices under them to when the general principles of seniority contained in O.M dated 22-12-1959 are applicable within 2 weeks as these orders will be effective from the next month.”
8. Rule 28(iii) of the MPSC Rules, 1965 is also reproduced herein below:
“Rule 28(III): The relative seniority of direct recruits and promotees shall be determined according to rotation of vacancies between direct recruits and promotees as determined under Rule 5 for that year and the additional direct recruits selected against carried forward vacancies of the previous year would be placed en-bloc below the last promotees (or direct recruits as the case may be).”
9. Before going into the merit of the case, this court proposes to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents on the ground that all the persons whose names are shown in the seniority list, have not been arrayed as party herein and therefore, the petition is liable to be rejected for non-joinder of necessary party. Refuting the said allegation, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners have no any grievance against them and no relief has been claimed against them for the reason that their seniority positions are not in dispute. The dispute is only in respect of the inter-se seniority between the petitioners and the private respondents. If that be the case, all are not required to be made party herein and only the persons who are likely to be affected by any decision rendered by this court in the instant writ petition and in their absence, no order can be passed by this court without giving them an opportunity of being heard, are the necessary party. Since their seniority positions are not in dispute, they are not necessary party and the present writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground that they have not been made party. As and when a new seniority list is prepared by the State Government, their seniority positions will continue to remain unchanged except in cases of new appointees/promotees and persons who have retired or expired.
10. Before adverting to the aforesaid contentions, this court deems it appropriate to examine and deal with the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited and relied upon by the counsels appearing for the parties. In support of his contention, Shri M. Rarry, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied upon the decision in Bimlesh Tanwa v. State of Haryana, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 604, wherein the Supreme Court held that seniority is not a fundamental right. It is merely a civil right. Inter-se seniority of the candidates who are appointed on the same day would be dependent on the rules governing the same. In the absence of rules governing seniority an executive order may be issued to fill up the gap. Only in the absence of a rule or executive instructions, the court may have to evolve a fair and just principle which could be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case. In Suraj Prakash Gupta v. State of J&K, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 561 wherein one of the issues was as to whether the direct recruits could claim a retrospective date of recruitment from the date on which the post in direct recruitment was available, even though the direct recruit was not appointed by that date and was appointed long thereafter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“81. This contention, in our view, cannot be accepted. The reason as to why this argument is wrong is that in service jurisprudence, a direct recruit can claim seniority only from the date of his regular appointment. He cannot claim seniority from a date when he was not borne in the service. This principle is well settled. In N.K Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (SCC at p. 325, para 32) Krishna Iyer, J. stated:
Later direct recruits cannot claim deemed dates of appointment for seniority with effect from the time when direct recruitment vacancy arose. Seniority will depend upon length of service.
Again, in A. Janardhana v. Union of India it was held that a later direct recruit cannot claim seniority from a date before his birth in the service or when he was in school or college. Similarly it was pointed out in A.N Pathak v. Secy. to the Govt. (SCC at p. 767) that slots cannot be kept reserved for direct recruits for retrospective appointments.”
11. In Pawan Pratap Singh v. Reevan Singh, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 267 wherein the question relates to determination of seniority between two groups of direct recruits to the posts of Deputy Jailor, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“45. From the above, the legal position with regard to determination of seniority in service can be summarised as follows:
(i) The effective date of selection has to be understood in the context of the service rules under which the appointment is made. It may mean the date on which the process of selection starts with the issuance of advertisement or the factum of preparation of the select list, as the case may be.
(ii) Inter se seniority in a particular service has to be determined as per the service rules. The date of entry in a particular service or the date of substantive appointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority inter se between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from different sources. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
(iii) Ordinarily, notional seniority may not be granted from the backdate and if it is done, it must be based on objective considerations and on a valid classification and must be traceable to the statutory rules.
(iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. It is so because seniority cannot be given on retrospective basis when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre and by doing so it may adversely affect the employees who have been appointed validly in the meantime.”
12. In Harish Chandra Ram v. Mukh Ram Dubey, reported in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 490, the issue was as to whether a general candidate should be considered for promotion on the ground that since the vacancy reserved for ST was not filled up for three successive years, it must be deemed that the vacancy had been dereserved and thrown open to the general candidates. While considering the said issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the expression “recruitment year” and held that the expression “recruitment year” means the year when the recruitment takes place. The relevant para Nos. 5, 6 & 7 are reproduced herein below:
“5. In view of the aforestated resolutions, it is clear that the general candidates will not be considered for promotion to the post for SC, ST or BC reserved candidates. The reserved candidates even if they are not available, it is settled law that unless dereservation is done the vacancy will not be thrown open to the general category. It is not incumbent upon the Government as soon as the vacancy arises that it must be filled by recruiting the candidates either by direct recruitment or promotion from feeder cadre or by transfer. So, as and when recruitment takes place the cases of all the candidates including reserved candidates must be considered according to rules which would arise only when recruitment takes place. Take for instance an hypothetical case. A and B are eligible for consideration and were considered in 1980 for two vacancies and B was found suitable and was appointed to one vacancy in 1982. One more vacancy arose in 1983. In the year 1983, A, C and D were considered. A and D were promoted in 1984. The recruitment years are 1982 and 1984, and not 1980 when one vacancy existed or 1983 when two vacancies existed. So each year is not the year of recruitment. As and when recruitment takes place in a particular year, it would be the year of recruitment.
6. Take another illustration. Suppose Public Service Commission advertises for direct recruitment in the year 1980, but actually selects the candidates in 1984. Whether 1980 would be the recruitment year? Answer would be no. Second advertisement was made in 1985 and recruitment was made in 1990. The second recruitment year is 1990 and not 1985. It is thus clear that the recruitment year is the year in which recruitment takes place, but not each three successive years in which the vacancy exists. The same yardstick would apply to fill in the reserved vacancy. Dereservation will be considered only at the end of third recruitment year provided reserved candidates are not available, or considered at the recruitment and found not fit for promotion or carried forward for three successive recruitment years. Then the matter should be placed before the competent authority for consideration for dereservation of the reserved posts and a resolution or order should be made dereserving the posts. Then those alone reserved posts or vacancies will be thrown open for recruitment by the general candidates.
7. In view of the above legal position, though the vacancy had occurred in the year 1980 but recruitment was made in the year 1987 by which time the appellant had already fulfilled the qualifications and had become eligible for consideration to Vacancy No. 2 in the roster which was admittedly reserved for SC candidate. The Promotion Committee was right in considering the case of the appellant for promotion as Senior Selection Grade Head Typist since that post was kept reserved for the Scheduled Caste candidate.”
13. Supporting the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Shri S. Jhalajit, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 8 in WP(C) No. 120 of 2014 relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AFHQ/ISOs SOs (DP) Association v. Union of India, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 331 wherein the question as regards determination of inter-se seniority between direct recruits and promotes fell for consideration, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“40. Mr Paramjit Singh Patwalia, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant AFHQ/ISOs SOs (DP) Association, in support of his submissions, placed reliance upon Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K. In the said case, this Court dealt with a situation of giving direct recruitment appointment antedated from the date of occurrence of a vacancy in the direct recruitment quota, even if on that date the said person was not directly recruited. The Court, in answer to Point 4, held as under: (SCC p. 599, paras 80-81)
“Point 4
Direct recruits cannot claim appointment from date of vacancy in quota before their selection
80. We have next to refer to one other contention raised by the respondent direct recruits. They claimed that the direct recruitment appointment can be antedated from the date of occurrence of a vacancy in the direct recruitment quota, even if on that date the said person was not directly recruited. It was submitted that if the promotees occupied the quota belonging to direct recruits they had to be pushed down, whenever direct recruitment was made. Once they were so pushed down, even if the direct recruit came later, he should be put in the direct recruit slot from the date on which such a slot was available under the direct recruitment quota.
81. This contention, in our view, cannot be accepted. The reason as to why this argument is wrong is that in service jurisprudence, a direct recruit can claim seniority only from the date of his regular appointment. He cannot claim seniority from a date when he was not borne in the service. This principle is well settled. In N.K Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (SCC at p. 325, para 32) Krishna Iyer, J. stated:
Later direct recruits cannot claim deemed dates of appointment for seniority with effect from the time when direct recruitment vacancy arose. Seniority will depend upon length of service.
Again, in A. Janardhana v. Union of India it was held that a later direct recruit cannot claim seniority from a date before his birth in the service or when he was in school or college. Similarly it was pointed out in A.N Pathak v. Secy. to the Govt., Ministry of Defence (SCC at p. 767) that slots cannot be kept reserved for direct recruits for retrospective appointments.”
41. In State of Uttaranchal v. Dinesh Kumar Sharma this Court has clearly held that the seniority is to be reckoned not from the date when the vacancy arose, but from the date on which the appointment is made to the post.”
14. On the other hand, Shri M. Devananda, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents relied upon the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the first being the one in Jagdish Ch. Pathak v. State of Orissa, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 456 wherein the issue was whether the seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees should be fixed by taking into consideration the quota fixed for them and with reference to the vacancies occurred against this quota. Rule 26 which provides the manner as to how the seniority be determined, was relevant and considering the scheme thereof, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“24. Rule 26 with which we are really concerned in the present case is the rule of seniority. It would be appropriate to extract the said Rule 26 in extenso:
“26. Seniority.— (1) When officers are recruited by promotion and by direct recruitment during the same year, the promoted officers shall be considered senior to the officers directly recruited irrespective of their dates of joining the appointment.
(2) Between the two groups of promoted officers, those promoted from the rank of Sub-Assistant Engineers shall en bloc be senior to those promoted from the rank of Junior Engineers.
(3) Subject to provision of sub-rules (1) and (2) seniority of officers shall be determined in accordance with the order in which their names appear in the lists prepared by the Commission.”
The very scheme of recruitment under the Rules, as indicated above, unequivocally indicates that in the case of direct recruits the final authority lies with the State Government who issues appointment orders from amongst the persons found eligible by the Public Service Commission and further who have been found medically fit by the Medical Board. Even such an appointee is also required to undergo probation for two years and thereafter he can be confirmed in the service. Under Rule 26, which is the Rule for determining inter se seniority between promotees and direct recruits when the expression used is “officers are recruited by promotion and by direct recruitment” necessarily it means that when they are appointed as Assistant Engineers by the State Government. To import something else into the Rule will neither be in the interest of justice nor is it necessary in any manner and it would tantamount to legislation by the Court. It is a well-known principle of construction of a statute that when the language used in the statute is unambiguous and on a plain grammatical meaning being given to the words in the statute, the end result is neither arbitrary, irrational or contrary to the object of the statute, then it is the duty of the court to give effect to the words used in the statute as the words declare the intention of the law-making authority best. In that view of the matter we do not see any justification to go into the question of quota meant for direct recruits and promotees nor is it necessary to find out as to the year in which the vacancy arose against which the recruitment is made. On an analysis of the scheme of the Rules, as narrated earlier, we are of the considered opinion that the expression “recruited” would mean appointed and the expression “during the same year” in Rule 26 would mean during the calendar year and, therefore, direct recruits recruited during the calendar year would be junior to the promotee recruits recruited during the said calendar year.
32. The next question for consideration is whether the year in which the vacancy accrues can have any relevance for the purpose of determining the seniority irrespective of the fact when the persons are recruited? Mr Banerjee's contention on this score is that since the appellant was recruited to the cadre of Assistant Engineer in respect of the vacancies that arose in the year 1978 though in fact the letter of appointment was issued only in March 1980, he should be treated to be a recruit of the year 1978 and as such would be senior to the promotees of the years 1979 and 1980 and would be junior to the promotees of the year 1978. According to the learned counsel since the process of recruitment takes a fairly long period as the Public Service Commission invites application, interviews and finally selects them whereupon the Government takes the final decision, it would be illogical to ignore the year in which the vacancy arose and against which the recruitment has been made. There is no dispute that there will be some time lag between the year when the vacancy accrues and the year when the final recruitment is made for complying with the procedure prescribed but that would not give a handle to the Court to include something which is not there in the rules of seniority under Rule 26. Under Rule 26 the year in which vacancy arose and against which vacancy the recruitment has been made is not at all to be looked into for determination of the inter se seniority between direct recruits and the promotees. It merely states that during the calendar year direct recruits to the cadre of Assistant Engineer would be junior to the promotee recruits to the said cadre. It is not possible for the Court to import something which is not there in Rule 26 and thereby legislate a new rule of seniority. We are, therefore, not in a position to agree with the submission of Mr Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, on this score.”
15. Secondly, in A.K Sehgal v. Raje Ram Shoeran, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 304, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“19. It is settled law that appointment to a post in accordance with the rules is a condition precedent and no one can claim appointment to a post or promotion, as of right, but has a right to be considered in accordance with the rules. Appointment by promotion or direct recruitment, therefore, must be in accordance with the rules so as to become a member of the service in a substantive capacity. Seniority is to be fixed in accordance with the principles laid down in the rules.”
16. Thirdly, in Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 417, one of the issues was as regards the determination of seniority between the appellant and the respondents. The Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of Rule 3(1) of the 1992 Rules in which the expression “recruitment year” is defined as the period of twelve months commencing from the first of July of calendar year. After referring to its earlier decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“34. Admittedly, promotions were not made with effect from one and the same date. The appellants and the respondents were promoted against the vacancies which had occurred in different recruitment years under different Rules and on different criteria. Thus, the respondents would rank below the appellants in seniority. Therefore, there could be no justification to hold that their inter se seniority in the feeding cadre would be relevant for determining the seniority of AECs. More so, had the interim order not been passed by this Court, the appellants could have been promoted under the unamended Rules much earlier. Thus, they are entitled for equitable relief, as the effect of the interim order of this Court was required to be neutralised. The appellants who had been promoted with an earlier date, thus, are bound to be senior than the respondents who had been promoted with respect from a later date. No employee can claim seniority prior to the date of his birth in the cadre.”
17. Fourthly, in Jogendra Sethi v. Rabindranath Behura, reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 693, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“6. Provision with regard to reservation of posts for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Orissa is made in the Orissa Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (For Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1971 and the rules framed thereunder. In Section 7 of the said Act provision is made for carrying forward vacancy for “three years of recruitment”. The expression “recruitment year” is defined in Section 2(b) of the Act. Prior to 1987 it meant the financial year during which the recruitment is actually made. By the amendment of 1987 the word “financial year” was replaced by “calendar year”.”
18. Fifthly, in Maharashtra Vikrikar Karmachari Sangathan v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 552, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“26. Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that some of the appellants have put in more than 17 years of service when a few of the direct recruits were either schooling and/or not born in the cadre. If the appellants were to be pushed down, it would cause great hardship to them. We are unable to subscribe to this contention because if there is patent violation of the quota rule, the result must follow and the appellants who remained in the office for all these years cannot take the advantage of this situation. This submission is, therefore, devoid of any substance.”
19. Since the contentions of Shri R.K Umakanta, the learned Government Advocate are similar to that of the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents, the same are not repeated here for the sake of brevity.
20. From the perusal of the decisions cited hereinabove, it is seen that seniority is not a fundamental right. It is merely a civil right. Inter-se seniority of the candidates who are appointed on the same day would be dependent on the rules governing the same. In the absence of rules governing seniority, an executive order may be issued to fill up the gap. Only in the absence of a rule or executive instructions, the court may have to evolve a fair and just principle which could be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case. In service jurisprudence, a direct recruit can claim seniority only from the date of his regular appointment. He cannot claim seniority from a date when he was not borne in the service. Inter-se seniority in a particular service has to be determined as per the service rules. The date of entry in a particular service or the date of substantive appointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority inter-se between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from different sources. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the rules which govern and regulate the determination of relative seniority, are nothing but the MPS Rules, 1965 and the relevant rule is Rule 28(iii) which provides that the relative seniority of direct recruits and promotees shall be determined according to rotation of vacancies between direct recruits and promotess as determined under Rule 5 for that year but the unfortunate part is that the expression “for that year” is not defined in the said rules. Therefore, the issue ultimately centres round the interpretation of the expression “recruitment year” and in other words, the short question that arises for consideration by this Court is as to whether the petitioners and the private respondents are appointed in the same recruitment year or not. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the expression “recruitment year” means the financial year for the reason that in the Office Memorandum dated 29-04-1999, clause 4.2 provides that for preparation of a select panel, Departments may calculate the vacancies (for reporting to DPC) financial year-wise. Moreover, the expression “recruitment year” is defined in Section 2(b) of the Reservation Act, 1976 as the financial year during which a recruitment is actually made by the State Government. On the other hand, the learned counsels appearing for the respondents have submitted that inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees shall be determined in terms of Rule 28(iii) of the MPS Rules, 1965 and in particular, the MPSC Rules, 1965 (2nd Amendment) 2009 published vide Notification dated 18-12-2009 wherein the term “year” is defined as the calendar year.
21. The present controversy has arisen mainly because of the fact that the rule 28 (iii) of the MPS Rules, 1965 do not lay down the manner as to how the inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees be determined and it simply provides that the relative seniority shall be determined according to rotation of vacancies between the direct recruits and the promotees as determined under rule 5 for that year. Rule 5 of the MPS Rules, 1965 provides for method of recruitment-50% by direct recruitment and 50% by promotion. If the recruitment, both by direct recruitment and by promotion, takes place in the same recruitment year, there will be no difficulty in determining the inter-se seniority. But it does not happen in the present case and the determination of inter-se seniority will depend upon the interpretation of the expression “recruitment year” in the context of the State Government and in particular, in the context of the present case. As regards the interpretation of the expression “recruitment year” the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners appear to have some force. The Office Memorandum dated 29-04-1999 contains instructions to be followed by a DPC in matters of holding its meetings towards promotion which is one of the methods of recruitment. Admittedly, the expression “recruitment year” is defined in Section 2(b) of the Reservation Act, 1971 as the “financial year during which a recruitment actually made” which provides provisions for reservation of vacancies in posts and services in order to ensure adequate representation of the reserved categories. It is no doubt true that these two namely the Office Memorandum dated 29-04-1999 and the Reservation Act, 1971 have nothing to do directly with the determination of inter-se seniority but they do have some relevance indirectly as regards the interpretation of the expression of “recruitment year”. The conjoint reading of both makes it very clear that they are somehow related to recruitment either by way of the direct recruitment or the promotion and in other words, both are to be taken into account at the time of recruitment in respect of posts and services in the State. Moreover, the fact that the expression “year” has been defined in Section 2(f) as “calendar year” only by way of an amendment of the MPS Rules, 1965 vide Notification dated 18-12-2009, shows indubitably that the expression “recruitment year” was never intended to mean “calendar year” prior to amendment which was prospective in its operation. From the aforesaid circumstances, it can be safely inferred and held that the expression “recruitment year”, prior to amendment, will mean “financial year” so far as the State of Manipur is concerned as aforesaid hereinabove. The various decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents and in particular, the decisions rendered in Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 417 and Jogendra Sethi v. Rabindranath Behura, reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 693 as regards the interpretation of the expression “recruitment year” will have no application for the reason that the expression “recruitment year” has been defined in the relevant rules mentioned therein.
22. Having held that the expression “recruitment year” would mean “financial year”, the facts of the present case would be required to be examined to find out as to whether the inter-se seniority between the petitioners and the private respondents has been properly and correctly determined in the impugned seniority lists. The petitioners were appointed on promotion to the post of MPS Grade-II vide order dated 01-03-2007 issued by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Manipur on the recommendation of a duly constituted DPC associated with the Manipur Public Service Commission and therefore, it can definitely be said that they were appointed in the recruitment year, 2006-07. On the other hand, the fact that the private respondent Nos. 3 to 32 were appointed to the post of MPS Grade-II vide order dated 14-08-2007 issued by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Govt. of Manipur while the private respondent No. 33 was appointed vide order dated 24-11-2007, has shown that they were appointed in the recruitment year, 2007-08. Since both the petitioners and the private respondents are not appointed in the same recruitment year, the principles of dovetailing cannot be applied while determining the inter-se seniority between the petitioners and the private respondents, as has been erroneously done by the State Government in the present case. The final seniority lists dated 17-05-2013 and 20-01-2014 are bad in law and consequently, all actions taken pursuant thereto including the orders issued by the State Government granting promotions to the post of MPS Grade-I, are rendered null and void so far as the petitioners and the private respondents are concerned. However, it is made clear that till the directions given by this court herein-below being complied with by the State Government, status quo as on date shall be maintained as regards the actions taken by the State Government pursuant to the said seniority lists.
23. For the reasons stated herein above, the writ petitions being WP(C) No. 366 of 2013 and WP(C) No. 120 of 2014 are allowed and consequently, the Government orders dated 17-05-2013, 20-01-2014 and 19-02-2014, impugned herein, in respect of the petitioners and the private respondents, are quashed and set aside with the following directions:
(a) The State Government shall prepare a seniority list afresh in respect of the MPS Officers, after taking into account the observations made by this court hereinabove, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order;
(b) While preparing the seniority list of MPS Officers, the State Government shall follow the guidelines/instructions contained in the Office Memorandum dated 07-02-1986 which is adopted by the State Government vide its Office Memorandum dated 13-11-1987 as directed vide order dated 18-02-2013 passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in WP(C) No. 235 of 2012. There shall be no order as to costs.