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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
  • PUNJAB TENANCY ACT
  • H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act.
  • C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976.
  • section 58 of the Tenancy Act
  • provisions of section 58 H of the Tenancy Act
  • H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.
  • Section 58 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter
  • section 46 of the HP Land Revenue Act.
  • Section 46 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act
  • section 100, C.P.C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
  • PUNJAB TENANCY ACT
  • H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act.
  • C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976.
  • section 58 of the Tenancy Act
  • provisions of section 58 H of the Tenancy Act
  • H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.
  • Section 58 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter
  • section 46 of the HP Land Revenue Act.
  • Section 46 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act
  • section 100, C.P.C.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (appellants) filed a suit for possession of land described in the plaint (Khata/Khasra particulars and aggregate area given in the record). The plaintiffs alleged that revenue entries recording Darshan Singh (now deceased) as a non-occupancy tenant were wrong, illegal and void because he was never inducted as a non-occupancy tenant; the owners were not aware of those entries and plaintiff No. 1 only came to know of them in May 1990 and opposed the attestation of conferment of proprietary rights. The plaint further alleges that defendant No. 1 took advantage of the revenue entries and dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit land in July 1990.

Defendant No. 1 contested the suit, denied dispossessing the plaintiffs in July 1990, asserted that he was a non-occupancy tenant inducted in 1960, and raised an objection as to the Civil Court's jurisdiction, submitting that conferment and vesting of proprietary rights under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (the Tenancy Act) is automatic and that the dispute therefore fell within revenue jurisdiction.

The trial court framed issues (including whether defendant's possession was trespass, whether tenancy entries were illegal, and whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction). After evidence, the trial court decreed the plaintiffs' suit. On appeal the lower Appellate Court set aside the trial court's decree and remanded the plaint to plaintiffs for presentation in a competent court, concluding that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred. The plaintiffs filed this Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 62 of 1997), which was admitted on 23.11.2001 on the substantial question of law: "Whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to go into the question involved in the present case between the parties?"

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the plaintiffs' suit challenging revenue entries and claiming possession (i.e., whether the forum is civil or revenue jurisdiction where entries record a non-occupancy tenant).
  2. Whether the lower Appellate Court was correct in holding that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was excluded in this matter and in remanding the plaint to be presented before a competent (revenue) court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Plaintiffs (as recorded)

  • The revenue entries showing Darshan Singh as non-occupancy tenant were wrong, illegal and void and not binding on the plaintiffs because he was never inducted as a non-occupancy tenant.
  • The owners were not aware of those entries; plaintiff No. 1 only discovered them in May 1990 and thereafter opposed the attestation of conferment of proprietary rights on defendant No. 1.
  • They sought possession of the suit land and reliefs consistent with challenging the correctness of the revenue record.

Respondent / Defendant No. 1 (as recorded)

  • Denied dispossessing the plaintiffs in July 1990 and asserted he was in possession as a non-occupancy tenant, having been inducted by predecessors of the plaintiffs in 1960.
  • Raised a jurisdictional objection: contended that the dispute falls within the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, which provides for conferment/vestment of proprietary rights (i.e., the matter is triable by revenue authorities and appellate/revisional authorities under the Tenancy Act), and therefore the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chuhniya Devi Vs. Jindu Ram, 1991 (1) Shimla Law Case Cs 223 (Full Bench of this Court) The Full Bench held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred only when both parties admit the status of landlord and tenant; where there is dispute about the status, the Civil Court has jurisdiction. The High Court observed the lower Appellate Court relied on this decision to exclude civil jurisdiction but found that the lower court had not applied its judicial mind or read the authority; the Chuhniya Devi ratio was used to show that civil courts retain jurisdiction where landlord-tenant status is disputed.
Babu Ram (deceased) through LRs Smt. Sita Devi and others Vs. Pohlo Ram (deceased) through LRs Smt. Vidya Devi and others, 1991 (2) Sim. L.C. 211 Held that where the status of plaintiff as tenant is not admitted by the defendant, the suit is not barred by Section 58 of the Tenancy Act; Civil Court can entertain such suits (following the principle in Raja Durga Singh). Quoted as consistent authority supporting the proposition that civil courts have jurisdiction where tenant status is disputed; used to reinforce the High Court's conclusion that the lower Appellate Court erred.
Raja Durga Singh v. Tholu and others, AIR 1963 SC 361 The Supreme Court observed that the legislature barred only suits from civil courts where there was no dispute between the parties that the person in possession was a tenant; there is no provision excluding suits by or against a person claiming to be a tenant whose status is disputed. Relied upon as the foundational Supreme Court authority establishing that civil jurisdiction is barred only in the absence of dispute as to tenancy; the High Court invoked this ratio to conclude civil court jurisdiction existed in the present case.
Birbal Vs. Udhami and others, 1992 (1) Sim.L.C. 153 Held that Section 58 of the Act does not bar suits by or against a person claiming to be a tenant whose status as tenant is not admitted by the land owner; civil courts can try such disputes. Cited to show consistent local precedent applying the Durga Singh principle; used to support the proposition that the civil court had jurisdiction in the present matter.
V. Ramachandra Ayyar and another Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar and another, AIR 1963 SC 302 Authority referred to in the context of second appeals (observations relating to Regular Second Appeal under section 100 CPC prior to amendment); cited within local reasoning. Referenced (via Birbal) as an authority relevant to considerations on second appeals and the propriety of interference; used as supporting background in analysis of the appellate process.
Udham Singh Vs. Ram Singh and Another, (2007) 15 SCC 529 The Supreme Court observed that jurisdictional questions are to be decided on the basis of the averments in the plaint and not on the basis of ultimate factual findings; the Court criticized deciding jurisdiction by reference to merits. The High Court relied on this Supreme Court pronouncement to hold that the lower Appellate Court's jurisdictional finding (based on merits or documents) was unsustainable; it supported the conclusion that jurisdiction should be determined from the plaint's averments and that civil court jurisdiction existed here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by stating the controlling principle that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be readily inferred or excluded; the proper test is the "pith and substance" of the plaint's allegations and the reliefs sought, not the defence in the written statement.

The learned lower Appellate Court had concluded that civil jurisdiction was excluded principally by relying on the Full Bench decision in Chuhniya Devi. The High Court noted that the lower Appellate Court had not adequately applied its judicial mind nor properly read the Chuhniya Devi decision.

The High Court then surveyed authoritative decisions (both from this Court and the Supreme Court) establishing the consistent legal position:

  • The Chuhniya Devi Full Bench holding: civil jurisdiction is barred only when both parties admit the landlord-tenant status; where status is disputed civil courts have jurisdiction.
  • Local precedents (e.g., Babu Ram, Birbal) and the Supreme Court decision in Raja Durga Singh affirm that Section 58 (Tenancy Act) does not bar suits by or against persons claiming to be tenants where the status is disputed.
  • The Supreme Court in Udham Singh clarified that jurisdictional questions must be assessed on the pleadings and not by resolving ultimate factual issues; jurisdiction should not be decided by reference to the merits or documents in a manner that pre-empts the trial.

Applying these principles to the present record, the High Court held that the question of whether defendant No. 1 was in possession as a non-occupancy tenant or a trespasser involved a dispute about the status of the parties — precisely the sort of dispute which the cited authorities indicate is triable by the Civil Court. Consequently, the lower Appellate Court's finding that civil jurisdiction was barred was incorrect and unsustainable. The High Court therefore declined to go into the factual merits (so as not to deprive parties of appellate opportunities) but set aside the lower Appellate Court's order on jurisdictional grounds and remitted the matter to that court for fresh decision on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the lower Appellate Court for fresh decision.

Direct consequences and directions made by the Court:

  • The substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellants: it is the Civil Court which has jurisdiction to entertain the present lis (i.e., the suit as pleaded).
  • The lower Appellate Court's order remanding the plaint for presentation in a "competent" (revenue) court is set aside; the appeal is remanded to the lower Appellate Court to be decided afresh on merits.
  • The parties are directed to appear before the lower Appellate Court on 3.10.2016; the Court requested that the lower Appellate Court dispose of the appeal expeditiously and in any event not later than 31 December 2016.
  • The parties are left to bear their own costs.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and restates existing authorities on forum/jurisdictional questions (including Supreme Court and Full Bench precedents) but does not purport to create a new principle; it affirms that where the tenancy/ownership status is disputed on the pleadings, the Civil Court retains jurisdiction and the question must be decided on merits rather than by excluding the civil forum at a preliminary stage.

    Swaran Singh (Deceased), Through Lrs. v. Darshan Singh (Deceased), Through Lrs. S

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    RSA No. 62 of 1997

    Date of decision: 14.9.2016

    Swaran Singh (Deceased), through LRS. …Appellants . Versus

    Darshan Singh (Deceased), through LRS. …Responde P nts Coram .

    The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1Yes. H For the Appellants: Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, A f dvocate.

    For the Respondents: Mr. K.D. Sood, Senior Advocate with Mr.Rajneesh K. Lal,o Advocate, for respondents No. 1(a) to 1 (e t ).

    r

    Tarlok Singh Chauh u an J. (Oral).

    The plaintiffs ar o e the appellants, who aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court, whereby he held the suit of the plaintiff t o Cbe not maintainable before the Civil Court and thereby reversed the h findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, have filed this Regul i ar g Second Appeal questioning the said judgment and decree. H 2. The bare minimal facts as necessary for adjudication of this case are that the plaintiffs/appellants (herein after referred to as the 'plaintiffs') filed a suit for possession of land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 62min/160, Khasra No. 1 min measuring 3 Bighas, Khasra No. 55 min measuring 7 Bighas and Khasra No. 56 min measuring 14 Biswas, Kitas 3 total measuring

    1 0 Bighas 1 4 Biswas. It was further pleaded that the revenue entries showing Darshan Singh, (now deceased) as non-occupancy tenant were wrong, illegal, void and not binding on plaintiffs and proforma defendants, as he was never inducted as non-occupancy tenant. The owners were not aware of the wrong revenue entries and only in the month of May, 1990, plaintiff No. 1 came to know about such entries, where after, he moved an application opposing the attestation of conferment of proprietary rights upon defendant No. 1. Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes

    1

    2 RSA No. 62 of 1997

    However, defendant No. 1, taking undue advantage of the wrong revenue entries dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit land in July, 1990.

    3. Only defendant No. 1 contested the suit and denied that he h . ad dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit land in July, 1990 and asserted that he was a non-occupancy tenant over the suit land and was induct . edP as such by predecessor of the plaintiffs in the year 1960. He rai H sed the objection regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit an f d further submitted that the conferment and vestment of proprietary rig hts o is automatic under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.

    4. The learned trial Court fram r edt the following issues:-

    "1. Whether the possession of defendant No. 1 in the suit land is of tres-passe o r? OP u P 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the entries of tena C ncy are illegal and fraudulent? OPP 3. W hether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim possession, as h claimed? OPP 4. Whether the proper court fee has been affixed? OPP

    ig

    5. Whether this court has jurisdiction? OPP

    6. Whether this suit is within limitation? OPP

    H 7. Relief." 5. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. However, on appeal being filed before the learned lower Appellate Court, the decree passed by learned trial

    Court was set aside and the case was remanded back to it for returning the

    plaint to the plaintiffs for presentation in a competent Court of law.

    6. Aggrieved by the said findings, plaintiffs/appellants have filed the instant appeal and the same came to be admitted on 23.11.2001 on the following substantial question of law:-

    "Whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to go into the question involved in the present case between the parties?"

    2

    3 RSA No. 62 of 1997

    I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case.

    7. At the outset, it may be observed that the jurisdiction of C . ivil Court cannot be readily inferred or easily excluded. While determining such jurisdiction, it is the pith and substance of the plaint's allegations th . atP have to be kept in mind, so also the pith and substance of the r elie H f sought and the jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence taken b f y the defendant in the written statement.

    8. Adverting to the facts of the t cas e, oit would be noticed that the only reason which weighed with the lear r ned lower Appellate Court to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Civil Co u urt was excluded is the judgment rendered

    by Hon'ble Full Bench of thi o s Court in Chuhniya Devi Vs. Jindu Ram 1991 (1) Shimla Law Case C s 223, as would be evident from para 9 of the judgment, which reads thus:

    h "9. The facts of the case are not disputed that the plaintiffs and g proforma-defendants No. 2 to 19 having been recorded as occupancy i

    tenants of the suit land shall be deemed to have become its owners. H

    However, the suit land is alleged to be admittedly in possession of the defendant No. 1. Though it is alleged in the plaint that the defendant No. 1 has dispossessed the plaintiffs and came in illegal possession of the suit land in May, 1990, but the long standing entries in the revenue records commencing from the Jambandies 1960-1961 (Ext.DW1/A) todate show the possession of the defendant No. 1 over

    the suit land as non-occupancy tenant on payment or rent of Rs.150/-

    per annum. The presumption of correctness having been attached to

    the entries of the revenue records he shall prima facie be deemed to

    be in possession of the suit land as non-occupancy tenant. However

    at the worst it can be taken that there is a dispute between the parties

    if the possession of the defendant No. 1 over the suit land has been

    as a non-occupancy tenant or not. But such dispute is triable by the

    revenue Courts under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The

    order of the Land Reform Officer to that effect is appealable to the

    higher revenue courts. Even the revision and review lies to the higher

    Authorities. Therefore, it is not disputed that the H.P. Tenancy and

    Land Reforms Act is a complete Code in itself with regard to the

    3

    4 RSA No. 62 of 1997

    dispute in question. Therefore, I do agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the Chuhniya Devi's case referred to above the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in this matter is barred. This point as such is decided in favour of the appellants."

    .

    9. To say the least, the learned lower Appellate Court has not at all applied its judicial mind and has further not even cared to have . aP glance, much less, read the judgment passed in Chuhniya Devi's ca H se (supra) or else the learned lower Appellate Court would not have pass f ed such an order.

    10. In Chuhniya Devi's case (supra), th o e Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court had categorically held that the jurisdi t ction of the Civil Court was barred only when both the parties admit about r the status of landlord and tenant, but when there is dispute about such u status, then the Civil Court alone would

    have the jurisdiction. This po o sition of law has been consistently maintained by

    this Court and reference in this regard can conveniently be made to Babu

    Ram (deceased) th ro C ugh L.Rs. Smt. Sita Devi and others Vs. Pohlo Ram

    (deceased) th h rough L.Rs. Smt. Vidya Devi and others 1991 (2) Sim. L.C.

    211, w i he g rein it has been held as under:- H

    "6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that the status of the plaintiff was not admitted by defendant and, therefore, there was no bar for civil court to entertain and decide the suit and moreover incorrect entry had appeared in the revenue record against the plaintiff, therefore, suit for declaration in a civil court was competent and maintainable in view of section 46 of the

    HP Land Revenue Act. It was further contended that defendant

    could not be permitted to lead additional evidence merely to fill in the

    lacunae in the case especially when such evidence was within the

    knowledge of the defendant and could have been easily produced in

    the trial court.

    7. I see much force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the suit is barred under Section 58 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter to be called as the Tenancy Act) is not tenable. There is no clause in section 58 of the Tenancy Act which provides for a suit by or against a person claiming himself to be a tenant and whose status as a tenant is not

    4

    5 RSA No. 62 of 1997

    admitted by the land owner. The legislature barred only those suits from the cognizance of civil court where there is no dispute between the parties about the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was a suit filed by the plaintiff claiming himself to be in possession of the property as a tenant under the defendant and defendant had n.ot admitted the status of the plaintiff, as such, rather, it was p . le P aded that the plaintiff was not at all in possession. The provisions contained in the Punjab Tenancy Act, as applicable to Himachal Pradesh, which

    are parimateria with the provisions of section 58 H of the Tenancy Act

    came up for consideration before the Supre f me Court in Raja Durga Singh V. Tholu and others, AIR 19 63 o SC 361. The Supreme Court observed init report as under: "……There is no entry r or t item relating to a suit by or against a person claiming to be a tenant and whose status as a tenant is not admitted by u the landlord. It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer th o at the legislature barred only those suits form the cognizance of a civil court where there was no dispute between the C parties that a person cultivating land or who was in p ossession of land was a tenant……" 8 h . In view of the specific pleadings and as observed by the g Supreme Court in Durga Singh's case (supra), Civil Court i

    undoubtedly had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. Moreover, plaintiff had felt aggrieved by an entry made in the revenue

    H

    records on the basis of an order passed by Revenue Officer. Section 46 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act provides that if a person considers himself aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession by an entry in a record of right or any periodical record, he can institute a suit for declaration of the rights under Chapter VI of the

    Specific Relief Act, 1963. The courts below, as such, were right in

    their view that Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the

    suit."

    11. On the same preposition, reliance can be placed on the judgment rendered in Birbal Vs. Udhami and others 1992 (1) Sim.L.C. 153, wherein this Court held as under:-

    "8. The close perusal of section 58 (3) of the Act shows that there is no clause therein providing for a suit by or against a person claiming himself to be a tenant and whose status as a tenant is not admitted by the land owner. The legislature barred only those suits from the cognizance of civil courts where there is no dispute between the

    5

    6 RSA No. 62 of 1997

    parties about the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was a suit filed by the plaintiff claiming himself to be in possession of the property as a tenant under the defendant and defendant had not admitted the status of the plaintiff as such, rather, it was pleaded that the plaintiff was not at all in possession. The provisions contained in the Punj.ab Tenancy Act, as applicable to Himachal Pradesh, which are pari material with the provisions of section 58 of the Tenancy A . ctP came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Raja Durga Singh V. Tholu and others, AIR 1963 SC 361. The Suprem H e Court observed as under:

    "….There is no entry or item relatinfg to a suit by or against a person claiming to be t a te o nant and whose status as a tenant is not admitted by the landlord. It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the legislature barred only those suits from th u e cogrnizance of a civil court where there was no dis o pute between the parties that a person cultivating land or who was in possession of land was a tenant….." In view of the specific pleadings and as observed by the Suprem e C Court in Durga Singh's case (supra), civil court undoubtedly had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. In the instant case,

    a h dmittedly, both the parties are at loggerheads with respect to the g status of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims to be the owner in i

    possession of the suit land. The point involved in the instant case is covered by the facts and circumstances of the case of Raja Durga

    H

    Singh (supra). Accordingly, the point being devoid of any merit is rejected. Even otherwise, no interference is called for in the second appeal keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case which are covered by the observations made in V. Ramachandra Ayyar and another Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar and another, AIR 1963

    SC 302. The observations, in fact, pertain to the Regular Second

    appeal under section 100, C.P.C. prior to its amendment by C.P.C.

    (Amendment) Act, 1976. Defendant Birbal has no legs to stand up

    irrespective of the plea of relinquishment of tenancy land by the

    plaintiff in view of section 31 of the Act."

    12. Above all, the question posed for consideration is no longer resintegra in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

    Udham Singh Vs. Ram Singh and Another (2007) 15 SCC 529, wherein it was observed as under:-

    6

    7 RSA No. 62 of 1997

    "11. The observations of the High Court on the point of jurisdiction may be quoted, which read as under:

    "It may be very specifically pointed out here that so far as the present case is concerned, as per the allegations made in the plaint, the plaintiff filed a suit for possession agains.t a trespasser on the basis of title. Such a suit . pr P imarily is triable by the civil court and in the present case the plaintiff has failed to prove his plea that he was the owner and the

    defendants were the trespassers. S H uit, as discussed above, has to be disallowed. In the present case, relationship of landlord and tenafnt between the parties

    existed and stood esta t blis he o d during the trial of the present suit. On the basis r of the ratio of Chuhniya case (supra) the plaintiff otherwise has not been successful to make out a case for civil u court's interference. ON that account also, the plaintif o f has not been successful." 12. According to the own observations of the High Court on the basis of the ave C rment made in the plaint the suit was cognizable by the civil court. The averments and prayers made in the plaint, are relevant for purpos e of deciding the forum where the cause will lie. Looking to the p h laint case, the High Court was itself of the opinion that the civil court g was competent to take cognizance of the suit. But we feel that the i

    High court went wrong while holding otherwise on the basis of the findings ultimately arrived at by the High Court on facts that the

    H

    defendants were not the trespassers. The jurisdiction is not to be decided on the basis of the ultimate findings arrived at by the Court. We have already held earlier that the High Court erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two courts of fact, namely, the trial court and first appellate court after detailed and elaborate

    discussion of the oral as well as documentary evidence on the record.

    The High court misread the documents and thereby upset the findings

    of courts below."

    13. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, the findings rendered by the learned lower Appellate Court on the point of jurisdiction cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. The learned Lower Appellate Court has not gone into the merits of the case and therefore, it would not be advisable for this Court to go into the factual matrix of the case, lest it defeats one's valuable right of appeal to the aggrieved party. The substantial

    7

    8 RSA No. 62 of 1997

    question of law is answered accordingly and it is held that it is only the Civil Court which has the jurisdiction to entertain the instant lis.

    14. Having said so, the appeal is allowed and the judgment a . nd decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court being not sustainable in the eyes of law is accordingly set aside, leaving the parties to bear . thePir costs. The appeal is remanded back to the learned lower Ap H pellate Court for decision afresh. f

    15. The parties through their learned co o unsel are directed to appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court t on 3.10.2016. As the suit in this case was filed nearly 26 years back r on 24.10.1990, the learned lower Appellate Court is requested to d u ispose of the appeal as expeditiously as

    possible and in no event late o r than 31st December, 2016.

    C

    (Tarlok Singh Chauhan), Judge. 14 th September, 2016 (KRS) gh

    H

    i

    8

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    Swaran Singh (Deceased), Through Lrs. v. Darshan Singh (Deceased), Through Lrs. S
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