Pradeep Nandrajog, J.:— Having heard learned counsel for the parties no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order dated 22.2.2008 passed by the Delhi School Tribunal.
2. 2 points are urged at the hearing today. It is firstly urged that the order of termination could not have been passed with reference to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Second contention urged is that the order was a camouflage, real intention being to deprive petitioners from salary as per recommendations of the Vth Pay Commission.
3. I note that the petitioner and one Amar Nath were employed as drivers under the DAV Public School. They were the junior most drivers. With a view to clean the area of Delhi, Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that no bus other than run on CNG would operate within the Union Territory of Delhi.
4. The school was unable to convert its fleet into CNG run fleet resulting in certain employees being declared surplus on account of non-availability of job.
5. Petitioner and Amar Nath, being the junior most drivers were retrenched vide notice dated 7.1.2003 Being workmen, retrenchment compensation under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was paid. Retrenchment was challenged urging that under the Delhi School Education Act 1973 the concept of retrenchment does not exist. Second point urged was that the retrenchment was mala fide intended to deprive the petitioner his due salary as per recommendation of the Vth Pay Commission.
6. Qua the plea that pertaining to employees of a school recognized under the Delhi School Education Act the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable, suffice would it be to state that under said circumstances, on abolition of post the services of the petitioners could be dispensed with for it is a rule of service jurisprudence that where a post itself is abolished, the holder of the post loses lien. Thus de-hors the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, the petitioner has no case.
7. I may note that the petitioner was working as a workman under the school and therefore procedure under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act was rightly followed.
8. On the plea of mala fide, suffice would it be to state the petitioner made bald allegations that he was not being paid full pay and allowances as per the recommendations of the V Pay Commission. This was the stand in the legal notice dated 10.1.2003 (page 27-28) of the writ petition. In para 3 of the notice the petitioner stated as under:-
“3. That the school has not paid my clients their full Pay and Allces as per Fifth Pay Commission. There arrears as per record comes to approximately Rs. seventy thousand and eighty thousand respectively which the school authorities are holding back and have not paid them. That the above mentioned notices addressed to both of my clients are illegal, unjust arbitrary, against law and fully smacks of malafide intentions.”
9. The response of the school to para 3 of the notice reads as under:-
“That the contents of para 3 of your said Notice, being false, are denied. The school has been paying pay and allowances to each of your clients in accordance with the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission as accepted by the Government. They are in receipt Rs. 3,500/- p.m as basic pay and Rs. 1435/- p.m as, Dearness Allowance. It is denied that the school has held back Rs. 70,000/- due to your client, Shri Raj Kumar; and Rs. 80,000/- due to your client, Shri Amar Nath. It is also denied that the Notices given to your clients are illegal, unjust, arbitrary and mala fide.”
10. Under the circumstances I hold that there is no basis for the petitioner to allege that the order of termination was a camouflage.
11. I find no infirmity in the view taken by the Delhi School Tribunal.
12. The writ petition is dismissed in limine.