AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 with section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act
  • 15 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Central Act)
  • provisions of the Punjab Act with section 15 (a) of the Central Act.
  • Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Delhi Amendment Act, 1959 (Act 20 of 1959)
  • rule of construction of section 15 (a) of the Central Act
  • PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT 1948
  • provision of the Punjab Act in section 5 (2) (a) (vi)
  • provision of section 5 (2) (a) (vi) of the Punjab Act
  • SECTION 15 CENTRAL SALES TAX ACT 1956
  • provisions of section 15 (a) of the Central Act,
  • Delhi Act by section 15 (a) of the Central Act
  • provisions of sub-clause (vi) of section 5 (2) (a)
  • State Sales Tax Act, the State Sales Tax Act
  • Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957
  • provisions of the State Sales Tax Acts
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Sales Act,
  • Punjab General Sales Tax Rules, 1949
  • section 5 (2) (a) (vi) of the Punjab Act.
  • 1958 section 15 of the Central Act
  • section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Act.(2)
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Act.(3)
  • Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941
  • State Sales Tax Act or the Rules
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Act
  • section 15 (b) of the Central Act
  • provision of the Sales Tax Act
  • Sub-clause (vi) of section 5 (2) (a)
  • section 15 of the Central Act
  • provisions of the Punjab Act,
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • section 5 of the Punjab Act
  • section 4 of the Delhi Act
  • State Sales Tax Act
  • section 5 (2) (a) (ii).
  • section 5 (2) (a) (6)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 with section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act
  • 15 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Central Act)
  • provisions of the Punjab Act with section 15 (a) of the Central Act.
  • Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Delhi Amendment Act, 1959 (Act 20 of 1959)
  • rule of construction of section 15 (a) of the Central Act
  • PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT 1948
  • provision of the Punjab Act in section 5 (2) (a) (vi)
  • provision of section 5 (2) (a) (vi) of the Punjab Act
  • SECTION 15 CENTRAL SALES TAX ACT 1956
  • provisions of section 15 (a) of the Central Act,
  • Delhi Act by section 15 (a) of the Central Act
  • provisions of sub-clause (vi) of section 5 (2) (a)
  • State Sales Tax Act, the State Sales Tax Act
  • Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957
  • provisions of the State Sales Tax Acts
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Sales Act,
  • Punjab General Sales Tax Rules, 1949
  • section 5 (2) (a) (vi) of the Punjab Act.
  • 1958 section 15 of the Central Act
  • section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Act.(2)
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Act.(3)
  • Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941
  • State Sales Tax Act or the Rules
  • section 15 (a) of the Central Act
  • section 15 (b) of the Central Act
  • provision of the Sales Tax Act
  • Sub-clause (vi) of section 5 (2) (a)
  • section 15 of the Central Act
  • provisions of the Punjab Act,
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • section 5 of the Punjab Act
  • section 4 of the Delhi Act
  • State Sales Tax Act
  • section 5 (2) (a) (ii).
  • section 5 (2) (a) (6)
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — V.S. Deshpande, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These connected writ petitions concern the levy of sales tax on "declared goods" (specifically cotton yarn) under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as extended to Delhi (the "Delhi Act") and its compatibility with section 15(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 read with Article 286(3) of the Constitution.

Two assessees filed writs (Civil Writ 1247 of 1972 — M/s Dina Nath & Sons v. The Sales Tax Officer; and Civil Writ 350 of 1973 — M/s Ramesh Trading Company v. The Sales Tax Officer) seeking quashing of sales-tax assessments for 1969-70 on the ground that the Delhi Act permitted taxation of declared goods at more than one stage, contrary to section 15(a) of the Central Act, and therefore no liability arose.

The Financial Commissioner had accepted the assessees' view in two matters (Messrs Gobind Saran Ganga Saran v. The State, Revisions Nos. 234 & 384 of 1972; and M/s Raj Trading Company v. The State, Revisions No. 319–322 of 1972). The Commissioner of Sales Tax challenged those Financial Commissioner orders by filing Civil Writ 460 of 1973 and Civil Writ 553 of 1973, seeking quashing of the Financial Commissioner orders and asserting that the Delhi Act was consistent with section 15(a) and that the respondents were liable to assessment.

All four writs were heard together before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi Act, as applied to cotton yarn (a declared good), permits the levy of sales tax at more than one stage, contrary to section 15(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
  2. Whether the Delhi Act sufficiently fixes the stage of taxation (i.e., whether the taxing provision operates as a single-point levy and, if so, at which stage).
  3. Whether purchasers or sellers under the Delhi Act have (or can be expected to have) the requisite knowledge that tax has already been levied on particular declared goods, thereby preventing multiple levies.
  4. Whether, where declared goods have already suffered tax, the sale prices must be excluded from a dealer's gross turnover even if the State Act does not expressly provide such an exclusion.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessees' Arguments

  • The Delhi Act does not fix the stage at which cotton yarn is liable to sales tax in Delhi; because of that omission, the tax is liable to be levied at more than one stage in a series of sales, which contravenes section 15(a) of the Central Act.
  • A dealer or registered dealer selling cotton yarn could not know whether the yarn had already been subjected to sales tax in a prior sale; in the absence of such knowledge the dealer might be compelled to pay tax again, contrary to section 15(a).
  • Under the Delhi Act a dealer or registered dealer would be required to include sales of cotton yarn in his taxable turnover and no provision enables him to exclude sales already taxed; thus the same goods could be taxed more than once, contrary to section 15(a).
  • It was further suggested that section 5A of the Delhi Act (allowing notification of the point in the series at which goods may be taxed) was inserted in 1959 to enable fixing of points, implying that absent such notification the stage remains indefinite (argument rejected by the Court).

Commissioner of Sales Tax / Government's Arguments

  • Section 15(a) of the Central Act does not require a State sales-tax enactment to use the words "first" or "last" sale; the taxing provision must be read to ascertain the stage at which it operates.
  • Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Delhi Act effects a single-point levy: the tax is leviable on the last sale (a sale by a registered dealer to an unregistered dealer or consumer), because sales to registered dealers who avail exemptions are not taxable and the taxable sale will therefore be the sale that removes the goods from the stream of commerce within Delhi.
  • A registered dealer who purchases from an unregistered dealer or consumer would be expected (and bound) to know, and therefore to inquire, whether the sale had already suffered tax; such knowledge prevents successive levies in ordinary commercial circumstances.
  • Once a sale has suffered the levy of sales tax, there is no liability to levy again and, where liability does not arise, the sale price need not be included in gross turnover — the distinction between the liability to levy and the liability to be assessed is significant.
  • The legislative history (statement of objects and reasons for the 1959 Delhi amendment) supports the view that the Delhi Act's scheme contemplates taxation on the last sale for declared goods; further, Form 22A-type certification used in Punjab is unnecessary in Delhi because of the last-sale scheme.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
M/s. Fitwell Engineers v. Financial Commissioner, Delhi Administration (Civil Writ No. 590 of 1973; decided April 26, 1974) Interpreted section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Delhi Act as adopting a single-point levy; sale to unregistered dealer or consumer is the taxable (last) sale. This Court relied on the Fitwell decision to support the conclusion that the Delhi Act's scheme fixes the taxable stage as the last sale and effects a single-point levy even without using the words "last sale".
Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 592 Construction principle: clause (3) of Article 286 and section 15(a) do not destroy State charging sections but modify them; State law is subject to restrictions and conditions contained in Central law. Cited as authority for reading the Central Act and State Act harmoniously and for the rule that section 15(a) modifies State provisions rather than invalidating them outright.
Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1967) 20 S.T.C. 290 Emphasised the need for State Acts to make clear that tax will not be levied except from the persons who are bound to pay; criticised absence of machinery for ascertaining whether tax has already been paid (in the Punjab Act's clause vi). Discussed at length; Court accepted the Supreme Court's concerns about the Punjab provision but concluded Bhawani Cotton Mills does not require that the State Act must expressly use the words "first" or "last". The judgment was used to explain differences between Punjab and Delhi Acts.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lakshmi Oil Mills, Bhongir, (1967) 20 S.T.C. 489 Schedule language that characterises the purchaser (e.g., "when purchased by a miller") can indicate the taxable stage without using the word "first". Used to support the proposition that an Act can sufficiently indicate the taxable stage by its scheme and language without expressly saying "first" or "last".
Sri Venkateswara Rice, Ginning and Groundnut Oil Mill Contractors Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 28 S.T.C. 599 Confirmed that once particular goods have been subjected to tax, the State's power to tax those goods is exhausted and subsequent dealings cannot be taxed. Relied upon to show that the State Act's scheme can make the first purchase taxable and thereby preclude further taxation of the same goods.
Rafeeq Ahmed & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1969) 24 S.T.C. 430 Similar interpretation (to Andhra cases) about Schedule language indicating stage without the explicit word "first". Referenced to support the view that statutory language may indicate the stage of taxation without the literal use of "first" or "last".
Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab, (1967) 20 S.T.C. 430 Constitution Bench holding that, read with section 15, Punjab Act's terms fixed the stage for taxation (purchase by dealer for use in manufacture) even without the words "first" or "last". Relied upon to show that section 15 read with State Acts can automatically control and fix the stage for taxation; supports harmonious reading of Central and State law.
Gopaldas v. Sales Tax Officer, (1973) 31 S.T.C. 575 Observed that an unregistered dealer would usually sell to a registered dealer at a loss, making the hypothetical re-entry of goods unlikely. Cited by this Court to reject the assessees' "fanciful" scenario that taxed goods might re-enter the stream and be taxed again.
Rattan Lal v. The Assessing Authority, (1970) 25 S.T.C. 136 Rejected the contention that re-entry by a non-registered dealer necessarily creates multiple levies; supported clarity after amendment. Used as precedent rejecting the assessees' contention regarding possible multiple taxation after interposition of a non-registered dealer.
A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, (1957) S.C.R. 837 Authority that even when a State Act does not expressly provide exclusion of previously taxed sale price from turnover, Article 286 or corresponding central provision may require such exclusion. Relied on to support the conclusion that where liability to levy does not arise, previously taxed sale prices need not be included in gross turnover even if State Act lacks explicit exclusionary provisions.
State of Assam v. Ramesh Chandra Dey, (1962) 1 S.C.R. 986 Expressed the same view concerning exclusion of sale price from turnover when liability does not exist. Relied upon by the Court (and earlier in Fitwell Engineers) to justify that the Delhi Act need not expressly provide for exclusion of sale price of declared goods once taxed earlier.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis around three expressly identified aspects of the levy: (1) stage of the taxation, (2) knowledge about the taxation, and (3) exclusion from taxation. The Court's reasoning proceeds from the historical and textual construction of section 15(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and the corresponding State (Delhi) provisions.

1. Stage of the taxation:

  • The Court recounted that prior to the 1958 amendment, section 15(a) had specifically restricted taxation of declared goods to the "last sale or purchase inside the State"; the 1958 amendment replaced that specific wording with a broader prohibition that "such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage".
  • The amendment's purpose, as the Court reads it, was to ensure single-stage taxation while leaving State legislatures free to choose the point of levy (first, last, or any defined stage) appropriate to their law.
  • The Court relied on Modi Spinning to explain the rule of construction: the Central Act modifies State law but does not destroy it; the two must be read harmoniously.
  • Examining section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Delhi Act and the earlier Fitwell Engineers decision, the Court concluded that the Delhi Act's scheme operates as a single-point levy, identifying the taxable sale as one in which a registered dealer sells to an unregistered dealer or a consumer — effectively the last sale within Delhi.
  • The Court rejected the assessees' submission that the State Act must expressly use the words "first" or "last" to be compatible with section 15(a), noting multiple authorities (including Andhra and Punjab decisions) that a statute's language or scheme can indicate the taxable stage without those exact words.

2. Knowledge about the taxation:

  • The Court examined Bhawani Cotton Mills and related authorities which criticised the Punjab Act's clause (vi) for creating uncertainty — there the structure made it difficult for a purchaser to know whether tax had already been paid.
  • But the Court distinguished the Delhi Act from the problematic Punjab provision: the Delhi Act does not contain a provision corresponding to the six-month limitation in the Punjab Act that caused uncertainty.
  • The Court accepted the reasoning (e.g., in Rattan Lal and other cases) that the dealer is expected to know the commercial facts of his dealings (and to inquire where relevant) and that such knowledge suffices to preclude multiple levies in normal practice; the possibility of fanciful re-entry scenarios is too remote to require special statutory machinery.
  • The Court further noted that a registered dealer who, for particular goods, is acting as an unregistered dealer (because they are not listed on his registration certificate or because he does not use the certificate) is treated as an unregistered dealer for that transaction — so the scheme treats such transactions as sales to unregistered dealers where appropriate.

3. Exclusion from the taxation (treatment of gross turnover):

  • The Court addressed the assessees' concern that the Delhi Act lacks an express provision excluding sale prices of declared goods already taxed from a dealer's gross turnover.
  • Relying on A.V. Fernandez and State of Assam v. Ramesh Chandra Dey, the Court held that where liability to levy does not arise (because the goods have already suffered the single permissible levy), the sale price need not be included in the gross turnover even if there is no express State provision for exclusion.
  • The Court drew a distinction between (a) absence of liability to levy (which obviates inclusion in turnover), and (b) a situation where liability exists but a deduction must be claimed at assessment (which requires express statutory provision). The present cases fall in category (a).

The Court considered and rejected the assessees' ancillary arguments: the argument that section 5A's notification mechanism meant the stage was indefinite; the hypothetical re-entry of taxed goods leading to double taxation; and the absence of a Form 22A-like certificate in Delhi. In each instance, the Court found the Delhi Act's scheme and relevant authorities sufficient to allay these concerns.

Holding and Implications

Final Ruling:

The Court ordered that the writ petitions filed by the assessees (Civil Writs 1247 of 1972 and 350 of 1973) are DISMISSED, and the writ petitions filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax (Civil Writs 460 and 553 of 1973) are ALLOWED. The impugned orders of the Financial Commissioner are quashed and the Financial Commissioner is directed to act in the light of the observations made in this judgment.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The assessees' claims that the Delhi Act permitted multi-stage taxation of declared goods were rejected; they remain liable to assessment under the Delhi Act as construed.
  • The Commissioner of Sales Tax's challenge to the Financial Commissioner's decisions succeeded; the Financial Commissioner's orders quashed and the Commissioner is entitled to proceed under the law as interpreted by this Court.
  • The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Broader implications: The opinion primarily applies established principles of statutory construction (as applied to section 15(a) of the Central Act and State sales tax laws) to the facts of these cases. The judgment does not purport to announce a novel departure from the precedents it discusses; rather it applies and reconciles existing authorities to hold that the Delhi Act effects a single-stage levy and is consistent with section 15(a).

    The Sales Tax Officer And Others S v. The Sales Tax Officer And Others S

    V.S Deshpande, J.:— clause (3) of Article 286 of the Constitution enacts that “any law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify.” Accordingly, selection 15 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Central Act) lays down the restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a state in the following words: —

    “Every sales tax law of a state shall, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely: —
    (a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such goods inside the State shall not exceed three per cent of the sale or purchase price thereof, and such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage.”
    Among certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce so declared by section 14 is included “cotton yarn” the levy of sales tax on the inter-State sale of which is the subject-matter of these writ petitions. In Civil Writ 1247 of 1972 (M/s. Dina Nath & Sons v. The Sales Tax Officer) and Civil Writ 350 of 1973 (M/s. Ramesh Trading Company v. The Sales Tax Officer) the petitioners pray that the assessments of sales tax for the year 1969-70 made against them in respect of the sale prices of cotton yarn under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as extended to Delhi (hereinafter called the Delhi Act) should be quashed. They contend that the declared goods are liable to be taxed at more than one stage under the Delhi Act. This being contrary to the provisions of section 15 (a) of the Central Act, no liability at all arises against the petitioners for the payment of sales tax on these declared goods even once or at one stage. They contend that they are not liable to pay any sales tax at all in view of the provisions of the delhi act being incompatible with the provisions of section 15 (a) of the Central Act.
    This view of the provisions of the delhi act contended for in the writ petitions mentioned above was accepted by the Financial Commissioner in (1) Messrs. Gobind Saran Ganga Saran v. The State (Revisions Nos. 234 and 384 of 1972) decided on February 13, 1973, and (2) M/s. Raj Trading Company v. The State Revisions No. 319 to 322 of 1972) decided on February 13, 1973. The Commissioner of Sales Tax has, therefore filed Civil Writ 460 of 1973 (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Financial Commissioner and M/s. Gobind Saran Ganga Saran) and Civil Writ 553 of 1973 (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Financial Commissioner and M/s. Raj Trading Company) praying that the above mentioned orders of the Financial Commissioner for the assessment years 1968-69 in Civil Writ 460 of 1973 and 1966-67 and 1967-68 in Civil Writ 553 of 1973 be quashed inasmuch as the provisions of the delhi act are in conformity with the restrictions and conditions imposed on the Delhi Act by section 15 (a) of the Central Act and the Respondent No. 2 in each of the writ petitions was liable to the assessment of sales tax on the sale of the declared goods made by them, in Delhi. These four writ petitions were heard together.
    The following grounds were advanced by Mr. Ashok Sen and Mr. R.C Chawla for denying the liability of the assessees to be assessed to any sales tax on the sale of the declared goods in Delhi by the assessees: —
    (1) The Delhi Act does not fix the stage at which the sale of the cotton yarn is liable to the payment of sales tax in Delhi with the result that such tax is liable to be levied at more than one stages in a series of sales contrary to section 15 (a) of the Central Act.
    (2) Under the provisions of the delhi act, a dealer or a registered dealer selling cotton yarn would not know whether the said cotton yarn has been already subjected to payment of sales tax in a previous sale and in the absence of such knowledge he would be made liable to the payment of sales tax over it again contrary to section 15 (a) of the Central Act.
    (3) A dealer or a registered dealer would be bound to include sales of cotton yarn in his taxable turnover under the provisions of the delhi act in the absence of any provision enabling him to exclude the same from being shown as taxable turnover on the ground that the cotton yarn has been already subjected to sales tax in a previous sale thus making such cotton yarn liable to sales tax at more than one stages contrary to section 15 (a) of the Central Act.
    Mr. M.C Bhandare assisted by Mr. Wazir Singh for the Commissioner of Sales Tax controverted each of the above contentions. He pointed out that section 15 (a) of the Central Act did not require the State Sales Tax Act to state whether the stage at which the sales tax was to be levied on the declared goods was to be the first sale or the last sale. All that was needed was to read the taxing provision to know from it the stage at which the sales tax was to be levied. Under section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act it is the last sale of the declared goods which would be taxable inasmuch as it would be a sale by a registered dealer to art unregistered dealer or a consumer. At this stage, the declared goods will pass out of the stream of commerce or the series of sales to which they may be subjected inside Delhi. For, if the unregistered dealer were to sell these goods again neither was any sales tax leviable on the sale price realised by him nor was he authorised to collect such a sales tax from his purchaser. If the consumer were to sell the declared goods to some one else the question of imposition of sales tax on such a sale would not arise at all as the consumer was not a dealer who carried on the business of selling these goods. The stage of taxation was thus fixed as the stage of the last sale, secondly, because the sales tax would be levied only on a sale which is made to an unregistered dealer or a consumer, any registered dealer who purchases these goods again from an unregistered dealer or a consumer was bound to know that the sale must have suffered the levy of sales tax when the unregistered dealer or the purchaser bought it. He would, therefore, naturally ask him if the sale of goods to him had been the subject-matter of the levy of sales tax. He was indeed bound to make such an inquiry inasmuch as section 5 (2) (a) (ii) made it clear to every body that only a sale to an unregistered dealer or a consumer was the sale which was liable to be taxed. If, therefore, the registered dealer who had purchased these goods again from an unregistered dealer or a consumer were to sell these goods again to an unregistered dealer or a consumer, such registered dealer would not be liable to the levy of sales tax on such a sale inasmuch as the declared goods would be known to have suffered the levy of sales tax to the knowledge of such a registered dealer. Thirdly, once the sale of declared goods to an unregistered dealer or a consumer has suffered the levy of sales tax, a registered dealer who purchases such goods from an unregistered dealer or a consumer but sells them again to an unregistered dealer or a consumer need not show such a sale in his gross turnover inasmuch as the liability to the levy of sales tax does not arise at all. It is only if the liability had arisen but some deduction had to be made from the gross turnover to show that such goods were not to form part of the taxable turnover of such a registered dealer that it would have been necessary for the registered dealer to show such a sale in his gross turnover. For, there is difference between the liability to the levy of sales tax and the liability to be assessed for the payment of the sales tax. The sales of declared goods which have already suffered a levy of sales tax on a previous sale would have been required to be shown in the gross turnover only if the price of such a sale had to be deducted from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover. Since, however, the liability to levy of sales tax itself is absent, the sale price of declared goods which have been already subjected to sales tax in a previous sale does not have to be shown even in the gross turnover.
    The points in controversy between the parties, therefore, relate to three aspects of the levy of sales tax on declared goods, namely: —
    1. Stage of the taxation,
    2. Knowledge about the taxation,
    and 3. Exclusion from the taxation.
    We now proceed to consider each of these three aspects in the light of the arguments addressed by the learned counsel.
    1. Stage of the taxation: —
    The power to levy sales tax has been enjoyed by the Legislatures of the Provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Legislatures of the States under the Constitution. Neither under the said Act nor under the Constitution was there any limitation placed on the powers of the State Legislatures to impose sales tax on goods at more than one stages in the series of sales to which such goods may be subjected in each State. Whether the goods would be taxed only at one stage or at more than one stages depended entirely on the provisions of the particular State sales tax law. In a recent Division Bench decision of this Court in M/s. Fitwell Engineers v. Financial Commissioner, Delhi Administration, (Civil Writ No. 590 of 1973 decided on April 26, 1974) (1) to which one of us (Deshpande, J.) was a party, it was pointed out that in this respect the State sales tax laws were of two types, namely, (a) those which imposed sales tax only at one stage, and (b) those which imposed sales tax at more than one stages. The former was single point levy, the latter being multi point levy system of sales tax. Parliament showed its awareness of this state of affairs when the original section 15 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 as it existed before its amendment in 1958 laid down that the tax payable under a State sales tax law in respect of any sale or purchase of goods which were declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce shall be levied only in respect of the last sale or purchase inside the State. Parliament thereby recognised that under certain State sales tax laws sales tax was leviable at more than one stages. It restricted the levy of such sales tax on the declared goods only to the last stage. This was because after the last stage of sale of purchase the goods would pass out of the series of sales and purchases or the stream of commerce. The last sale or purchase would be either by a dealer or by a consumer. A subsequent sale or purchase by such a dealer or a consumer would not be liable to the levy of sales tax. The old section 15 of the Central Act is, therefore, significant to show that firstly multi-point levy sales tax laws existed and secondly that after the stage of the last sale or purchase, the goods would not be liable to sale or purchase tax under a State sales tax law.
    In 1958 section 15 of the Central Act was amended. In section 15 (a) the provision that the levy of tax would be restricted to the last sale or purchase was substituted by the provision that “such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage”. The reason for the amendment seems to be that Parliament did not think it fit to restrict all the State sales tax laws to the stage of last sale or purchase in imposing sales tax on the goods. For, under the scheme of certain State sales tax laws before the restriction was imposed by the old section 15 (a), sales tax may be leviable at a stage earlier than the stage of the last sale or purchase. Similarly, certain State sales tax laws might prefer to impose sales or purchase tax on the first sale or purchase in respect of the declared goods even if the sales tax on the other goods was levied on the last sale or purchase. It was with a view to leave the State legislatures free to fix the stage at which sales or purchase tax should be levied on declared goods that the amendment of section 15 (a) made in 1958 simply stated the principle that the tax shall not be levied at more than one stage. Another significance of the amendment is that Parliament realised that it was not necessary to state the stage of taxation as being the last sale or purchase (or for the matter of that the first sale or purchase). For, even without the use of the word “last” or the word “first” the provision of the Sales Tax Act concerned can itself indicate whether the tax would be leviable on the last or the first sale. As pointed out in Fitwell Engineer's case by this Court the sales tax was leviable on the last sale under section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act because of the single point levy system adopted in that provision. The Court was concerned in that case to point out that the first sale to a registered dealer was exempted under section 5 (2) (a) (ii) and, therefore, the Court used the expression “second sale” to denote the point at which sales tax could be levied thereunder. But that expression has to be understood to mean “the last sale” inasmuch as the last sale could be either the second sale or the third or the fourth one depending on how long the series of sales to registered dealers went on. If the first registered dealer sold the goods to an unregistered dealer or a consumer, then the second sale itself would be taxable under section 5 (2) (a) (ii). But if the said registered dealer sold to another registered dealer who claimed exemption from sales tax and after such exemption the said registered dealer still sold to another registered dealer who also claimed exemption from sales tax, then the series of sales would be prolonged and the tax would be leviable on the third or the fourth or the fifth sale. It is, therefore, more convenient to refer to the taxable sale as the last sale which may be any sale from the second sale onwards depending on when the series of sales to registered dealers comes to an end.
    The sales tax laws of the States had existed from before the Constitution. Sales taxes were levied under them either on the first or the last sales. The object of the amendment of section 15 (a) of the Central Act in 1958 was not to create a conflict between the Central Act and the State sales tax laws. Had section 15 (a) not been amended in 1958, the State sales tax laws would have been required to be so worded as to ensure that the declared goods thereunder were taxed only at the stage of the last sale or purchase. Such a step would have been unnecessary because all that Parliament was interested was to ensure that the declared goods were taxed only at one stage. It was of no concern to Parliament whether the point of levy was the first sale or purchase or the last one. This object was ensured by the amendment of section 15 (a) of the Central Act in 1958.
    The principle as to how the Central Act was to be construed in relation to the State sales tax laws was laid down by the Supreme Court in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1965) 1 S.C.R 592 (2). While construing the amended section 15 (a) as carrying out the intention of Article 286 (3) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court observed at page 600 as follows: —
    “The meaning or the intention of clause (3) of Article 286 is not to destroy all charging sections in the Sales Tax Acts of the States which are discrepant with section 15 (a) of the Central Sales Act, but to modify them in accordance therewith. The law of the State is declared to be subject to the restrictions and conditions contained in the law made by Parliament.”
    Every State sales tax law was, therefore, left free in its own way to ensure that the tax on declared goods was not levied at more than one stage. Apparently, there would be two ways in which a State sales tax law may fix the stage of taxation. One way is to state that the first or the last sale or purchase would be taxable irrespective of the question as to who was the seller or the purchaser. Another way was to indicate the person in whose hands the sale or purchase would be taxable. The former one would be perhaps more suitable to multi-point sales tax laws while the latter one would be found perhaps more suitable to single-point sales tax laws, though either of the methods could be adopted in any of these two systems of sales tax laws. In Fitwell Engineers case, this Court analysed section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act fully and came to the conclusion that its object was to ensure a single point levy of sales tax in the State of Delhi. It was emphasised that the sale to a registered dealer who could claim exemption from payment of sales tax was exempted only because it was expected that the said registered dealer after having secured the exemption would sell the goods in Delhi either to an unregistered dealer or to a consumer so that the said sale would be taxable in Delhi and thus the goods would be taxed at least at one stage in Delhi. In that case the Court mentally compared section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 with section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act and found them substantially similar. The analogous provision in the Orissa Act was also similar. The Court, therefore, observed that these provisions ensured a single-point levy of sales tax. In that case the attention of the Court was not invited to the provision of section 5 (2) (a) (vi) of the Punjab Act which is as follows: —
    “In this Act the expression “taxable turnover” means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom —
    (vi) the purchase of goods which are sold not later than six months after the close of the year. . ”
    This limitation that the sale must take place not later than six months after the close of the year is peculiar to the Punjab Act. Its effect is that even though the goods had been taxed once, they would be liable to tax again if they are sold later than six months after the close of the year in which the purchase had taken place. This provision of the punjab act leads to multi-point levy of sales tax.
    In Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1967) 20 S.T.C 290, (3), the question for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions of the Punjab Act were in consonance with section 15 (a) of the Central Act in view of clause (vi) of section 5 (2) (a) of the said Act. At page 300 of the report, the High Court had recognised that “no proper machinery has been provided in the principal Act or in the Rules framed thereunder to ensure that each successive purchaser knows whether tax has been levied or is leviable on any purchaser through whom the goods have already passed at a prior stage.” The High Court, however, did not invalidate the impugned provisions of the Punjab Act because it was open to each purchaser to claim a refund of the tax already deposited by him if he is not liable to pay under the provisions of Sub-clause (vi) of section 5 (2) (a) and it was entirely a question of proving certain facts by evidence that refund is due and ought to be made. At pages 326 and 327 of the report, the Supreme Court pointed out that the High Court was itself impressed by the difficulties in the actual working of the Act. The Supreme Court did not accept the view of the High Court that a provision for refund was a sufficient answer to the incompatibility of certain provisions of the Punjab Act with section 15 (a) of the Central Act. At page 328 of the report is to be found the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court. The Court pointed out that the State Sales Tax Act itself must “make it very clear that there will be no levy or collection of tax, except from the persons who are bound to pay, as per the Central Act. It is here that there is considerable difficulty caused by the absence of any provision, either in the Act or in the rules or the forms, indicating the stage at which the tax is to be levied.” When the Court proceeded to say that the State Sales Tax Act or the Rules framed thereunder must prescribe a “single point for taxation”, the question arises whether their lordships intended that the State Act must mention whether it is the first sale or the last sale which is to be taxed. It was contended for the assessees that unless the first or the last sale was itself indicated in the State Sales Tax Act, the State Sales Tax Act would not be in consonance with section 15 (a) of the Central Act and that this was the meaning of the above-mentioned observation of the Supreme Court. We are unable to agree with this contention. For, section 15 (a) of the Central Act itself does not require that the State Sales Tax Act must say in so many words that the first or the last sale is liable to be taxed in respect of the declared goods. All that section 15 (a) as amended in 1958 requires is that the declared goods should not be taxed at more than one stage. As laid down by the Supreme Court in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills case (Supra) the rule of construction of section 15 (a) of the Central Act with the relevant provisions of the State Sales Tax Acts is that the provisions of the latter are subject to the restrictions imposed by the former. The two are to be read harmoniously. The Central Act does not destroy the State Act. Therefore, in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills case, even though a notification by the State Government under section 5 of the Punjab Act could prescribe a rate of 4 per cent for the taxation of the concerned declared goods, the Act was not invalidated. On the contrary, section 15 (a) of the Central Act was read with the State Act and the effect of the State Act and the notification issued thereunder was modified to read that the rate of tax levied thereunder was 2 per cent and not 4 per cent. A perusal of the further observations of the Supreme Court in Bhawani Cotton Mills case at pages 328 and 329 brings out that the Court did not intend to say that the State Sales Tax Act must state that either the first or the last sale was to be taxed. On the other hand, their lordships construed section 15 (a) of the Central Act to mean that the State Sales Tax Act has only to ensure that the declared goods are not taxed at more than one stage. This could be done by the scheme of the taxing provision and even without using the words “first” or “last” sale or purchase as indicating the stage of the taxation. At page 329 their Lordships observed as follows: —
    “Sub-clause (vi) of section 5 (2) (a) negatives the assumption that the normal rule, under the Act, in respect of declared goods is to levy the tax on the first purchaser.”
    The expression “normal rules” shows that the rule was inferred from the provisions of the Act even without the use of the words “first purchaser”. The decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawani Cotton Mills case, therefore does not support the contention of the assessees that section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act is incompatible with section 15 (a) of the Central Act merely because it does not state that the last sale, namely, the sate to an unregistered dealer or a consumer was taxable thereunder even though, as pointed out in Fitwell Engineers case, this was the effect of a proper reading of section 5 (2) (a) (ii).
    At page 325 of the report in Bhawani Cotton Mills case, their Lordships observed that the relevant provisions in the Sales Tax Acts in force in the States of Madras, Mysore, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh definitely and clearly indicated the stage at which the tax is to be levied either on purchase or on sale. A brief examination of the relevant provisions of some of these Acts would, therefore, better enable us to understand the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Bhawani Cotton Mills case.
    Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 lays down that the sales tax on declared goods would be levied in accordance with the provisions of Schedule III to that Act. The said Schedule enumerates the items of the declared goods which are taxable and indicates the stage of taxation against each of them. Against some items the stage of taxation is prescribed to be the first or the last purchase. Against other items the indication of the stage is given not by the use of the words “first” or “last” but by characterising the purchaser. For instance, item No. 6 “groundnuts” was taxable “when purchased by a miller other than a decorticating miller in the State”. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lakshmi Oil Mills, Bhongir, (1967) 20 S.T.C 489, (4) it was contended for the assessee that this provision was contrary to section 15 (a) of the Central Act inasmuch as the stage of taxation was not specified by the use of the word “first” before the word “miller”. This argument was rejected by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of P. Jaganmohan Reddy, C.J, and Krishna Rao, J. who held that even without the use of the word “first” before the word “miller”, the language of the Schedule indicated that it was the purchase by the first miller which was to be taxed if the said miller was not a decorticating miller. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court in Sri Venkateswara Rice, Ginning and Groundnut Oil Mill Contractors Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 28 S.T.C 599. At page 602 (5) of the report Hegde, J. observed as follows: —
    “It is now well settled that even under the sales tax laws, the change in respect of a sale or purchase becomes effective as soon as the sale in the case of sales tax and purchase in the case of purchase tax is made, though the liability of the dealer can be computed only at the end of the year. . To restate the position, whenever a miller purchases groundnut, the turnover relating to that purchase becomes exigible to tax subject to such exemptions as may be given under the Act. . It was urged on behalf of the assessees that if we place that interpretation then even the turnovers relating to subsequent purchases of the same groundnut made by the other millers would become exigible to tax despite the fact that only a single point purchase tax is leviable under the Act. It was further urged that we should not read into item 6 of the Third Schedule the word “first” before the word “miller” under column 2 thereof. We see no merit in these contentions. Quite clearly in view of section 14 and section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act and section 6 of the Act, purchase of groundnut can be taxed only at one stage. Once a particular quantity of groundnut has been subjected to payment of tax, the State's power to tax in respect of those goods gets exhausted and any further dealing in those goods cannot be brought to tax. This is clear from the scheme of the Act. There was no need for the Legislature to say “when purchased by first miller” in column 2 of item 6 of the Third Schedule, because from the language employed therein, it is clear that the first purchase becomes eligible to tax and in view of section 6 of the Act, the subsequent purchases of the same goods cannot be subjected to tax.”
    The Second Schedule to the Madras Act serves the same purpose in the same way. So does section 9 (6A) of the Mysore Act.
    The same view was expressed in another Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rafeeq Ahmed and Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1969) 24 S.T.C 430 at 438 (6) on similar language in respect of another declared goods, namely, “hides and skins” in the Third Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh Act.
    Two Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court consisting of two common members, namely, Subba Rao, C.J and Shah, J. decided two cases on April 10, 1967. The first was the Bhawani Cotton Mills case, referred to above. The second was Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab, (1967) 20 S.T.C 430 (7). It was argued at page 7 by the assessee that the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 was in conflict with section 15 of the Central Act inasmuch as it enabled the levy of sales tax at more than one stages. This argument was rejected by the Constitution Bench after referring to the observation of the Court in the previous decision in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills case, which we have already cited above. Referring to the decision in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills case, their Lordships observed as follows at page 449: —
    “The effect of this judgment is that the stage prescribed under section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act before the amendment and the prohibition against taxation at more than one stage contained in the amended section would automatically control the provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. With the result up to October 1, 1958, under the State Sales Tax Act a tax could be levied only in respect of purchase of declared goods inside the State and only on the purchase made by a dealer of goods for use by him in the manufacture of goods and from October 1, 1958, the State can only levy tax at one stage. For the second period the Central Act by its own force did not fix the stage. . It follows from the said discussion that the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, during the crucial period which is the subject-matter of these appeals, in terms fixed a stage for taxation, i.e, the stage of purchase by a dealer for use in the manufacture of goods.”
    It is important to note that the decision in Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan's case considered the same Punjab Act which was considered in Bhawani Cotton Mills case but arrives at the conclusion that section 15 of the Central Act has to be read with the provisions of the Punjab Act with result that the stage of the taxation in the Punjab Act is automatically fixed without the use of the words “first” or “last” sale or purchase.
    On behalf of the assessees an attempt was made to argue that section 5A had to be inserted in the Delhi Act by an amendment in 1959 to enable the Chief Commissioner to prescribe points at which goods may be taxed. Section 5A is as follows: —
    “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, the Chief Commissioner may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the point in the series of sales by successive dealers at which any goods or class of goods may be taxed.”
    It was argued that unless and until a notification is issued under section 5A in respect of cotton yarn, the stage at which it is to be taxed remains indefinite. It was pointed out that such a notification had been issued in respect of “coal” which was one of the declared goods on January 18, 1963. This argument is also unacceptable. The statement of objects and reasons attached to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Delhi Amendment Act, 1959 (Act 20 of 1959) stated that the Bill sought to amend the law to give effect, inter alia to the following object, namely: —
    “ (f) to provide for the levy of tax at any point other than the point of last sale so that sales tax may be levied at the first point on certain items which are manufactured in factories.”
    This authoritative statement by the Government accepted by Parliament shows that the Government and Parliament understood that the tax under the Delhi Act was leviable on the last sale. This view accords with the view expressed by this Court in Fitwell Engineers case. This also supports the argument of the Government in the present case that even though section 5 (2) (a) (ii) does not use the words “last sale”, the effect of the scheme of the said provision is to subject only the last sale to taxation. It is to be noted that nowhere in the statement of objects and reasons of the Amendment Bill of 1959 it is stated that the object of the amendment was to make definite the stage of taxation either generally or in respect of the declared goods. We have already stated above that even the Supreme Court has expressed the view that it is not necessary to use the words “first sale” or “last sale” to make the stage of taxation definite. The stage could be defined without the use of such words. Full reasons have been given in the Fitwell Engineers case to show that section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Delhi Act ensures that the sales tax would be levied only when a registered dealer sells to an unregistered dealer or a consumer which would be the last sale in a series of sales. The sales tax would not be levied on earlier sales to registered dealers who could claim exemption in respect of such sales in the registration certificate.
    It was argued for the assessees that reference was made at page 328 of the report of the Bhawani Cotton Mills case by the Supreme Court to cases “where a non-registered dealer may have intervened”. It was argued that after the last sale by a registered dealer to an unregistered dealer or to a consumer it is possible that such an unregistered dealer or a consumer may sell the same goods back to a registered dealer. It was further possible that such a registered dealer would again sell the goods to an unregistered dealer or to a consumer and in such an eventuality the declared goods would be subjected to tax even though they had been taxed before. This is a fanciful argument which is untenable. Firstly, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out immediately, at page 328 of the report of Bhawani Cotton Mills case that even if a non-registered dealer intervened, “it is clear that under section 15 (a) of the Central Act the tax cannot be levied at more than one stage”. Secondly, it was pointed out by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gopaldas v. Sales Tax Officer, (1973) 31 S.T.C 575 at 579 that an unregistered dealer would sell goods to a registered dealer usually at a loss. For, if he sells the goods to a registered dealer at a profit, such a registered dealer would be buying those goods at a higher price than he would have paid for purchase of those goods from a registered dealer. For transactions between registered dealers are trading transactions which are wholesale. The sale price is, therefore, much lower than the sale price in a sale to a registered dealer from an unregistered dealer. For the same reason, the price when the goods are sold by one registered dealer to another registered dealer would be lower than the price which would be charged by an unregistered dealer when he sells to a registered dealer. For, an unregistered dealer under the Delhi Act is presumably not liable to pay any sales tax inasmuch as the taxable turnover is presumed to be below the taxable quantum. He is thus presumed to be a petty dealer doing retail sales. Retail prices are higher than the wholesale prices. We are, therefore, in respectful agreement with the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that the possibility of such a sale by an unregistered dealer to a registered dealer is a remote one. We cannot construe a taxing enactment in such a fanciful manner. Thirdly, such an argument was also rejected by the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal v. The Assessing Authority, (1970) 25 S.T.C 136, (7A) to which reference will be made while dealing with the next contention of the assessees.
    2. Knowledge of the taxation: —
    The decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawani Cotton Mills case seems to have been based on the fact that under the provisions of the Punjab Act, it was not possible for the dealer to know if the declared goods had been already subjected to tax before hand. This is clear from the following observations at pages 328-329 of the report: —
    “At this stage, the question naturally arises, as to whether there is anywhere in the Act or the rules any provision, by which the person, sending the return, will be able to know that the tax, in respect of the declared goods purchased by him, have already been paid by another dealer and that the value of the purchases, effected by him, need not be shown in this return. . There is no machinery by which a dealer can ascertain whether his vendor of the declared goods has paid the tax already. Even otherwise, it will be seen that if a dealer, A, sells the declared goods to B, six months after the close of the year (B being a registered dealer), A becomes liable to purchase tax. But if B sells the identical declared goods, again, after the period mentioned in sub-clause (vi), he will also be liable to pay purchase tax. That means, in respect of the same item of declared goods, more than one person is made liable to pay tax and the tax is also levied at more than one stage.”
    The lack of knowledge on the part of the dealer was thus the result of the peculiar provision of the Punjab Act in section 5 (2) (a) (vi) which is completely different from the provisions of the delhi act which does not contain any provision which corresponds to section 5 (2) (a) (vi) of the Punjab Act. The uncertainty created by section 5 (2) (a) (6) was removed by the subsequent amendment of the Punjab Act which was a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawani Cotton Mills case. After this amendment, the Supreme Court held in Rattan Lal v. The Assessing Authority, (1970) 25 S.T.C 136, that no uncertainty was left in the mind of the dealer. At pages 144-145 of the report, Hidayatullah, C.J, observed as follows: —
    “It will be seen that the matter is now in the hands of the dealer. He has to find out for himself whether he is liable to pay the tax or not. A dealer knows what he has done with his goods or is going to do with them. If he knows that he is not the last dealer having parted with the goods to another dealer or he knows that he is going to use the goods or sell them to consumers, he knows when he is not liable to tax and when he is. . This information is always possessed by a dealer and by providing that he need not include in his actions of persons who are negligent or mistaken but only of persons who act correctly, according to law.”
    These observations apply with full force to the Delhi Act. Thereunder the sale does not become taxable unless it is a sale by a registered dealer to an unregistered dealer or a consumer in view of the scheme of section 5 (2) (a) (ii). It was again argued by the assessees that a sale by a registered dealer to another registered dealer who is not registered in respect of the particular declared goods or who does not use his right to claim exemption by using his registration certificate in purchasing such declared goods would be liable to tax. This argument is negatived by the fact that such a sale is not a sale to a registered dealer at all. In respect of the goods which are not mentioned in his registration certificate, the purchasing dealer is acting as an unregistered dealer and not as a registered dealer at all. Similarly, a registered dealer who does not claim the advantage of a tax-free purchase by using his registration certificate is also acting as an unregistered dealer. The sale is taxable, therefore, as a sale to an unregistered dealer and not as a sale to a registered dealer. This is not an exception to the rule embodied in section 5 (2) (a) (ii) that it is only the last sale which is taxable because it is a sale by a registered dealer to an unregistered dealer or to a consumer. In the Fitwell Engineer's case. The Division Bench has cited Supreme Court decisions to show that such a sale is a sale to an unregistered dealer inasmuch as qua such a sale the registered dealer is not a registered dealer at all but is an unregistered dealer.
    Reference was also made on behalf of the assessees to Form 22A framed under the Punjab General Sales Tax Rules, 1949 whereby the selling dealer certifies that the goods being sold have already suffered tax. It was argued that no such certificate is given by the selling dealer under the Delhi Act. The answer to this contention is simple. The taxation under the Punjab Act is on the first purchase. The declared goods have to be sold again thereafter. It is important, therefore, that the certificate must be given by the first purchaser that he has already paid the tax of these goods when such first purchaser sells these goods to another purchaser. Under the Delhi Act, however, the tax is levied on the last sale. In the nature of things, it is known that the unregistered dealer or the consumer must have paid the tax when he purchased them from a registered dealer. Since it is not expected that a sale by such a registered dealer or a consumer to another unregistered dealer or consumer would be taxable, there is no need why the certificate similar to the one in Form 22A of the Punjab Rules should have to be given in such a transaction governed by the Delhi Act.
    3. Exclusion from the taxation: —
    Basing themselves on the amendment made in the Punjab Act after the Bhawani Cotton Mills case, the learned counsel for the assessees argued that the amended Punjab Act provided that the declared goods which had been once subjected to taxation should be excluded from being shown in the turnover of a dealer subsequently. It was pointed out that the Supreme Court took notice of this amendment in their decision in Rattan Lal's case and held that after the amendment, the Punjab Act could not be said to conflict with section 15 (a) of the Central Act. It was argued that there was no such provision in the Delhi Act for the exclusion of the declared goods from being shown in the gross turnover of a dealer under the Delhi Act. It was also argued that under section 4 of the Delhi Act “every dealer whose gross turnover . . exceeded the taxable quantum” was liable to pay sales tax. The implication of the argument was that in the absence of a provision in the Delhi Act for the exclusion of the sale price of the declared goods from being included in the gross turnover on the ground that such goods have already suffered tax, the Delhi Act would be liable to the same objection to which Punjab Act was liable as held in the Bhawani Cotton Mills case. This contention is also not tenable. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in the Bhawani Cotton Mills case did not hold that the Punjab Act was bad because it did not provide for the exclusion of the sale price of the declared goods from the gross turnover of a dealer on the ground that such goods had already been subjected to tax. The amendment in the Punjab Act made after the decision in the Bhawani Cotton Mills case making provisions for such exclusion was by way of abundant caution. It was not necessitated by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bhawani Cotton Mills case. The decision of the Supreme Court in A.V Fernandez v. State of Kerala, (1957) S.C.R 837, (8) is an authority for the proposition that even though a State Sales Tax Act did not provide for the exclusion of the sale price of certain goods, such sale price had to be excluded from the turnover by reading Article 286 or a provision corresponding to it in the State Sales Tax Act. The same reasoning would apply if section 15 (a) of the Central Act is read with the Delhi Act. The reading of the two together brings about the result that the sale prices of the declared goods which have been already subjected to tax do not have to be included in the gross turnover of a dealer. The reason is the distinction between the liability to pay sales tax and the assessment of such liability by a sales tax authority. When the liability itself does not arise, the sale price does not have to be shown in the gross turnover even though there is no specific provision for its exclusion from the gross turnover under a State Sales Tax Act. On the other hand, if an exemption has to be claimed during the assessment to sales tax, then such exemption or deduction from gross turnover can be claimed only when there is a specific provision for such deduction in the State Act. The present case falls under the first category, namely, of the non-existence of the liability. It is not necessary, therefore, that the Delhi Act should provide for the exclusion of the sale price of the declared goods which are already taxed from the gross turnover of a dealer. The same view was expressed by the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Ramesh Chandra Dey, (1962) 1 S.C.R 986 at 991-992 (9) and was relied upon by this Court in the Fitwell Engineer's case. In their decision in Devidass Gopal Krishnan, referred to above, also the Supreme Court expressed the same view following their decision in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills case.
    A passing reference was made to section 15 (b) of the Central Act by Mr. R.C Chawla for the assessees. We are unable to deal with section 15 (b) of the Central Act inasmuch as it has no relevance to the cases before us. None of the assessees has paid the Central Sales tax and none of them is claiming a refund of the State sales tax paid by him. In fact, no reference can be made to the machinery of refund under the Delhi Act inasmuch as none of the assessees before us claims to be entitled to refund. These assessees have not paid either the State sales tax or the Central sales tax. They have, therefore, no locus standi to raise any question regarding any provision for refund either in the Central Act or in the State Act.
    No other contention was raised by the Assessees. All their contentions having fallen through and the contentions of the Government having succeeded, the writ petitions filed by the assessees, namely, Civil Writs 1247 of 1972 and 350 of 1973 are dismissed and the writ petitions filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, namely, Civil Writs 460 and 553 of 1973 are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Financial Commissioner are quashed. The Financial Commissioner will now act in the light of the observations made in this judgment.
    In the circumstances of the case, the parties are ordered to bear their own costs.
    Order accordingly.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    The Sales Tax Officer And Others S v. The Sales Tax Officer And Others S
    (Sep 10, 1974)