| Gopisetti Venkatratnam & Others v. Vijayawada Municipality & Another, AIR 1966 S.C. 353 |
Rate increases by a municipality do not necessarily alter the conditions of an agreement under Section 21(2) if the agreement provides for payment of rates fixed from time to time. |
Cited to support the proposition that increasing rates where consumers have agreed to pay rates fixed by the licensee does not require State sanction under Section 21(2). |
| Saila Bala Roy v. Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality, AIR 1936 Calcutta 265 |
Minimum charges are based on idea that licensee incurs capital expenditure and deserves a reasonable return; minimum charges could be levied if agreed in contract. |
Used to show early recognition that minimum charges reflect return on capital and can be contractual; court noted it did not hold minimum charges could only be levied under the proviso to Section 22. |
| Kaka Ram Tej Bhan Sekari v. Bhattar Electrical Engineering & General Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1939 Peshawar 8 |
A rule for recovering minimum charge that lacked State Government approval was held invalid (showing need for governmental approval where licensing rules require it). |
Cited but court observed it does not support the narrower proposition that minimum charges can only be levied under the proviso to Section 22. |
| Amin Chand Bhola Nath v. The Jullundhur Electric Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1953 Punjab 166 |
Where special capital works are undertaken at a consumer's request, Section 22's proviso may be invoked to determine minimum sums to give reasonable return on capital. |
Referred to for the proposition that proviso to Section 22 is applicable in cases of separate supply requiring special capital outlay at consumer's request; court distinguished present facts. |
| M/s Watkins Mayor & Co. v. Jullundur Electric Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 Punjab 133 |
Minimum charge in contract provides for fair return on licensee's outlay; minimum charges are a mode of ensuring return on capital outlay. |
Used as supporting authority that contractual minimum charges are a recognized method of protecting licensee's capital investment. |
| Babulal Chhaganlal Gujarati v. Chopra Electric Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 Bombay 1826 |
A licence may limit the rates a licensee can charge; where licence forbade standing charge, imposition was illegal. |
Distinguished: court noted no comparable prohibition existed in the present case. |
| Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Executive Engineer ... & M/s. Madhu Sudandas and Brothers, AIR 1966 Bombay 160 |
Tariff increases including minimum billing demand charges can be enforceable where agreement binds consumer to prevailing rates; demand charges formed part of tariff. |
Cited to show that demand charges are part of tariff and enforceable under an agreement obliging payment according to tariff in force. |
| M. G. Natesa Chettiar v. The Madras State Electricity Commissioner (Madras High Court) |
Minimum charge is consideration for keeping energy available, not a penalty; statutory basis may be Section 22's proviso but contractual provision can be valid. |
Referred to for the characterisation of minimum charges and the acceptability of contractual minimums even after deletion of a now-repealed clause authorising minimum charges. |
| Hari Shankar & others v. U.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1974 Allahabad 70 |
Term "tariff" includes fixation of rates and rules/regulations; minimum guaranteed charges are terms/conditions of supply included in tariff. |
Used to support view that minimum guaranteed charges are part of tariff and thus within rate-fixing domain. |
| Gujarat Electricity Board v. Shri Rajratna Naranbhai Mills Co. Ltd., (1975) 1 GLR 90 |
Minimum charge in agreement for bulk supply provides for reasonable return on investment and is not necessarily a penalty or unreasonable. |
Relied upon to show contractual minimum charges can be a legitimate mode of providing return to licensee. |
| Ratenlal Muraka v. Kerala State Electricity Board, ILR 1976(1) Kerala 435 |
Sections 22 and 23 provide statutory basis for monthly minimum charges; agreements may include minimum-payment terms consistent with the Act. |
Referred to in the survey of authorities supporting statutory or contractual basis for minimum charges. |
| M/s. Devidayal Metal Industries v. Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay, AIR 1980 Bombay 154 |
Case concerned security deposits rather than minimum demand charges; single judge did not consider authorities on minimum charges. |
Cited and distinguished as not directly relevant to minimum demand charge legality. |
| D.C.M. Ltd. & another v. Assistant Engineer, AIR 1988 Rajasthan 64 |
Proviso to Clause VI and Section 22 indicate consumer liability to pay minimum charges amounting to reasonable return on capital; statutory caps (15%) may apply under Clause VI. |
Referenced for the view that statutory provisions can justify minimum charges and that certain Schedule clauses could limit amounts; court noted Clause VI is inapplicable to Corporation by virtue of DMC Act proviso. |
| Bihar State Electricity Board v. M/s. Green Rubber Industries & Ors., JT 1989 (4) S.C. 421 |
Supreme Court upheld contractual clause for minimum guarantee charges as not unreasonable; supply agreements create contractual relations distinct from statutory duties. |
Relied upon as a leading Supreme Court authority upholding contractual minimum charges; court emphasized contractual basis rather than invoking proviso to Section 22. |
| Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Jalgaon Borough Municipality, AIR 1975 SC 2235 |
Agreement clauses embodying minimum-guarantee doctrine are in consonance with spirit of proviso to Section 22; minimum charges ensure licensee can meet maintenance expenses. |
Cited to show Supreme Court approval where agreements required minimum guarantees and justified minimum charges on operational grounds. |
| Wm. M'Coard & Son v. Corporation of Glasgow, Scots Law Times 1935 (via Halsbury) |
English interpretation of standby supply and minimum charges; standby supply can be demanded only if consumer agrees to pay minimum sums; arbitration available in default. |
Used to explain the meaning of the proviso to Section 22 by analogy with English statutory provisions and commentary in Halsbury. |
| London Electricity Board (Court of Appeal case) |
Permitted higher standing/standing charges for larger houses where justification (greater equipment, maintenance, capital demand) existed; not undue discrimination. |
Applied by analogy to hold that different tariffs for different classes (e.g., arc furnaces) can be valid where rational basis exists. |
| Kartar Singh & Ors. v. Punjab State Electricity Board, ILR 1971(1) Punjab 255 |
Classification and different tariff for tubewell owners held reasonable; distinct categories justify distinct charges. |
Relied upon as authority that classifying certain consumers (e.g., induction furnace owners) as separate category for tariff purposes can be reasonable. |
| Northern India Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & another, AIR 1976 P&H 59; appeal SLR 1976 SC 1100 |
Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld higher demand charge for arc furnaces as reasonable classification; Supreme Court partially modified on reduction where shortages prevented consumption. |
Directly analogous: used to support permitting higher demand charges for arc furnaces and to note adjustments where inability to consume due to power cuts should proportionately reduce minimum charges. |
| Indian Metal & Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 SC 1727 |
Concerned unequal treatment of similarly situated power-intensive units (export-oriented units); principle that similarly situated units should be treated alike. |
Distinguished by the court: facts and categories differ; not controlling on present classification of arc/induction furnaces as a separate class. |
| Sunderdas Kanhaiyalal Bateja, 1989 (3) SCC 396 |
When a decision is legislative (notification or statute-like) principles of natural justice may not apply absent express statutory provision. |
Relied upon to hold that principles of natural justice were not necessarily attractable to the Corporation's legislative/statutory rate-fixing process under Section 283. |
| Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Suit No. 518-A of 1983 (single judge, 23-5-1984) |
Held that Section 283 of DMC Act is the statutory power to fix rates and clause in agreement obliges consumers to pay rates fixed under that power. |
Referred to for the interplay between clause 15 of the agreement and Section 283; court held clause and section must be read together and supported this approach. |