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  • Court Fees Act or in the Civil Procedure Code.
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  • Court Fees Act or in the Civil Procedure Code.
  • s. 28 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench reference arose from an application by a litigant for permission to sue in forma pauperis. The Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction, heard the applicant, and rejected the application. The Subordinate Judge's rejection rested on the view that the applicant's cause of action had arisen beyond the period of limitation and therefore the applicant had no right to sue. The central procedural question referred to the Full Bench was whether the High Court, under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), possesses revisional jurisdiction to revise orders made under s. 407 CPC (orders rejecting applications to sue as paupers), and whether the specific order in this case was a fit subject for revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order rejecting an application to sue in forma pauperis under s. 407, Civil Procedure Code, can be revised by the High Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Whether, on the facts of the particular case before the Full Bench (rejection of the pauper application on the ground that the cause of action was barred by limitation), the Subordinate Judge acted "illegally or with material irregularity" so as to make the order a proper subject for revision under s. 622 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties and Positions Raised in Court

Positions and Arguments Raised During the Hearing

  • It was suggested in argument that an order rejecting an application under s. 407 is a preliminary proceeding (taken before the appearance of the opposite party) and therefore does not constitute a "case" within the meaning of s. 622 CPC.
  • An argument advanced (described in the opinion as that of the learned counsel for the opposite party) was that because s. 413 leaves open to the applicant the right to institute a suit in the ordinary manner, the order under s. 407 is not a final adjudication and thus should not be the subject of revision under s. 622 CPC.
  • The learned pleader for the petitioner cited rulings (including decisions of the Madras High Court such as Ammal v. Nayudu) to support the view that an exercise of jurisdiction under s. 407 which is illegal or materially irregular would be a proper subject for revision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (Privy Council) The test that revisional jurisdiction under s. 622 depends on whether the lower court "acted illegally or with material irregularity"; mere wrong decision is insufficient if jurisdiction was properly exercised. The Bench (first opinion) applied this test to limit revisional jurisdiction: because the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction and had exercised it without illegality or material irregularity, revision under s. 622 was not available in the present case.
Magni Ram v. Jiwa Lal (Full Bench of this Court) Adoption of the Privy Council rule regarding revisional jurisdiction under s. 622 (as described in the opinion). Mahmood, J. noted that this Full Bench ruling adopted the Privy Council rule and that he had concurred in it; he regarded it as binding for the general principle but wrote to clarify the scope.
Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali Explanation and clarification of the scope of the Privy Council rule and revisional jurisdiction under s. 622. Mahmood, J. referred to his prior explanation in this case to elucidate the exact scope of the rule adopted from the Privy Council and applied it in his reasoning here.
Phul Singh v. Jagan Nath Held by a Division Bench of this Court that an order refusing permission to sue in forma pauperis did not fall within the term "case" in s. 622 and therefore could not be revised. Mahmood, J. cited this as authority relied on at bar but expressed inability to concur with the general form of the rule laid down in that decision.
Bhulneshri Dat v. Bidiadhis Reportedly took the same view as Phul Singh regarding non-revisability of s. 407 orders. Cited by Mahmood, J. as an authority consistent with Phul Singh; he indicated disagreement with that general rule.
Sital Sahu v. Bechu Ram Reportedly took the same view as Phul Singh regarding non-revisability of s. 407 orders. Cited by Mahmood, J. as part of the line of authorities whose general rule he found himself unable to accept.
Ammal v. Nayudu Supports the view that an exercise of jurisdiction under s. 407 which is illegal or involves material irregularity may be a proper subject of revision. Mahmood, J. cited this case as supporting his view that s. 407 orders can be revised where there is illegality or material irregularity.
Raghunath Das…(Petitioner); v. Raj Kumar…(Opposite Party) Illustration (in earlier opinion) concerning the power of amendment under s. 206 and the effect on revisional jurisdiction under s. 622. Mahmood, J. referred to his prior discussion of situations giving rise to revision, citing this case as an example previously considered (noting he dissented on the result in that earlier matter).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two main strands of judicial reasoning: (A) the view expressed by Sir W. Comer Petheram, C.J. (with Straight, Oldfield, and Brodhurst, JJ.) limiting their reply to the particular case, and (B) the comprehensive analysis by Mahmood, J., who addressed both the general question and the particular case.

A. Reasoning in the First Opinion (Sir W. Comer Petheram, C.J., with Straight, Oldfield, and Brodhurst, JJ.)

  1. They observed that the reference question could not be answered generally and must be limited to the particular facts of the case before them.
  2. They applied the Privy Council test from Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh: the High Court may exercise revisional jurisdiction under s. 622 only where the lower Court acted "illegally or with material irregularity"; mere error of judgment is insufficient if the lower Court had jurisdiction and exercised it.
  3. They examined the statutory scheme in Chapter XXVI (ss. 403–410) governing suits by paupers, noting procedural steps: written application (s.403), presentation (s.404), power to reject for formality (s.405), examination of applicant (s.406), grounds for rejection (s.407), notices and formal hearing (ss.408–409), and effect of granting application (s.410).
  4. They concluded that the Subordinate Judge could properly reject an application at a preliminary stage (under s. 405 or s. 407) where, from the record and examination, the cause of action appeared to have arisen beyond the period of limitation; the words in s. 407 that allegations must "show a right to sue" were read broadly to require a subsisting enforceable cause of action not barred by limitation.
  5. Because the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction, heard the matter, and decided it without illegality or material irregularity, the High Court had no jurisdiction to revise the order under s. 622 in the present case.

B. Reasoning in Mahmood, J.'s Opinion

  1. Mahmood, J. separated the reference into two aspects: (1) the general legal question whether orders under s. 407 are subject to revision under s. 622, and (2) whether the particular circumstances of the present case justified revision.
  2. On the general question, he acknowledged binding authority in the Privy Council ruling (Amir Hassan Khan) and the Full Bench (Magni Ram), but expressed that prior Division Bench cases (Phul Singh, Bhulneshri Dat, Sital Sahu) asserting that s. 407 orders are not "cases" under s. 622 were, in his view, too narrow.
  3. He analyzed Chapter XXVI (ss. 401–413) and highlighted the close analogy between an application to sue in forma pauperis and an ordinary plaint: s. 403 requires particulars like a plaint; s. 410 deems a granted application to be the plaint for a suit under Chapter V; s. 413 bars subsequent identical pauper applications after refusal. On this statutory reading he found strong analogy supporting the view that rejection under s. 405 or s. 407 is an adjudication akin to rejection of a plaint and therefore falls within the ordinary sense of the word "case" used in s. 622.
  4. He emphasized policy considerations: rules allowing pauper litigation derogate from the general right to sue without fees and should be interpreted strictly to protect litigants' rights, and the revisional jurisdiction must be capable of remedying failures of justice where the pauper has no appeal and cannot bring an ordinary suit because of indigence.
  5. He accepted that even if an order under s. 407 is a "case" for revision, revision should be limited to instances where the lower Court exercised jurisdiction "illegally or with material irregularity" in the sense adopted from the Privy Council. He illustrated extreme hypothetical examples (e.g., summary rejection without examination or investigation) where revision would be necessary to prevent denial of justice to an indigent litigant.
  6. Turning to the specific facts, Mahmood, J. considered whether the Subordinate Judge acted legitimately in rejecting the application on limitation grounds. He construed "right to sue in such Court" in clause (c) of s. 407 broadly to include suits barred by positive rules of law (analogous to s. 54( c ) on rejection of plaints barred by law). He relied on s. 28 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) that extinguishes the right to property when limitation runs, and observed that the Subordinate Judge had found the suit was barred by limitation and had considered the merits and heard the opposite party. Thus, the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction and did not act illegally or with material irregularity.
  7. Mahmood, J. therefore concluded: generally, orders under s. 407 are revisable by the High Court under s. 622 where there is illegality or material irregularity; on the facts of the present case, no such illegality or material irregularity existed, so revision was not warranted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court has revisional jurisdiction under s. 622 Civil Procedure Code to revise an order passed under s. 407 Civil Procedure Code (rejecting an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis) where such rejection has been made by exercising jurisdiction "illegally or with material irregularity"; however, in the present case the Subordinate Judge exercised his jurisdiction without illegality or material irregularity, and therefore this is not a fit case for revision under s. 622.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Subordinate Judge's order rejecting the pauper application on the ground of limitation stands, because it was made by a court that had jurisdiction and was not shown to have acted illegally or with material irregularity.

Broader implications discussed in the opinion:

  • The Full Bench (through Mahmood, J.'s reasoning) articulated a general principle that orders under s. 407 can be the subject of revision under s. 622 in appropriate cases of illegality or material irregularity. This clarifies that such orders are not automatically excluded from revisional scrutiny, although revision remains discretionary and limited to the statutory test of illegality or material irregularity adopted from the Privy Council.
  • The opinion stresses that the statutory scheme for pauper suits (Chapter XXVI CPC) must be read in context with other Code provisions (e.g., provisions treating rejection of plaints as decrees for appeal purposes) and that the revisional jurisdiction should be available to prevent failure of justice where a pauper has no effective alternative remedy.

Note on precedent-setting:
The Court stated the general rule that s. 407 orders are revisable under s. 622 where illegality or material irregularity is established. In the present case, though the Court applied that rule to decline revision, the Bench elucidated the circumstances in which revision would be available. The immediate effect is the affirmance of the Subordinate Judge's order in this case; the opinion also contains guidance on the interpretation of Chapter XXVI and the interplay of s. 622 with pauper application orders.

    Chattarpal Singh (Petitioner) v. Raja Ram (Opposite Party).

    Sir W. Comer Petheram, C.J and Straight, Oldfield, and Brodhurst, JJ.:— It seems to us that the question put by this reference can scarcely be answered generally, and that our reply to it must be [663] limited to the particular case out of which it has arisen. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in a recent ruling—Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh—have laid down the following test to be adopted in deciding as to the powers of the High Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code:— “The question then is, did the Judges of the lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material irregularity? It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them, and they did decide it. Whether they decided rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case, and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.” In the case before us, it is conceded that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to hear the application, that be did hear it, and that he has decided it. It is not enough to give us jurisdiction to revise his order under s. 622, to show that be has decided wrongly, but it must be made out that he acted illegally or with material irregularity. We must therefore look to the sections of Chapter XXVI of the Code, under which the Subordinate Judge's proceedings were taken, to ascertain precisely what his powers were. By s. 403 it is provided that an application for permission to sue as a pauper must be in writing, that it is to contain all the particulars required by s. 50 to be given in ordinary plaints, that it shall be accompanied by a schedule of the petitioner's moveable and immoveable property, with an estimate of its value, and that it must be signed and verified in like manner as a plaint. S. 404 deals with the presentation of the petition, and s. 405 enacts that, if the application is not framed or presented in the manner prescribed, it shall be rejected. S. 406 provides for the examination of the applicant; and then we come to s. 407, which declares the grounds on which, after examination of the applicant, the Court shall reject the application. If none of these grounds appear, in other words, if the applicant makes out satisfactory prima facie grounds for calling on the proposed defendant to show cause against his application, then notices are to issue as provided in s. 408, and they pave the way to the formal bearing mentioned in s. 409, at which the question of the applicant's pauperism has to [664] be determined. It will thus be observed that the proceedings under ss. 405 and 407 are of a preliminary character, and a rejection under those sections is not, as in the case of s. 409, of a final kind, and a bar to a subsequent application. Examining s. 409 with advertence to the circumstances of the case out of which the reference has arisen, it appears to us that it was competent for the Subordinate Judge to reject the applicant's petition upon the ground that, as from his petition and his examination his cause of action was shown to have arisen “beyond the period of limitation allowed by law for instituting the suit” (s. 50, last para.), his allegations did not “show a right to sue” (s. 407, cl. c). We cannot, read these words of s. 407 as limiting the Court's discretion to merely ascertaining whether the “right to sue” arose within its jurisdiction, but they have in our opinion a more extended meaning, namely, that an applicant must make out that he has a good subsisting cause of action, capable of enforcement in Court, and calling for an answer, and not barred by the Law of Limitation or any other law. If it were not so, then the discretion of the Court, being limited to the matter of jurisdiction would be of little value. Whether in the case before us we treat the Subordinate Judge's order as made under s. 407 or s. 405, it appears to us that he was acting entirely within his powers in holding that the applicant had no right to sue, his cause of action having accrued beyond the period of limitation provided by law for his proper suit. It has therefore not been shown that “he exercised his jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity,” and it follows that we have no jurisdiction to revise his orders under s. 622 of the Code. In these terms we answer the reference.

    Mahmood, J.:— Bearing in mind the rulings referred to by the Division Bench and the course which the argument before the Full Bench has taken, I am of opinion that the question raised by this reference has two distinct aspects: first, as a general question, whether orders under s. 407 of the Civil Procedure Code are subject to the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code; and secondly, whether the circumstances of this particular case furnish grounds for the exercise of such revisional jurisdiction. I will consider each of these points separately.

    [665] Upon the first point, relating to the general principle upon which the revisional powers of this Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code must be exercised, we are of course bound by the ruling of the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, and by the recent Full Bench ruling of this Court in Magni Ram v. Jiwa Lal, which simply adopted the rule laid down by the Lords of the Privy Council. I was one of the Judges who concurred in the Full Bench ruling, but finding that the rule therein laid down was interpreted in a manner which was inconsistent with my reasons for concurring in the Full Bench ruling, I took it upon myself in the case of Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali to explain, at some length, the exact scope of the rule laid down by the Lords of the Privy Council, and which we had unanimously adopted in the Full Bench. I still adhere to the views which I then expressed, and I now pass to the special question whether orders under s. 407 of the Civil Procedure Code, rejecting applications for permission to sue in forma pauperis, can be, revised by this Court under s. 622 of the Code. But before expressing my own views upon the matter, I wish to refer to certain rulings which were cited on either side at the hearing. The first of these is the case of Phul Singh v. Jagan Nath in which a Division Bench of this Court held that an order refusing permission to sue in forma pauperis did not fall within the term “case” in s. 622, and therefore could not be dealt with in revision. The same view appears to have been taken in Bhulneshri Dat v. Bidiadhis, and also in Sital Sahu v. Bechu Ram. It was principally in consequence of these cases that my brother Oldfield and myself made this reference to the Full Bench. The particular circumstances of these cases do not appear from the report, but I confess, and I say this with due deference, that I am unable to concur in the general form in which the rule was laid down in those cases. The word “case,” as used in s. 622 of the Code, is nowhere defined; but adopting the general rule of construing statutes, I hold that the word should be understood in its most broadest and most ordinary sense, unless there were specific reasons for narrowing its meaning. I confess I am unaware of any such reasons, and limiting the arguments to orders under [666] s. 407 of the Civil Procedure Code, I should say as a general proposition that which might constitute the subject of an appeal would necessarily be a “case.” I say this because in the course of the argument, it was suggested that the reason why an order rejecting an application under s. 407, was not a “case” within the meaning of s. 622, was that such an order constituted no adjudication, but only a preliminary proceeding taken before the appearance of the opposite party. So far as this argument is concerned, I have only to say that the Code itself provides cases in which adjudications do take place without the presence of the opposite party, and are regarded at adjudications furnishing matter for appeal. I need not refer to the Code at large, but only to such parts of it as afford the strongest analogy to the immediate question which I am now considering. Now s. 407 is a part and parcel of one distinct Chapter—XXVI of the Code—which provides rules for “suits by paupers,” and begins with s. 401, which gives the general right to indigent persons to bring suits in forma pauperis, subject of course to the specific rules laid down in the Code. S. 403 provides that the pauper is to seek his remedy by a written application containing “the particulars required by s. 50 in regard to plaints in suits;” s. 404 lays down rules as to presentation of the application; s. 405 gives a summary power to the Court to reject the application if the rules contained in ss. 403 and 404 are not duly observed; s. 406 provides for examination of the applicant “regarding the merits of the claim;” and then comes s. 407, which confers upon the Court the power of rejecting the application after having ascertained the merits of the claim. This power is limited to the conditions prescribed by the various clauses of the section, but the clause with which we are immediately concerned is cl. (c), which lays down that one of the grounds for rejecting the application may be that the applicant's allegations do not “show a right to sue in such Court.” To proceed further with the main features of the rules contained in the Chapter:—S. 408 provides for the service of notice on the opposite party, fixing a day for receiving evidence as to the applicant's pauperism; s. 409 relates to the procedure to be adopted at the hearing; and s. 410 provides that “if the application be granted, it shall be numbered and registered, and shall be deemed the plaint in the suit, and the suit shall [667] proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted under Chapter V.” The only other section of the Chapter which I wish to notice is s. 413, which lays down that “an order of refusal made under s. 409 to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper shall be a bar to any, subsequent application of the like nature by him in respect of the same right to sue, but the applicant shall be at liberty to institute a suit in the ordinary manner in respect of such right.”

    Now, reading these provisions of the law together, there is no doubt in my mind that the strongest possible analogy exists between an application to sue in forma pauperis and an ordinary plaint in a suit under Chapter V of the Code—a view fully supported by the principle upon which ss. 403 and 410 have been framed. This being so, it seems to me to follow as a corollary that rejection of an application to sue in forma pauperis under s. 405 or s. 407 falls under the same general category of adjudications as the rejection of an ordinary plaint under s. 53 or s. 54. In both cases the service of notice on the opposite side, or his appearance, is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of rejection, and it follows that if the rejection of a plaint is a “case,” the rejection of an application to sue in forma pauperis must also constitute a “case,” Indeed, the Code in s. 2 has expressly given to “an order rejecting a plaint” the status of a “decree” for the purposes of appeal, and, going further in the same direction, cl. (b) of s. 588 gives the rights of appeal even from “orders returning plaint for amendment or to be presented to the proper Court,” that is, from orders under s. 83 or s. 67 of the Code. Now, as I said before, it is not easy for me to conceive that an adjudication which might have constituted a “case” for appeal falls short of the meaning of that word as used in s. 622 of the Code; and I may say broadly that which is a case for appeal must also be a case for revision, subject, of course, to the rules which govern the exercise of the appellate and revisional jurisdictions respectively. I might carry the analogical argument further by saying that the illegal rejection of a pauper's application to sue has for him the same effect as the erroneous rejection of the plaint has for an ordinary plaintiff; and though for obvious reasons the policy of the law is to differentiate between the two with reference to the right of appeal, the legal conceptions of an order rejecting [668] an application to sue in forma pauperis and an order rejecting the plaint, must necessarily fall under the same category so far as the interpretation of the term “case” in s. 622 is concerned. As to the policy of the law itself, I have to say, with reference to an observation made in the course of the argument, that I have long held the opinion that the only justification in the eye of legislative science for imposing taxes upon litigation in the shape of court-fees can be the cheek which they have upon frivolous and vexatious litigation, and that though such checks may be necessitated by the exigencies of the administration of justice, they must not be regarded as affording ground for the hypothesis that the Courts of justice in British India have been established only for the rich, and that the law is intended to give less protection to the poor than to the wealthy. It is in this light, and this light alone, that I can interpret the rules of our law as to pauper litigants, whether such rules be contained in the Court Fees Act or in the Civil Procedure Code. Something to this effect was said by me recently in disposing of an application under s. 549 of the Civil Procedure Code; and, applying the spirit of the same principle to the present case, and whilst fully aware of the policy of the law in connection with suits in forma pauperis as distinguished from, ordinary suits, I hold that the provisions of s. 407 must be interpreted strictly, because they operate in derogation of the right which every litigant has to seek the aid of the Courts of Justice. There is of course no appeal from an order rejecting a pauper's application under s. 407 of the Code; but what I have already said satisfies me that such an order would be a “case” within the meaning of s. 622. It may, indeed, as was said in the course of the argument, be a “hard case,” furnishing grounds for interference in revision according to the rules provided by the law. The question must of course depend upon the circumstances of each case, and where jurisdiction has been exercised “illegally or with material irregularity,” the case would of course be a proper one for the exercise of revisional power by this Court. In Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali to which I have already referred, my brother Oldfield and myself concurred in holding that an obviously wrong exercise of jurisdiction in opposition to the rules of the limitation law [669] constituted a ground for interference in revision. In the same case, in concurring with my learned brother, I illustrated my views by supposing other cases which would demand such interference, and, in the case of Raghunath Das…(Petitioner); v. Raj Kumar…(Opposite Party).*, I held, though I had the misfortune of dissenting in the result from the opinion of my brother Oldfield, that the power of amending decrees under s. 206, when exercised “illegally or with material irregularity,” would furnish grounds for revision. And here I wish to point out that my learned brother differed with me, not because he did not think that an order under s. 206 would constitute a “case” within the meaning of s. 622, but because he was of opinion that the amended decree could be made the subject of appeal under s. 540, and therefore by reason of s. 622, which provides revision in appealable cases, the order could not be considered in the exercise of this Court's revisional jurisdiction. Upon the exact point which I am now considering, there was therefore no difference of opinion between my learned brother and myself.

    Returning once more to orders rejecting, under s. 407, applications to sue in forma pauperis, I have to cite the case of Ammal v. Nayudu, which supports my view of the law, and shows that an exercise of jurisdiction under that section, when such exercise of jurisdiction is open to the objection of illegality or material irregularity, would form a proper subject of revision by the High Court. Other rulings of the Madras High Court, which are consistent with the same view, were also cited by the learned pleader for the petitioner in this case, but I need not refer to them because they do not bear directly upon the point now under consideration. But in order to illustrate my view, I will suppose an extreme case in which the exercise of revisional jurisdiction would be necessitated in connection with orders under s. 407. Suppose a case in which the lower Court, under serious misapprehension of the law, summarily rejects an application to sue in forma pauperis for reasons other than those presented in ss. 405, 406, or 409, without examining the applicant, and without making any attempt to investigate the merits of the claim or the facts as to pauperism. Would such a case not be a proper subject for revision under s. 622? The order though manifestly illegal and open to the objection of [670] material irregularity, could, of course, not be the subject of appeal, and if the argument of the learned counsel for the opposite party, in this case were to be accepted, such an order could not be made the subject of revision either. And it was said that the order was not a final adjudication, because the latter part of s. 413 leaves it open to the applicant to institute a suit in the ordinary manner—a provision similar to that of s. 56 regarding ordinary plaints. But how is such a suit to be instituted by a man who is an absolute pauper, who, whilst having aright, has suffered an injury, and when be has gone into Court to seek redress, is turned out of it by a summary order rejecting his application in the most arbitrary manner, without any adjudication as to the merits of his claim, and without any trial as to the fact of his pauperism? The law gives him no right of appeal, his indigence disables him from paying the court-fees, and if the revisional powers of this Court in such an extreme case as I have supposed could not be exercised, the necessary conclusion is that there may exist in British India cases in which there is a right which has been infringed, but for which there is virtually no remedy. But in my opinion our law contemplates no such results, and when it conferred the revisional powers upon this Court, it intended that those powers should be so exercised as to prevent such failure of justice. What I have said furnishes an answer in the affirmative to the general question which was referred to the Full Bench by my brother Oldfield and myself.

    I now proceed to discuss the second aspect of the question which has been involved in the course of the argument before the Full Bench— a question which goes behind the reference, and relates to the merits of the case itself. In this aspect the present case is not an extreme case of the kind which I have supposed in illustrating the question of principle originally referred to the Full Bench. I have already said that the exercise of the Court's power to reject pauper applications under s. 407 is limited to the grounds specified in the various clauses of that section itself, and the question then which arises here is, whether the learned Subordinate Judge acted legally in rejecting the application in the present case on the ground of limitation. He could have acted only under cl. (c) of s. 407 in rejecting the application, because his judgment-[671] contains no finding as to the applicant's pauperism, and proceeds entirely upon the view “that the applicant's allegations show that he has no right to sue for the property,”—a phrase which adopts almost verbatim the language of the clause to which I have referred. I confess that, at the hearing before the Full Bench I entertained doubts as to whether the expression “right to sue,” coupled with the phrase “in such Court,” did not limit the clause to questions relating to cause of action and jurisdiction. I, however, formed no definite opinion, and by the courtesy of the learned Chief Justice I was allowed time to consider the point, and I have arrived at the same conclusion as he and my other learned colleagues have adopted with reference to this particular point. I agree with them in thinking that these phrases must be understood in their broad sense, so as to include, not only questions of jurisdiction, but also such as fall within the purview of clause (c), s. 54, which lays down that plaints, shall be rejected “if the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any positive rule of law.” The Law of Limitation constitutes “a positive rule of law” barring civil actions, and s. 28 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) lays down, that “at the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” In the present case, which was a suit for possession of property, the learned Subordinate Judge has found that the suit was barred by limitation, and bearing in mind the rule of the limitation law to which I have just referred, I am of opinion that he acted rightly in holding that the applicant's allegations did not show “a right to sue” in his Court within the meaning of cl. (c), s. 407, of the Civil Procedure Code. Whether his conclusions upon the merits of the case were correct or erroneous is another matter, but he had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the case, and in the exercise of his jurisdiction he did not act “illegally or with material irregularity” within the meaning of s. 622 of the Code. If he had acted with such illegality or material irregularity, the case would, in my opinion, for the reasons already stated, have been a fit one for interference in revision. But here the learned Subordinate Judge appears to have observed all the rules of law provided for such matters, and his judgment shows that he considered the merits of the claim, and [672] disposed of the application after having heard the defendant or the opposite party.

    For these reasons I formulate my answer to this reference in the following terms:—

    The Court has powers under s. 622, Civil Procedure Code, to revise an order passed under s. 407, Civil Procedure Code, rejecting an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis, in cases where such rejection has been made by exercising jurisdiction “illegally, or with material irregularity” within the meaning of s. 622, but in the present case the jurisdiction vested in the lower Court, having been exercised without being open to either of such objections, the present is not a fit case for revision under s. 622, Civil Procedure Code.

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    Chattarpal Singh (Petitioner) v. Raja Ram (Opposite Party).
    (Apr 18, 1885)