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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • S. 4, sub-section (1), the Provincial Government
  • (f) of Section 4(1) of the Press Act, 1931.
  • 1939. Section 3(3) of the Press Act, 1931,
  • choose.2. Sub-section (4) of this section
  • sub-s. (3) of Section 3 of the Press Act,
  • sub-s. (1), of Section (4) of the Press Act.
  • S. 4, sub-section (1).4. Section 25
  • s. 23, Press Act, (Act 23 of 1931),
  • Section 8(3) of the Press Act,
  • Section 24 of the Press Act,
  • s. 4(1)(a), Press Act, 1931.
  • sub-section (3) of S. 3,
  • S. 4(1), Press Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • S. 4, sub-section (1), the Provincial Government
  • (f) of Section 4(1) of the Press Act, 1931.
  • 1939. Section 3(3) of the Press Act, 1931,
  • choose.2. Sub-section (4) of this section
  • sub-s. (3) of Section 3 of the Press Act,
  • sub-s. (1), of Section (4) of the Press Act.
  • S. 4, sub-section (1).4. Section 25
  • s. 23, Press Act, (Act 23 of 1931),
  • Section 8(3) of the Press Act,
  • Section 24 of the Press Act,
  • s. 4(1)(a), Press Act, 1931.
  • sub-section (3) of S. 3,
  • S. 4(1), Press Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under s. 23 of the Press Act (Act 23 of 1931) by Kumar Badri Narain Singh, keeper of the Hazara Memorial Press, Gaya, to set aside an order of the Provincial Government requiring him to deposit security of Rs. 1,000. The Provincial Government opposed the application through the Advocate-General. A Special Bench was constituted under Section 24 of the Press Act to hear the application.

The applicant had been served with a notice under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Press Act on 15 December 1939, calling upon him to deposit Rs. 1,000 (in money or government securities) with the District Magistrate of Gaya on or before 13 January 1940. The notice alleged that the Hazara Memorial Press had been used to print material described in clauses (a) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Press Act. The schedule to the notice listed poems in the Hindi periodical "Chingari" dated 6, 13 and 20 November 1939 and 4 December 1939.

It was conceded that the applicant was not responsible for the November 1939 publications but admitted responsibility for the poem published in the 4 December 1939 issue of the "Chingari." Consequently, the Special Bench confined its inquiry to that December 4, 1939 poem.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the poem published in the "Chingari" on 4 December 1939 contains words, signs or visible representations falling within clauses (a) or (d) of Section 4(1) of the Press Act, 1931.
  2. Whether the order of the Provincial Government requiring the keeper of the press to deposit security (challenged under Section 23 of the Press Act) should be set aside by the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Petitioner's) Arguments — Mr. Sarjoo Prasad

  • Argued that the word "revolution" does not necessarily imply violence or bloodshed; a revolution may be bloodless and peaceful, and that is what the poem contemplated.
  • Submitted that poetic license must be given considerable latitude in interpreting poems of this kind, and that the poem's language could be read as an exhortation to bring about change by legitimate, constitutional and peaceful means.
  • Relied on precedents (including AIR 1934 Lah 2642 and ILR (1938) 1 Cal 455) to support the view that the use of the word "revolution" or similar slogans does not automatically bring material within Section 4(1)(a) or (d) of the Press Act.

Provincial Government's Arguments (Respondent)

  • Contended that the concluding portion of the poem contains words that incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to or encourage, the commission of murder or other cognizable offences involving violence, falling within Section 4(1)(a) of the Press Act.
  • Also contended that the words tended, directly or indirectly, to bring into hatred or contempt a class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India (specifically "masters" or "exploiters"), raising an issue under Section 4(1)(d) of the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
57 Bom 253 Cited regarding the requirement that words must denote a definite or ascertainable class to fall within clause (d) of Section 4(1). The court relied on the principle to conclude that the terms "masters" or "exploiters" were too wide and vague to denote a definite class within Section 4(1)(d); the Advocate-General conceded he could not seriously contend that (d) was made out.
AIR 1934 Lah 2642 (Des Raj case) Held that the word "revolution" does not necessarily imply violence; a revolution may be bloodless and peaceful. The court distinguished this case: unlike the poster in AIR 1934 Lah 2642 (which contained nothing beyond a heading and had content suggesting peaceful change), the poem before the Bench used imagery and language that the court considered to advocate violent revolution.
ILR (1938) 1 Cal 455 Supports giving a common-sense interpretation to caricatures, cartoons or similar documents — the impression to a man of ordinary common sense is the proper test. The court applied the common-sense test to the poem and concluded that an ordinary reader would view the poem as exhorting violent destruction of the existing order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench framed its task (under Sections 23 and 25 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Press Act) as deciding whether the poem of 4 December 1939 contained words falling within clauses (a) or (d) of Section 4(1).

The court analysed the poem in its parts. The opening stanzas praise labourers and describe their exploitation; up to a point the poem contains no matter suggesting it falls within clauses (a) or (d). The court identified the disputed material as the concluding stanza which begins "Labourers. Raise now the cry of Revolution" and includes imagery of the heavens trembling, flames of revolution bursting forth from land and water, dancing the "fearful dance of destruction," and the assertion that "only total destruction will create a new world order."

On clause (d): the court held that the phrase "masters or exploiters" is too wide and vague to denote a definite and ascertainable class as required by Section 4(1)(d), and noted that the Advocate-General effectively conceded that (d) could not be seriously pressed.

On clause (a): the court considered whether the concluding stanza tends to incite to or encourage the commission of murder or cognizable offences involving violence. The court rejected the petitioner's submission that the word "revolution" could be read as necessarily peaceful, reasoning that the surrounding imagery — earthquakes, flames, a "fearful dance of destruction," and the insistence that "total destruction" is required — is not the imagery of peaceful or constitutional change but of violent upheaval. The court concluded that the poem, read in a common-sense way by a person of ordinary understanding, exhorts violent destruction of the existing social order and therefore tends to incite to the commission of cognizable offences involving violence.

The court further held that it is unnecessary to show that the words tend to incite a particular named offence (e.g., a specific murder); it is sufficient if the words tend to incite to or encourage cognizable offences involving violence in general. Accepting the petitioner's narrower view (that the words must point to a specific crime) would be to "hold that the greater does not include the less."

The court distinguished the cited Lahore case (AIR 1934 Lah 2642) on its facts — there the poster contained nothing beyond a heading and the contents suggested peaceful change — and held the present poem is materially different. The ILR (1938) 1 Cal 455 principle of common-sense interpretation was applied to conclude the poem would be read by an ordinary reader as an exhortation to violent revolution.

Based on this analysis, the Bench concluded that the Provincial Government was entitled to require the applicant to furnish security (the opinion specifically refers to "Section 8(3) of the Press Act" in this connection) and that the application to set aside the order must fail.

The judgment records the concurrence of Dhavle, J. and Manohar Lall, J.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Direct effect: The application under Section 23 to set aside the Provincial Government's order requiring security of Rs. 1,000 is dismissed; the Provincial Government was entitled to call upon the keeper of the Hazara Memorial Press to furnish security as indicated in the opinion (the court refers to Section 8(3) in that context).

Broader implications: The court relied on a common-sense interpretation of the poem and distinguished earlier authorities where the context showed only non-violent intent. The opinion does not state that it establishes any new binding precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Bench.

D.S/R.K

    Kumar Badri Narain Singh, Keeper Of Hazara Memorial Press, Gaya v. Chief Secretary To Government Of Bihar

    Harries, C.J:— This is an application under s. 23, Press Act, (Act 23 of 1931), by Kumar Badri Narain Singh, the keeper of the Hazara Memorial Press, Gaya, to set aside an order of the Provincial Government demanding security of Rs. 1000 from the applicant as keeper of the said Press. The Provincial Government has appeared by the Advocate-General who opposes the application. As required by Section 24 of the Press Act, this Special Bench has been constituted to hear the application. The applicant was served with a notice under sub-s. (3) of Section 3 of the Press Act, on 15th December 1939, calling upon him to deposit with the District Magistrate of Gaya on or before 13th January 1940, security to the amount of Rs. 1000 in money or in Government securities. This notice alleges that the Hazara Memorial Press was used for the purpose of printing matter set out in the schedule which was of the nature described in cls. (a) and (d) of sub-s. (1), of Section (4) of the Press Act. The schedule sets out poems in Hindi published in the “Chingari” dated 6th November, 13th November and 20th November 1939, and in the issue of 4th December 1939. It is now conceded that the petitioner was not responsible for the publication of the articles in the month of November 1939, but it is admitted that he was responsible for the publication of the poem in the issue of the “Chingari” of 4th December 1939. The case is, therefore, confined to the poem published in the “Chingari” on 4th December 1939. Section 3(3) of the Press Act, 1931, is in these terms:

    Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any printing press kept in any place in the territories under its administration, in respect of which security under the provisions of this Act has not been required, or having been required has been refunded under sub-section (2), is used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other document containing any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in S. 4, sub-section (1), the Provincial Government may, by notice in writing to the keeper of the press stating or describing such words, signs or visible representations, order the keeper to deposit with the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the press is situated security to such an amount not being less than five hundred or mote than three thousand rupees as the Provincial Government may think fit to require, in money or the equivalent thereof in securities of the Central Government as the person making the deposit may choose.

    2. Sub-section (4) of this section requires that the notice referred to in S. 3 shall appoint a date, not being sooner than the tenth day after the date of the issue of the notice, on or before which the deposit has to be made. In the present case the petitioner was called upon to make the deposit on or before 13th January 1940. Section 4(1) of the Act is as follows:

    Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any printing press in respect of which any security has been ordered to be deposited under S. 3 is used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other document containing any words, signs or visible representations which—

    (a) incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to or to encourage, the commission of any offence of murder or any cognizable offence involving violence, or

    or which tend, directly or indirectly:

    (d) to bring into hatred or contempt His Majesty or the Government established by law in British India or the administration of justice in British India or any class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, or to excite disaffection towards His Majesty or the said Government….

    3. In the present case the notice alleges that the poem published in the issue of the “Chingari,” dated 4th December 1939, contained words falling within cls. (a) and (d) of this section. Section 23(1) of the Act is in these terms:

    The keeper of a printing press who has been ordered to deposit security under sub-section (3) of S. 3, or the publisher of a newspaper who has been ordered to deposit security under sub-s. (3) of S. 7, or any person having an interest in any property in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under S. 4, S. 6, S. 8, S. 10 or S. 19, may, within two months from the date of such order, apply to the High Court for the local area in which such order was made, to set aside such order, and the High Court shall decide if the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order was made did or did not contain any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in S. 4, sub-section (1).

    4. Section 25 provides that if a Special Bench of the High Court constituted under s. 24 is not satisfied that the words contained in the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order under S. 4, sub-s. (1), was made, it shall set aside the order. From these sections, it is clear that what the Bench has to decide is whether the poem published in the issue of the “Chingari,” dated 4th December 1939, contains words falling within cl. (a) or cl. (d) of S. 4(1). The poem published on 4th December 1939 is entitled “Labourers—the mainstay of the world.” It begins emphasising that labourers are the mainstay of the present world and then proceeds to describe their unfortunate and pitiful lot. When the scorching summer midday sun burns they are found toiling in the open fields and khalihans to provide food for others. They work day and night, still, their children are hungry and the labourer has even no clothes to cover the body of his young wife.

    5. On the other hand, the masters are enjoying the fruits of their labour. This portion of the poem ends with the words, “O! helpless and poor labourers.” The tone of the poem then suddenly changes and the author points out that so far from being helpless the labourers are all powerful and are the life and soul of the universe. Though speechless today, when organized they will be as powerful as millions and this portion of the poem ends with these words: “Why are you helplessly tolerating the exploitation of your masters?” Up to this, the poem contains no matter which can possibly be suggested to fall within cls. (a) and (d) of S. 4(1), Press Act. It is however contended that the remainder of the poem does contain such matter. The remaining lines are as follows:

    “Labourers. Raise now the cry of Revolution.

    The heavens will tremble, the Universe

    Will shake and the flames of revolution

    Will burst forth from land and water. You who have been the object of exploitation,

    Now dance the fearful dance of destruction on this earth

    Truly, labourers. Only total destruction will create a new world order and that will bring happiness to the whole world.”

    6. On behalf of the Provincial Government it has been contended that this portion of the poem does contain words which incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to of to encourage, the commission of murder or cognizable offence involving violence. It is further contended that the words tend, directly or indirectly, to bring into hatred or contempt a class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, namely the masters or exploiters. In my judgment, it cannot be said that these words tend to bring into hatred or contempt any class or section of His Majesty's subjects. The words “masters or exploiters” are too wide and vague to denote a definite or ascertainable class so as to come within cl. (d) of S. 4(1) of the Act: see 57 Bom 253.1 The Advocate-General very properly conceded that he could not seriously contend that the poem complained of came within the mischief of S. 4(1)(d) of the Act. The question however remains whether the poem contains words falling within s. 4(1)(a) of the Act.

    7. The concluding portion of the poem begins with the words “Labourers. Raise now the cry of Revolution,” and these words may in themselves well suggest violence. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad who appeared on behalf of the petitioner contended however that “revolution” does not necessarily involve either violence or bloodshed. A revolution may be a bloodless and a peaceful one, and he has contended that such is the revolution contemplated by the author of this poem. It is urged that all the words amount to is an exhortation to the labourers to bring about a change in the social order by legitimate, constitutional and peaceful means. It appears to me however that if that was the object of the author of this poem, then he has used language singularly inappropriate for his purpose. He urges the labourers to raise the cry of revolution, and the consequence of that cry would be that the heavens would tremble, the universe would shake and the flames of revolution would burst forth from land and water. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has strenuously urged that the Court must permit considerable poetic license in poems of this kind; but it is to be observed that the imagery employed by the poet in this part of the poem is not the imagery of peace or constitutional change but the imagery of terrible violence. The revolution is likened to an earthquake causing the heavens to tremble and the universe to shake and it is then likened to an eruption causing the flames of revolution to burst forth from land and water. The revolution contemplated by the poet is clearly revolution through violence. The poet then urges the labourers who have been the object of exploitation to dance the fearful dance of destruction on this earth and then concludes by pointing out that total destruction alone would create the new world order which will bring happiness to the labourers. If the revolution contemplated was a peaceful bloodless one, why call upon the labourers to dance the fearful dance of destruction and insist that total destruction alone must precede the new world order? This is obviously an exhortation to the labourers to destroy the existing social order and to destroy it by force and violence. Then and only then will a new world order be possible and happiness for the toiling masses achieved.

    8. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad then contended that even if this portion of the poem contained words tending to incite to or to encourage bloody revolution such would not be words within s. 4(1)(a) of the Act. His contention was that words tending to incite to or encourage general violence were not sufficient to come within the mischief of S. 4(1)(a). The words used must tend to incite to or to encourage the commission of some specific crime such as murder or a particular cognizable offence involving violence. In my judgment, words tending to, incite to or to encourage bloody revolution and the destruction of the present social order by bloodshed and force clearly come within S. 4(1)(a) of the Act. Bloody revolution and forcible and violent destruction of the present social order involve all kinds of cognizable offences involving violence and would in all probability involve murder. In my view is unnecessary to show that the words tend to incite to, or to encourage the commission of a particular offence or offences. It is sufficient if they tend to incite to or to encourage the commission of cognizable offences of violence in general. To accept Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's contention would be to hold that the greater does not include the less. Great stress was laid by counsel for the applicant on the case in AIR 1934 Lah 2642 in which a Bench of that Court held that a revolution did not necessarily imply violence and commission of cognizable offences involving violence. In that case Des Raj was responsible for the publication of a poster the headline of which contained the words “Long, Long live Revolution.” The poster in question was a mere announcement that it was intended to publish and circulate a series of pamphlets under the headings “Thoughts of Young men, their Ideas and Aspirations” containing the views of young men on all topics of the day, the movements in the country and the forces working behind them. It was contended that the use of the words “Long long live Revolution” brought the poster within the mischief of s. 4(1)(a), Press Act, 1931. The Bench, however, held that there was nothing in the poster to bring it within the provisions of that section. At page 266 Agha Haider, J., observed:

    It is true that the heading itself contains the word “revolution,” but revolution, even in political matters need not necessarily be accompanied by bloodshed. A revolution may be absolutely bloodless and peaceful and there is no reason why we should assume that in the present case the revolution intended by the maker of the leaflet was a sanguinary or a violent revolution.

    9. At page 268 Tek Chand, J., observed:

    The headline of the poster however contains the words “Long Long Live Revolution” and the learned Sessions Judge has held that this heading ‘can be regarded as tending to incite to, or encourage, the commission of a cognizable ofience involving violence.’ It is however a matter of common notoriety that this slogan, whatever its original significance might have been, has now come to be used indiscriminately by all those who aim at bringing about a marked change in the Government of the country, by any means whatever, violent or non-violent, constitutional or otherwise. The mere use of these words, without more cannot therefore lead to the conclusion that it was intended to produce literature advocating violence. Moreover in this case such an assumption is clearly negatived by the contents of the poster itself which says that the pamphlets, which it is proposed to publish and circulate, will contain the views of young men on ‘all topics of the day and the movements in the country and the forces behind them’.

    10. In my judgment this Lahore case is clearly distinguishable from the case which I have to consider. There was nothing in the poster beyond the heading which tended to incite to, or encourage any form of revolution, and there was nothing to suggest that the “revolution” there referred to was anything more than a peaceful bloodless one. In fact, the contents of the poster strongly suggested that the publisher had in mind only peaceful bloodless change. In the present case however the “revolution” referred to is clearly a violent and terrible one, and those who are urged to bring it about are urged to dance the fearful dance of destruction and cause total destruction of the existing order. The readers are not urged to bring about a change but destroy the existing order so that a new order may arise from the ashes of the old world. Reliance was also placed by counsel for the petitioner on the case in ILR (1938) 1 Cal 455;3 but in my view that case can be of no assistance to the petitioner. The point at issue in that case was whether a certain poster fell within mischief of cls. (d) and (f) of Section 4(1) of the Press Act, 1931. Biswas, J., held that in dealing with such a poster containing a caricature or cartoon, the common sense interpretation of such a document, namely the impression it gives to a man of ordinary common sense must be taken. The learned Judge pointed out that “it is worse than useless to try to extract a meaning out of it by a laboured commentary.” I respectfully agree with the statement of the learned Judge that a common sense interpretation must be given to the document complained of. The question to be answered always is, what impression will the document or words give to a man of ordinary common sense? That question in my view, admits only of one answer in the present case. A man of ordinary common sense reading the poem complained of in this case would be bound to conclude that bloody and fearful revolution was the only panacea for the ills of the exploited labourers. He would be bound to regard the poem as an exhortation to the labourers to arise and to destroy the existing order by force and by the commission of violent crime. That being so, the Provincial Government were entitled to call upon the applicant as keeper of the Hazara Memorial Press, Gaya, to furnish security under Section 8(3) of the Press Act, and that being so, this application must fail. I would therefore dismiss the application.

    Dhavle, J.:— I agree. How little the last stanza with the flames of revolution that are to burst forth from land and water, and the terrible dance (karal tandab) that is to be danced upon the glory of this world (is jaga bhaibhab par) is meant to inculcate peaceful operations is clear from the summing up in the concluding lines in which it is emphatically asserted that total destruction alone will introduce a new order which will be full of happiness; and it is noticeable that sarbanas, the expression for “total destruction,” is so simple that nobody who knows the language will have the smallest difficulty in understanding it.

    Manohar Lall, J.:— I agree with the exhaustive analysis made by my Lord, the Chief Justice, of the poem in the ‘Chingari’ and would dismiss this application.

    D.S/R.K

    11. Application dismissed.

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