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Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns five petitioners convicted and sentenced in relation to an incident in which a constable, Kaira Ho, deputed from Baharagora police station in the Dhalbhum Sub-division of Singhbhum, was assaulted and tied to a post inside Nabo Kumar Maity's house while attempting to execute a warrant of arrest against the petitioner Kartik Chandra Maity. Kartik was found outside the house, shown a warrant and arrested; he invited the constable to Nabo's house where both brothers would furnish bail together; on approaching that house the constable was assaulted and tied by the five petitioners.

Sentences imposed (as described in the opinion): Kartik Chandra Maity sentenced to nine months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 under Section 234, concurrently with six months' rigorous imprisonment under Sections 342 and 147, I.P.C., each. The other four petitioners were sentenced to concurrent terms of six months' rigorous imprisonment under Sections 225, 342 and 147, I.P.C. All five were also convicted under Section 353, I.P.C., but the learned Sessions Judge, while affirming that conviction on appeal, did not think it necessary to pass any separate sentence under Section 353.

Procedurally, the matter reached the court by way of petition (appeal/review context) challenging the convictions and sentences on multiple grounds, including the lawfulness of the arrest and the validity of the warrant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arrest of Kartik Chandra Maity was lawful, specifically whether the endorsement on the warrant required the designation of the officer in addition to the name (relation to Section 79, CrPC).
  2. Whether the constable's report needed to record the fact that he had notified the accused of the substance of the warrant (relation to Section 80, CrPC).
  3. Whether a warrant signed by a magistrate other than the Sub-divisional Magistrate who took cognizance (specifically signed by Babu K.C. Chatterji "for S.D.O Dhalbhum") was valid under Section 75, CrPC.
  4. Whether the prosecution could rely on Section 54(1), CrPC (power of police to arrest without warrant) to validate an otherwise invalid arrest executed under a defective or improperly signed warrant.
  5. Whether a document admitted as First Information (Ex. 3) was actually the first information and, if not, whether its admission affected the convictions.
  6. Whether convictions under Sections 224, 225 and 353, I.P.C. could be sustained if the underlying arrest/apprehension was unlawful, and whether convictions under Sections 342 and 147, I.P.C. were maintainable despite any invalidity of the warrant.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The arrest of Kartik was unlawful because the endorsement on the warrant should have included not only the name but also the designation of the endorsing officer (relying on a perceived requirement beyond Section 79, CrPC).
  • The constable's report did not state that he had notified Kartik of the substance of the warrant, rendering the arrest illegal (challenge based on Section 80, CrPC).
  • The warrant was invalid because it was not signed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate who had taken cognizance; instead it was signed by another Magistrate, Babu K.C. Chatterji, “for S.D.O Dhalbhum,” and Section 75, CrPC requires the presiding officer's signature.
  • The document admitted as First Information (Ex. 3) was not in fact the first information and therefore should have been excluded.

Crown / Respondent's Arguments

  • Reference to Section 79, CrPC: only the name is required to be endorsed on the warrant; Form 2, Sch. 5 of the CPC does not invalidate the arrest — relying on Bankey Behary Singh v. Emperor.
  • Reference to Section 80, CrPC: the section does not require that the fact of notification be mentioned in the report.
  • Section 54(1), CrPC was invoked to argue that a police officer may, without warrant, arrest a person concerned in a cognizable offence, and thus the Crown suggested this might validate the arrest irrespective of the warrant's defects (citing Kishun Mandar v. Emperor and Emperor v. Bhola Bhagat).
  • The Crown also referred to Section 23 of the Police Act 1861 in support of constabulary powers, though the opinion notes limits to its applicability to execution of invalid warrants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bankey Behary Singh v. Emperor Endorsement on warrants: Section 79 requires the name to be endorsed; Form 2, Sch. 5 CPC not determinative for Section 79 endorsements. Cited to reject argument that endorsement required designation as well as name; used to support that only the name is required under Section 79.
Jagpat Koeri v. Emperor Validity of warrants signed by someone other than the magistrate who took cognizance (interpretation of 'presiding officer' under Section 75). Cited by petitioners to support invalidity where an Honorary Magistrate signed; Dhavle J. considered it supportive of non-delegation, while Scroope J. distinguished it on facts and powers of the signing magistrate.
Queen-Empress v. Dalip Principle that offences under Ss. 224 & 225 IPC (resistance/escape from lawful apprehension) require proof that apprehension/arrest was lawful. Referenced to highlight requirement that lawful apprehension must be shown for conviction under these sections.
Sampat v. Emperor Same principle as above regarding necessity of lawful arrest for convictions under resistance/escape provisions. Used along with other cases to show necessity of lawfulness of arrest for sustaining convictions under Ss. 224 & 225 and S. 353.
Durga Charan v. Queen-Empress Same family of authority concerning lawfulness of arrest as prerequisite for offences resisting lawful apprehension. Grouped with other precedents to underline the legal requirement that arrest/apprenhension be lawful for certain convictions.
Raman Singh v. Queen-Empress Again cited in relation to requirement of lawful apprehension for offences under Ss. 224, 225 and 353. Referenced to support the proposition that such convictions depend on lawfulness of arrest.
Kishun Mandar v. Emperor Use of Section 54(1), CrPC: police power to arrest without warrant where reasonable complaint, information or suspicion exists. Cited by Crown to argue applicability of Section 54(1); court noted it was not a case of an invalid warrant and could not be read to validate the warrant in the present circumstances without evidence that the constable acted under Section 54.
Appaswami Mudaly v. Emperor Observation that if a constable specifies a power which proves to be wanting, resistance or escape may not constitute an offence. Quoted to show that specifying a non-existent power can impact culpability, but court cautioned against broadly applying Section 54 to validate defective warrants without record/evidence.
Mousi Lal v. Emperor Constable must suggest in evidence any belief or grounds justifying action under Section 54; if he purports to act under warrant, the case stands as stated in the warrant. Cited to support the proposition that courts should take the case as the complainant/constable frames it rather than infer Section 54 application without explicit evidence.
Emperor v. Bhola Bhagat Authority cited in support of Crown's position on constabulary powers or arrest without warrant (distinguished by court). Court found the case distinguishable from present facts and thus not controlling to validate the warrant or arrest here.
Gansa Oraon v. King-Emperor Admissibility of documents alleged to be First Information; relevance to whether a later document (Ex. 3) could be treated as first information. Used to support conclusion that even if Ex. 3 were inadmissible, the convictions did not materially rest on it and therefore could not be interfered with on that ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Analysis by Dhavle, J.

Dhavle J. examined multiple legal contentions raised by the petitioners.

  1. On endorsement of the warrant (Section 79, CrPC): he held Section 79 requires only the name to be endorsed; reliance on Bankey Behary Singh v. Emperor supported rejection of the petitioners' argument that designation must also be endorsed.
  2. On notification (Section 80, CrPC): he observed Section 80 does not require that the fact of notification be recorded in the constable's report; on the facts found by lower courts the requirements were substantially complied with and Kartik had "reasonable opportunity of knowing on what charge he was being arrested".
  3. On validity of the warrant's signature (Section 75, CrPC): he considered the warrant invalid because it was signed not by the Sub-divisional Magistrate who had taken cognizance but by another magistrate (Babu K.C. Chatterji) "for S.D.O Dhalbhum." He found no provision in the Code enabling a Sub-divisional Magistrate to have his warrants signed by a subordinate magistrate, contrasted Sections 68 and 75 to infer the legislature did not intend delegation of signing warrants, and thus was not satisfied the warrant was validly signed.
  4. On the consequence for convictions under Ss. 224, 225 and 353, I.P.C.: he observed those sections relate to resistance to or escape from "lawful apprehension," and therefore prosecution must show the arrest was lawful. He found the Crown's attempt to rely on Section 54(1), CrPC inapt since the constable purported to act under a warrant and there was no evidence he had independent knowledge or suspicion or that he acted under Section 54; citing authorities (including Kishun Mandar and Appaswami Mudaly) he concluded Section 54 could not be applied without specific evidence and that convictions under Ss. 224, 225 and 353 could not be upheld and should be set aside.
  5. On Ex. 3 (First Information): Dhavle J. noted the contention that Ex. 3 was not the first information and thus inadmissible, but concluded the convictions did not materially rest on Ex. 3, relying on Gansa Oraon v. King-Emperor, so convictions were not interfered with on that ground.
  6. On convictions under Ss. 342 and 147, I.P.C.: he reasoned these offences were distinct from the resistance/escape offences; even if the warrant was invalid, the petitioners had gone beyond resisting an unlawful arrest and had caused hurt and wrongfully confined the constable. Because the constable acted in good faith under colour of office, the petitioners were punishable for rioting (S.147) and wrongful confinement (S.342). Thus he would affirm the convictions and sentences under Ss. 147 and 342.

Analysis by Scroope, J.

Scroope J. concurred except on the issue of invalidity of the warrant for the specific reason that it had not been signed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate who directed its issue.

  1. He reviewed the report from the Sub-divisional Officer which explained that Babu K.C. Chatterji, a Deputy Magistrate with First Class powers, was left in charge during the S.D.O.'s absence on tour and signed the warrant "for the Sub-divisional Officer." Chatterji held powers under Sections 190(1)(a) and (b), and Sections 143, 144 and 192, CrPC.
  2. Scroope J. concluded that in those circumstances Chatterji was the "presiding officer" for the purposes of Section 75 and that a warrant expressed to issue from the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate and signed "for the Sub-divisional Magistrate" by a magistrate who would have jurisdiction was valid. He distinguished Jagpat Koeri v. Emperor on the basis that in that case the signing magistrate (an Honorary Magistrate) apparently lacked Section 190 powers and could not be described as presiding officer.
  3. He reasoned practically that requiring a warrant to await the personal signature of an absent Sub-divisional Officer could impede the course of justice and facilitate escape; where two magistrates at sub-divisional headquarters possess identical powers to take cognizance of complaints and issue warrants under Section 204, the remaining magistrate may sign for the other when the latter is absent.
  4. On this basis, Scroope J. would maintain convictions under Ss. 224, 225 and 353, but would not pass separate sentences under those sections because the sentences already imposed under Ss. 147 and 342 were sufficient punishment.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court affirmed the convictions and sentences under Sections 147 and 342, I.P.C. for wrongful confinement and rioting.

There is a divergence between the two judicial opinions as to the fate of the convictions under Sections 224, 225 and 353, I.P.C.:

  • Dhavle, J.: would set aside the convictions under Ss. 224, 225 and 353 on the ground that the warrant was invalidly signed and the prosecution did not show the arrest was lawful; Section 54(1), CrPC could not be invoked in the absence of specific evidence that the constable acted under it.
  • Scroope, J.: would maintain the convictions under Ss. 224, 225 and 353, finding the warrant valid because it was signed by a Deputy Magistrate in charge with First Class powers who acted "for the Sub-divisional Officer," but would pass no separate sentence under those sections as the sentences under Ss. 147 and 342 are adequate.

Direct effects on the parties (as expressly stated in the opinion):

  • The convictions and sentences under Sections 147 and 342, I.P.C. are affirmed.
  • There is a split in judicial conclusions regarding convictions under Sections 224, 225 and 353, I.P.C.: one judge would set them aside; the other would affirm them but not impose additional punishment beyond the sentences under Ss. 147 and 342.

The opinion concludes with "Order accordingly." The opinion does not purport to create a new broader precedent beyond its application to the facts and statutory interpretation issues discussed (signature/authority to sign warrants, interplay of Sections 75, 79 and 80 CrPC, and limits on invoking Section 54(1) CrPC to validate defective warrant-based arrests).

    Kartik Chandra Maity v. Emperor Opposite Party.

    Dhavle, J.:— The petitioner Kartik Chandra Maity has been sentenced to nine months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 under S. 234, concurrently with rigorous imprisonment for six months under Ss. 342 and 147, I.P.C each. The other four petitioners have been sentenced to concurrent terms of six months' rigorous imprisonment under Ss. 225, 342 and 147, I.P.C All the five petitioners have also been convicted under S. 353, I.P.C, but on appeal the learned Sessions Judge, while affirming the conviction, did not consider it necessary to pass any separate sentence under this section.

    2. It appears that Kaira Ho, a constable, was deputed from police station Baharagora in the Dhalbhum Sub-divison of Singhbhum to execute a warrant of arrest against the petitioner Kartik Chandra Maity and his brother Nabo Kumar Maity, following a complaint under S. 379, I.P.C which had been preferred before the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Dhalbhum. Kartik was found outside the house, shown the warrant against him and formally arrested. He asked the constable to go with him to Nabo's house where, he said, both the brothers would furnish bail together. On approaching Nabo's house however the constable was assaulted by the five petitioners and tied with a rope to a post inside Nabo's house.

    3. The learned advocate for the petitioners has assailed the conviction on the ground that the arrest of Kartik was not lawful. He has contended that the endorsement on the warrant against Kartik should have been given not the name only but the designation also of Kairo Ho. Section 79 of the Cr PC however only requires the name to be endorsed, and Form 2, Sch. 5 of the CPC, to which reference has been made, has no bearing on endorsements under S. 79 and will further not have the effect of invalidating the arrest: vide Bankey Behary Singh v. Emperor (1). The learned advocate has also contended that the arrest was illegal because the constable does not in his report say that he had notified the substance of the warrant of Kartik. But Section 80 of the Cr PC does not require the fact of the notification to be mentioned in the report; and on the fact found by the lower Courts it is quite clear that the requirements of the section were substantially complied with in the present case and that Kartik had

    “reasonable opportunity of knowing on what charge he was being arrested and before what Court he was to appear, so that he might take steps to arrange for his defence”

    4. To quote from p. 498 of the report of Bankey Behary Singh's case already cited. A more substantial objection on behalf of the petitioners is based on the fact that the warrant is signed not by the Sub-divisional Magistrate who had taken cognizance of the case under S. 379, I.P.C, but by another Magistrate Babu K.C Chatterji, “for S.D.O Dhalbhum.” Section 75 of the Cr PC requires that the warrant shall be signed by the presiding officer; and the learned advocate has cited the case of Jagpat Koeri v. Emperor (2), in which a warrant of arrest signed not by the Magistrate who had taken cognizance of the case but by an Honorary Magistrate who lived in the same town was held invalid under the section, Prima facie the “presiding officer” of the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate was the Sub-divisional Officer himself. An inquiry has been made from the Deputy Commisioner of Singhbhum regarding Mr. Chatterji's powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure and his authority to sign the warrant for the Sub-divisional Officer of Dhalbhum. The reply received does not refer to any provisions of the Code under which Mr. Chatterji could have signed the warrant, but says that he has been vested with powers under “Ss. 190(a) and (b), 143, 144 and 192” of the Code and that he is almost invariably left in charge in the inevitable absence of the Sub-divisional Officer on tour and signs “for Sub-divisional Officer” if that officer has sanctioned the order previously and as Deputy Magistrate in charge if he acts on his own initiative. Mr. Chatterji did not in the present case act “on his own initiative.” I do not see how the absence of the Sub-divisional Officer on tour could operate to enlarge Mr. Chatterji's powers under the Code or to confer on him the authority that the S.D.O had under S. 204, as the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, to issue the warrant. It is true that the order for the issue of the warrants was passed by the S.D.O himself, but we have not been referred to anything in the Code which will enable a Sub-divisional Magistrate to get his warrants signed by a Subordinate Magistrate. The learned advocate for the petitioners has in this connexion drawn attention to the contrast between Ss. 68 and 75 of the Code: warrants issued under the latter section “shall be…….signed by the presiding officer,” while summonses issued under S. 68 may be signed by the presiding Officer “or by such other officer as the High Court may, from time to time, by rule direct.” The inference seems clear that the legislature did not intend to permit a delegation of the duty of signing warrants. I am not at all satisfied that the warrant signed as it was by Mr. Chatterji, was valid. Ss. 224 & 225. I.P.C, deal with resistance to or escape from “lawful apprehension,” and S. 353 with “assault…….to deter a public servant from discharge of his duty.” It thus becomes essential for the convictions under these sections that the prosecution should show that the apprehension or arrest made or attempted by Kaira no was lawful in every way—vide such cases as Queen-Empress v. Dalip (3), Sampat v. Emperor (4), Durga Char an v. Queen-Empress (5), and Raman Singh v. Queen-Empress (6). Mr. Agarwala for the Crown has not contested this but has endeavoured to meet it by referring to Section 54(1) of the Cr PC, which authorizes any police officer, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, to arrest any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonble complaint has been made or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. He has cited Kishun Mandar v. Emperor (7) in support, but that was not a case of an invalid warrant and the person wanted in that case was found by their Lordships to come within the terms of S. 54. In the present case there was no reference to the section in the lower Courts, and the question of what the constable knew, believed or suspected against Kartik was not gone into. The constable did not purport to act without a warrant and the probability is that (apart from the invalid warrant) he had no knowledge or suspicion of his own at all that Kartik was concerned in any cognizable offence. What he actually did was to endeavour to execute the warrant. In Appaswami Mudaly v. Emperor (8), it was observed that if a constable in effecting an arrest specifies a certain power which proves to be wanting, resistance to him or escape from his custody constitutes no offence. To hold that S. 54 applies in such cases without any intimation to the accused, and with out any allegation by the constable in his deposition that he proceeded under the section would be to nullify several salutary provisions contained in Part B Ch. 6, Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to the execution of warrants of arrest. In Mousi Lal v. Emperor (9), decided in this Court in 1918, Rou and Jwala Prasad, JJ., refused to accept a similar contention and observed:

    “But nowhere in his evidence does he (the constable) suggest that he had reason for such belief. He purports to have acted under cover of the warrant and we must take the case as stated by the complainant in it.”

    5. The case of Emperor v. Bhola Bhagat (10), which has also been referred to by Mr. Agarwala, is easily distinguishable. Mr. Agarwala has also referred to Section 23 of the Police Act 1861, but this section does not cover the execution of invalid warrants, nor does it extend a constable's powers of arrest. In this view the convictions of the petitioners under Ss. 224, 225 and 353, I.P.C, cannot be upheld and I would set them aside.

    6. The learned advocate has also contended that the document admitted as the First Information in the case, Ex. 3 is not in fact the first information and should have been excluded. This contention is supported by the facts that four days before Ex. 3 was drawn up there were two informations given at the thana and recorded in the station diary, Exs. 5 and 6, of which the latter was given by the constable himself. It is however clear that the convictions of the petitioners do not materially rest on this inadmissible document, and cannot therefore be interfered with on this ground: see Gansa Oraon v. King-Emperor* (11).

    7. The offences under Ss. 342 and 147 stand on a different footing from those under Ss. 224, 225 and 353. As the warrant was invalid, Kartik and his friends were entitled to resist or escape; from a custody which was not strictly lawful. But they went further and: caused hurt to the eonstable and wrongfully confined him. The constable was plainly acting in good faith under colour of office, though like the petitioners themselves he was probably unaware that the warrant he had been deputed to execute had been signed by an unauthorized person. The petitioners are thus clearly punishable for the rioting which was indulged in with the common object of assaulting the constable, and for the wrongful confinement of the constable. I would therefore affirm the convictions and the sentences passed upon the five petitioners under S. 147 and 342, I.P.C

    Scroope, J.:— I agree except as regards the third ground on which the warrant is urged to be invalid, namely, because it has not been signed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate who directed the issue of the warrant, having taken cognizance of the case under Section 190(1)(a) of the Cr PC, but by another Magistrate Babu K.C Chatterji “for S.D.O, Dhalbhum.” The report received from the Sub-divisional Officer of Dhalbhum shows the circumstances in which Babu K.C Chatterji came to sign the warrant; he was left in charge during the absence of the Sub-divisional Officer on tour and accordingly he signed the warrant “for the Sub-divisional Officer.” He is a Deputy Magistrate with First Class powers and has powers also under Ss. 190(1)(a) and 190(1)(b) as well as under Sections 143, 144 and 192 of the Cr PC; so in respect of taking cognizance of offences on complaint his powers are identical with those of the Sub-divisional Magistrate. He thus signed the warrant as Deputy Magistrate in charge during the absence of the Sub-divisional Officer on tour and in my opinion he was “the presiding officer” for the purposes of S. 75. Owing to the exigencies of official business it is not by any means possible for the execution of an order to follow at once on the passing of the order and there may be cases where owing to his absence on tour in the interior of a sub-division or absence at the district headquarters or illness a considerable period might have to elapse before the Sub-divisional Officer's signature can be obtained on a warrant in which he has directed to issue.

    8. The argument of the learned advocate for the petitioner requires one to hold that in such circumstances warrants must be held up until the Sub-divisional Officer is himself able to sign them. Obviously the course of justice might very seriously be impeded if such were the law facilitating as it would the escape of offenders. In such a case I consider that a warrant expressed as here to issue from the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate and signed as here “for the Sub-divisional Magistrate” by a Magistrate who himself would have jurisdiction in the matter is a valid warrant and that such an officer is a “presiding officer” for the purposes of S. 75. This view does not amount to any enlargement of existing powers; it simply renders feasible the exercise of existing powers; in other words, where there are two Magistrates at the sub-divisional headquarters with identical powers in the matter of taking cognizance of offences on complaints and in the matter of issue of warrants under S. 204 (under which section the warrant in the present case was issued) I would say that in the absence of either from the headquarters the remaining one can sign for the other warrants issued under the latter's direction. The case in Jagpat Koeri v. Emperor is not on all fours with the present one. That was a case of an Honorary Magistrate who, as far as can be seen, had no powers under Section 190 of the Cr PC and could not in any view of the matter be called the Magistrate incharge or “the presiding officer.”

    9. I would therefore maintain the conviction under Ss. 224, 225 and 353, I.P.C but pass no separate sentence thereunder as the sentences passed under Ss. 147 and 342, I.P.C are sufficient punishment for the petitioners.

    P.N/R.K

    10. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Kartik Chandra Maity v. Emperor Opposite Party.
    (May 13, 1930)