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  • Section 7(iv-A) and not Section 7(v), Court-fees Act,
  • Section 7 (iv-A), Court-fees Act,
  • COURT FEES ACT
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  • Section 7(iv-A) and not Section 7(v), Court-fees Act,
  • Section 7 (iv-A), Court-fees Act,
  • COURT FEES ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Court-fee: Section 7(iv-A), Court-fees Act

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff 1 is a divided brother of the late Vedala Raghavacharyulu, who died in or about January 1929, leaving his widow (defendant 2). Plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the sons of plaintiff 1. By his will, the testator conferred certain rights on the widow for her life and after her lifetime on plaintiff 1 (and, implicitly, his sons) as a vested remainder.

The plaintiffs' case alleges that the widow had only a life-interest and that the plaintiffs hold vested remainder interests; that the widow was directed by the testator to discharge debts in a particular manner but failed to do so; that she colluded with defendant 1 and executed promissory notes in the testator's name (some purporting to be renewals of debts); and that, relying on these promissory notes, defendant 1 instituted a suit (O.S. No. 230 of 1934) in the District Munsif's Court, Masulipatam, against defendant 2. The plaintiffs allege defendant 2 allowed an ex parte decree to be passed against her personally and against the husband's assets in her hands, that the decree was collusive and cannot bind the plaintiffs' vested remainder, and that properties subject to the plaintiffs' vested remainder are being brought to sale.

The plaintiffs therefore filed the present suit seeking (1) a declaration that the decree obtained by defendant 1 against defendant 2 in O.S. No. 203 (or 230 as elsewhere stated) of 1934 is collusive and does not affect the plaintiffs' vested remainder; and (2) a permanent injunction restraining defendant 1 from selling the plaintiffs' vested remainder in pursuance of that decree.

The learned District Munsif held that Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act applied and directed payment of court-fees accordingly. The Revision Petition challenges that view.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act applies to this suit — i.e., whether the plaintiffs are required to value the relief under Section 7(iv-A) (which, in substance, applies where a suit seeks cancellation of a decree for money) when they sue for a declaration that a decree obtained against the widow is collusive and does not bind their vested remainder.
  2. Whether a plaintiff who was not a party to a decree and who seeks a declaration regarding the decree's effect on his vested remainder is bound to treat his suit as one for cancellation (and thus attract the court-fee regime under Section 7(iv-A)) or whether a declaratory suit suffices and attracts a different court-fee valuation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs asserted that the widow (defendant 2) had only a life-interest and that the plaintiffs possessed a vested remainder under the will of Vedala Raghavacharyulu.
  • They alleged the widow colluded with defendant 1 to execute promissory notes in the deceased husband's name and that defendant 1 obtained an ex parte decree in a separate suit based on those notes.
  • The plaintiffs contended that the decree obtained cannot bind their vested remainder and sought a declaration to that effect and an injunction to prevent sale of their vested remainder under that decree.

Opposing Argument / Respondent's Contention

  • It was contended (by respondents or opposing counsel) that the language of Section 7(iv-A) is general and that because the decree is against the estate, a prayer for a declaration that the decree is not binding necessarily involves cancellation of the decree for money; hence Section 7(iv-A) should apply and the plaintiffs should value their relief accordingly.
  • Counsel Mr. Champakesa Ayyengar relied on authorities (notably Nemichand Sowcar v. Namberumal Chetty and Bali Reddi v. Khatipulal Sab) to support the contention that persons who were parties to a decree (or transferees from a party) seeking a declaration of its validity are bound to value the relief under Section 7(iv-A).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Naghabushanam v. Venkatappayya, AIR 1935 Mad 203 Observation that a fiscal enactment such as the Court-fees Act cannot prescribe substantive rights or forbid declaratory suits; the contention that the section forbids declaratory suits is untenable. The court adopted Venkatasubba Rao, J.'s observations to reject the argument that the general language of Section 7(iv-A) prohibits declaratory relief and therefore to hold Section 7(iv-A) inapplicable here.
Secretary of State v. Lakhanna, AIR 1933 Mad 430 Holds that in case of an alienation by the father it may be sufficient to obtain a mere declaration that it is not binding on the son (i.e., cancellation is not the only remedy). Referred to by the court as authority for the proposition that a declaration can suffice where the plaintiff was not a party to the earlier instrument or decree.
Annamalai v. Krishtappa, AIR 1935 Mad 66 Supports the view that distinctions based upon onus of proof should not be imported into deciding court-fee questions. Used to support the court's rejection of importing a proof-burden distinction into the court-fee characterization of the suit.
Balakrishnan Nair v. Vishnu Nambudri, AIR 1931 Mad 375 Held that a declaration was sufficient where a minor member sought to set aside a decree against the karnavan to which the minor was not a party; cancellation was not necessary. Applied as precedent that persons not parties to a decree may seek declaration rather than cancellation and thus not attract the Section 7(iv-A) valuation.
Venkatasiva Rao v. V. Satyanarayanamurthy, AIR 1932 Mad 605 Approved the view that plaintiffs not parties to a previous decree should pray for a declaration that the previous decree is not binding and that it was inappropriate to ask for setting aside a decree to which they were not parties; observed that the form of relief is immaterial where cancellation is necessarily involved. Quoted and relied upon to explain that when a plaintiff seeks only a declaration in respect of rights vis-à-vis a decree to which he was not party, Section 7(iv-A) does not automatically apply.
Nemichand Sowcar v. Namberumal Chetty, AIR 1935 Mad 671 Concerned a transferee from a party to a decree; the principle that what applies to a party to a decree may apply to his transferee. Noted by the court as relied upon by opposing counsel to support valuation under Section 7(iv-A); the court distinguished its applicability to the present plaintiffs.
Bali Reddi v. Khatipulal Sab, AIR 1935 Mad 863 Headnote stated that a suit to set aside mortgage and sale deeds securing money was in substance one for cancellation and thus leviable to court-fee under Section 7(iv-A). The court examined the headnote, could not access the full papers, and concluded the decision did not address the present question in the way the headnote suggested; the court distinguished its facts and did not treat Bali Reddi as controlling here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by parsing the plain language of Section 7(iv-A): the section applies to suits for cancellation of a decree for money — i.e., to suits seeking to get rid of an obligation for payment of money imposed by a decree against the party who seeks to be freed of it.

Applying that formulation to the facts, the court observed that the plaintiffs were not parties to the decree in question and that no obligation under that decree was imposed personally on them or on property in their hands. On this prima facie basis the court concluded Section 7(iv-A) would not apply.

The court then considered the opposing contention that the section's language is general, that the decree is against the estate, and that a prayer for a declaration that the decree is not binding necessarily involves cancellation (and hence Section 7(iv-A)). To meet this, the court adopted the reasoning of Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Naghabushanam v. Venkatappayya: a fiscal enactment such as the Court-fees Act does not prescribe substantive rights nor forbid declaratory suits; therefore the court-fee classification should not be used to convert every declaratory suit into a suit for cancellation merely because the relief could have that effect in practice.

The court examined authorities where courts had held that a mere declaration suffices when the plaintiff was not a party to the earlier instrument or decree (Secretary of State v. Lakhanna; Balakrishnan Nair; Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthy) and emphasized the underlying principle: a distinction between (a) an obligation imposed on a party by a decree (which that party must seek to cancel if he wants relief from the obligation), and (b) an obligation asserted to be imposed by the personal law on a non-party's interest in the estate (where the non-party seeks merely a declaration that his interest is not liable under the decree).

The court further explained that if a plaintiff was seeking to get rid of an obligation existing under the decree itself, he would be bound to sue for cancellation (and Section 7(iv-A) would apply). But where a non-party plaintiff seeks a declaration that his estate interest cannot be rendered liable under the decree by virtue of personal law or the will, he is not obliged to sue for cancellation; a declaratory prayer is sufficient.

The court considered the two authorities relied on by opposing counsel (Nemichand Sowcar and Bali Reddi). It accepted that the principle applicable to parties to a decree may extend to transferees from those parties (Nemichand Sowcar) but distinguished the present plaintiffs (who were not parties nor transferees of a party in the sense invoked). Regarding Bali Reddi, the court attempted to inspect the papers but none were available; on examination of the judgment it concluded that the learned judge in Bali Reddi had not addressed the present question as counsel suggested, and that the case was predicated on facts (e.g., the son suing as heir or documents executed on his behalf) which made Section 7(iv-A) applicable there, not by reason of a general rule.

On this analysis, the court concluded the plaintiffs in the present case were not bound to value the relief under Section 7(iv-A) and that the District Munsif's order applying Section 7(iv-A) was incorrect.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court reversed the order of the lower court and allowed the Revision Petition. The court explicitly held that the plaintiffs are not bound to value their relief under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act. The court made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The District Munsif's direction that court-fees be paid under Section 7(iv-A) was set aside and the plaintiffs are not required to value their claim under that subsection in respect of the present declaratory and injunctive relief.
  • Broader implication: The decision follows and applies existing Madras precedents distinguishing suits by non-parties seeking declarations about the effect of a decree from suits by parties seeking cancellation. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule of general application beyond those principles, and no broader new precedent was announced beyond the application of the cited authorities to these facts.

Case references within this summary are taken verbatim from the provided opinion and are presented only to reflect the authorities discussed by the court.

    Vedala Vallabhacharyulu And Another Petitioners v. Vedala Rangacharyulu And Others S

    1. The question involved in this Revision Petition is one of court-fee and for the disposal of the same it is necessary to look into the allegations in the plaint and the substance of the relief claimed. Plaintiff 1 is a divided brother of one Vedala Raghavacharyulu, the husband of defendant 2. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the sons of plaintiff 1. Raghavacharyulu died in or about January 1929, leaving him surviving his widow, and by his last will and testament conferred certain rights in his estate on the widow and after her lifetime on the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiffs is that she has only a life-interest and that they have a vested remainder therein, The plaintiffs allege that the testator directed that the debts left by him should be discharged by his widow in a certain manner but she failed to do so, that she in collusion with defendant 1 executed certain promissory notes in his name, some of them purporting to be renewals of debts of her husband, that on the footing of the said promissory notes defendant 1 instituted O.S. No. 230 of 1934 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Masulipatam, against defendant 2, that the latter allowed an ex parte decree to be passed against her personally and against the assets of the husband in her hands, that the said decree was a collusive one and could not bind their vested remainder in the properties left by Raghavacharyulu and that the suit properties are being brought to sale and hence they have filed the present action for getting the following relief:

    It may be declared that the decree obtained by defendant 1 against defendant 2 in O.S. No. 203 of 1934, of the District Munsif's Court, Masulipatam is a collusive decree and that the said decree does not affect the plaintiffs or the vested remainder interest of the plaintiffs in the properties of the late Raghavacharyulu and that defendant 1 should be restrained by a permanent injunction from bringing to sale in pursuance of the said decree the vested remainder interest of the plaintiffs in the properties of the late Raghavacharyulu.

    2. The learned District Munsif took the view that Section 7 (iv-A), Court-fees Act, would apply to the case and directed court-fees to be paid accordingly. The question is, is this view correct? Section 7 (iv A) so far as it is material to this case, is as follows:

    In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money ... according to the value of the subject matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be... if the whole decree is sought to be cancelled... the amount for which the decree was passed.

    3. According to the plain language of the section, the essential nature of the relief sought must be for cancellation of the decree for money, i.e., getting rid of an obligation for payment of money imposed by the decree against the party who seeks to get rid of it. The plaintiffs were not parties to the said decree and there is no obligation imposed against them personally or against any property in their hands. Prima facie section 7 (iv-a) will not apply, but it is contended that the language of the clause is general, that the decree is against the estate and that the prayer for declaration necessarily involves the cancellation of the decree, and the clause in terms will apply. In regard to the argument based on the general language of the section, I would respectfully adopt the observations of Venkatasubba Rao, J who met a similar contention thus in Naghabushanam v. Venkatappayya AIR 1935 Mad 203 at pp. 449 and 450:

    His contention is... that this section (in regard to the decree and instruments of the kind dealt with by it) forbids declaratory suits and enacts that cancellation should always be prayed for. This argument is in my opinion utterly untenable. To declare what the substantive rights of the parties are or to prescribe the modes of enforcing those rights is outside the province of a fiscal enactment like the Court-fees Act.

    4. The same learned Judge had to deal with a case of a son suing to set aside an alienation made by the father or the Official Receiver exercising the right of the father. It was contended before him that the alienation being for an antecedent debt, prima facie bound the son and it was obligatory on the son to set it aside and that section 7 (iv-a) would apply to such a case. He repelled the contention and observed thus:

    It has been held by a Bench of this Court, of which I was a member, in Secretary of State v. Lakhanna AIR 1933 Mad 430 that in the case of an alienation by the father it is sufficient to obtain a mere declaration that it is not binding... in the present case, however the sale was made for paying off the father's antecedent debts and such a sale is binding upon the son unless he affirmatively proves that the debts are illegal or immoral. It is contended that on that ground the sale in the case in hand is prima facie good and therefore it is the son's duty to have it set aside. I do not think it would be right to import such a distinction in deciding a question of Court-fee--a distinction based upon the onus of proof: Annamalai v. Krishtappa AIR 1935 Mad 66 at pp. 387 and 388.

    5. A similar view was taken by Ramesam, J. in Balakrishnan Nair v. Vishnu Nambudri AIR 1931 Mad 375 where a minor member of Malabar tarwad sought to set aside a decree against the karnavan to which he was not a party eo nomine. The learned Judge held that a declaration was enough and no cancellation was necessary. This decision was referred to with approval by Reilly and Ananthakrishna Iyer, JJ., in Venkatasiva Rao v. V. Satyanarayanamurthy AIR 1932 Mad 605 and Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Naghabushanam v. Venkatappayya AIR 1935 Mad 203. Referring to the view of Ramesam, J., observes Reilly, J. thus:

    The learned Judge was right in saying that the plaintiffs there had to pray for no more than a declaration that the previous decree was not binding on them and the consequential relief of recovery and that it was not appropriate for them to ask that that decree, to which they had not been parties, should be set aside: Venkatasiva Rao v. V. Satyanarayanamurthy AIR 1932 Mad 605 at. p. 215.

    6. Ananthakrishna Ayyar J. similarly observed thus:

    A decree will have full force and binding effect between the parties to the same until it is set aside by the persons who were parties to the same; but persons who were not parties to the decree can only sue for a declaration in respect of their rights in relation to the decree (p. 226).

    7. The principle underlying the above view, as I understand it, is this, namely there is a distinction between an obligation imposed on a party by a decree and an obligation imposed on a party by the personal law by which he is governed in pursuance of the decree. In the one case ho seeks to get rid of the obligation existing under the decree; on the other he seeks to have it declared that he or his interest in the estate, which is sought to be made liable, cannot be rendered liable under the decree by virtue of the said personal law. In the latter case he is not bound to sue for cancellation of the decree; in the former case he is bound to sue for cancellation. Even if he sues for a bare declaration, it necessarily involves cancellation and the form of the relief he prays for is immaterial, as pointed out by Reilly, J. in Venkatasiva Rao v. V. Satyanarayanamurthy AIR 1932 Mad 605. The plaintiffs in this case say that whatever may be the effect of the decree on the interest of the widow, it cannot affect their interest in the estate whether under the general law or under the particular provisions of the will and therefore they are not bound to sue for cancellation of the decree. Mr. Champakesa Ayyengar relied on two cases in support of his contention that persons who were parties to the decree, in seeking a declaration of its validity, are bound to value the relief Under section 7 (iv-a). The first case he relies on is Nemichand Sowcar v. Namberumal Chetty AIR 1935 Mad 671. It was a case of a transferee from a party to a decree. There can be no question that what is applicable to a party to a decree will equally apply to a person who derived interest from him in relation to the property affected by the decree, i.e., the legal representative or transferee. The second case relied on is a decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J. reported in Bali Reddi v. Khatipulal Sab, AIR 1935 Mad 863. The headnote of the said case runs thus:

    Where a person sued to set aside certain mortgage deeds and sale deeds executed by his father and for possession of the immoveable properties covered by them, held, that the suit was in substance one for the cancellation of documents securing money or other property having a money value, and the plaint was leviable to court-fee Under Section 7(iv-A) and not Section 7(v), Court-fees Act, even though the prayer for cancellation was coupled with that for possession.

    8. I tried to send for the papers in the case to ascertain the exact facts on which the decision was based, but no papers were available in the office. From the said headnote it might appear that the learned Judge was laying down exactly the opposite of what he laid down in Annamalai v. Krishtappa AIR 1935 Mad 66 but on a close examination of the judgment, it will be seen that the learned Judge was not considering this question at all. It seems to have been assumed that it was obligatory on the son, if he was questioning the deeds executed by his father, to have them set aside either because the father executed the documents also on behalf of the son or the son was suing as heir of his father in which case section 7(iv-a) would apply. I am therefore of the opinion that the plaintiffs are not bound to value the relief under Section 7(iv-A), Court-fees Act. The order of the lower Court is reversed and this Revision Petition is allowed, but I make no order as to costs.

    C.R.P. No. 668 of 1936.

    9. Following the judgment in C.R.P. No. 667 of 1936, this Revision Petition is allowed. But I make no order as to costs.

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    Vedala Vallabhacharyulu And Another Petitioners v. Vedala Rangacharyulu And Others S
    (Dec 18, 1936)