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  • provision in Section 17 of the Travancore Ezhuva Act (Act III of 1100).
  • section 18 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100
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  • provision in Section 17 of the Travancore Ezhuva Act (Act III of 1100).
  • section 18 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (Appeal in O.S. No. 24 of 1952)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from O.S. No. 24 of 1952 on the file of the now defunct District Court of Mavelikara. Defendant 1 (the appellant) appealed against a judgment and decree dated 28th March, 1955 which set aside a sale deed, Ext. II (dated 30-9-1117), executed in favour of defendant 1 and defendant 2. Defendant 2 had earlier assigned his rights under Ext. II to defendant 1, and defendant 1 alone contested the suit in the lower court.

The disputed property originally belonged to the Puthu-parampu tarwad. That tarwad underwent a partition in 1099 M.E and a further division of a branch occurred on 25-10-1107 M.E (Exts. D and IV are copies of that partition). A different branch had assigned the property to P.W.2 on 4-5-1109 (Ext. A), but on 18-2-1112 P.W.2 sold it to Chellamma (Ext. B). Chellamma (defendant 3) later died unmarried and intestate.

Under section 18 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100, Chellamma's self-acquired and separate property devolved on her mother's thavazhi. At the time of Chellamma's death the mother's thavazhi consisted of six persons: Nani Amma, her son (defendant 3), her daughter Janaki Amma (defendant 4) and Janaki Amma's three children (the three plaintiffs). The impugned sale deed (Ext. II) was executed by those six persons and Kalyani Amma (who had a maintenance charge under the earlier partition). All three plaintiffs were minors when Ext. II was executed; their mother (defendant 4) acted both for herself and as guardian for her children.

The plaintiffs sued to set aside Ext. II on grounds that the alienation lacked consideration and tarwad necessity, seeking possession on behalf of their grandmother's thavazhi and mesne profits. Defendant 1 defended on grounds of valid consideration, tarwad necessity, disputed mesne profits and claimed value for improvements.

After trial the Additional District Judge, Mavelikara, set aside Ext. II and decreed recovery of the property for the plaintiffs on behalf of their grandmother's thavazhi subject to terms (deposit of Rs. 380 as valid consideration, payment for improvements, mesne profits, and costs). The appellant appealed against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs were competent (had locus standi) to maintain a suit on behalf of Nani Amma's thavazhi given that the thavazhi had purportedly disintegrated by the partition deed of 1107 M.E.
  2. Whether Ext. II (the sale deed) should be set aside in whole or in part, and if set aside what adjustments (consideration, improvements, mesne profits) should be ordered.
  3. What is the effect of section 18 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100, on devolution of property where a thavazhi had been previously divided (i.e., whether members take as tenants-in-common after prior disintegration).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The alienation evidenced by Ext. II lacked consideration and did not arise from tarwad necessity.
  • They sought to recover possession on behalf of their grandmother's thavazhi and claimed mesne profits.

Appellant's Arguments (1st Defendant)

  • Ext. II was supported by valid consideration.
  • The alienation was made out of tarwad necessity (i.e., it was justified as necessary for the tarwad).
  • The plaintiffs were not competent to maintain a suit on behalf of the thavazhi because the thavazhi had been disintegrated by the 1107 M.E partition—therefore rights devolved as tenants-in-common and certain shares had passed absolutely to vendees by Ext. II.
  • He disputed liability for mesne profits and claimed entitlement to the value of improvements he had effected on the property.
  • As a practical concession, the appellant indicated he would be content to retain a one-half share of the property, and sought that the decree of the lower court be upheld only with respect to the other half (the plaintiffs' half).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kittunni Nair v. Sankaran Nair (1122) 38 Cochin Law Reports 180 Represents the Cochin/Madras view that members of a Marumakkathayam tarwad may remain joint with respect to portions left undivided on partition. Cited to note an alternative view (that jointness can be retained for some properties). The court observed the present case did not involve property intentionally left undivided, so the case was not dispositive here.
Krishna Pillai v. Jagadeeshachandran Nair — 1957 K.L.J 202; 1957 K.L.T 62 (Varadaraja Iyengar, J.) Held that where a thavazhi disintegrated prior to devolution, properties devolve on the persons entitled as tenants-in-common (effect of section 18 of Travancore Nayar Act). Followed by this Court to conclude that when Chellamma died (after prior disintegration), each sharer took a separate one-sixth share and those who joined Ext. II passed their full rights to the vendees.
Neelakantan v. Varki — 22 T.L.J 1357 Decision relating to the corresponding provision (Section 15) of the Nayar Act of 1088, supporting the principle applied in Krishna Pillai. Referred to as precedent supporting the interpretation that disintegration prior to devolution leads to tenancy-in-common rather than continued jointness.
Unreported decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in A.S. No. 540 of 1953 Decision with reference to a similar provision (Section 17) of the Travancore Ezhuva Act (Act III of 1100), cited in support of the tenants-in-common principle. Relied upon as additional authority supporting the consequence of prior disintegration producing tenancy-in-common rights.
Velayudhan Nair v. Janaki — 1957 K.L.J 241; 1957 K.L.T 222 Authority for the proposition that a divided member cannot maintain a suit on behalf of a tarwad/thavazhi to set aside an alienation effected before the division. Cited by the Court to bolster the conclusion that after division a divided member lacks standing to sue on behalf of the former collective unit.
Bhavani Pillai v. Ammukutti Pillai — 1958 K.L.J 87 Reaffirms the view (following Krishna Pillai) that division of a tarwad affects members' standing and their mode of entitlement. Cited and followed as supporting precedent for denying suit-maintaining capacity of divided members acting on behalf of a ceased thavazhi.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along the following lines (expressed in the opinion):

  1. The court examined the character of the 1107 M.E partition of the relevant branch of the Puthuparampu tarwad. The original court record (Exts. D and IV) showed that the branch had "lost its jointness once and for all" by that partition.
  2. Applying section 18 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100, and the line of Travancore decisions (notably Krishna Pillai v. Jagadeeshachandran Nair and Neelakantan v. Varki), the court held that where a thavazhi has disintegrated prior to the devolution of property, the persons entitled take as tenants-in-common rather than as continuing members of a joint tarwad.
  3. As Chellamma died after that disintegration, six persons were entitled to her property as six separate one-sixth shares. Three of those sharers joined in executing Ext. II in their own rights. The court therefore accepted the appellant's contention that the full rights of those three sharers passed to the vendees under Ext. II.
  4. The court reviewed the lower court's findings (that Ext. II was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 380 and unsupported as to Rs. 270) and noted counsel's concession that the appellant would accept retaining a one-half share without apportioning the consideration between halves.
  5. Rather than forcing the parties into a fresh partition suit, the court modified the lower court's decree and passed a preliminary decree directing partition of the property into two equal halves: one half to the plaintiffs and the other half to the 1st appellant.
  6. Because the lower court had already assessed (for the whole) the value of improvements and mesne profits but the present decree awarded only the plaintiffs' half, the court directed that values and mesne profits must now be fixed only with respect to the plaintiffs' half. The earlier provisions in the lower court decree in that behalf were annulled and the lower court was instructed to determine (in the final decree) the value of improvements due to the appellant from the plaintiffs and the quantum of mesne profits payable by the appellant, payable only from the date when the value of the improvements is deposited into court.
  7. On costs, the court considered the unusual turn taken in the appeal and ordered that each side shall bear their respective costs throughout (departing from the lower court's order that allowed plaintiffs to realize half their costs from defendant 1).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is disposed of by modifying the lower court's decree: the court passes a preliminary decree for partition of the property into two equal halves — one half to the plaintiffs and the remaining half to the 1st appellant — and directs the lower court to determine, in the final decree, the value of improvements due to the appellant from the plaintiffs and the mesne profits payable with respect to the plaintiffs' half (mesne profits payable only from the date the value of improvements is deposited in court).

Implications / Consequences:

  • The plaintiffs were held to have no locus standi to maintain the suit on behalf of their grandmother's thavazhi in respect of the one-half share that belonged to Nani Amma and defendants 3 and 4 because the thavazhi had ceased to exist before Chellamma's death.
  • The full rights of the three sharers who joined Ext. II were held to have passed to the vendees for their shares; consequently the decree setting aside Ext. II was not sustained for the appellant's retained half.
  • The lower court's previous provisions regarding the amount of improvements and mesne profits for the whole property were annulled and must be re-fixed only in respect of the plaintiffs' half; mesne profits will be payable only from the date improvements are paid into court.
  • On costs, each party bears their own costs throughout.
  • The Court acknowledged that a difference of view exists between Travancore authorities and Cochin/Madras cases on whether jointness can be preserved for some portion left undivided; it noted that the difference was immaterial to the present case and suggested that the conflict might be considered on an appropriate occasion. The opinion therefore did not resolve that broader conflict in a manner that would create a new, general precedent on that point.

Disposition

The appeal stands disposed of in accordance with the modifications and directions stated above.

    Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhavi Amma And Others

    Koshi, C.J:— Defendant 1 in O.S No. 24 of 1952, on the file of the now defunct District Court of Mavelikara, has brought this appeal against the judgment and decree passed in that suit on 28th March, 1955 whereby a sale deed, Ext. II, dated 30-9-1117 in his favour and in favour of his brother, defendant 2, has been set aside on certain terms. Some time prior to the suit defendant 2 had made over his rights under Ext. II to defendant 1 and the latter alone contested the suit.

    2. The property conveyed as per Ext. II belonged originally to one Puthu-parampu tarwad in Amichakari Muri, Champakkulam Pakuthy, Ambalapuzha Taluk. That tarwad first got itself divided into different branches as per a partition deed in 1099 M.E Later, on 25-10-1107 one of the branches effected a further division and we are in this appeal mainly concerned with that branch. Ext. D and Ext. II are copies of the partition deed in that branch.

    3. Another branch of the Puthuparampu tarwad which got the property in question as per the partition of 1099 assigned the same to P.W 2 on 4-5-1109 (Ext. A, copy), but on 18-2-1112 P.W 2 sold the property to one Chellamma, a divided member of the branch first referred to—vide Ext. B, copy. Chellamma, defendant 3, Gopalan Nair and defendant 4, Janaki Amma were the children of one Nani Amma. The three plaintiffs in the suit are the daughters of defendant 4. At the time of the partition in their branch (1107), besides these six members there were two other members in the branch. They were Nani Amma's mother Kalyani Amma and the latter's son Krishnan Nair (Nani Amma's brother). Krishnan Nair renounced his rights in the branch tarwad properties in lieu of money compensation and Kalyani Amma was content with a provision for her maintenance. The properties of the branch tarwad were therefore divided into six shares and each member took a separate share. Chellamma did not survive long after she took the sale deed of the property concerned in this litigation. She was unmarried at the time of her death and she died intestate. According to the Travancore Nayar Act, 1100 (Act II of 1100) which governs this case, “On the death of a Nayar female leaving no lineal descendants surviving her, the whole of the self acquired and separate property left undisposed of by her at her death shall devolve on her mother's thavazhi.”—Section 18. At the time of Chellamma's death her mother Nani Amma's thavazhi consisted of Nani Amma, her only son (defendant 3), her surviving daughter Janaki Amma (defendant 4) and the latter's three children (plaintiffs 1 to 3). The sale deed impugned in this case is one executed by these six persons and Kalyani Amma. She joined the document as under the partition arrangement (1107) her maintenance stood charged on this property as well. All the three plaintiffs were minors when Ext. II was executed and their mother, defendant 4 besides acting on her own behalf also acted as the guardian of her children.

    4. The plaintiffs sought to set aside Ext. II on the ground that the alienation evidenced by it was not supported by consideration or tarwad necessity and they therefore claimed to recover possession on behalf of their grand-mother's thavazhi, together with mesne profits. Defendant 1 the appellant contended that there was consideration for the document, that there was tarwad necessity for the alienation and that there was no ground whatever to set it aside. He disputed his liability for mesne profits and further contended that he had effected various improvements on the property whose value he claimed in the event the court directed him to surrender the property. After an elaborate trial, the learned Additional District Judge, Mavelikara passed a decree setting aside Ext. II and permitting the plaintiffs to recover the property on behalf of their grand-mother's thavazhi. The terms of the decree are set out below:—

    “1. Ext. II or F sale deed is hereby set aside.

    2. Plaintiffs will recover possesion of the plaint schedule properties on behalf of plaintiffs' grand-mother Nani Amma's thavazhi on deposit of Rs. 380 the consideration for Ext. I found to have been binding on plaintiffs plus the value of improvements of Rs. 786 as. 14 ps. 7 from defendants 1 and 2.

    3. 1st defendant will draw the amount from court.

    4. Plaintiffs are allowed mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 78 as. 12 from the date of deposit of the consideration and value of improvements, for 3 years from the date of decree or till recover whichever even happens earlier.

    5. In the circumstances of this case plaintiffs are allowed half the costs. Interest on mesne profits and costs 6%.”

    5. The plaint in the suit, the appellant's written statement, the trial and the lower court's judgment followed the familiar pattern we come across when the junior members of a Marumakkathayam tarwad institute a suit to set aside an alienation effected by the karnavan and the senior anandiravans. Indeed the memorandum of appeal to this Court as also the argument before us until a certain stage followed that well-worn pattern. However subsequently Mr. T.K Narayana Pillai (N), the learned counsel for the appellant gave a turn to the whole case by contending that the plaintiffs were incompetent to maintain a suit on behalf of Nani Amma's thavazhi inasmuch as that Marumakkathayam unit had got disintegrated by the partition deed of 1107 under which every member took his or her share separately. As a logical corollary of that proposition it was urged that on Chellamma's death her properties devolved on the members of Nani Amma's thavazhi as tenants-in-common and that as such the shares of Nani Amma herself and those of defendants 3 and 4 had passed absolutely to the vendees as per Ext. II and that the plaintiffs were incompetent to question the alienation in respect of those shares. Learned counsel further submitted that if these arguments are accepted the appellant would be content with retaining a one-half share of the property and that in that event the lower court's decision setting aside Ext. II may be upheld with respect to the other half share, namely, the shares of the three plaintiffs.

    6. The Travancore case law and the decisions of this Court are almost uniform in the view that when a Marumakkathayam tarwad gets itself divided, it cannot remain undivided with respect to some property left in common or which through ignorance or inadvertance happens to be omitted from the division. The Cochin and the Madras cases take the view that it was open to the members of a Marumakkathayam tarwad while dividing their properties to remain joint with respect to a portion left undivided — vide the decision in Kittunni Nair v. Sankaran Nair — (1122) 38 Cochin Law Reports 180 — where one of us had occasion to review the decisions in Cochin, Travancore and Malabar when each was separate. However here we are not confronted with the situation of the parties leaving some property in common or some properties happening to be otherwise omitted at the time of the division. As per the original of Exts. D and IV the branch tarwad had lost its jointness once and for all and thereafter properties that devolve on persons who were formerly joint are taken by them as tenants-in-common. That has been held to be the effect of section 18 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100 when there had been a disintegration of thavazhi prior to the devolution of the property. See the decision of Varadaraja Iyengar, J. in Krishna Pillai v. Jagadeeshachandran Nair — 1957 K.L.J 202 : 1957 K.L.T 62. That decision followed a decision of the Travancore High Court reported in Neelakantan v. Varki — 22 T.L.J 1357 — which related to the corresponding section (Section 15) of the Nayar Act of 1088 and an unreported decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in A.S No. 540 of 1953 with reference to a similar provision in Section 17 of the Travancore Ezhuva Act (Act III of 1100). When Chellamma died there were six members in her mother's (divided) thavazhi and each of them was entitled to a separate one-sixth share in her properties. Three of those sharers joined Ext. II in their own rights and Mr. Narayana Pillai's contention that their full right passed to the vendees has therefore to be upheld.

    7. Reference may here also be made to certain authorities in support of the position that after a tarwad or tavazhi becomes divided, a divided member cannot maintain a suit on behalf of the tharwad or thavazhi as such, to set aside an alienation effected before the division — vide Velayudhan Nair v. Janaki — 1957 K.L.J 241 : 1957 K.L.T 222 and Bhavani Pillai v. Ammukutti Pillai — 1958 K.L.J 87. The latter case follows the decision in Krishna Pillai v. Jagadeeshachandran Nair and the former case refers to practically all the Travancore cases dealing with the question of the effect of division of a Marumakkathayam unit on the status of its members. Velayudhan Nair v. Janaki makes no reference to the Cochin or the Madras case-law where a different note is struck that even after division jointness can be maintained with respect to a portion of the property left undivided. In the case on hand this difference in views is immaterial, but we venture to think that on an appropriate occasion it will have to be considered which of these conflicting views is more acceptable.

    8. As a result of the foregoing discussion we hold that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to maintain an action on behalf of their grand-mother's thavazhi because that thavazhi as such had long ceased to exist before Chellamma died. The suit is therefore not maintainable with respect to the half share of Nani Amma and defendants 3 and 4. Though the lower court had found Ext. II was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 380/- and unsupported as to the balance, namely, Rs. 270/-, Mr. Narayana Pillai made it elear that the appellant would be content with a half share of the property without seeking to apportion between the plaintiff's half share and the remaining half share the consideration which the lower court has found to be valid and binding.

    9. In the circumstances of the case we do not consider that the parties should be driven to a fresh suit for partition. Accordingly in modification of the lower court's decree we pass a preliminary decree for partition of the property into two equal halves, one half of which should go to the plaintiffs and the remaining half should be retained by the 1st appellant. The lower court, as noticed earlier, fixed the value of improvements the appellant is entitled to as also the mesne profits he should pay if and when the amounts found due to him are deposited in court. In view of the decree we pass here value need be fixed only for the improvements on the half-share which the plaintiffs would get and mesne profits have also to be ascertained only with respect to that share. The provisions in those behalf in the lower court decree will therefore stand annulled. The lower court will in passing the final decree fix the value of improvements the appellant should get from the plaintiffs and also the quantum of profits he should pay. Mesne profits would become payable only from the date when the value of improvements are paid into court.

    10. The only question that remains for consideration is the question of costs. The lower court allowed the plaintiffs to realise one-half of their costs in that court from defendant 1. Regard being had to the turn the case took in this Court we consider that the proper order with respect to cost would be to make both sides to bear their respective costs throught and we order accordingly.

    11. The appeal will stand disposed of as above.

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    Comments

    Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhavi Amma And Others
    (Jul 8, 1958)