1. This revision petition is from an order of the District Judge, East Godavari dated 4th August, 1960.

2. The facts necessary for our purpose are that the land-lords, who are the respondents here, filed a petition on 8-2-1958 for eviction of the tenant before the House Rent Controller, Kakinada of a site and a building thereon on two grounds; firstly that the landlords required the premises for the purposes of running a cinema house and secondly that the tenant committed nuisance by encroaching on a site adjoining to the suit premises. The tenant set up a defence that the landlords are not carrying on any business of running a cinema house at the time of the petition and that he has not committed any nuisance so as to make him liable for eviction,

3. The Rent Controller after recording the evidence dismissed the petition holding that the landlords are not carrying on business of running a cinema house and that the tenant has not committed any act of nuisance. The land-lords therefore went in appeal before the Subordinate Judge, who found on both the grounds against the tenant and directed eviction. Aggrieved by that order of the learned Subordinate Judge, the tenant went in revision before the District Judge, East Godavari, who dismissed the revision petition and affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge. This revision petition is directed against the said order of the District Judge.

4. The only contention which is pressed on me by the learned Advocate for the petitioners is that the District Judge has erred in holding that the landlords are Carrying on business of running a cinema house within the meaning of section 7 (3) (a) (iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 25 of 1949, herein after called as the Act. In order to appreciate this contention it is necessary to look into section 7 (3) (a) (iii) which is in the following terms:—

“7 (3) (a): A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building………………

(iii) in case it is any other residential building, if the landlord is not occupying for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, a nonresidential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise.”

5. It is urged before me that the landlords cannot be taken to be carrying on the business of running a cinema within the meaning of section 7 (3) (a) (iii) as they are intending to start in future the cinema house. Reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Chowdhary Bakar Hussain v. Mowlvi Saheb (1956) An. W.R 498. After pointing out that the wording of the above said provision is unhappy, Umamaheswaram J., held on the facts of that particular case that as the landlord had only applied for the issue of a licence before he filed the petition for eviction, he cannot be considered to be carrying on business. The learned Judge referred to an earlier decision of this Court N. Narasimha Rao v. Sakala Virabhadra-swami (1955) A.L.T 580, and thought it unnecessary to decide in that case whether the wide construction placed by Viswanath Sastri J., on the phrase ‘carrying on business’ is correct or not. The learned Judge merely declined to extend the principle laid down in the earlier decision to the facts of the case before him. This case therefore does not by itself decide any thing with regard to the wording of ‘is carrying on business’ occurring in section 7 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. It is manifest that the principle laid down in the earlier decision therefore remains unshaken. In that earlier case Viswanatha Sastry, J., said:

“The pharse ‘carrying on business’ has no fixed connotation and its meaning and effect have to be ascertained from the context in which it is used, the nature of the business and the transaction incidental to it. If a dealer carrying on whole sale business in cloth has also obtained the necessary license and quota for carrying on retail business in cloth Page: 57and all that remains for him is to remove the cloth from his wholesale shop into the retail shop and begin to sell the cloth, he has started his business operations and section 7 (3) (a) (iii) applies to such a case. There is no yardstick by which we can measure the range of activities necessary to constitute the carrying on of a business. A business may take some time for its being organised and set on foot as a trading venture …………… In business, as in professions, there are initial stages and periods when there is very little activity visible to outsiders but nevertheless, the business or profession is regarded as bring carried on. The contention of the respondent would lead to this result that a wholesale dealer in cloth who wants to carry on retail cloth business in another shop as required by the rules would have to take out a shop on rent for sometime, stock his goods there and sell them in the rented premises before he can claim to get possession of his own premises for the retail business. This is hardly a result which could have been contemplated by the Legislature. If there is no bona fide preparation for running the business, then of course it is open to the court to say that the demand for eviction is unjustified. Here, however, the facts tell the other way……………. The wording of the relevant provision is no doubt some what unhappy and it would have been better if the words ‘for purposes of carrying on a business’ had been used instead of the words ‘for purposes of a business which he is carrying on’. Even on the language of the clause as it stands, it can be said that the petitioner requires his building for a business which he is carrying on.”

6. The test which appears to have been thus laid down in this case is that although the landlord may not actually carry on the business, but if he obtains a licence and makes all necessary preliminary arrangements to carry on the business, it will fall within the ambit of section 7 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act.

7. Even prior to the abovesaid decision of Viswantha Sastry, J., Ramaswami, J., in P.K. Kesavan Nair v. C.K. Babu Naidu 1954 Mad. 892, considered the abovesaid phrase and observed:

“The term ‘business’ includes every trade, occupation and profession. The ward ‘business’ has no technical meaning, but is to be read with reference to the object and intent of the Act in which it occurs. The term ‘business’ means an affair requiring attention and care; that which busies or occupies one's attention and labour as his chief concern; mercantile pursuits; that which one does for a livelihood, occupation, employment.”

8. The learned Judge continued:

“The pharse ‘carrying on business’ implies a repetition or series of acts. This pharse is in itself one of varying import according to as it is construed with an implied addition, so as to make it mean the whole business, the principal part of the business, any part of the business or that part of the business which may properly be supposed to have been contemplated. It has in the English Courts been interpreted according to the context and the apparent purpose of the Legislature.”

9. The facts of that case are substantially similar to the case under my consideration. In that case ‘A’ constructed an automobile factory at Madras and erected some machinery which he had shifted from Calicut. A portion of the Page: 58premises was in the occupation of ‘B’ a tenant, When ‘A’ applied for licence to run the factory, the Corporation of Madras refused to issue a licence on the ground that as per the rules no portion of the factory should be in occupation o??? another person. ‘A’ therefore applied to the Rent Controller for evicting ‘B’ on the ground that he required the same for carrying on his business. ‘B’ resisted the application alleging that ‘A’ was not seeking the portion for the business which he was carrying on but required it for a business which he intended to carry on in future. Applying the abovesaid test of ‘business’ and ‘carrying on business’ to the said facts it was held that ‘A’ had been carrying on automobiles business and towards that end he had been performing several acts like building the factory at a cost of several lakhs of rupees, shifting of the machinery from Calicut and applying for the licence to the Corporation of Madras for running the factory and that in such circumstances the contention of ‘B’ was devoid of any substance. To the same effect are the following two cases: K.S. Nataraja Achari v. J.K. Balasubramaniam 1957-II M.L.J 492, S. Kazimuddin Sahib v. Rangaswami Pillai 1958-II M.L.J 389. It is that clear that what section 7(3) (iii) requires is not that the landlord should have a business which he is already carrying on somewhere else if he want the tenant to be evicted. The abovesaid phrase is susceptible to the meaning of a person who has made all the preparations to commence business and took all necessary steps in a bona fide manner towards the starting of such a business. If we apply the test laid down by the abovesaid decisions to the facts of this case it becomes clear that the Court below has not erred in holding that the land-lords satisfied the conditions mentioned in section 7(3) (a) (iii). It is found in this case that the landlords obtained the requisite permission from the District Magistrate and collected the necessary material in erecting the cinema before he filed the petition in 1958. The contention of the learned Advocate that there is a conflict between the decision of Umamaheswaram, J., and that of Viswantha Sastry, J., for the reasons given above, does not appear to be correct. It is clear that the Act was brought in force in 1949 and right from 1953 to this date the abovesaid phrase is persistently interpreted in one way. It has never been interpreted in the narrow sense in which the learned advocate for the petitioners wants one to interpret, that it, that the phrase should be confined only to a case where the landlords have already established the business. No other authority taking any opposite view has been cited before me. I am therefore satisfied that the present case falls within section 7(3) (a) (iii) and the petition of the landlords for eviction has rightly been allowed on the ground of their bona fide requirement for carrying on the business.

10. It is contended by the learned advocate for the petitioners that the new Act realising the necessity of providing even for the case such as the present one has expressly added a provision to that effect in section 7 (3) (a) (iii) (b), which is in the following terms:—

“7(3) (a) (iii) In case it is any other non-residential building if the landlord is not occupying for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitiled whether under this Act or otherwise: ……………”

(a) for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on on the date of application

(b) for the purposes of a business which the landlord bona fide proposes to commence”

11. His contention appears to be that from the later Act it should be inferred that the pervious Act had not provided for the situation as it arises in this particular case, whereas the new Act provided for the same. In support of this he relies on the following passage which appears at page 330 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition:

“When an amending Act alters the language of the principal statute, the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately.”

12. I am afraid I cannot give effect to this argument. In all such cases inference does not necessarily arise that the Legislature intended to alter the law and make it as it was alleged to be. A different effect, however, would be given to an Act which showed, whether by recital or inference, that it intended to effect a change. It is no doubt true that subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked into in order to see what is the proper construction to he put upon an earlier Act. It must, however, be taken for granted that the Legislature is acquainted with the actual state of the law and the course of judicial decisions which interpreted the phrase in a particular way. While therefore enacting the new Act in 1960 the Legislature must be presumed to know that, the Courts have held that the phrase ‘is carrying on business’ is applicable to a case where the landlord bona fide has made all preparations and taken all necessary steps to establish that business, and if in view of those decisions by way of abundant caution the Legislature has amended the relevant provision to explain things more clearly, it is difficult to conclude from that that what appear, to be in the new Act was not included in the old Act. No case was cited before me to support the contention that when the Legislature amends to clarify things, it necessarily means that what was in the original Act did not include what is given in the new Act. In fact the inference can legitimately be drawn the other way that the Legislature has thought it advisable to clarify the situation keeping in view the meaning which has been judicially put on the abovesaid phrase. Any change in the wording of a section of an enactment does not necessarily involve a change in the law as amendments are often made to clear up ambiguities and by an ambiguity I mean a phrase fairly and equally open to diverse meanings. In Kikabboy v. I.T Commisioner 1950 Bom. 6 at 9, Chagla, C.J, who spoke for the Bench, observed;

“Now it is not necessary to hold that in every case where the Legislature amends the law it does so because but for the amendments the effect would have been something different. There are innumerable cases in the history of legilsation where the Legislature has added or deleted words in order to clarify the position.”

13. In this particular case although persistent attempt was made both in the Andhra High Court as well as in the Madras High Court to put interpretation on the abovesaid phrase making it a narrower one and applicable to cases where the and lord has started the business, but the uniform interpretation put by both Page: 60those High Courts appears to have been now affirmed by the Legislature in the form of the abovementioned provision in the new Act of 1960.

14. In view of the reasons which I have sought to give this revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

15. Petitioner will vacate within one month from to-day. Failing which order will be executed appropriately.

16. Revision Dismissed with costs.