This petition for writ arises out of certain proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, A parcel of land belonging to the petitioners was compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for a public purpose, namely building Hari Singh High School at Akhnur. An award was made by the Collector; but he did not give the petitioners any notice of either the award itself or of even the date on which it was to be announced.

The Collector however summoned the petitioners to his office on 6-9-60 and took it in writing from them to the effect that they received the award on that day. The same day the petitioners who did not accept the award applied to the Collector under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act asking him to refer the matter of the amount of compensation due to them for the determination of the court. The Collector rejected that application as time-barred.

In his order he pointed out that the award was signed by him on 5-2-60. He admitted that no notice of the award was given to the petitioners under S. 12(2) and that she got the award noted by the petitioners only on 6-9-60. Yet he held that under the second part of cl. (b) of Sub-Section (2) of S. 18 rime began to run against the petitioners from 5-2-60 when he signed the award, and that consequently the application made by the Petitioners for reference to the court was out of time.

2. This order of the Collector is sought to be quashed by the petitioners on the ground that it is erroneous on the face of it and that in passing it the Collector failed to exercise his jurisdiction. The petitioners also claim a writ of Mandamus to direct the Collector to make a reference to the Court under S. 18(1) of the Act.

3. The respondent Collector in his objections has pointed out that although no notice of the award was issued by him to the petitioners, the petitioners had applied for an attested copy of the award on 15-7-60 and obtained it on 21-7-60. This circumstance is said to reinforce the validity of the order of the Collector dated 12-9-80 that the application under S. 18 for reference to the court was barred by time.

4. The only question that has been argued before me is whether or not the view taken by the Collector that the application under S. 15 is time-barred is correct. Sub-Section (2) of S. 18 of the Act which prescribes the period of limitation runs ns follows :

"The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken :

Provided that every such application shall be made :

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when lie made his award, within sis weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under S. 12 Sub-Section (2), or within, six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire".

5. In the instant case it is common ground that the petitioners were neither present in person nor were represented before the Collector at the time when he made the award. Therefore cl. (a) of Sub-Section (2) has no application. The first Part of cl. (b) speaks of the receipt of a notice from the Collector under S. 12 Sub-Section (2). It is agreed that the only notice which can possibly fall under this part of cl. (b) was the one received by the petitioners on 6-9-60 when in the words of the Collector himself "the award was got noted by the petitioners" at his office in Jammu.

As the petitioners applied on the same day for a reference to the court, there could be no question of the application being barred by time. But the argument of the learned Advocate General for the respondent is that the case falls under the latter part of cl. (b) which says "within six months of the date of the Collectors award". This contention is built on the words "whichever period shall expire first" occurring at the end of cl. (b). The reasoning is that the date of the award is the date on which the Collector signed it.

That date is 5-2-60. As six months from that date expired well prior to 6-9-60, the petitioners are not entitled to take advantage of anything that took place on the later date. This line of argument is no doubt plausible, but I am afraid it does not stand careful scrutiny. "The date of the Collector's award'' is not an expression defined in the Act. We have, therefore, to gather its meaning and import from the relevant sections of the Act. These sections are Ss. 11, 12 and 18. Section 11 expressly enjoins that the Collector shall make an award under his hand.

Sub-Section (2) of S. 12 speaks about the presence of the persons interested when the award is made. Clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) of S. 18 again uses the expression "when he made his award," and lays down that if the party applying for a reference under Sub-Section (1) of S. 18 was present or represented before the Collector at the time when the Collector made the award, the period of limitation applicable to him shall be six weeks from the date of the award.

The expression "date of the award" in this clause appears to be synonymous with "the date when the Collector made the award". This, I think should naturally be the meaning to be attributed to the same expression occurring in clause (b) also. A reference to S. 11 and Sub-Section (2) of S. 12 considerably reinforces the correctness and validity of the conclusion that the date of an award is the date of making the award. Thus the period of limitation under the second Part of clause (b) of Sub-Section (2) of Sec. 18 runs from the date when the Collector made his award.

This alone does not, however, appear to be sufficient in view of the strenuous contention raised in the instant case, to fix precisely the starting point of limitation. The correct meaning and significance of the expression 'make an award' has to be ascertained for that purpose. The expression 'make an award' is not tantamount to the preparation of an award on paper or even the signing of it by the Collector. This expression necessarily implies publication or announcement of the award of sufficient intimation of it so as to bring it to the knowledge of the party affected by it.

Till that is done, I do not think there can be any award in the eye of law so far as the affected party is concerned. It is not necessary in every case to show that a copy of the award was actually given to the person interested; if it is shown that the affected party had obtained sufficient knowledge or information regarding the existence of the award or was afforded a reasonable opportunity to ascertain the contents of the award, the requirements of law would have been satisfied.

For instance, if the Collector intimates to the party sought to be affected that the award will be announced on a specified future date, it will ordinarily foe for the person so intimated to take steps to acquaint himself with the award and if he fails to do so, he will have to thank himself for the adverse consequences. The law deems such an intimation sufficient to enable the Collector validly to make the award. But if no manner of notice of either the contents of the award or the date of its announcement was sought to be given to the party concerned, it is very difficult as a matter of law to say that the award was really made qua that party.

It is well to notice here that Sub-S. (1) of S. 18 permits a person to apply for a reference to the court only if "he has not accepted" the award. A person can accept or reject an award only if he knows about the award. Therefore, S. 18(1) presupposes knowledge of the award on the part of the person who applies for a reference to the court. This right to apply for a reference to the court cannot, therefore, possibly be held to have become barred even before the person affected had knowledge of the existence of the award which alone could lead him to accept or not to accept the award.

To say that limitation for making an application under S. 18(1) will run against a person even before he has an inkling of the existence of the award of the Collector will not only lead to a travesty of justice but also constitute a curiosity in the interpretation of statutes. Take a case where the Collector signs an award and gives no inkling of it to the concerned person for a period of six months.

The valuable right of that person, who remained honestly ignorant for six months or more, to require fee Collector to make a reference to the court under S. 18(1) would remain lost, if the contention of the learned Advocate General is right. If such an iniquitous result is permitted as a matter of statutory construction, the valuable right conferred by the legislature under S. 18(1) becomes worthless and illusory indeed, a very strange result of the interpretation of a statute.

We cannot reasonably attribute to the legislature the somewhat queer intention that a valuable right given under one part of the section should become still born on a verbal construction of another part of the same section. This only underlines the validity of the interpretation which I have sought to put on the words "make the award." This interpretation seems to accord with principle and commonsense, justice and fair-play; it is also well supported by precedents.

6. Under S. 25 of the Madras Act (Act XXVIII of 1860) the starting point of limitation for an appeal by way of suit was the passing of the Survey Officers' decision, and the question as to when a Survey Officer can be held to have passed his decision came up for consideration before the Madras High Court as early as 1883 in Annamalai v. Cloete, ILR 6 Mad. 189, and it was held that the Survey Officer could be said to have passed the decision only when it was communicated to the parties. This ruling was followed in Seshama v. Sankara ILR 12 Mad 1. The same principle has been laid down by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in dealing with the provisions of S. 20 of the Khoti Settlement Act (Bombay Act I of 1880) in Mahipat v. Lakshman, ILR 24 Com. 426. At page 430 Parsons, J. pointed out :

"If a dispute exists, he is to determine it, but he can do this of his own motion, and no provision is made for the communication of his decision to any of the parties affected thereby. It may lie buried in his desk for three years as in the present case, and no one may know of its existence till it is made use of for the purpose of framing the register. It is not necessary to discuss what effect the proved communication of the decision might have; it is sufficient to say that the decision can have no force until it is pronounced or in some way brought to the notice of the parties, and that as this is not shown to have been done in the present case till the botkhat was framed and signed, the date when this was done should be taken as the starting point of limitation."

7. In the Secretary of State v. G. Narayanaswami Naidu, ILR 34 Mad 151, the starting point of limitation for an appeal by way of a suit against a final decision under S. 24 of the Survey and Boundaries Act, Madras Act IV of 1897 fell for determination. That Act had prescribed the date of decision under S. 13 of it as the starting point of limitation. But the true connotation of the words "date of decision' was in controversy. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Miller and Munro, JJ. held as follows :-

"There is some difficulty in the matter, but on the whole we think we ought to follow the authorities to which we have referred which hold that the date of a decision is the date of its communication to the parties. A decision cannot properly be said to be passed until it is in some way pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing what it contains. Till then, though, it may be written out, signed and dated, it is nothing but the decision which the officer intends to pass. It is not passed so long as it is open to him to tear up what he has written and write something else."

8. In Abdul Ali v. Mirja Khan, ILR 28 Bom. 8, A Division Bench considered the meaning of the expression "making of the order" occurring in S. 77 of the Indian Registration Act. Chandawarkar, J., speaking for the Division Bench stated :-

"The lower courts have held that the plaintiff's suit is within limitation, because in "their opinion it must be taken to run from the date on which the order of the Registrar was communicated to the plaintiff. We agree with that view. An order does not become an order unless and until steps are taken by the officer passing it to bring it to the consciousness and knowledge of the party against whom it is passed."

This decision was followed by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kirpa Ram v. Asu Singh, 41 Pun Re 1917 : (AIR 1917 Lah 63). Shadi Lal, J. who delivered the judgment observed as follows :

"As observed by the Bombay High Court in ILR 28 Bom. 8 the expression "making of the order" in S. 77 means, not merely recording the order of refusal in writing, but communicating it to the party concerned so as to bind him by it. Any other interpretation would lead to the absurdity that a suit might be barred by time before the person entitled to impeach the order came to know of its existence."

9. The same question of the terminus a quo for limitation came up for decision before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Swaminathan v. Lakshman, AIR 1930 Mad 490, and it was expressly held that an appeal to the District Registrar or a suit is not barred by statute, if it is filed within 30 days of the date of the communication of the order of the Sub-Registrar or the District Registrar refusing registration even though it is filed beyond 30 days of the date of that order. At page 491 Venkatasubba Rao, J. pointed out :-

"Apart from authority, it seems to me that there can be no valid order unless it is made after notice to the parties affected by it, or, it is communicated to them in the absence of such notice. To take a contrary view seems opposed to reason and principle."

He proceeded to observe that

"The very word 'order' by necessary implication means in law that the party affected has had reasonable notice of it."

10. Muthiah Chettiar v. I. T. Commr. Madras. AIR 1951 Mad 204 was concerned with the ascertainment of the starting point of limitation under S. 33-A(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922. In that case Muthiah Chettiar was assessed to income-tax by the Income-tax Officer Cuddalore Circle by his order dated 4-2-48. On 18-2-49 the assessee filed an application under S. 33-A(2) of the Income-tax Act before the Commissioner of Income-tax for revision of the assessment order.

The Commissioner rejected that application in limine as barred by time. S. 33-A(2) of the Income-tax Act allowed a period of one year from the date of the assessment order, but the assessee received that assessment order only on 24-2-48. If the period of one year were to be computed from that date, the revision preferred by him before the Commissioner Income-Tax was in time on the other hand, if the period was computed from the alleged date of the order, namely, 4-2-48 it would be out of time. The contention of the assessee was that the terminus a quo was the date of the receipt of the assessment order by him. That contention was upheld by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. Rajamannar, C.J. stated the position of law in the following words :

"If a person is given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order. Therefore the period of one year has to be computed not from the date when the order was signed by the Income-tax Officer but the date when it was communicated to the assessee or the date when it was pronounced or published in such a manner that the party must be deemed to have had notice of it or the date of such pronouncement or publication."

11. In Lakshmana Rao v. Rev. Div. Officer, AIR 1954 Mad 942, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. considered the question of the starting point of limitation under the provisions of Sub-S. (2) of S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act - the very question which has arisen in the present case. He reviewed several of the decisions adverted to by me earlier in this judgment and came to the following conclusion :-

"The provisions of S. 18 and the periods of limitation set out therein have to be read in conjunction with the duty cast upon the officer by the terms of S. 12(2). Read in this light the only conclusion possible is (1) where notice of the date on which an award would be passed is intimated to a party and he or his representative is present at the time when the award is made, the reference application has to be filed within six weeks from the date of the award. In such a case there will be no exclusion of time taken by the claimant in obtaining a copy of the award. (2) In cases where notice of the date on which the award will be made is not communicated to the claimant, the Collector has to send notice of the award to the persons interested under S. 12(2). Where such notice has been issued, the claimant has six weeks from the receipt of the notice under S. 12(2) for the purpose of filing the reference application. (3) Where the claimant has notice that an award would be made on a particular date, but was not present personally or by representative at the time the award was rendered, and the Collector has not served him with notice of the award under S. 12(2) the claimant would have a period of six months from the date of the award to apply for the reference. This is the precise scope of the provision granting six months from the date of the award referred to in the concluding portion of the proviso to S. 18(2). (4) In other cases, he would have six months from the time the claimant has information that an award has been passed"

12. With respect, I agree with this interpretation of S. 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. I need not repeat that any other construction would jeopardize the right and deny the remedy which the legislature has granted to an aggrieved party under Sub-Section (1) of S. 18 of the Act

13. My attention has been pointedly drawn to a ruling of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reported as Jehangir v. C.D. Gaikwad, AIR 1954 Bom 419 which takes a contrary view. I find myself wholly unable to follow this decision. The earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court in ILR 24 Bom 426 (Supra) and ILR 28 Bom 8 (Supra), not to speak of the decisions of the other High Courts, were not brought to the notice of the learned Judges in AIR 1954 Bom 419 (Supra).

Nor am I able to see any reason why the principle of those earlier decisions should not apply with equal force to the interpretation of S. 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. On the other hand, good reason and sound principle clearly Point to tire applicability of that salutary principle to cases falling under the second part of cl. (b) of Sub-Section (2) of S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

14. In AIR 1954 Bom 419 (Supra) it has been somewhat forcefully pointed out that the law of limitation is always a harsh law, that it would be a mistake to look for ethical principles in it and that it would be a mistake to construe the law of limitation from the point of view of the merit of the claims put forward by the parties. This may be true, but this surely does not mean that if a provision of the law of limitation is fairly susceptible of two constructions, the court must only adopt the one which is more harsh.

Nor do I think that the words of a limitation provision should be construed or understood in any exceptional manner divorced from well-established rules of interpretation and settled and salutary principles of law. I am free to confess that the decision in AIR 1954 Mad 942 (Supra) which is based on the principle accepted in several earlier Division Bench rulings of various High Courts seems to me to be preferable to that reported in AIR 1954 Bom 419 (Supra).

15. It is urged that an award in a land acquisition proceeding is in the nature of an offer which the person interested is free to accept or reject and that, therefore, an award should not be put on the same footing as a judicial or a quasi-judicial order passed by a court or a Tribunal. This aspect does not in any manner affect the principle. If an award amounts to or is in the nature of an offer to the owner of the land, that is all the more reason why the award should be communicated to him. It is not known to law that an offer can be properly made to a person for his acceptance without his being made aware of the offer itself. It does not, therefore at all avail the respondent to say that the award he made was in the nature of an offer to the petitioners.

16. Viewed from any point of view, I am satisfied that the order of the Collector that the petitioners' application under S. 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is barred by time is plainly erroneous. Even if we take it that the petitioners knew of the award on 15-7-60 when they applied for an attested copy of it, their case would fall under the latter part of cl. (b) of S. 18(2), and they will have a period of six months from 15-7-60.

If we take 6-9-60 as the date when they received notice of the award within the meaning of S. 18(2), then there will be no question of limitation at all because on that date itself they had applied for a reference to court under S. 18(1). I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the order passed by the Collector holding that the petitioners' application under S. 18(1) is time-barred ought to be quashed. The petitioners are also entitled to a writ of Mandamus directing the Collector (respondent) to deal with the petitioners' application under S. 18(1) according to law on the footing that it is within time.

17. The petition is allowed and the writs asked for issued. The petitioner will get a sum of Rs. 100/- as costs from the respondent.

Petition allowed.