Citation Codes

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citation codes

Case Number

Letters Patent Appeal No. 9 of 1984 (R)

Attorney(S)

S.N.Singh
Indrani Chaudhary
Debi Prasad

Judges

Lalit Mohan Sharma
R.N Lal, JJ.

Acts

S. 110, Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

In June 1971 Bachanand Thakur, a young boy, was run over by a truck owned by the respondent (a Welfare Organisation). The respondent's vehicles were exempted from the requirement of insurance under the proviso to S. 94(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The boy sustained serious injuries. His father filed a claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (constituted under S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act) seeking compensation of over Rs. 53,000. The Tribunal allowed the claim in part and awarded Rs. 13,620 to the claimant.

The respondent (opposite party) appealed to the High Court under S. 110D of the Act; the appeal was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 15 of 1978 (R). A learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the Tribunal's award on two grounds: (i) that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction because the vehicle involved was not covered by an insurance policy; and (ii) that the petition was not maintainable because it had been filed by the father rather than by the injured boy. The Single Judge's order is reported at 1984 BLT (Rep) 285. The present opinion is the Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 challenging that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a Claims Tribunal constituted under S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act has jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for compensation arising out of the use of a motor vehicle that is not covered by an insurance policy (i.e., uninsured vehicle).
Whether a claim petition filed by the father of an injured minor (rather than by the minor himself) before the Claims Tribunal is maintainable under the Act (specifically S. 110A(1)(c) and its proviso).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

Reliance on the chapter heading "Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against 3rd party Risk" (Chapter VIII) and on provisions such as S. 96 and S. 95 to argue that the Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving insured vehicles, and that claims arising from uninsured vehicles fall outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
Emphasis on the proviso to S. 94(3): the existence of a requirement to establish and maintain a fund for authorities exempted from compulsory insurance was said to indicate that claims against uninsured (or exempted) vehicles are to be dealt with outside the Claims Tribunal mechanism (i.e., by civil suit or by the fund mechanism).
Pointed to the mandatory language of S. 95(1) ("must") and to the Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 form (column 17 requiring name and address of insurer) to suggest that the statutory scheme contemplates insured vehicles for proceedings under Chapter VIII, implying exclusion of uninsured vehicles from the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
Contended that the claim petition was not maintainable because it was filed by the father of the injured minor rather than by the minor himself.

Appellant / Claimant

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate statement of the appellant's pleaded arguments beyond the factual account that the father filed the petition and the Tribunal's grant of partial compensation. The Court's reasoning addresses the respondent's contentions directly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
1984 BLT (Rep) 285	This is the citation to the impugned High Court judgment (Single Judge) which held that the Tribunal's remedy was not maintainable and that the remedy lay by civil suit; it also held that the petition filed by the father was not maintainable.	The Court set aside this judgment, restored the Tribunal's award and allowed the Letters Patent Appeal, reversing the Single Judge's conclusions on jurisdiction and maintainability.
R. v. Surrey Assessment Committee, (1948) 1 K.B. 29 (page 32)	Authority for the principle that headings in statutes cannot control or vary the clear words of a statutory provision; headings may resolve ambiguity but cannot override plain statutory language.	The Court relied on this principle to reject the respondent's attempt to limit Chapter VIII's scope based on the chapter heading "Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against 3rd party Risk," holding that the clear language of S. 110 and related provisions governs.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Punjab Roadways, Ambala City, AIR 1964 Punjab 235	Holds that the expression "duly authorised agent" should be construed liberally (not narrowly), to include persons with implied authority (example: husband competent to maintain action for injured spouse).	The Court cited and followed this approach to conclude that the father of the injured minor was a properly authorised person to file the petition (as natural guardian / person with implied authority) and that the objection based on the father's filing was hyper-technical and unsustainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court tested the respondent's contention that Claims Tribunals lack jurisdiction in respect of accidents involving uninsured vehicles by examining the language of the statute (Chapter VIII) and related provisions, without allowing the chapter heading to restrict clear statutory text.

Key steps in the Court's analysis (expressed in the opinion) were:

Textual interpretation of S. 110: The section authorises Tribunals to adjudicate "claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles." The Court observed that the section contains no wording that narrows its scope to insured vehicles.
Reference to S. 2(18): The statutory definition of "motor vehicle" is broad (any mechanically propelled vehicle adopted for use upon roads), and Chapter VIII does not redefine that term to exclude uninsured vehicles. Thus the natural reading includes uninsured vehicles unless the statute explicitly excludes them.
Analysis of the proviso to S. 94(3): Rather than showing exclusion from Tribunal jurisdiction, the proviso (which requires exempted authorities to establish and maintain a fund for liabilities) suggests that compensation may still be awarded in respect of accidents involving uninsured/exempt vehicles, but that a fund is provided because no insurer exists to discharge liability. Thus the proviso supports Tribunal jurisdiction rather than negates it.
Consideration of S. 95 and S. 96: The Court found S. 95's use of "must" is applicable only where insurance is required; it is not a universal direction that negates S. 94(3). S. 96 and provisions concerning apportionment (including S. 110B) were read as neutral or inclusive: S. 110B required the Tribunal to specify amounts payable "by the insurer or owner or driver ... or by all or any of them," which does not imply that an insurer must always exist or that uninsured vehicles fall outside Tribunal competence.
Practical reading of procedural forms: The presence of a column for insurer details in the Bihar Rules' application form was seen as appropriate for insured cases but could not be dispositive of jurisdiction; forms commonly contain inapplicable fields in some types of cases and do not exclude those cases from Tribunal jurisdiction.
Principle on statutory headings: Relying on authority, the Court emphasised that a chapter heading cannot control clear statutory language; headings may only resolve ambiguity. Because S. 110 and related provisions clearly entailed jurisdiction over motor-vehicle-related claims (including uninsured vehicles), the heading could not be used to negate that effect.
Policy considerations: The Court noted the objective behind establishing Claims Tribunals — speedy and inexpensive relief for road accident victims — and held that excluding victims of accidents involving uninsured vehicles would produce unjustifiable discrimination and hinder the statutory purpose.
On maintainability when filed by a parent: The Court examined S. 110A(1)(c) (permitting an application by a "duly authorised agent") and its proviso, and relied on the cited precedent (New India Assurance) to construe "duly authorised agent" liberally. The Court found the father, as natural guardian of a young boy who could not sue by himself, was competent to file the claim and there was no suggestion he lacked authority. The Single Judge's hyper-technical objection was rejected.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Letters Patent Appeal was allowed; the judgment in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 15 of 1978 (R) (reported at 1984 BLT (Rep) 285) was set aside and the decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was restored.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The Tribunal's award in favour of the appellant (Rs. 13,620) is restored. The appellant is entitled to the costs of the Miscellaneous Appeal and of the Letters Patent Appeal, jointly assessed at Rs. 1,000.
Legal conclusions (as applied by the Court in this opinion): (a) Claims Tribunals constituted under S. 110 have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising out of accidents involving motor vehicles even where those vehicles are not covered by an insurance policy (including vehicles exempted under S. 94(3)); (b) procedural features such as a form field for insurer details or chapter headings cannot override the clear statutory language conferring jurisdiction; (c) a claim filed by the father of an injured minor is maintainable where the father acts as the natural guardian/duly authorised agent under S. 110A(1)(c) and no suggestion is made that he lacked authority.
The Court did not indicate that a novel binding precedent of wider application beyond this statutory interpretation was being established; the decision rests on textual interpretation of the Act, applicable authorities on statutory construction and recognized principles regarding representation of minors and duly authorised agents.

Disposition: Appeal allowed. Costs awarded to appellant (Rs. 1,000). R.N. Lal, J. concurred.

Show full summary ...

Parmanand Thakur v. Commissioner, Coal Mines Welfare Organisation .

Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.:— The main question which arises in this case is whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) constituted under S. 110, Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim of compensation in respect of an accident involving the death or bodily injury to a person arising out of the use of a motor vehicle not covered by a policy of insurance. On the application of the appellant-claimant, the Tribunal awarded compensation amounting to Rs. 13,620/-. The opposite party filed an appeal in this Court under S. 110D of the Act which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 15 of 1978 (R). A learned single Judge of this Court, who heard the appeal, held that the remedy of the claimant was by way of a suit in the Civil Court and the application before the Tribunal was not maintainable. He also held that the claim petition was fit to be rejected on the additional ground that it was filed by the father of the injured minor boy and not by the boy himself. The award was accordingly set aside (vide 1984 BLT (Rep) 285). The present appeal under Cl. 10 Letters Patent, is directed against this judgment.

2. The accident took place in June, 1971 when Bachanand Thakur, a young boy, was run over by a truck belonging to the opposite party-respondent, a Welfare Organisation, which is exempted by sub-s. (3) of S. 94 of the Act from the requirement of getting its vehicles insured. The boy sustained serious injuries, and his father moved the Tribunal claiming compensation of over Rs. 53000/-. The opposite party contested the claim on the ground that the claim petition was not maintainable. As stated earlier, the Tribunal rejected the defence and allowed the claim partially.

3. In support (of) his view that the claim petition was not maintainable on the ground that the truck involved in the accident was not covered by an insurance policy, the learned single Judge strongly relied on the heading “Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against 3rd party Risk “of Chapter VIII in which the provisions relating to the constitution of Tribunals and their jurisdiction a re included, and on S. 96 directing the insurer to pay the awarded sum. Mr. Debi Prasad, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the provisions of Chap. VIII support this view. Referring to the Proviso in S. 94(3) which is quoted below, the learned counsel argued that the requirements of establishing and maintaining a fund for meeting liabilities arising out of road accidents involving uninsured vehicles has been inserted for the reason that the claim arising out of such accidents are beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;

“94……………………………

(3) The appropriate Government may, by order, exempt from the operation of sub-s. (1) any vehicle owned by any of the following a uthorities, namely:—

(a) the Central Government or a State Government, if the vehicle is used for Government purposes connected with any commercial enterprise;

(b) any local authority;

Provided that no such order shall be made in relation to any such authority unless a fund has been established and is maintained by that authority in accordance with the rules made in that behalf under the Act for meeting any liability arising out of the use of any vehicle of that authority which that authority or any person in its employment may incur to third parties…………………………”

Reference was also made to the mandatory nature of the provisions of S. 95(1) by the use of the word “must” and the item 17 in the Form of application for compensation prescribed under the Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 relating to the name and address of the insurer.

4. The establishments of Claims Tribunals are dealt with in S. 110 which says that the Tribunals may be constituted “for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles”. The section does not use any word which may be interpreted to narrow down its scope. The clause “arising out of the use of motor vehicles” in the section does not suggest that any category of vehicles is excluded. The expression “motor vehicle” defined in S. 2(18) of the Act to mean any mechanically propelled vehicle adopted for use upon roads is wide in its scope and admits only those vehicles which run upon fixed rails or those of a special type adopted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises, as exceptions. The distinction between an insured vehicle and an uninsured one is not made. While assigning special meaning to several expressions in S. 93 for the purpose of Chap. VIII, “motor vehicle” has not been given a different definition. The intention is clear that “motor vehicle” has to be understood in the same sense in this Chapter as in the other parts of the Act; and it can certainly not be suggested that uninsured vehicles are entirely beyond the scope of the Act. The learned counsel for the parties took us through all the sections of Chap. VIII in search of provisions helpful to their respective interpretations and I could not discover any such provision which may support the view expressed in the impugned judgment excepting the Heading. The proviso in S. 94(3) directing creation of a fund, relied on by Mr. Debi Prasad does not help him at all. On the contrary, it suggests that compensation may be awarded in connection with accidents arising out of the use of uninsured vehicles, for, in such cases there being no insurer to discharge the liability, creation of a fund for that purpose was considered necessary. The opening sentence in S. 95 referred to by Mr. Prasad is of a neutral character in regard to the question under consideration. The word “must” is applicable only to such cases where a policy of insurance is required. To assume that the section is directing insurance in every case will amount to negativing sub-s. (3) of S. 94 dealing with the power of exemption. Besides even the suggested meaning of S. 95 does not advance the defendant's case at all. Similar is the position with respect to S. 96 as also S. 110B, which is quoted below:—

“110B. On receipt of an application for compensation made under S. 110A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid; and in making the award the claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be.”

(emphasis added)

The provisions relating to apportionment of the liability does not suggest an insurer in every case, because then on the same logic it will be necessary to have a driver of the vehicle apart from the owner. I do not think it can be suggested that an owner driven car is also exempted from the jurisdiction of the claims Tribunals.

5. Mr. Debi Prasad also placed before us the form of application prescribed by the Bihar Rules in which column 17 is meant for giving the name and address of the insurer. This column obviously is meant only for such cases where insured vehicles are involved but there is no warrant for assuming that all cases in which any of the columns is redundant are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. It cannot be suggested that every column in this form is necessarily applicable to all categories of claim cases. By way of example I would refer to columns 20 and 21 for stating respectively “relationship with the deceased” and “title to the properties of the deceased”. This very form is to be used even in cases where no death occurs as is apparent from columns 2, 3, 4 and 6 etc. A close examination of the language of S. 110 read with Ss. 2(18) and 93 and that of the proviso to S. 94(3) lead to the irresistible conclusion that uninsured vehicles are also within the scope of S. 110.

6. Mr. Debi Prasad is, of course, right in referring to the Heading of the Chapter in support of his argument. The question is whether the language of the Heading can limit the scope of the Chapter which is otherwise clearly wider. It has been uniformly held that Headings cannot control the plain words of the statute. The court is entitled to look at the Heading for resolving any doubt that it may have as to the ambiguous words but, if the meaning of the section is clear, it cannot be used for giving a different effect (see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes). In R. v. Surrey Assessment Committee (1948) 1 K.B 29 at page 32 Lord Goddard, G.J observed that “while the court is entitled to look at the headings in an Act of Parliament to resolve any doubt they may have as to ambiguous word, the law is quite clear that you cannot use such heading to give different effect to clear words of the section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning. Since the sections of Chapter VIII clearly lead to the conclusion that all the Vehicles covered by the definition of S. 2(18) whether insured or not are within its scope, the heading cannot be relied upon for negativing it.

7. There is another reason in support of my view. The object of establishment of claims Tribunals by the amendment in the Act was, inter alia, to ensure speedy relief to victims of road accidents by a less expensive process and there is no reason to place the victims of accidents involving uninsured vehicles at a disadvantage. If the interpretation as suggested by the respondent is accepted it will lead to illegal discrimination, which has to be avoided. I, therefore, hold that the claim petition of the appellant filed before the Tribunal cannot be held to be not maintainable.

8. The learned Single Judge has also observed that the claim petition having been filed by the father of the injured boy and not by the boy himself was not maintainable. I am aforesaid this view also cannot be sustained. Section 110A(1)(c) permits the petition to be filed by a duly authorised agent of an injured person. The proviso to the clause further indicates that the compensation can be claimed in certain cases in a representative capacity. So far the present case is concerned, the injured was a young boy reading in class IV and could not have sued by himself. Even on his behalf his father who is the natural guardian had to take all necessary steps. The father could have authorised any other person under clause (c) of S. 110A(1) for making the application; instead he has himself acted in this regard. It has not been suggested on behalf of the opposite party at any stage that he was not empowered to act on behalf of his son. The judgment of the Tribunal does not indicate that the point which found favour with the High Court was even urged in the court below. I fully agree with the observation of the Punjab High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Punjab Roadways, Ambala City, AIR 1964 Punjab 235, that the expression “duly authorised agent” referred to in cl. (c) should not be construed narrowly so as to mean a person expressly authorised or having the authority in writing. It must be given a wide and liberal meaning as including a person having implied authority to claim compensation. In that case the husband of the injured person was held to be competent to maintain the action. So far the present case is concerned, the father-applicant besides suffering severe mental strain on account of the injury to his son, had to spend considerable amount of money over the treatment of the boy for which he was compensated by the Tribunal. I, therefore, do not find any merit in the hyper-technical objection taken on behalf of the respondent before us.

9. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 15 of 1978 (R) is set aside and the decision of the Tribunal is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs of the Misc. Appeal and of the Letters Patent Appeal which together are assessed at Rs. 1000/-.

R.N Lal, J.:— 10. I agree.

Appeal allowed.

Parmanand Thakur v. Commissioner, Coal Mines Welfare Organisation .

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

Appellant / Claimant

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Parmanand Thakur v. Commissioner, Coal Mines Welfare Organisation .

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