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  • Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) and Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it mentions CPC which is a legislative act
  • CPC (Code of Civil Procedure)
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  • Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) and Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it mentions CPC which is a legislative act
  • CPC (Code of Civil Procedure)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 filed O.S. No. 11286 of 1998 before the Additional City Civil Judge, Mayo Hall, Bangalore, seeking ₹55,00,000 damages for alleged wrongful detention by the State of Kerala. The plaint was presented on 28-10-1998 without prior statutory notice under Section 80(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). Simultaneously the respondent:

  • Filed I.A. No. 1 under Section 80(2) CPC seeking leave to sue without the notice, and
  • Filed I.A. No. 2 under Section 151 CPC for extension of time to pay the requisite court-fee.

I.A. No. 2 was allowed on 29-10-1998; the court-fee was paid on 28-11-1998 and summons issued the same day. The State of Kerala (appellants) thereafter filed I.A.s Nos. 3 and 4 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint for non-compliance with Section 80(1). The trial court dismissed those applications on 3-9-2001.

The appellants challenged that order in C.R.P. No. 5189 of 2001 before the Karnataka High Court. On 20-1-2005 the High Court dismissed the revision petition, presuming that I.A. No. 1 had been granted and upholding the trial court’s refusal to reject the plaint. The present civil appeal was filed by the State of Kerala before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of any express order, an application under Section 80(2) CPC can be presumed to have been granted, thereby dispensing with the statutory notice required by Section 80(1).
  2. Whether the trial court was justified in hearing and rejecting the appellants’ applications under Order VII Rule 11 CPC before deciding the plaintiff’s pending application under Section 80(2) CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • No order was ever passed on I.A. No. 1; therefore the statutory prerequisite of notice under Section 80(1) remained unmet, rendering the suit defective.
  • The trial court ought first to have decided I.A. No. 1; until then, considering or rejecting the Order VII Rule 11 applications was improper.
  • Mere filing of an application under Section 80(2) does not amount to grant of leave; reliance placed on State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders and Bajaj Hindustan Sugar & Industries Ltd. v. Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The High Court correctly presumed that the trial court had impliedly allowed I.A. No. 1, because the plaint was not returned and proceedings continued.
  • Relied on Irappa Basappa Kudachi v. State of Karnataka, where a similar presumption was accepted.
  • Consequently, the suit was maintainable and the plaint was rightly retained.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders (2006) 12 SCC 119 Service of notice under Section 80(1) CPC is a condition precedent; the requirement is mandatory. Supported the appellants’ contention that non-compliance renders a suit non-maintainable unless leave under Section 80(2) is expressly granted.
Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1926-27) 54 IA 338 Mandatory nature of Section 80 notice pre-amendment. Quoted within Pioneer Builders; forms part of the jurisprudential background affirming strict compliance.
Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand v. Union of India AIR 1966 SC 1068 Reiterates that notice under Section 80 is mandatory. Cited indirectly via Pioneer Builders; reinforces the statutory requirement.
Bihari Chowdhary v. State of Bihar (1984) 2 SCC 627 Objects of Section 80: give Government an opportunity to reconsider and avoid litigation. Referenced in the discussion illustrating legislative intent behind Section 80.
Bajaj Hindustan Sugar & Industries Ltd. v. Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 43 A suit against Government without Section 80 notice is permissible only with leave of the court. Relied upon by appellants to show that express leave is an essential prerequisite.
Irappa Basappa Kudachi v. State of Karnataka (1996) 2 Kant LJ 591 On facts, presumption of grant of Section 80(2) application where no order is recorded. Cited by respondent to justify the High Court’s presumption; the Supreme Court declined to follow this view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court disagreed with both the trial court and the High Court. Its analytical steps were:

  1. Confirmed the factual position that no order had been passed on I.A. No. 1 under Section 80(2) CPC.
  2. Emphasised that filing such an application does not regularise the defect of absent notice; the court must actively consider urgency, hear both sides, and make a reasoned decision.
  3. Held that, until the application is expressly decided, the irregularity persists, making the maintainability of the suit uncertain.
  4. Rejected the doctrine of presumed grant, reasoning that it would render the statutory requirement and judicial scrutiny under Section 80(2) meaningless.
  5. Concluded that the trial court erred in taking up—and rejecting—the Order VII Rule 11 applications before disposing of I.A. No. 1, and that the High Court compounded this error by upholding the presumption.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Supreme Court:

  • Quashed the Karnataka High Court’s judgment dated 20-1-2005 and the trial court’s order dated 3-9-2001.
  • Directed the trial court to first determine I.A. No. 1 under Section 80(2) CPC; only thereafter may it hear the appellants’ applications under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
  • No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision clarifies that leave under Section 80(2) CPC cannot be implied; an express, reasoned order is required before a suit filed without statutory notice can proceed. Although the ruling reiterates existing principles rather than creating new precedent, it underscores procedural discipline in suits against the Government.

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    State Of Kerala And Others v. Sudhir Kumar Sharma And Others

    Anil R. Dave, J.— Leave granted. Being aggrieved by the judgment delivered in State of Kerala v. Sudhir Kumar Sharma Civil Revision Petition No. 5189 of 2001 dated 20-1-2005 by the High Court of Karnataka, this appeal has been filed by the Government of Kerala and other officials.

    2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a nutshell, are as under: Respondent 1 has filed a civil suit, being OS No. 11286 of 1998 in the Court of the Additional City Civil Judge at Mayo Hall in Bangalore. According to Respondent 1, he had been wrongfully detained by the State authorities and therefore, in the said suit he has prayed that he should be awarded Rs 55,00,000 as damages with interest thereon at the rate of 18%. As the suit has been filed against the State, he was supposed to give a notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) but he had not given the statutory notice under Section 80 CPC in accordance with law. In fact, the notice was issued by him on 24-10-1998 whereas the suit had been filed on 28-10-1998. At the time of filing the suit, he had not even received acknowledgment from the authority to whom he had issued the notice. He had not even affixed requisite court fee stamp to the plaint when the plaint was filed in the court. Respondent 1 being conscious of the defects in the suit filed by him, had also filed two interlocutory applications along with the plaint on the date on which the plaint had been filed. IA No. 1 was filed under the provisions of Section 80(2) CPC seeking leave of the court to file the suit without serving a notice under Section 80(1) CPC and IA No. 2 was filed under Section 151 CPC praying for extension of time for payment of the court fee.

    3. On 29-10-1998 IA No. 2 had been granted by the court, whereby Respondent 1 was granted time up to 28-11-1998 for paying the court fee stamp and the same was paid by him on 28-11-1998 and therefore, summons had been issued on 28-11-1998. Thereafter, hearing had been adjourned from time to time.

    4. In the said suit, IAs Nos. 3 and 4 were filed on behalf of the present appellants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC praying for rejection of the plaint. The said applications filed by the appellants had been heard by the trial court and ultimately, by an order dated 3-9-2001, the said applications praying for rejection of the plaint had been rejected.

    5. Being aggrieved by the order dated 3-9-2001, whereby the applications praying for rejection of the plaint had been rejected, the appellants had filed Civil Revision Petition No. 5189 of 2001, which was also rejected by the High Court by an order dated 20-1-2005 Civil Revision Petition No. 5189 of 2001 and the said order has been challenged by the appellants in this appeal.

    6. The trial court had rejected IAs Nos. 3 and 4 praying for rejection of the plaint for the reason that it did not find any justifiable reason for rejecting the plaint.

    7. So far as the High Court is concerned, it came to the conclusion that the trial court was right in rejecting the applications praying for rejection of the plaint as there was no justifiable reason for rejecting the plaint. The High Court also came to the conclusion that IA No. 1 filed by Respondent 1 seeking leave of the Court to permit the filing of the suit without serving notice under Section 80(1) CPC had been presumed to have been granted and therefore, there was no reason for rejecting the plaint. The High Court also found that the deficit court fee stamp had also been paid within the extended period granted by the trial court. Thus, there was no justifiable objection to the plaint and therefore, according to the High Court the decision of the trial court was just and proper.

    8. The High Court noted that IA No. 1 was pending before the trial court and yet applications praying for rejection of the plaint had been heard by the trial court. The High Court, therefore, presumed that IA No. 1, filed under Section 80(2) CPC, was granted and therefore, the objection with regard to non-compliance with Section 80(1) CPC was not justifiable.

    9. In the aforestated circumstances, what is to be examined by this Court is whether there can be any presumption with regard to grant of the application filed under Section 80(2) CPC, even if no order was passed on the said application and whether the trial court was justified in dismissing the applications of the appellants filed for rejection of the plaint though the application filed by Respondent 1-plaintiff under Section 80(2) CPC was not finally decided.

    10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants had submitted that as no order had been passed on the application filed under Section 80(2) CPC, it had not been finally disposed of and therefore, the High Court was in error in presuming that the said application had been granted. It had been also submitted that without deciding the application filed by Respondent 1 under Section 80(2) CPC, the trial court as well as the High Court could not have come to the conclusion that the plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It had been further submitted that without deciding the application filed by Respondent 1, the trial court should not have even heard the applications filed by the appellants for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It had been thus submitted that the High Court as well as the trial court had committed a grave error by coming to the conclusion that the plaint could not have been rejected under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

    11. So as to substantiate the aforestated submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, he had relied upon the judgment delivered by this Court in State of A.P v. Pioneer Builders (2006) 12 SCC 119. He had drawn our attention to the observations made by this Court on the requirement of giving statutory notice to the Government and the object of giving notice under Section 80(1) CPC. He had drawn our attention specifically to para 14 of the aforestated judgment, which reads as under:

    “14. From a bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 80, it is plain that subject to what is provided in sub-section (2) thereof, no suit can be filed against the Government or a public officer unless requisite notice under the said provision has been served on such Government or public officer, as the case may be. It is well settled that before the amendment of Section 80 the provisions of unamended Section 80 admitted of no implications and exceptions whatsoever and are express, explicit and mandatory. The section imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the court and in the absence of compliance with Section 80, the suit is not maintainable. (See Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secy. of State for India in Council (1926-27) 54 IA 338, (1927) 26 LW 809; Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand v. Union of India AIR 1966 SC 1068 and Bihari Chowdhary v. State of Bihar (1984) 2 SCC 627.) The service of notice under Section 80 is, thus, a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer. The legislative intent of the section is to give the Government sufficient notice of the suit, which is proposed to be filed against it so that it may reconsider the decision and decide for itself whether the claim made could be accepted or not. As observed in Bihari Chowdhary (1984) 2 SCC 627 the object of the section is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation.”

    12. Thereafter, the learned counsel had relied upon the judgment delivered in Bajaj Hindustan Sugar & Industries Ltd. v. Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 43 which also lays down law to the effect that a suit may be filed against the Government or a public officer without serving notice as required by Section 80(1) CPC only with the leave of the court. He had further submitted that as the suit was defective on account of non-compliance with Section 80(1) CPC and as leave had not been granted by the trial court to Respondent 1-plaintiff under Section 80(2) CPC, the plaint ought to have been rejected by the trial court and alternatively he had submitted that hearing of applications praying for rejection of the plaint filed under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC should have been postponed till the application filed under Section 80(2) of Respondent 1 was finally decided.

    13. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1-original plaintiff had made an effort to justify the reasons given by the trial court as well as by the High Court for rejecting the applications filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

    14. It had been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1 that the High Court was right in presuming that the application filed under Section 80(2) CPC had been entertained and granted. The learned counsel had relied upon the judgment delivered in Irappa Basappa Kudachi v. State of Karnataka (1996) 2 Kant LJ 591 wherein it has been held on the facts of the case that even if no order is passed on an application filed under Section 80(2) CPC, it can be presumed that the said application is granted.

    15. Relying upon the aforestated judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Irappa Basappa case (1996) 2 Kant LJ 591, it had been submitted by the learned counsel for Respondent 1 that though no order was passed on the application made under Section 80(2) CPC, it was rightly presumed that the trial court had granted the said application and therefore, there could not have been any objection with regard to filing of the suit in violation of the provisions of Section 80(1) CPC. It had been also submitted that had the application filed under Section 80(2) been rejected by the trial court, the plaint would have been returned to Respondent 1-plaintiff but as the plaint had not been returned, the presumption would be that the application under Section 80(2) had been granted.

    16. For the aforestated reasons, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents had submitted that the appeal should be dismissed by this Court.

    17. We have heard the learned counsel at length and have also perused the judgments cited by them.

    18. Looking to the facts of the case and the provisions of law, we do not agree with the view expressed by the trial court as well as by the High Court.

    19. It is an admitted fact that no order had been passed on the application filed under Section 80(2) CPC whereby leave of the court had been sought for filing the suit without complying with the provisions of Section 80(1) CPC. In our opinion, a suit filed without compliance with Section 80(1) cannot be regularised simply by filing an application under Section 80(2) CPC. Upon filing an application under Section 80(2) CPC, the court is supposed to consider the facts and look at the circumstances in which the leave was sought for filing the suit without issuance of notice under Section 80(1) to the government authorities concerned. For the purpose of determining whether such an application should be granted, the court is supposed to give hearing to both the sides and consider the nature of the suit and urgency of the matter before taking a final decision. By mere filing of an application, by no stretch of imagination can it be presumed that the application is granted. If such a presumption is accepted, it would mean that the court has not to take any action in pursuance of such an application and if the court has not to take any action, then we failed to understand as to why such an application should be filed.

    20. It is an admitted fact that no order had been passed on the application filed under Section 80(2) CPC. Till a final order is passed granting the said application, in our opinion, the irregularity in filing of the suit continues. If ultimately the application is rejected, the plaint is to be returned and in that event the application filed on behalf of the appellants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is to be granted. If the application filed under Section 80(2) is ultimately granted, the objection with regard to non-issuance of notice under Section 80(1) CPC cannot be raised and in that event the suit would not fail on account of non-issuance of notice under Section 80(1) CPC.

    21. We reiterate that till the application filed under Section 80(2) CPC is finally heard and decided, it cannot be known whether the suit filed without issuance of notice under Section 80(1) CPC was justifiable. According to the provisions of Section 80(2) CPC, the court has to be satisfied after hearing the parties that there was some grave urgency which required some urgent relief and therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file a suit without issuance of notice under Section 80(1) CPC. Till arguments are advanced on behalf of the plaintiff with regard to urgency in the matter and till the trial court is satisfied with regard to the urgency or requirement of immediate relief in the suit, the court normally would not grant an application under Section 80(2) CPC. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that mere filing of an application under Section 80(2) CPC would not mean that the said application was granted by the trial court.

    22. In the aforestated circumstances, we hold that the trial court had wrongly rejected the applications filed by the appellants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The trial court ought to have heard and decided the application filed under Section 80(2) CPC before hearing the applications under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

    23. As a result of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment Civil Revision Petition No. 5189 of 2001 delivered by the High Court confirming the order of the trial court dated 30-9-2001 is quashed and set aside. The order of the trial court rejecting applications under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is also quashed and set aside. It is directed that the trial court shall first of all decide the application filed by Respondent 1 under Section 80(2) CPC and only after final disposal of the said application, the applications filed by the appellants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC shall be decided.

    24. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

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    State Of Kerala And Others v. Sudhir Kumar Sharma And Others
    (Sep 2, 2013)