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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 INSC 160
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 494 of the Penal Code
  • Sections 406, 494 and 498-A of the Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Chapter XIX Part A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Sections 494 and 406 of the Penal Code
  • Section 173 and Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 INSC 160
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 494 of the Penal Code
  • Sections 406, 494 and 498-A of the Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Chapter XIX Part A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Sections 494 and 406 of the Penal Code
  • Section 173 and Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, K. Neelaveni, married Respondent 2, S.K. Siva Kumar, on 3 September 1997. Her parents allegedly provided gold ornaments and household articles at the time of marriage. The appellant asserts that during her pregnancy a scan revealed a female foetus, prompting her husband and in-laws to demand an abortion, assault her on 18 January 1998, and ultimately expel her from the matrimonial home. She gave birth to a girl on 25 June 1998.

The appellant further alleged that her husband contracted a second marriage with one Bharathi—purportedly with the support of other accused persons—and that a child was born of that union. On 7 November 2002 she filed a written complaint, leading to registration of offences under Sections 406, 494 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Upon completion of investigation, police submitted a charge-sheet under the same sections.

Respondents 2–13 petitioned the Madras High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the charge-sheet so far as it related to Sections 406 and 494 IPC. Accepting their plea, the High Court (order dated 29 September 2008) quashed those sections but left the charge under Section 498-A intact. The appellant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the allegations in the First Information Report (FIR) and the materials collected during investigation disclose the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 406 and 494 IPC.
  2. Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash portions of a charge-sheet before the Magistrate had exercised jurisdiction under Section 190 CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The FIR specifically alleges a second marriage and the birth of a child, thereby satisfying the prima facie ingredients of Section 494 IPC.
  • The complaint and investigation materials show that gold ornaments and household articles were entrusted to the husband, who subsequently drove the appellant out, thus attracting Section 406 IPC.
  • At the quash stage the High Court was obliged to accept allegations in the FIR and investigation record as true; issues such as performance of essential marriage ceremonies can be examined only at trial.

Respondents' Arguments

  • No material establishes that a second marriage was duly performed with requisite rites and ceremonies; therefore Section 494 IPC is not made out.
  • Allegations do not fulfil the ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC.
  • The High Court rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that, at the stage of considering a quashing petition, courts must confine themselves to the allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected during investigation; the veracity of those allegations is a matter for trial. The FIR clearly alleged:

  • A second marriage between Respondent 2 and Bharathi, witnessed and supported by co-accused, and the birth of a child from that union—constituting prima facie material under Section 494 IPC.
  • Entrustment of gold ornaments/household articles followed by acts amounting to criminal breach of trust and cruelty—supporting a charge under Section 406 IPC.

The Court emphasized that the Magistrate, upon receiving the police report, retains discretion under Section 190 CrPC to decide whether to take cognizance or discharge the accused under Section 239 CrPC. Interference by the High Court before the Magistrate exercised that statutory discretion was deemed “undesirable.”

The Court also noted that all alleged offences are triable by a Magistrate as warrant cases; quashing two of the three charges did not avoid trial but fragmented it, which the Code aims to prevent. Accordingly, allowing full play to the CrPC’s procedural scheme was considered imperative.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the High Court’s order quashing the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 IPC is set aside.

Immediate Effect: The entire charge-sheet—Sections 406, 494 and 498-A IPC—stands restored, and the matter returns to the Magistrate for proceedings in accordance with law. Broader Implications: The decision reiterates that High Courts should exercise caution in quashing charges before the Magistrate has applied his mind under Section 190 CrPC, particularly where warrant-case offences triable by the Magistrate are involved.

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    K. Neelaveni v. State

    C.K Prasad, J.— Leave granted. The appellant wife aggrieved by the order dated 29-9-2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal OP No. 23473 of 2008, whereby it had quashed the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code, 1860, has preferred this appeal seeking special leave to appeal.

    2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the appellant wife, K. Neelaveni on 7-11-2002 gave a written report to the Inspector of Selaiyur Police Station, inter alia, alleging that her marriage was performed with Respondent 2-accused, S.K Siva Kumar on 3-9-1997 in which gold ornaments and various other household articles were given by her parents. She had further alleged that her husband used to abuse her and her family members under the influence of alcohol and demanded Rs. 50,000 from her parents.

    3. According to the first information report, when the appellant was pregnant, on scan it was found that she was carrying a female foetus, her husband and his family members started harassing her and insisted for aborting the child. On her refusal to give consent for abortion, according to the informant, on 18-1-1998 her husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law assaulted her and had driven her out from the matrimonial home and the husband left her on way to her parents house. She gave birth to a girl child on 25-6-1998.

    4. The informant in the written report had further alleged that her husband had married another lady, namely, Bharathi without her consent with the help and in the presence of other accused persons. She had further alleged that a female child was born to them from the wedlock.

    5. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, a case under Sections 406, 494 and 498-A of the Penal Code was registered against the accused persons. Police after usual investigation submitted charge-sheet under Sections 406, 494 and 498-A of the Penal Code.

    6. The accused persons, namely, Respondents 2 to 13 filed a petition before the High Court for quashing the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code, inter alia, contending that in the absence of any material to show that “the second marriage was duly performed with religious rites and essential ceremonies” charge-sheet under Section 494 of the Penal Code is fit to be quashed. It was further contended that the allegations made in the first information report and the materials collected during the course of investigation do not fulfil the ingredients of offence under Section 406 of the Penal Code.

    7. The aforesaid submissions found favour with the High Court and it had quashed the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code. While doing so, the High Court observed as follows:

    “As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, a careful reading of the complaint of the second respondent, statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC and the charge-sheet do not reveal the ingredients constituting the offences under Sections 494 and 406 IPC, yet the first respondent has chosen to file the charge for the said offences. Therefore, this Court is constrained to quash the charge-sheet as against the petitioners as far as the offences under Sections 406 and 494 IPC alone are concerned. It is made clear that the charge-sheet as against the petitioners under Section 498-A IPC is not quashed.”

    8. Mr Guru Krishna Kumar, the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant submits that the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the charge-sheet did not reveal the ingredients constituting the offences under Sections 494 and 406 of the Penal Code is erroneous. He draws our attention to the first information report and submits that there is an allegation of the second marriage and even birth to a child and hence it cannot be said that the ingredients constituting offence under Section 494 of the Penal Code do not exist.

    9. The learned counsel pointed out that the High Court while considering the application for quashing of the charge-sheet was obliged to take into account the allegations made in the first information report and the materials collected during the course of investigation. He submits that in case the allegations made in the first information report and the materials collected during the course of the investigation are taken into account, same constitute an offence under Section 494 of the Penal Code. It has further been pointed out that the gold ornaments and household articles were given to the husband and she was driven out from the matrimonial home on a refusal to consent for abortion.

    10. Accordingly, Mr Guru Krishna Kumar submits that the allegation in the first information report and the materials collected during the course of investigation clearly constitute offences under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code.

    11. Mr R. Shunmugasundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents 2 to 13, however, submits that the ingredients of offences under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code do not exist and, therefore, the High Court did not err in quashing the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code.

    12. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced and we are inclined to accept the submission of Mr Guru Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant.

    13. From a perusal of the allegations made in the first information report, it is evident that the appellant has clearly alleged that her husband had married another lady, namely, Bharathi and the said marriage had taken place in the presence and with the support of other accused persons. She had also stated that from the second marriage with Bharathi a girl child was born. In the first information report, it had clearly been alleged that besides gold ornaments, other household articles were given in marriage and further she was subjected to cruelty and driven out from the matrimonial home by the accused persons. In our opinion, the allegations made in the first information report, at this stage, have to be accepted as true, and the allegations so made prima facie, constitute offences under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code.

    14. It has to be borne in mind that while considering the application for quashing of the charge-sheet, the allegations made in the first information report and the materials collected during the course of the investigation are required to be considered. Truthfulness or otherwise of the allegation is not fit to be gone into at this stage as it is always a matter of trial. Essential ceremonies of marriage were gone into or not is a matter of trial.

    15. From what we have said above, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in holding that the charge-sheet does not reveal the ingredients constituting the offences under Sections 494 and 406 of the Penal Code.

    16. It seems that the accused persons approached the High Court for quashing of the charge-sheet even before any order was passed by the Magistrate in terms of Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In our opinion, when a report is submitted to the Magistrate he is required to be prima facie satisfied that the facts disclosed therein constitute an offence. It is trite that the Magistrate is not bound by the conclusion of the investigating agency in the police report i.e in the charge-sheet and it is open to him after exercise of judicial discretion to take the view that the facts disclosed in the report do not constitute any offence for taking cognizance. Quashing of Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code from the charge-sheet even before the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is undesirable. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, quashing of the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code at this stage in exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was absolutely uncalled for.

    17. It is relevant here to state that offences under Sections 406, 494 and 498-A are triable by a Magistrate, First Class and as all these offences are punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding two years, the case has to be tried as a warrant case. The procedure for trial of warrant case by a Magistrate instituted on a police report is provided under Chapter XIX Part A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 239 inter alia provides that:

    “239. When accused shall be discharged.—If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.”

    It seems that the accused persons even before the case had reached that stage filed an application for quashing of the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code. In our opinion, the High Court ought not to have interfered after the submission of the charge-sheet and even before the Magistrate examining as to whether the accused persons deserved to be discharged in terms of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    18. There is yet another reason which the High Court ought to have considered before quashing the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code. All the offences are triable by the Magistrate and quashing of the charge-sheet under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code had not resulted into exonerating the accused persons from facing the trial itself. Matter would have been different had the offences under Sections 406 and 494 of the Penal Code been triable as sessions case. In a matter like this the High Court ought to have allowed the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure referred to above their full play.

    19. For all these reasons we are unable to sustain the order impugned in the present appeal. We hasten to add that all the observations made in this judgment are for the purpose of disposal of this appeal and shall have no bearing during the course of trial.

    20. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.

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    Comments

    K. Neelaveni v. State
    (Mar 22, 2010)