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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1994 INSC 443
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5 of the Act
  • Section 5 of the TADA Act read with Section 25 of the Arms Act
  • Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
  • Section 5, TADA Act
  • The TADA Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1994 INSC 443
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5 of the Act
  • Section 5 of the TADA Act read with Section 25 of the Arms Act
  • Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
  • Section 5, TADA Act
  • The TADA Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was convicted by the Designated Court, Rohtak at Jind, on 6 November 1992 under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) read with Section 25 of the Arms Act. The prosecution proved that on 2 April 1989, during an investigation near Village Gurthali canal bank, police officers apprehended the appellant in possession of a .315 bore rifle, three cartridge belts (25 rounds each), a magazine with seven live cartridges, and a rexine bag containing two packets of ten cartridges each—totaling 109 live rounds. The appellant lacked any licence or permit. The seized firearm was certified “in firing condition” by an armourer.

Seven prosecution witnesses, including two civilian witnesses (PW 5 Ram Kishan and PW 6 Subhash), supported the case. Relying on their testimony, the Designated Judge sentenced the appellant to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of ₹500, with six months’ additional imprisonment in default. The present appeal challenges that conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statutory presumption under Section 5 of TADA was properly applied when the appellant was allegedly not informed of his right to rebut the presumption, as later clarified in the Constitution Bench decision in Sanjay Dutt (II).
  2. Whether the conviction could stand on the strength of police testimony corroborated by two civilian witnesses whose presence at the scene was questioned by the defence.
  3. Whether the prosecution proved that the rifle was serviceable when the armourer did not conduct a test-fire.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt (II) declared the Section 5 presumption to be rebuttable; the trial court failed to apprise the appellant of this right, denying him a fair opportunity to lead rebuttal evidence.
  • Testimony of civilian witnesses PW 5 and PW 6 was unreliable: they belonged to a different locality, had no reason to remain at the police chowki until midnight, and their accounts of where they slept differed.
  • Absent credible civilian corroboration, conviction based solely on police witnesses should not be sustained.
  • The armourer never test-fired the rifle; hence serviceability remained unproven, rendering the conviction speculative.

State’s Arguments

  • Under Sanjay Dutt (II), the prosecution must prove three elements: possession of specified arms, lack of authorisation, and possession within a notified area—each satisfied here.
  • The appellant faced a specific Section 5 charge and was questioned under Section 313 CrPC; the court did not prevent him from adducing rebuttal evidence, so no prejudice occurred.
  • Expert evidence from an armourer suffices to establish serviceability; actual firing is unnecessary.
  • The Designated Court imposed only the statutory minimum sentence; no ground exists for interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sanjay Dutt (II) v. State through CBI, Bombay, (1994) 5 SCC 410 Section 5 TADA creates a rebuttable presumption; prosecution must prove (i) possession, (ii) lack of licence, (iii) notified area. The Court found all three ingredients satisfied and held the appellant had adequate opportunity to rebut the presumption but failed to do so.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the record in light of Sanjay Dutt (II) and concluded:

  • Presence of statutory ingredients: The appellant possessed a rifle and 109 live cartridges without licence in an area where TADA was in force, satisfying the prosecution’s burden.
  • Opportunity to rebut: The appellant was specifically charged under Section 5 TADA and questioned under Section 313 CrPC, affording him the chance to explain the possession; he offered no explanation or evidence.
  • Credibility of witnesses: PW 5 and PW 6 gave a reasonable explanation for their presence at the police chowki; their testimony corroborated the police evidence. The Court declined to discard their accounts over minor discrepancies.
  • Serviceability of the rifle: Expert armourer evidence established that the firearm was in firing condition; an actual test-fire was deemed unnecessary.
  • Rule of prudence: While independent corroboration is desirable, it is not indispensable; in this case, the combined testimony of police and civilian witnesses and physical recovery of arms sufficed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

The decision upholds the five-year sentence and ₹500 fine imposed by the Designated Court. The ruling applies the Constitution Bench guidance in Sanjay Dutt (II) without creating new precedent; its direct effect is limited to the parties involved.

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    Sukhpal v. State Of Haryana .

    Order

    1. This appeal is directed against the order of conviction of the appellant dated 6-11-1992 by the Designated Court, Rohtak at Jind, under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, hereinafter referred to as ‘TADA’ Act, read with Section 25 of the Arms Act and consequential order of sentence for a period of five years with a fine of Rs 500; in default further imprisonment for six months. The prosecution case in short is that on 2-4-1989, Shri Sumer Singh, Inspector along with the police officials and Ram Kishan and Subhash were present in the area of Village Gurthali near Canal Bank in connection with investigation of a case (State v. Surinder under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section 5 of the TADA Act). At that time, the accused Sukhpal was apprehended by the said police party. The said Sukhpal was carrying one rifle of .315 bore and he was also having three belts each containing 25 cartridges in his waist. A magazine of the rifle containing seven live cartridges of .315 bore was also with him. The accused was also holding one bag of rexine in which two packets each containing 10 cartridges of the said rifle were also recovered. In this way 109 live cartridges were recovered from the possession of the accused apart from the said rifle. The accused could not produce any permit or licence for keeping the said arms and ammunition. The accused was put under arrest and the rifle and the cartridges recovered from his possession were sealed in separate parcels with the seal of SSM and the same were handed over to PW 6 Subhash. The said rifle was got tested by an armourer. A challan under Section 25 of the Arms Act and also under Section 5 of the TADA Act was framed against the accused. PW 1 Shri Banwari Lal, ASI, PW 2 Surjit Singh, Armourer, PW 3 Shri Bram Sarup Ahmad, PW 4 Sumer Singh, Inspector, PW 5 Ram Kishan, PW 6 Subhash and PW 7 Birbhan Kanungo were examined by the prosecution in support of the prosecution case. PW 2 Surjit Singh, Armourer was examined for the purpose of establishing that the rifle found in possession of the accused was in a firing condition. The said armourer had deposed that he had examined the rifle and found that the said rifle was in firing condition. The prosecution case has been proved by the evidences of the said police personnel and also two civilian witnesses namely PW 5 Ram Kishan and PW 6 Subhash. The said two civilians have deposed that in connection with a dacoity case they had been to the police chowki on the said date and they were asked to wait as they were given to understand that some clue about the dacoity was available. At about 2.00 a.m at midnight, while they were sleeping in the police chowki compound they were aroused and taken in a police vehicle and they witnessed the arrest of the accused along with the said rifle and cartridges. The learned Designated Judge considering the said evidences has come to the finding that the case against the accused was established. He has accordingly convicted the accused under Section 5 of the TADA Act read with Section 25 of the Arms Act and has passed the aforesaid sentence of five years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs 500.

    2. Mr Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended before us that in the recent Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of Sanjay Dutt (II) v. State through CBI, Bombay (1994) 5 SCC 410, (1994) 3 Scale 1004, this Court has indicated that the presumption under Section 5 of TADA Act is a rebuttable presumption and the accused is entitled to rebut such presumption in a trial. Mr Malhotra has submitted that unfortunately the said decision was not rendered at the time when the trial had taken place and the accused-appellant was not aware that he had a right to rebut the presumption under Section 5 of the TADA Act. He has submitted that it was the bounden duty of the Court to apprise the accused of such right of rebuttal so that he could lead evidence by way of rebuttal of the said statutory presumption. Mr Malhotra has also submitted that in the instant case, although two civilians PW 5 and PW 6 have been examined by the prosecution to support the prosecution case that the accused was apprehended with rifle and cartridges, the testimony of the said two witnesses namely PW 5 and PW 6 is not worthy of credence and should not be accepted. Admittedly, they belonged to a different locality and according to their own statement they had come to the police chowki sometime about 7 to 8 p.m for causing enquiry about a dacoity case. There was no reason for them to stay back in the police chowki right up to the midnight so that they could accompany the police party at the time of apprehending the accused. Mr Malhotra has also submitted that while one of such witnesses had stated that both had slept in the courtyard, the other had stated that one of them slept in the room. If such contradiction is considered along with the fact that the said two witnesses were not reasonably expected to stay back in the police station, their evidences could not have been accepted as reliable by the learned Designated Court. Mr Malhotra has submitted that if the said evidences are not taken into consideration, then the prosecution case is to be accepted only on the basis of the depositions of police officials and in the facts and circumstances of the case, such testimony of the police personnel without corroboration from a reliable independent witness should not be accepted and no conviction could be based for want of proper evidence. Mr Malhotra has also submitted that the armourer was examined for the purpose of proving that the rifle alleged to have been found with the accused was in a serviceable condition but it is an admitted case that the said armourer had not fired the rifle and he could not say if the said rifle had at all been fired or not. He has, therefore, submitted that the conviction of the appellant lies in the realm of surmise and conjecture. Such conviction and sentence are, therefore, liable to be set aside by allowing the appeal.

    3. Disputing the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for the State has submitted that in the said Constitution Bench decision in the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State (1994) 5 SCC 410, (1994) 3 Scale 1004, it has been clearly indicated that under Section 5 of the TADA Act the prosecution has to prove three ingredients, namely, the accused had possessed the arms and ammunition as specified in the said section, such possession of arms etc. was unauthorised and, the possession of such arms and ammunition was within a notified area as referred to in Section 5 of the TADA Act. The learned counsel has submitted that in the instant case, the accused was found in possession of a large quantity of cartridges and the said rifle without any authority under the law. He was also found to have possessed such arms and ammunition within a notified area under Section 5 of the TADA Act. Accordingly, in view of the statutory presumption under the said Section 5, the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 5 of the TADA Act and no illegality has been committed in convicting the accused under Section 5 of the TADA Act. The learned counsel has also submitted that the specific charge under Section 5 of the Act was made against the accused. He, therefore, had every opportunity to give the evidence in rebuttal. He was also specifically told about the said charge under Section 5 of the Act at the time of his examination under Section 313 of CrPC. But no statement by way of rebuttal has been made by the accused. Therefore, no illegality has been committed in convicting the accused by the learned Designated Court. As the accused had ample opportunity to lead evidence by way of rebuttal of the presumption under Section 5 of the TADA Act and the learned Designated Court had not prevented him from adducing evidence in rebuttal, no question of suffering any unmerited prejudice arises in this case. He has also submitted that the rifle was examined by an armourer who with his expertise had found that the said rifle was in a firing condition. Accordingly, the Court was justified in accepting such deposition of the armourer. It was not at all necessary that the firing condition of the rifle was required to be ascertained only by resorting to actual firing. The learned counsel for the State has further submitted that in the instant case, the minimum sentence that may be imposed under Section 5 of the Act has been passed by the learned Judge. Therefore, no interference is called for by this Court and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

    4. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties it appears to us that in the instant case, the prosecution has examined the witnesses to establish that the accused had been apprehended with a rifle of .315 bore and 109 live cartridges of such rifle. It is an admitted position that the accused had no licence or permit to possess the said rifle and cartridges at the relevant time. It is also an admitted position that the TADA Act was applicable in the area where the accused was apprehended. Accordingly, all the three ingredients as indicated in the said Constitution Bench decision, have been fulfilled in the instant case. Normally, the presence of PW 5 and PW 6 in the police chowki was not expected at that hour but PW 5 and PW 6 have given a reasonable explanation as to why they had come to the police chowki on that day and why they had waited there. We do not find any valid reason to discard the evidences adduced in the case by PW 5 and PW 6. Apart from that, the police personnel have also deposed and such depositions stand fully corroborated by the evidences of PW 5 and PW 6 and by the recovery of the rifle and cartridges. It may be indicated here that as a rule of prudence, corroboration preferably by a reliable witness is desirable. But in all cases, such corroboration cannot be insisted as a matter of course because it may not be possible in all cases to get corroboration from an independent witness. In our view, the learned counsel for the State is justified in her contention that in the instant case, firing capability of the said rifle has been found by an expert, namely, an armourer who has a special training in the subject. It is not absolutely necessary to make a test-firing for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a rifle is capable of firing. We are, therefore, not inclined to hold that the firing capability of the said rifle has not been established in the instant case. It also appears to us that the accused was charged under Section 5 of the TADA Act but he has not given any explanation as to why and for what purpose he had possessed the said rifle and the said cartridges. Even when opportunity under Section 313 CrPC was given to the accused, no statement has been made as to why the said arms and ammunition had been kept by him at the time of his apprehension. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused had sufficient opportunity to explain the purpose of possession of the said arms and ammunition and to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 5 of the TADA Act but he has failed and neglected to give any explanation or evidence which may be even remotely construed as an evidence by way of rebuttal. In the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is therefore dismissed.

    Criminal Appeal No. 733 of 1992

    5. In view of the decision referred in Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 1992, no further order need be passed in this appeal and the same is also dismissed.

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    Comments

    Sukhpal v. State Of Haryana .
    (Oct 5, 1994)