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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, the rules
  • Section 23 (2) of the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952.
  • Rule 375 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules
  • 1964, Sub-rule (4)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, the rules
  • Section 23 (2) of the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952.
  • Rule 375 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules
  • 1964, Sub-rule (4)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition arises from a dispute concerning certain lands originally granted as 'Muafi' lands to a temple of Thakurji in village Dulmana, Tehsil Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar. These lands were in possession of the deceased Bhinya Ram, who acted as a 'Pujari', and the petitioners are his legal representatives and family members. After the resumption of 'Muafi' lands effective from 1-1-1959, Bhinya Ram obtained an order from the Collector declaring the land as his personal property under Section 23(2) of the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, and it was entered as his khatedari land. Subsequent land exchanges were sanctioned by the Deputy Colonisation Commissioner, including an auction sale to petitioner No. 8, Balbir Singh.

A suit concerning possession of the disputed land was filed by one Ladhuram, who claimed cultivation rights as 'Pujari' and obtained an injunction against dispossession. The suit remains pending. The petitioners filed this writ petition challenging orders of Ministers dated 21-3-1970 and 26-3-1971, which directed cancellation of certain land exchanges and sales, maintaining possession of the 'Muafi' land with Ladhuram, and ordering inquiries into other exchanges. The petitioners contend that these ministerial orders were made mala fide, without jurisdiction, and without hearing them, alleging bias on the part of the Ministers.

The respondents raised two preliminary objections: first, that the joint writ petition by eight petitioners is not maintainable under Rule 375 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules and the precedent set in Chandmal Naurat Mal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1968 Raj 20); second, that the petitioners concealed material facts and have not come with clean hands.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a joint writ petition by eight petitioners is maintainable under Rule 375 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, considering the cause(s) of action involved.
  2. Whether the petitioners' alleged concealment of material facts amounts to coming without clean hands, thus justifying dismissal of the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The joint petition by eight petitioners is not maintainable under Rule 375 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, as amended in 1964, and as interpreted in Chandmal Naurat Mal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1968 Raj 20).
  • The petitioners have concealed material facts relating to a temporary injunction passed against them and subsequent dismissals of appeals and revisions, indicating they have not come with clean hands.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners rely on Nathmal v. Commissioner Civil Supplies (1951 Raj LW 467) and Jas Raj v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1977 Raj 150) to contend that joint petitions are maintainable when there is a common cause of action.
  • The petitioners assert that the orders of the Ministers were mala fide, without jurisdiction, and passed without hearing them, and that the Ministers were biased due to prior connections with the opposing party.
  • They argue that requiring separate petitions after six years would not advance justice and would be a waste of judicial time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandmal Naurat Mal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 Raj 20 Interpretation of Rule 375 regarding maintainability of joint petitions; requirement that relief must be founded on the same cause of action. The Court upheld the objection that the joint petition was not maintainable because the petitioners did not have the same cause of action; the injury threatened or suffered was not identical.
Nathmal v. Commissioner Civil Supplies, 1951 Raj LW 467 Allowing joint petitions when two persons have exactly the same cause of action. The Court noted that this precedent was no longer fully valid after the 1964 amendment to Rule 375 but was relied upon by petitioners to argue for joint petitions where causes of action are the same.
Jas Raj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1977 Raj 150 Joint petitions maintainable when petitioners have a community of interest and the cause of action arises from a common order affecting all. The Court distinguished this case, noting that the present petitioners do not share the same cause of action despite a common order, thus the joint petition was not maintainable.
Rediffusion (Hong Kong) v. Att. Gen. of Hong Kong, (1970) AC 1136 (PC) Definition of "action" and "cause of action" in legal proceedings. The Court used this definition to clarify the meaning of cause of action for determining maintainability of joint petitions under Rule 375.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the maintainability of the joint writ petition under Rule 375 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules as amended in 1964, which prohibits applications by more than one person unless the relief claimed is founded on the same cause of action. The Court analyzed the precedents, notably Chandmal's case, which emphasized that petitioners must have the same rights infringed by the impugned act or order for a joint petition to be maintainable.

The Court distinguished Jasraj's case, where a community of interest and a common cause of action existed because the petitioners were aggrieved by the same government order affecting their lands. In contrast, the present case involves petitioners with different rights and interests affected differently by the impugned ministerial orders. For example, Balbir Singh's interests differ from the other petitioners, and some petitioners are not adversely affected at all. The Court held this to be a clear case of misjoinder of parties and causes of action, violating Rule 375.

Regarding the second objection of concealment of material facts, the Court found that although the petitioners did not disclose certain facts about injunctions and appeals in the related suit, this concealment did not affect the main point in the petition or demonstrate that the petitioners had come without clean hands. Therefore, the Court rejected this objection.

As a result, the Court upheld the first objection of non-maintainability due to misjoinder and allowed the petitioners two weeks to indicate on whose behalf the writ petition would continue, permitting others to file separate petitions if desired.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision is as follows:

The first preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the joint petition is upheld.

The second preliminary objection concerning concealment of facts and clean hands is rejected.

Consequently, the petitioners are granted two weeks to inform the Court on whose behalf the writ petition will proceed. It is open to the other petitioners to file separate petitions. This decision directly affects the procedural posture of the case by requiring separation of claims to comply with Rule 375. No new legal precedent is established, and the ruling primarily enforces existing procedural rules on joinder and maintainability.

    Sheo Karan v. The State Of Rajasthan

    1. This writ petition comes up today for the decision of two preliminary points raised by the respondents :--

    (1) That it is a joint petition by 8 petitioners and is not maintainable in view of Rule 375 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules which was inserted on 9-10-1964 and in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Chandmal Naurat Mal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 Raj 20;

    (2) The petitioner has concealed facts and the petitioner having not come with clean hands, the petition should be thrown out.

    2. In village Dulmana, Tehsil Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar, there is a temple of Thakurji which had a grant of 'Muafi' lands in 6 PBN, Square Nos. 44 and 45, measuring 15 Bighas and 17 Biswas. These lands were in possession of one deceased Bhinya Ram, as a 'Pujari'. The petitioner No. 1 Sheo Karan petitioners Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 are his legal representatives. Besides this land, Bhinya Ram also had there 7 Bighas of 'lagani' land. After the resumption of 'Muafi' land w. e. f. 1-1-1959, though the deity was the Muafi holder, yet Bhinya Ram got an order in his favour from the Collector, Sriganganagar on 13-10-1959 that the land in question was his personal property under Section 23 (2) of the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. It was then entered as his khatedari land. The petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, namely; Smt. Rami Devi W/o Shri Sheo Karan and Shri Sitaram S/o Sheo Karan purchased certain lands in tehsil Pilibanga in 7 PBN. These lands were reserved for purposes of orchard and Mandi. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were granted lands in exchange in 7 PBN itself. Deceased Bhinyaram also applied for exchange of land for the aforesaid 'Muafi' and 'Lagani' lands. Exchange was allowed to him and the said former 'Muafi' land was put to auction and purchased by the petitioner No. 8 Balbir Singh. The said exchanges were sanctioned by the Deputy Colonisation Commissioner, Hanumangarh. on 20-4-1961.

    3. The lands so sold by auction to the petitioner No. 8 were in fact in possession of one Ladhuram who had filed a suit in the court of the Assistant Collector, Hanumangarh against Bhinyaram that Bhinyaram became blind and his son Sheokaran had become a Patwari. Therefore he was appointed a 'Pujari' in 1949-50 and he has been cultivating the land in lieu of his services to the temple. Since Sheo Karan was a patwari, he managed a forged girdawari of the disputed land in his favour and thus it was entered in the khatedari of Bhinyaram. Ladhuram prayed for a declaration that the land should be declared as of his khatedari Ladhuram also obtained an injunction from that court against his dispossession on 23-7-1960. Appeal and Revision against the inj unction were also dismissed. The suit has had a chequered career and is still pending. Sheo Karan filed this petition and got the suit stayed on the basis that a writ petition has been filed in the matter in this Court. In this writ petition he had also applied for the stay, but that was ultimately rejected.

    4. In the revision proceedings against the order of the Deputy Colonisation Commissioner allowing exchanges of land, Shri Manphool Singh, Minister of State put up a note on 31-3-1970 before the Minister concerned about this matter. His view was that the exchange allowed in favour of Bhinyaram, his son and members of his family by the Deputy Colonisation Commissioner by his order dated 20-4-1961 was without jurisdiction and deserved to be cancelled. He also proposed that the Collector, Sriganganagar be directed to hold complete inquiry and give proper orders. The Minister Shri Shobharam approved the proposal. The Collector, Srigangannagar heard the parties concerned and made an order dated 13-1-1971 and sent the papers to the State Government for appropriate orders. By then Shri Brij Prakash Goyal became the Deputy Minister for Colonisation. He submitted a note that the land 16 Bighas and 17 Biswas which was in the 'Muafi' of Thakurji should remain in possession of the pujari Ladhuram and the land given in exchange thereof to Bhinyaram be cancelled. The sale of the land of the Muafi which was auctioned in favour of Balbir Singh should also be cancelled. He further proposed that whatever land has been allowed to Bhinya Ram in exchange of the reserved land, that may be maintained but the views of the Collector be invited in respect of the remaining exchange. This order was approved by the Minister of State Shri Manphool Singh on 2-4-1971.

    5. By the present writ petition, the petitioners Nos. 1 to 8 pray that the order of the Ministers dated 21-3-1970 and 26-3-1971 be quashed on the ground that the orders of the Ministers were made mala fide, without any jurisdiction and without hearing the petitioners. Both the Ministers namely; Manphool Singh and Brij Prakash Goyal had a bias and were disqualified from deciding the matter, Shri Goyal was the counsel for Ladhuram in the revenue suit and wanted to oblige his former client. Shri Manphoolsingh was similarly biased because he had at one stage espoused the cause of Ladhuram when he was a member of the Legislative Assembly.

    6. In dealing with the preliminary objection, the learned counsel for the respondents relies upon Chandmal's case (AIR 1968 Raj 20), while the learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon Nathmal v. Commissioner Civil Supplies, 1951 Raj LW 467 and upon Jas Raj v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 WLN 589 : (AIR 1977 Raj 150). In Nathmal's case two persons on whom two different orders were passed had joined in one petition. The Division Bench saw no objection to this course when the case of the two persons was exactly the same. But this case is no more valid as in 1964, Sub-rule (4) was added to Rule 375 as follows :

    "An application by more than one person shall not be entertained except when the relief claimed is founded on the same cause of action."

    6-A. Now, "An action" is an application to a court by a plaintiff for the grant of specified relief against the defendant. "A cause of action" is a state of facts the existence of which entitles the court to grant to the plaintiff the relief applied for in the action, vide Rediffusion (Hong Kong) v. Att. Gen. of Hong Kong, (1970) AC 1136 (PC).

    7. In Chandmal's case (AIR 1968 Raj 20), 41 persons filed a writ petition for restraining the respondent State from enforcing the provisions of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, the rules made thereunder and the byelaws made by the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Kishangarh. The office raised an objection that the petition was not maintainable in view of the aforesaid rule, as the relief claimed by the petitioners cannot be said to be founded on the same cause of action. The office pointed out that while the petitioners may have similar or identical cause of action, they cannot be said to have the same cause of action within the meaning of the rule. The Division Bench observed as follows (at p. 22):

    "The problem to our mind, in short is whether the petitioners can be said to have founded the relief in the writ petition on the same cause of action. It is true the petitioners are challenging the validity of the same law in the same manner, and it may be assumed that they are affected in the same way. But all the same this is not sufficient for holding that they have the same rights which are allegedly infringed by this law. In other words, the injury with which they are threatened or have already suffered cannot be said to be the same."

    8. Now, one has only to substitute the words "the impugned order" for the word "law" occurring in the above passage, and one will find the same situation and the same answer as were there in Chandmal's case.

    9. A different note appears to have been struck in Jasraj's case (AIR 1977 Raj 350). In that case, the petitioners were the owners and occupiers of certain lands. The Government of Rajasthan acquired these lands. The petitioners made representations asking for their lands to be released from acquisition. The Government issued a notification releasing their lands but the Tehsildar took possession of the lands. Later on, the Government withdrew the notification releasing the lands. The petitioners in a joint petition prayed for quashing of the order of withdrawal of release of the lands. An objection was raised, in view of the Chandmal's case (AIR 1968 Raj 20) that a joint petition by all the petitioners was not maintainable as the causes of action were separate. This objection was rejected by Sachar J. holding that the petitioners community of interest and cause of action arose when the Government directed to release all the lands of the petitioners by a common order.

    Their community of interest further continued when the Government issued the impugned notification purporting to rescind the earlier order. The claim of the petitioners in short was that the Government having passed an order of release from acquisition, had no jurisdiction to rescind the same by the subsequent order. The petitioners are not raising any separate claim or asking for any separate determination of points with which one may be interested and the other may not be. They were aggrieved by the same common order and the cause of action was thus the same. The learned Judge did not agree that their causes of action were similar but not same. He continued to observe that unlike Chandmal's case, no objection was raised by the office to the maintainability of the joint petition. Had that been done, it would have been open to the petitioners to file separate petitions. That having not been done it would work injustice if the petition was to be thrown out now on a hyper-technical ground. Even if this petition was dismissed on this ground, it would be open to the petitioners to file fresh petitions with the result that all the time which has been spent in filing replies and having the case ready, will have to be gone into again. This time consuming process will serve no purpose. It cannot advance the cause of justice because the petition even if dismissed on this ground, and the petitioners filed fresh ones, they will have to be admitted because they would raise arguable points. He further added that according to Chandmal's case in such a situation the petitioners must be given an opportunity to choose as to on whose behalf the writ petition shall continue. Even if that course was adopted, and the petition was to continue on behalf of one petitioner, the result will be the same, apart from the formality of asking the petitioners to file separate though identical petitions.

    10. On the basis of these observations, Mr. Mridul learned counsel for the petitioners now submits that the petitioners in this case were aggrieved by the same orders of the Ministers and their cause of action is the same namely; the offending orders. He further submitted that it will not advance the cause of justice if after a lapse of 6 years, the petitioners are now told to go and file separate petitions. To my mind, these submissions cannot be allowed to prevail. The criteria laid down in Chandmal's case was not that the petitioners were affected by the same act in the same manner and in the same way. It is further necessary to find whether same rights have been infringed. In Jasraj's case, it appears to me that there being community of interest, the cause of action was held to be the same. But the case before us has quite a different aspect. The last of the orders under challenge as a matter of fact contains the following directions:--

    (1) The former 'Muafi' land should remain in possession of Pujari Ladhuram and the auction thereof in favour of Balbir Singh be cancelled.

    (2) The land which was allotted to deceased Bhinya Ram in exchange of the aforesaid 'Muafi' land shall be declared to be Government property and Bhinya Ram shall be evicted therefrom.

    (3) An enquiry shall be made and opinion of the Collector obtained in respect of the remaining exchange of land except the land which has been allotted in exchange of the land brought under reservation for Mandi etc.

    11. Now, it is obvious that the rights of all petitioners are different, they are affected in different ways, even though the order is common. Interests of Balbir Singh are quite distinct from the interests of the first 7 petitioners. Even amongst them, the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 who were allotted land in exchange on account of their lands having been reserved do not have any cause of action at all. The impugned order does not affect them adversely at all. In respect of the exchange allowed for Non-Muafi lands of Bhinya Ram, only an enquiry has been directed by the State Government. It is, therefore, a clear case of misjoinder of the parties and causes of action, the state of facts in case of the three categories of the petitioners being not the same. It was urged that the order of the Minister made without hearing the petitioners and mala fide, was the cause of action. This argument cannot be accepted because the order is what is desired to be quashed, and what will entitle the court to grant this relief is not that it was made without hearing or mala fide or without jurisdiction but it is the existence of those facts from which the rights flow and which will make the impugned order bad on account of these reasons and therefore, reversible. The common feature between this case and Jasraj's case (AIR 1977 Raj 150) is only that one order has been made in respect of the matters aforesaid. But that alone is not sufficient. The causes of action do certainly vary and therefore, the petition is in violation of the said R. 375. The objection cannot be got over simply by stating that the office had made no objection or that a long time had passed since the filing of the petition. The reply to the writ petition raising this objection was filed on 1st March, 1972, by respondent No. 6 (though all the petitioners were served only by 9-12-1974). Therefore, it cannot be said that this objection cannot be upheld in the year 1977.

    12. The second objection is that the petitioners have concealed material facts relating to the passing of the temporary injunction by the court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh against Sheo Karan and his father Bhinya Ram on 23-7-1960 in suit No. 37/60. They have also concealed the fact that the appeal No. 417/1960 preferred against the said order was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner (Colonisation) Bikaner on 3-2-1961. They also concealed the fact that the revision preferred by Bhinya Ram and Sheokaran against the order of the Additional Commissioner of 3-2-1961 also failed. No rejoinder was filed to this objection.

    13. But I do not think that the concealment of these facts has any bearing on the main point in the petition and therefore, it is not possible to say that by concealing the aforesaid facts, the petitioners have tried to mislead the Court and have not come with clean hands.

    14. The result of the aforesaid discussions is that the second preliminary objection is rejected. The first objection is upheld and two weeks' time is allowed to the learned counsel for the petitioners to let this Court know as to on whose behalf the writ petition will be continued so that the matter may be heard further. It will be open to the several petitioners to file separate petitions, if they want to do so.

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    Sheo Karan v. The State Of Rajasthan
    (Jul 27, 1977)