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  • Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security and Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity the Act).
  • Section 60, 76(h) read with Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Sections 60, 76(h) and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security and Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity the Act).
  • Section 60, 76(h) read with Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Sections 60, 76(h) and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — M.M. Kumar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenged notices dated 19.7.2007 (P-5 and P-6) issued under Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The petitioner claimed to be a tenant of the property in question since August 2006 and objected to the notices which were issued after the lender recalled a substantial outstanding loan amount with interest. The court observed that the charge on the property was created prior to the commencement of the petitioner's tenancy. The writ petition was dismissed by the court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who entered into tenancy after the creation of a charge (equitable mortgage) on the property can claim protection against the charge-holder.
  2. Whether the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 are opposed by the petitioner's claim of tenancy commencing after the charge was created.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted that he had been a tenant in the property since August 2006.
  • The petitioner challenged the notices dated 19.7.2007 on the ground that they were issued to the borrowers after the lender recalled a large outstanding loan amount with interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh, AIR 1962 SC 205 Reiteration of principles concerning priority of charges/mortgages over later-created tenancies as applied by the Supreme Court (as referenced by the court). The court treated this case as part of authoritative precedents confirming that a tenancy arising after creation of a charge does not defeat the rights of the charge-holder.
Mathuralal v. Kehsar Bai (1970) 1 SCC 454 : AIR 1971 SC 310 Reiteration of the principle that a tenancy arising after the creation of a charge is not entitled to protection as against the charge-holder. Relied upon to support the proposition that the petitioner's tenancy (post-charge) affords no protection against the bank.
Shah Mathuradas Maganlal and Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage, 1976 (3) SCC 660 Reiteration of the same general principle regarding mortgage/charge priority over subsequent tenancies. Applied as part of the line of authority establishing that later tenancies do not prejudice the rights of mortgagees/charge-holders.
Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. Mohan Lal, 1988 (1) RCR (Rent) 57 : (1988) 1 SCC 377 : AIR 1988 SC 299 Reiteration of principles concerning the relationship between tenancies and prior encumbrances/mortgages. Used to reinforce the legal position that a tenant entering after the creation of a charge lacks protection against the charge-holder.
Carona Shoe Co. Ltd. v. K.C Bhaskaran Nair, 1989 (1) RCR (Rent) 514 : 1989 (1) RRR 451 : 1989 (2) SCC 395 Reiteration of the accepted principles about priority of mortgage/charge over subsequent tenancy rights. Counted among the authorities showing consistent Supreme Court position that later tenancies cannot prejudice mortgagee/charge-holder rights.
Parmeshwaran Govindan v. Krishnan Bhaskaran, 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 572 Specifically referred to Sections 60, 76(h) and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; explained that on payment/deposit of mortgage money the contractual mortgagor-mortgagee relationship ends and the mortgagee's right to remain in possession ceases. The court relied on the Parmeshwaran passage to explain the statutory context and to support the legal proposition that rights of possession and the effect of mortgage/charge are controlled by those provisions; used to underline that tenancy after creation of charge cannot defeat the charge-holder's rights.
Cheriyan Sosamma v. Sunderessan Pillai Saraswathy Amma, 1999 (1) RCR (Civil) 559 : 1999 (1) RCR (Rent) 199 : 1999 (3) SCC 251 Reiteration of the established principle concerning priority of charges over later-created tenancies. Relied on as part of consistent Supreme Court authority supporting the court's conclusion that the petitioner's post-charge tenancy does not protect him against the bank.
Nirmal Chandra v. Vimal Chand, 2001 (2) RCR (Rent) 123 : 2000 (5) SCC 51 Reiteration of the line of authority on the relationship between tenancy and prior encumbrances/mortgages. Included in the body of precedents reinforcing the court's application of the principle that a later tenancy affords no protection against a prior charge-holder.
Prithi Nath Singh v. Suraj Ahir, AIR 1963 SC 1041 Held that when mortgage money is paid by the mortgagor to the mortgagee there remains no debt and therefore the mortgage cannot continue; deposit/payment of mortgage money ends the mortgage and the mortgagee's right to remain in possession ceases. Quoted within Parmeshwaran and used to explain the legal effect of payment/deposit on mortgage rights; supported the court's analysis of when mortgage/charge rights continue or cease.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reference to the material facts and settled principles of law as follows:

  1. The petition attacked notices dated 19.7.2007 issued under Section 13(4) of the Act; the petitioner claimed tenancy from August 2006 and relied on that tenancy to challenge the notices.
  2. On perusal of the notices it was evident that the charge on the property had been created prior to the commencement of the petitioner's tenancy in August 2006.
  3. The court recalled the line of Supreme Court authorities which establish that tenancy must be proved to exist prior to the date of creation of an equitable mortgage/charge if the tenant seeks protection against the charge-holder; a tenancy created after the charge cannot prejudice the rights of the mortgagee/charge-holder.
  4. The court noted the proposition (as discussed in Parmeshwaran and Prithi Nath Singh) that the contractual relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee, and the consequences of payment/deposit of mortgage money, determine the continuance or cessation of mortgage rights; these statutory principles (Sections 60, 76(h) and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 were referenced in Parmeshwaran) inform the legal position regarding possession and priority.
  5. The court applied these principles to the facts: because the petitioner's tenancy began after the creation of the charge, the petitioner did not enjoy any legal protection vis-à-vis the charge-holder (the respondent bank). The court concluded that a mortgagee or mortgagor cannot induct a tenant in a manner that prejudices the rights of either party, and a later-created tenancy cannot confer rights against the prior charge-holder.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner's claim of tenancy commencing in August 2006 does not afford protection against the respondent bank, because the equitable charge on the property predated that tenancy; the writ petition was dismissed accordingly.
  • Broader implications: The opinion applies established Supreme Court authority on the relative priority of charges/mortgages and later tenancies; the judgment does not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying those existing principles to the facts of this case.

End of summary. This summary is limited to and based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

    M/S Delhi Punjab Goods Carrier Pvt. Ltd. v. Bank Of Baroda .

    M.M Kumar, J.:— The instant petition challenges notices dated 19.7.2007 (P-5 and P-6) issued under Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security and Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity ‘the Act’). The petitioner has claimed that he is a tenant in the property in dispute since August, 2006 and the notices have been issued to the borrowers after recalling the huge outstanding amount of loan with interest. It is evident from the perusal of the notices that charge on the property was created much earlier to the commencement of tenancy in August, 2006. In such a situation a tenant of the present nature would not enjoy any protection as the property has already been encumberated by the charge created over it by the owner/borrower. The principles of law have been reiterated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh, AIR 1962 SC 205; Mathuralal v. Kehsar Bai, (1970) 1 SCC 454 : AIR 1971 SC 310; Shah Mathuradas Maganlal and Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage, 1976 (3) SCC 660; Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. Mohan Lal, 1988 (1) RCR (Rent) 57 : (1988) 1 SCC 377 : AIR 1988 SC 299; Carona Shoe Co. Ltd. v. K.C Bhaskaran Nair, 1989 (1) RCR (Rent) 514 : 1989 (1) RRR 451 : 1989 (2) SCC 395; Parmeshwaran Govindan v. Krishnan Bhaskaran, 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 572; Cheriyan Sosamma v. Sunderessan Pillai Saraswathy Amma, 1999 (1) RCR (Civil) 559 : 1999 (1) RCR (Rent) 199 : 1999 (3) SCC 251 and Nirmal Chandra v. Vimal Chand, 2001 (2) RCR (Rent) 123 : 2000 (5) SCC 51. These principles are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. In Parmeshwaran's case (supra) Hon'ble the Supreme Court referred to Sections 60, 76(h) and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and observed as under:—

    “A conjoint reading of Section 60, 76(h) read with Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act would amplify that on deposit of the mortgage amount, the contractual relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee ceases. This Court in Prithi Nath Singh v. Suraj Ahir, AIR 1963 SC 1041 held that when the mortgage money is paid by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, there does not remain any debt from the mortgagor to the mortgagee and, therefore, the mortgage can no longer continue after the mortgage money is paid. Therefore, on payment of mortgage money or deposit thereof in the Court by the mortgagor, the mortgage comes to an end and the right of the mortgagee to remain in possession also. Thereafter, the mortgagee continues in unlawful possession.”

    2. From the above principles of law it is evident that tenancy has to be proved by a document or otherwise prior to the date of creation of charge of equitable mortgage. It is well settled that a mortgagee or mortgagor cannot induct a tenant without mutual agreement and confer upon a tenant any right to the prejudice of either of the parties. In the instant case, the relationship of the petitioner as a tenant with the borrower as a landlord admittedly came into existence after the creation of charge by the borrower on the property which is under the tenancy of the petitioner and therefore no protection in law would be available to such a tenant and above principles laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court would fully apply to the facts of the instant case and it has to be held that the petitioner in his capacity as tenant does not enjoy any right qua the charge holder-respondent bank. The writ petition is wholly misconceived and is thus liable to be dismissed.

    3. For the reasons afore-mentioned, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    M/S Delhi Punjab Goods Carrier Pvt. Ltd. v. Bank Of Baroda .
    (Nov 29, 2007)