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  • section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code), its provisions
  • Section 11 of the Code. Decisions
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  • section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code), its provisions
  • Section 11 of the Code. Decisions
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two writ petitions (C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R) and C.W.J.C No. 754 of 1986 (R)) that raised identical issues. Petitioners applied in response to an advertisement for appointment as Urdu Assistant Teachers in Ranchi district. The advertisement required candidates to hold a Maulvi, Alim or Fazil examination. The petitioners claimed to have passed the Fazil examination from Darul Uloom Deoband (U.P). They were appointed by office order dated 10 April 1982 and joined service. Subsequently respondent no. 3 issued an office order terminating their services on the ground that the degree from Darul Uloom Deoband was not recognised by the State Government (Annexure-3). The petitioners challenged the termination by filing writ petitions.

Procedurally, the petitions were initially listed before a Single Judge. One earlier writ (C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R)) arose from a related group of petitioners who had challenged a letter (dated 23.2.1984) requiring production of documents to show recognition of the Darul Uloom degree. The Single Judge in C.W.J.C No. 384/1984 granted relief limited to directing payment of salary arrears and current salary, without deciding recognition. Another subsequent writ (C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R)) by some petitioners was dismissed at the admission stage by a Division Bench on grounds that it was a second writ seeking essentially the same relief and that recognition of degrees is for the State to decide (the Division Bench referred to Articles 226 and 227 in this context). The present matters were directed to be heard together by this Bench and ultimately listed before a larger Bench for determination of whether the Division Bench's dismissal on res judicata grounds was correct.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division Bench's finding in C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) that the subsequent writ was not maintainable — because the relief sought had already been refused in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) — effectively operated as res judicata and barred the later writ petition.
  2. Whether principles of res judicata (and the related technicalities of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure) are applicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution in the circumstances of these cases.
  3. Whether the earlier procedural dismissal and the refusal to entertain a Civil Review application rendered the petitioners precluded from obtaining relief in a later petition, particularly when the prior order did not decide recognition of the degree or the termination of service.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners asserted that their Fazil degree from Darul Uloom Deoband was recognised by the State of Bihar (they advanced this as a fact in their pleadings).
  • They contended that the advertisement under which they applied did not list recognised institutions by name, so no specific institutional exclusion was brought to their notice at appointment stage.
  • No objection was raised at the time of their appointment in 1982 about the sufficiency of their academic qualification; the State did not then challenge their eligibility.
  • Repeated opportunity was given to the State to produce any decision showing which institutions' degrees were recognised, but the State did not produce any document expressly showing that Darul Uloom Deoband's degree was recognised by Bihar.
  • The petitioners contended that the cause of action for the termination of service (challenged in the later writ) was distinct from the cause of action in C.W.J.C No. 384/1984 (which concerned only a notice to produce documents and payment of salary).

Respondent / Government Pleader's Arguments

  • Learned Government Pleader No. II argued that principles of res judicata applied and that once this Court had refused relief in an earlier proceeding, a second writ seeking virtual repetition of the same relief should not be entertained.
  • He submitted that the petitioners' appointments were illegal because their degrees were not recognised and, therefore, the termination of service should not be interfered with.
  • It was also argued that the technicalities of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (relating to res judicata) should be included when applying res judicata principles to writ proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Daryao v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457 Cited as part of Supreme Court decisions demonstrating applicability of res judicata principles to writ proceedings and the need for finality in litigation. Used with other Supreme Court decisions to establish that general principles of res judicata may be applied in Article 226 proceedings as a matter of public policy, while noting limits.
Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1150 Cited concerning applicability of res judicata principles in writ matters. Relied upon to explain that finality should attach to binding decisions but technicalities may be immaterial when invoking the general doctrine in appropriate cases.
Gulabchand Chotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1153 Cited for the general proposition that res judicata principles can inform writ proceedings. Grouped with other authorities to show the Supreme Court's approach to res judicata in writ contexts; assisted the Court in analysing whether such principles barred the subsequent petition.
Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2108 Cited regarding the applicability of res judicata principles to writ proceedings. Considered in the Court's survey of authority on res judicata and constructive res judicata for proceedings under Article 226.
Shivdev Singh & Others v. State of Punjab & Others, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1909 Cited as a Supreme Court decision said to be "to the contrary" of the view that Civil Review is not maintainable against orders under Articles 226 and 227. The Court noted that its earlier refusal to entertain Civil Review was erroneous in view of this decision; used to support the petitioners' contention that Civil Review could be entertained in appropriate circumstances.
Chittoori Subbanna v. Kudappa Subbanna, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1325 Cited for the principle that a decision on a pure question of law touching the jurisdiction of a court does not operate as res judicata. Applied to hold that where an earlier decision involved jurisdictional error or a pure question of law on jurisdiction, it cannot bind a subsequent court by res judicata.
Matfaura Prasad v. Dossibai, (1970) 1 SCC 613 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2355 Cited for the same principle that questions of law touching jurisdiction do not operate as res judicata. Invoked alongside Chittoori Subbanna to justify that the previous decision should not operate as res judicata where it involved jurisdictional/legal error.
Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.A. Diksbitu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 193 Cited for the principle that a decision given by an authority suffering from an inherent lack of jurisdiction cannot be sustained merely by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel. Relied upon to support the proposition that if a prior order was a nullity or wholly without jurisdiction, it cannot operate as res judicata against subsequent proceedings.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 Cited for the proposition that judgments rendered per incuriam (including those violating fundamental principles) are not binding on subsequent Benches and a larger Bench is not bound by a smaller Bench. Used to justify treating the earlier Division Bench decision and the subsequent refusal to entertain Civil Review as not binding on the present Bench.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 Cited for the rule that decisions which are obiter, per incuriam, rendered sub-silentio, or given with consent or reservation are not binding on another Bench. Applied to reinforce that earlier rulings of this Court did not bind the present Bench where they fell within those categories or involved error.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a series of analytical steps tied closely to the facts and prior orders:

  1. Distinction between petitioners: The Court immediately noted that petitioners in C.W.J.C No. 754 of 1986 (R) were not parties to C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) or C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R), so the Division Bench's observation in C.W.J.C No. 1423/85 could not operate against them. Any res judicata question had to be decided only in relation to the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R).
  2. Content and effect of the earlier order (C.W.J.C No. 384/1984): The Court reviewed the reliefs sought and the precise order passed in C.W.J.C No. 384/1984. It found that the Single Judge had confined relief to directing payment of salary while expressly not deciding the issues relating to recognition of the Darul Uloom degree or quashing the notice that required production of documents. Therefore the prior order did not adjudicate the recognition question or the termination of service.
  3. Applicability of res judicata to writ proceedings: The Court acknowledged that although Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure excludes Code provisions from Article 226 proceedings, the Supreme Court has in appropriate cases applied general principles of res judicata in writ matters. The Court surveyed Supreme Court authority and observed that while general principles of res judicata are applicable as a matter of public policy, the technicalities of Section 11 need not be decisive.
  4. Causation and distinctness of cause of action: The Court emphasized that the cause of action for quashing a termination order (sought in C.W.J.C No. 1423/1985) could not have been the cause of action in C.W.J.C No. 384/1984, which dealt only with a notice to produce documents and payment of salary. Because the relief and cause of action were different, res judicata did not bar the subsequent petition.
  5. On the correctness of the earlier Division Bench decision: The Court found that the dismissal in C.W.J.C No. 1423/85 was based on an incorrect application of res judicata. It also held that the earlier refusal to entertain the Civil Review application was erroneous, particularly in light of Supreme Court authority (Shivdev Singh) that the Court referred to.
  6. Jurisdictional and per incuriam considerations: Drawing on authorities (Chittoori Subbanna; Matfaura Prasad; Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.A. Diksbitu; A.R. Antulay; Municipal Corporation v. Gurnam Kaur), the Court reasoned that where an earlier order was founded on an erroneous view of law touching jurisdiction, was a nullity, rendered per incuriam, or where a smaller Bench's decision is not binding on a larger Bench, the earlier decision will not bind the present Bench by way of res judicata.
  7. Equality of relief and avoidance of discrimination: The Court observed that similar reliefs had been granted to other petitioners and that denying the same reliefs to petitioners in C.W.J.C No. 1302/87 would cause discrimination; therefore similar reliefs ought to be granted to avoid unequal treatment.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed Annexure-3 (the office order terminating the services of the petitioners). The Court made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The termination order(s) embodied in Annexure-3 were quashed by this Court as a result of these proceedings. That is the immediate and concrete effect on the parties recorded in the opinion.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion grounds its decision in established Supreme Court authorities concerning the limited application of res judicata to Article 226 proceedings, the non-binding effect of per incuriam or jurisdictional errors, and the principle that a later Bench is not bound by an erroneous earlier Bench. The judgment does not assert the creation of a new legal precedent beyond its application of those authorities to the facts; accordingly, no novel doctrine is expressly proclaimed in this opinion beyond its application to the present cases.

    Md. Nazimuddin And Another Petitioners (In C.W.J.C 754/86 (R) v. Md. Idris And Others Petitioners (In C.W.J.C No. 1302/87R)

    1. By Court. On 18.9.1987 at the time of odmission of C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R) the Bench ordered that as the identical question was involved in that writ application and also in C.W.J.C No. 754 of 1986 (R), both the cases will be heard together. Both the cases were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.

    2. The facts of both the cases are identical. In pursuance of an advertisement, copy of which is Annexure-2 the petitioners applied for the post of Urdu Assistant Teachers in Elementary Schools in the district of Ranchi. For Urdu teachers, the academic qualification laid down was that the candidate must have passed the examination of Maulvi or Alim or Fazil. According to the petitioners, they have passed Fazil examination from Darul Uloom Deoband (U.P). The petitioners were selected for appoinment and by office order dated 10th April, 1982, a copy of which is Annexure-1, the petitioners were appointed as Assistant Teachers in Urdu in different schools in the district of Ranchi. They joined their respective schools in pursuance of the same. While they were so working, respondent no. 3 issued an office order terminating the services of the petitioners on the ground that the degree given of by Darul Uloom Deoband was not recognised by the State Government A copy of that order is Annexure-3 to both the writ petitions. The validity of this has been challenged in both the writ applications.

    3. Both the writ applications, were listed for hearing before a learned Single Judge (B.P Singh, J.). The learned Single Judge in his order dated 10.7.1989 observed that in view of a Division Bench decision of this Court with regard to some of the petitioners i.e the petitioners in C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R), the matter should be heard by Division Bench. The matter was listed before a Division Bench for hearing. The learned Judges of the Division Bench noticed the judgment of another Division Bench that in C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) in which some of the petitioners were parties, it was held that C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) was barred by res-judicata as those petitioners had moved this Court earlier in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) which was disposed of on 8.5???. The correctness of that finding was doubted by the Division Bench and it ordered that the matter should be listed before a larger Bench. It has been listed before this Bench for hearing.

    4. Some more facts which are relevant to notice are that on 23.2.1984, respondent no. 3 issued a letter to the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R) by which the petitioners were informed that their degree from Darul Uloom Deoband in Fazil was not recognised by the State Government and they were directed to produce documents to show that it was recognised by the State Government. The validity of this was challenged by these petitioners in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R). They also prayed for a direction on the State Government to pay their salary which had been stopped. Prayer was also made for direction to the State Government to recognise the degree of Darul Uloom Deoband. The learned Single Judge by order dated 8.5.1984 disposed of the matter by passing the following order:—

    “The respondents shall pay the salary to the petitioners so long as they are in service of the respondents and are doing teaching work. This order is being passed after hearing the parties.

    With this observation, the writ application is disposed of.”

    5. Thereafter Annexure-3 to the writ applications was issued which was challenged by the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R) by filing C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R). The Division Bench of this Court by order dated 8.4.1985 dismissed the same at the admission stage, a copy of which is Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 3 in C.W.J.C No. 754 of 1986 (R). The relevant portion of the order with which we are concerned in this case and which was noticed by the learned Single Judge and the learned Judges of the Division Bench when these cases were listed for hearing before them reads as follows:—

    “In our opinion, once this Court refused to interfere with that part of the order it shall not be proper exercise of discretion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to entertain a second writ application virtually for the same relief. Apart from that, it is for the State Government to recognise any degree of an institution within the State of Bihar or of any other State. This Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the State of Bihar to recognize the degree of Darul Uloom Daoband (U.P). Under the existing rule, the petitioners were required to hold a degree of any recognised institution before they could have been appointed. Under the circumstances mentioned above, it is not possible to quash the order which is impugned in the present writ application.”

    6. The question which arises in these cases is whether the finding recorded by the Division Bench in C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) that writ application was not maintainable because the relief prayed for in that writ application had been refused in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R). In other words whether the relief prayed for in C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) was barred by res-judicata in view of the order passed in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R).

    7. We may immediately notice that so far the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 754 of 1986 (R) are concerned, they were neither the parties in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) nor in C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R). The observation of the Division Bench in C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) with regard to the effect of the order passed in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) shall not apply to the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 754 of 1986 (R), and the question of res-judicata shall have to be decided only in relation to the petitioners in C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R).

    8. We have noticed in extenso the relief prayed for in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) and the subject matter of that writ application. We have quoted the relevant order by which that writ petition was disposed of. It will appear that although in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) the petitioners had prayed for quashing the notice by which they were directed to produce document to show that the degree of Darul Uloom Deoband was recognised by the State Government and also for a direction that the degree of that institution be recognised by the State Government, the learned Single Judge did not record any finding with regard to those reliefs. He confined only with regard to the prayer of the petitioners for a direction on the respondents to pay their arrear as well as current salary. Direction in that regard was given to the respondents.

    9. In view of the explanation to section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the Code’), its provisions will not apply to any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Notwithstanding this the Supreme Court, in appropriate cases, has applied some of the principles of the Code as a matter of public policy in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The general principles of res-judicata have been made applicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Government Pleader No. II submitted that general principles of res-judicata will also include the technicalities of Section 11 of the Code. Decisions of Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U.P: A.I.R 1961 S.C 1457, Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer: A.I.R 1965 S.C 1150, Gulabchand Chotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay: A.I.R 1965 S.C 1153 and Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P: A.I.R 1981 S.C 2108 lay down about the applicability of principles of res-judicata in writ matter. The principles which emerge from the decisions are that finality should be attached to the binding decisions pronounced by court of competent jurisdiction and individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. A matter may be barred because of constructive res-judicata. Technical aspect of section 11 will be immaterial when the general doctrine of res-judicata is invoked.

    10. In view of the reliefs prayed and the order passed in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) was any of the principles of res-judicata attracted to C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R)? The reliefs prayed for in C.W.J.C No. 384 of 1984 (R) were to quash the notice directing the petitioners of that case to produce document in support of the fact that degree of Darul Uloom was recognised by Bihar Government and for direction to State to pay salary. This Court by allowing the second relief disposed of the case. In other words, this Court did not interfere with the notice. In C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) relief prayed for was to quash the order of termination of service. This relief could not have been made in C.W.J.C no. 384 of 1984 (R) and this could not have been an issue in that case. The cause of action of the second writ petition was not and could not have been the cause of action of the first writ petition. The principles of res-judicata had no application to C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) and that case could not have been dismissed on that ground.

    11. The petitioners have asserted that the degree given by Darul Uloom Deoband are recognised by the State of Bihar. They further asserted that in the advertisement in pursuance of which applications were filed by them for the posts of Assistant Teacher in Urdu, the names of recognised institution were not stated. At the time of their appointment as far back as in 1982, no objection was raised from any quarter that as the petitioners had obtained degree from Darul Uloom Deoband they had not the requisite academic qualification for being considered for the appointment of Assistant Teacher in Urdu. Further, in these cases repeated opportunity was given to the State to produce the decision of the State Government showing the names of the recognised institutions. In their counter-affidavit, the respondent has annexed the order of the State Government dated 11.3.1977 (Annexure C) and notification dated 1.8.1985 (Annexure D) to show that the degree of Darul Uloom Deoband was not recognised by the State Government. From Annexure C, it appears that the State had notified the degrees of Madarsa Board which would be treated equivalent to the degree of School Final Examination or Universities. From perusal of Annexure D, it appears that the State Government decided the order of priority to be given to persons holding particular degree. In none of these annexures, there is any reference of any institution whose degree has been recognised by the State of Bihar.

    12. It was submitted by learned Government Pleader No. II that in view of the fact that very appointment of the petitioners was illegal, the order terminating their services should not be interfered with. It is not the case of the State that the petitioners were appointed as Assistant Teachers in Urdu as the degree of Darul Uloom Deoband was not recognised. If that would be the position, the contention of learned Government Pleader No. II might have been considered. In view of the facts already noticed with reference to the advertisement, letter of appointment, Annexures C and D, it cannot be held that the initial appointment of the petitioners were illegal, inasmuch as they had no requisite academic qualifications. The petitioners were appointed as far back as in 1982 and the State-respondent has failed to prove that as yet the State has taken any decision with regard to the degree of Darul Uloom Deoband.

    13. In C.W.J.C No. 1302/87(R), it has been asserted that after the order was passed by this Court in the aforementioned C.W.J.C No. 1423/84(R), the petitioners filed a Civil Review application, which was placed for admission before a Division Bench of this Court, and by an order dated 13.8.1987, passed in Civil Review application no. 7/86(R), and as contained in Annexure-10 of the said writ application this Court passed the following order:—

    “No Civil Review application is maintainable against an order passed in an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

    If some fresh material or materials which were not known to the petitioners have come to light the petitioners will be well advised to file another writ application. If so advised they will be at liberty to file a fresh application, which shall be disposed of on its own merits, in accordance with law:”

    14. The said writ application being C.W.J.C no. 1302 of 1987 (R) was filed thereafter.

    15. It is true that a writ court does not and cannot entertain a second writ application when the earlier judgment passed therein is binding upon the parties.

    16. In the instant case, however, it appears that the writ petition of the petitioners of C.W.J.C no. 1302 of 1987 (R) was dismissed on purely technical ground and on misappre-ciation of the position of law. This Court in its order passed in the aforementioned C.W.J.C No. 1423/85(R) merely held that in view of the earlier decision in C.W.J.C no. 384/84(R), the second writ application was not maintainable. In the instant case, this Court erroneously also did not entertain the Civil Review application filed on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners were thus prejudiced; as firstly, this Court in the earlier writ application being C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) applied erroneously the principles of res-judicata, which as noticed hereinbefore were not applicable and again refused to entertain the Civil Review application, simply on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to review its earlier order, passed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, despite the decision of the Supreme Court in Shivdev Singh & Others v. State Of Punjab & Others, reported in A.I.R 1963 S.C 1909 to the contrary.

    17. It is now well known that a decision on a pure question of law touching the jurisdiction of the court does not operate as res-judicata. Reference in this connection may be made to Chittoori Subbanna v. Kudappa Subbanna reported in A.I.R 1965 S.C 1325, and in Matfaura Prasad v. Dossibai, reported in (1970) 1 SCC 613 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 2355.

    18. Spencer-Bower and Turner in “The Doctrine of Res-judicata”, stated the law in Article 114 thereof thus:—

    “A tribunal may exceed its jurisdiction either by embarking upon an enquiry outside its province, or, while, confining its inquiry within the proper limits, by making an order in excess of its powers. In either case the result will be to nullify the decision as a res-judicata in the former case, by the effect of the events, we have mentioned upon the declaratory part of the decision, and, in the second, by their effect upon its jussive or prohibitory provisions.”

    19. Refusal to exercise jurisdiction on an erroneous view of the law is also a question of law touching the jurisdiction of the Court.

    20. Further, if the order passed was a nullity being wholly without jurisdiction, the same will also not operate as res-judicata. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.A Diksbitu, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 34 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 193, wherein the law was laid down in the following terms:—

    “If the argument holds good, it will make the decision of the Tribunal as having been given by an authority suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction, sucn a decision cannot be sustainod merely by the doctrine of res-judicata or estoppel, as urged in this case”.

    21. This aspect of the matter has also been recently considered by the Supreme Court in the case of A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602. In that case it has been held that where by reason of the judgment of the Supreme Court, fundamental rights of the petitioners therein as enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, were violated in ignorance of salutary principles of law, the judgment must be held to have been rendered per-incuriam and such a judgment is not binding upon a subsequent Bench. In that case, if was further held that a larger Bench is not bound by the decisions of a smaller Bench.

    22. It is, therefore, clear that in view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the decision of this Court in the aforementioned C.W.J.C No. 1423 of 1985 (R) as also the order dated ???, passed in Civil Review no. 6 of 1986 (R), are not binding upon this Bench.

    23. In this connection, reference may also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ., reported in (1989) 1 SCC 101, wherein it has been held that a decision which is obiter-dicta or rendered per-incuriam or in sub-silentio or with consent of the parties or with a reservation that the same should not be treated as precedent, is not binding upon another Bench.

    24. Further, in view of the fact that similar reliefs are bound to be granted to the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 754/86 (R), in our opinion, discriminatian would be caused by our pronouncement, if the same reliefs are not granted to the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 1302 of 1987 (R).

    25. In this view of the matter, we are inclined to grant similar reliefs to the petitioners of C.W.J.C no. 1302 of 1987 (R).

    26. We, therefore, allow these writ petitions and quash annexure-3, but shall make no order as to costs.

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