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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff appealed against an order dated 10.2.2012 of the 5th Additional District Judge, Bhopal, which rejected her plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff's factual case, as pleaded, is that the suit land was purchased by her late father-in-law by a sale deed dated 19.6.1967. After his death on 15.8.2005, the property was inherited in equal shares by the plaintiff's late husband (Mahendra Kumar Jain), his elder brother Sumer Chand Jain (defendant No. 4), and the mother-in-law. Following the death of Mahendra Kumar, his one-third share devolved upon the plaintiff.

The plaintiff alleged that Sumer Chand Jain, without partition among heirs, divided and sold plots of the land to various persons. One such plot was sold to Shiv Prasad Vasu (defendant No. 3) by registered sale deed dated 24.10.2008; Shiv Prasad mortgaged that plot with the Central Bank of India (defendant No. 1) to obtain a loan. Defendant No. 2 is an Authorized Officer of the Central Bank of India.

The Authorized Officer, to enforce security interest under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, took possession of the plot and published an advertisement for auction. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the sale deed and mortgage were illegal, possession of the suit land after demolishing construction, and damages. The plaint showed the sale consideration as Rs. 2,23,000/-, default due to the bank as Rs. 8,14,197/-, and court fees paid in total Rs. 1,976/- (breakdown provided in the plaint).

The trial court, on objections raised under Order 7 Rule 11, rejected the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and also held that proper court fee had not been paid. The plaintiff appealed against that rejection.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court was correct in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 on the ground that the suit is barred by section 34 of the SARFAESI Act (i.e., whether civil court jurisdiction is ousted in respect of the plaintiff's claims).
  2. Whether the trial court was correct in holding that the plaintiff had not paid proper court fee for the reliefs claimed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff)'s Case

  • The plaintiff pleaded that she inherited one-third share and that certain sales by defendant No. 4 (Sumer Chand Jain) were illegal because they occurred without partition among heirs.
  • She sought a declaration that the sale deed and the mortgage are illegal, possession of the plot (including demolition of construction), and damages.
  • The plaint shows payment of court fees totaling Rs. 1,976/- (Rs. 1,000 for declaration; Rs. 100 for possession; Rs. 876 for damages) and valuation of the suit land for possession relief at Rs. 20/- (land revenue assessed at Re.1/- so value of possession taken as Rs.20/-), for which Rs.100/- court fee was paid under section 7(v)(a) of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

Respondents (Central Bank of India and Authorized Officer) — Objections

  • They objected under Order 7 Rule 11 that the suit is barred by section 34 of the SARFAESI Act because their security interest was being enforced under section 13 of that Act.
  • They also contended that the plaint was written on paper insufficiently stamped and should be rejected for that reason.

Defendant No. 3 (Shiv Prasad Vasu) — Objection

  • In a separate application, Shiv Prasad Vasu raised the objection that the plaintiff had not paid the proper court fee.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon, AIR 2010 SC 3413 Illustration of the legislative purpose and effect of the SARFAESI Act — empowering secured creditors to enforce security interests without court or tribunal intervention. The court referenced this decision to explain the background and legislative intent behind SARFAESI: that secured creditors were empowered to take enforcement steps absent court intervention.
Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank of India, AIR 2011 Madhya Pradesh 205 Referenced in the context of earlier discussion of sections 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act concerning remedies to persons aggrieved and appeals to Appellate Tribunal. The court noted it had earlier referred to these provisions in that case, using it to support exposition of the SARFAESI scheme (sections 13, 17, 18) and remedies available to aggrieved persons.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the scheme of the SARFAESI Act and the statutory provisions invoked by the respondents:

  1. The court described section 13 of the SARFAESI Act as providing a detailed mechanism for enforcement of security interest, including steps the secured creditor may take without court or tribunal intervention (referencing subsections (1), (2), (3), (3-A) and particularly subsection (4) which enumerates the modes of enforcement).
  2. The court outlined remedies under section 17 (application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal by any aggrieved person within 45 days) and section 18 (appeal to the Appellate Tribunal).
  3. Section 34 was identified as the provision that bars jurisdiction of civil courts in matters which a DRT or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine, and it also bars grants of injunctions in respect of actions taken under the SARFAESI Act or the RDDBFI Act.
  4. The court reiterated a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation: civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and exclusion of their jurisdiction must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied; exclusions are strictly construed and the burden of proving exclusion rests on the party asserting it. The court cited the general principle (as stated in G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation) that exclusion is an exception and not to be readily inferred.
  5. Applying these principles to the facts, the court held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine whether persons other than the mortgagor have title in the mortgaged property. Thus, the validity of the sale deed executed by a person other than the mortgagor and the consequent effect on the mortgage are matters beyond the DRT's power to decide.
  6. Because the DRT is not empowered to hold an enquiry on questions concerning the title of non-mortgagors (for example, declaring a sale deed wholly or partially invalid), the absence of such power indicates that the civil court's jurisdiction on that question is not ousted by section 34. The court therefore concluded that section 34 does not bar the civil court from deciding the plaintiff's challenge to the sale deed and mortgage.
  7. On the court fee issue, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was not a signatory or party to the sale deed or mortgage and therefore was not obliged to claim cancellation of those documents as merely consequential relief requiring a higher fee. For the declaration sought, she paid Rs.1,000/-, and for possession (valued at Rs.20/- given land revenue assessment at Re.1/-) she paid Rs.100/- under section 7(v)(a) of the Court Fees Act, 1870; accordingly, the court found the court fee paid to be proper.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 10.2.2012 (which rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11) is set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court for trial and decision in accordance with law.

Direct Consequences on the Parties:

  • The plaint rejection is reversed and the suit will proceed to trial in the trial court.
  • The appellant (plaintiff) is awarded costs of Rs. 2,000/-, payable by respondent nos. 1 and 2 (Central Bank of India and its Authorized Officer).

Implications Regarding Jurisdiction and Precedent:

The court clarified that section 34 of the SARFAESI Act does not oust civil court jurisdiction on questions the DRT is not empowered to determine (for example, title of persons other than the mortgagor or validity of sale deeds affecting mortgage). The decision confines itself to the application of the statute to the facts and the principles of interpretation; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond the stated analysis. No broader new precedent beyond the reasoning articulated in this opinion is stated.

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    Smt. Prabha Jain v. Central Bank Of India And Others S

    ORDER

    The following order of the Court was delivered by:

    Ajit Singh, J. This plaintiff's appeal is against the order dated 10.2.2012 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Bhopal, in Civil Suit No. 30-A/2011 whereby he has rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    2. The plaintiff's case is that the suit land was purchased by her late father-in-law vide sale deed dated 19.6.1967 and after his death on 15.8.2005 the same was inherited in equal shares by her late husband Mahendra Kumar Jain, husband's elder brother Sumer Chand Jain (defendant No. 4) and mother-in-law. After the death of Mahendra Kumar, his 1/3rd share was inherited by the plaintiff. But Sumer Chand Jain without any partition amongst the heirs divided the land into several plots and illegally sold them to different persons. One such plot was also sold to Shiv Prasad Vasu (defendant no. 3) vide registered sale deed dated 24.10.2008 who mortgaged the same with the Central Bank of India (defendant No. 1) for obtaining loan. Defendant no. 2 is an Authorized Officer of the Central Bank of India. The Authorized Officer in order to enforce the security interest has taken possession of the plot under section 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (in short “the SARFAESI Act”) and thereafter published an advertisement in the newspaper for its auction. In the suit the plaintiff has prayed that the sale deed and mortgage be declared illegal and she be given possession of the suit land after demolishing the construction raised on it. The sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed is Rs. 2,23,000/- and the default amount due to the Central Bank of India is shown to be Rs. 8,14,197/-. The plaintiff has paid the Court fee of Rs. 1000/- for the relief of declaration, Rs. 100/- for the relief of possession and Rs. 876/- for damages caused to the suit land i.e total Rs. 1976/-.

    3. The Central Bank of India and its Authorized Officer raised an objection under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the trial court that since security interest created in their favour was being enforced under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, the suit is barred under section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. They also took the objection that as the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, it be rejected on this ground also. Similar objection regarding insufficient payment of Court fee was taken by Shiv Prasad Vasu in a separate application.

    4. The trial court after hearing the parties by the impugned order allowed the objections and rejected the plaint on the ground that it is barred under section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. The trial court has even held that having regard to the valuation of the suit plaintiff has not paid the proper Court fee. We, therefore, have to examine whether the trial court has committed an illegality in rejecting the plaint.

    5. The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions, Act, 1993 (in short the RDDBFI Act”) was enacted because banks and financial institutions were experiencing considerable difficulties in recovering loans and enforcement of securities charged with them. This Act provided for the establishment of Debts Recovery Tribunals and Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. For few years the new dispensation under the RDDBFI Act worked well and the officers appointed to man the tribunals worked with great zeal for ensuring that cases involving recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions were decided expeditiously. But with the passage of time the proceedings before the tribunals stopped bringing desired results. A committee was, therefore, constituted to suggest measures for expediting the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. The committee in its report made various suggestions for bringing about radical changes in the existing adjudicatory mechanism for facilitating speedy recovery of the dues of banks and also for quick resolution of disputes arising out of the action taken for recovery of such dues. The Government of India accepted the suggestions and that led to enactment of the SARFAESI Act in the year 2002 by which for the first time the secured creditors have been empowered to take steps for recovery of their dues without intervention of the Courts or Tribunals (See United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon, AIR 2010 SC 3413).

    6. Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act contains detailed mechanism for enforcement of security interest. Sub-section (1) thereof empowers the secured creditors to enforce the security interest without the intervention of the Court or Tribunal notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Sub-section (2) enables the secured creditor to call upon the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities within sixty days from the date of notice with an indication that if he fails to do so, the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of its rights under sub-section (4). Sub-section (3) lays down that the notice issued under section 13(2) shall contain details of the amount payable by the borrower as also the details of the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the borrower. Sub-section (3-A) provides that if the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection in response to the notice issued under section 13(2), the secured creditor has to consider such representation or objection and if he comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable, then reasons for non-acceptance are required to be communicated within one week to the borrower. Sub-section (4) of section 13 enumerates various modes which can be adopted by the secured creditor if the borrower fails to discharge in full his liabilities in response to the notice under sub-section (2). Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act speaks of the remedies available to any person, including the borrower, who may have grievance against the action taken by the secured creditor by any of the measures provided under Sub-section (4) of section 13. Such an aggrieved person can make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal within 45 days from the date on which action is taken under that sub-section. Section 18 provides for an appeal to the Appellate tribunal against any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. We have earlier also made reference of these provisions in Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank of India, AIR 2011 Madhya Pradesh 205.

    7. Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court by declaring that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the RDDBFI Act.

    8. It is now well settled principle of law that there is a strong presumption that civil courts have jurisdiction to decide all questions of civil nature. The exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts is, therefore, not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must either be “explicitly expressed or clearly implied”. It is a principle by no means to be whittled down” and has been referred to as a “fundamental rule”. As a necessary corollary of this rule provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts and provisions conferring jurisdiction on authorities and tribunals other than civil courts are strictly construed. The existence of jurisdiction in civil courts to decide questions of civil nature being the general rule and exclusion being an exception, the burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded in any particular case is on the party raising such a contention. The rule that the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts is not to be readily inferred is based on the theory that civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and the people have a right, unless expressly or impliedly debarred, to insist for free access to the courts of general jurisdiction of the State. Indeed, the principle is not limited to civil courts alone, but applies to all the courts of general jurisdiction including criminal courts. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P Singh 13 Edition, 2012 PP 757 to 760).

    9. From the scheme of the SARFAESI Act narrated above it is apparent that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the question whether persons other than the mortgager had title in the mortgaged property. In that context the validity of the sale deed of a property mortgaged with the Central Bank of India cannot be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. If the sale deed is held to be wholly or partially invalid it will immediately affect the validity of the mortgage of that property. The jurisdiction of civil court is ousted in respect of matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered to decide. Absence of a provision to enable the Debts Recovery Tribunal for holding an enquiry on a particular question is indicative that jurisdiction of civil courts on that question is not excluded. The above question relating to the validity of the sale deed and its consequent effect on the mortgage are matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal is not empowered to decide. The provision for appeal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act by “any person” does not oust the jurisdiction of civil court on matters which cannot be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide these matters cannot be held to be ousted under section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.

    10. We also disagree with the finding of the trial court that proper Court fee has not been paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not a signatory or party in the sale deed as well as in the mortgage deed. She is, therefore, not required to claim the consequential relief of the cancellation of these documents. And for the relief claimed by her for the declaration of sale deed and mortgage as illegal, she has paid the proper Court fee. The consequential relief which the plaintiff has claimed and which is appropriate in the circumstances of the case is possession of the suit land/plot. The suit land/plot is assessed to the land revenue at Re. 1/-. She has valued this relief at Rs. 20/- and paid Rs. 100/- Court fee as required under section 7(v)(a) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The plaintiff has thus paid the proper Court fee.

    11. For these reasons we set aside the impugned order dated 10.2.2012 and remand the case to the trial court for its trial and decision in accordance with law.

    12. The appeal is allowed with costs of Rs. 2000/-, which shall be payable to the appellant by respondent nos. 1 and 2.

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    Smt. Prabha Jain v. Central Bank Of India And Others S
    (Oct 30, 2012)