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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Appeal under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 challenges an award passed by the Claims Tribunal under Section 140. The Tribunal had made an interim award of Rs. 7,500/- in favour of the claimant (respondent No. 1). It is undisputed that two motor vehicles were involved in the accident: the claimant was travelling in a bus (No. C.P.H. 8440) owned by respondent No. 3 (Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation) and the bus collided with a truck (registration CIW 7432) owned by respondent No. 2. The truck was insured with the appellant-insurer. The appellant challenged the award on the short ground that, because two vehicles were involved, the Tribunal should have apportioned or specified the "no-fault liability" in the award so that the insurer would not be required to pay the entire amount.

On the issue of filing deposit under Section 173, the appellant had duly deposited Rs. 3,750/-, being 50% of the award. The appeal was heard on that basis. The Tribunal had named the insurer and the Corporation as persons liable to pay the award, but the owner of the truck (Bhagwandas) was not named; the opinion notes that owner's liability is statutorily borne by the insurer under Section 149(1). The appeal was ultimately dismissed and the impugned order of payment by the insurer was held valid; the appellant was directed to deposit the balance Rs. 3,750/- within two weeks to enable disbursement to the claimant. The appellant was left entitled to seek adjustment of inter se liability against the Corporation later when the final award under Section 168(1) is passed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Claims Tribunal, when passing an interim award under Section 140 (no-fault interim award), is obliged to apportion or "specify" the no-fault liability between owners/insurers of multiple vehicles involved in the accident so that an insurer is not required to discharge more than its share.
  2. Whether the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjust equities between owners and insurers (or to order restitution/reimbursement) in the same proceedings (during trial and when making the final award under Section 168(1)) or whether such claims must be pursued separately in a civil suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Insurer — Shri Johri)

  • The collision between two vehicles made it prima facie a case of contributory negligence; liability shares should be determined by the Tribunal in the final award under Section 168.
  • The Tribunal ought to have apportioned or specified the no-fault liability even at the interim award stage under Section 140 so that the insurer would not be required to pay the entire sum attributable to the other vehicle.

Respondent No. 3 / Corporation's Position (Shri Khot)

  • Counsel for the Corporation conceded inability to cite a directly on-point reported decision resolving the specific controversy but did rely on several decisions (discussed below) in support of the Tribunal's power and the statutory scheme. He accepted that the impugned award substantially follows the statutory mandate and that naming the insurer as liable is not illegal because the owner's liability is statutorily discharged by the insurer under Section 149(1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 354 Interpreted by a Bench (Indore) as meaning no deposit under Section 173 need be made where the impugned award was passed before the new Act came into force (award dated 10-1-1989). The judge noted doubt about accepting that law; the appellant however deposited 50% of the award and avoided the need to refer the issue further. The opinion records that this decision's foundation came from earlier decisions on Section 6, General Clauses Act, but those earlier decisions have been overruled by Babulal's case.
Babulal's case, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 317 (Full Bench) Overruled earlier decisions concerning the scope of Section 6, General Clauses Act (as referred in Section 217(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act). The opinion refers to this Full Bench ruling as having overruled the earlier chain of decisions that had inspired Jaswant Rao.
Manila Ramdei, 1987 ACC CJ 764 : AIR 1988 Madh Pra 98 Claims Tribunal is required to exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Section 92-A, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to pass an order the reunder even in the absence of an application for relief. The court found reliance on this decision appropriate to support the view that prompt, imaginative orders under Section 140 are desirable to ensure immediate relief to victims.
Mahila Phoolwati, 1986 ACC CJ 106 : AIR 1986 Madh Pra 187 When the Court/Tribunal finds on material that one or more motor vehicles are involved, Section 92-A becomes operative and empowers the Tribunal to act to help victims. Used to justify the proposition that relief under Section 140 should be provided quickly and that tribunals have power to act to prevent destitution.
National Insurance Co. v. Sadhelal, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 383 Addressed procedural sequencing; noted that trial of statutory defences available to insurer can be postponed and an award under Section 92-A against insurer along with owner was not illegal. Referenced to show that awarding against insurers along with owners in early proceedings is not necessarily impermissible and that statutory defences may be tried later.
United Indian Insurance Co. v. Vijaya Singh (1990 ACC CJ 938) Contains observation that the insurance company has remedy open to realise sums from the owner/insurer of the other vehicle; fact-specific pleading concerned whether only the tractor was insured, not the trailer which caused the accident. The opinion notes the observation but emphasises that the decision does not indicate how, when or what remedy the insurer may avail; it is thus of limited assistance on restitution mechanics.
United India Insurance Co. v. Lakshmi, (AIR 1990 Madras 108) 1990 ACC CJ 390 In a collision between two trucks under the old Act, held insurer had no liability for death of the owner of one truck in which he was travelling (insurer's liability under section 95(1) old Act was "third party liability" only). The Court observed that the law in that Madras decision was not relevant to the controversy under the new provisions in issue.
Bhagwandas (1990 ACC CJ 495) (Madhya Pradesh) Expressed the view that the insurer's statutory right to claim exoneration (under exclusionary clause in section 96(2) old Act) cannot be defeated by putting a premium on the owner's default in pleading/proving. The judge referred to his own dissenting views in that case in relation to insurer's exoneration rights and used them to support the proposition that insurer should have remedy in the same proceedings to seek restitution/exoneration.
Skandia Insurance Co.'s case, 1987 ACC CJ 411 : AIR 1987 SC 1184 Apex Court decision analysed with respect to insurer's rights under the old Act and procedural consequences in appeals under the old provisions. The opinion notes prior careful analysis of this Apex Court decision in Bhagwandas and draws on that understanding in discussing insurer's remedial rights.
Sarmaniya Bai's case, 1990 ACC CJ 860 : AIR 1990 Madh Pra 306 (Full Bench) Claims Tribunal, though a "Court's substitute", retains inherent jurisdiction exercisable by a Civil Court; Claims Tribunals are entitled to execute awards and orders applying Order 21 CPC. The court relied on this Full Bench decision to support the view that Claims Tribunals may exercise inherent jurisdiction (including restitution/adjustment of equities) and execute awards, filling gaps where Chapter X/XII do not expressly provide.
Jail Berham v. Kedar Nath, AIR 1922 PC 269 (Privy Council) Principle that the Court has a duty to place the parties in the position they would have occupied but for a decree varied or reversed; inherent jurisdiction to act fairly and rightly towards parties. Quoted to buttress the existence of inherent jurisdiction enabling a tribunal to order restitution/adjustment where appropriate and to place parties in proper positions vis-à-vis each other.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from textual comparison of the statutory provisions and an examination of the policy and structure of the Act:

  1. Textual distinction between Section 140 and Section 168:
    • The court emphasises that Section 168(1) uses the term "specify" (requiring specification of persons liable in the final award), whereas Section 140(1) deliberately omits that term.
    • Section 140(1) expressly makes the "owners of the vehicles" "jointly and severally" liable to pay the fixed statutory sums as ad hoc no-fault compensation (Rs. 25,000 for death; Rs. 12,000 for permanent disablement).
  2. Effect of subsections of Section 140:
    • Sub-section (3) of Section 140 is noted to state that neither pleading nor proof of any "wrongful act, neglect or default" of any owner is required for the interim payment — indicating the statutory no-fault character.
    • Sub-section (4) prevents reduction of the fixed statutory compensation on the basis of the share of responsibility of any person. Taken together, the court reasons that Section 140 does not impose a duty on the Tribunal to name the tortfeasor or to apportion liability between owners at the interim stage.
  3. Practical consequences and desirability:
    • Although the Tribunal is not legally required to specify apportionment under Section 140(1), the court recognises a practical desirability that, when possible, the Tribunal should indicate the insurer as the person to discharge the interim liability where an involved vehicle is insured — to ensure swift relief to victims and to clarify routes for later restitution claims.
    • The court cautions that specifying the insurer at the interim stage should not be taken to bar the insurer's statutory right to agitate for exoneration or restitution subsequently in the same proceedings.
  4. Jurisdiction to adjust equities and restitution:
    • The court examines Chapter X and Chapter XII and finds no express bar depriving Claims Tribunals of jurisdiction to adjust equities between owners and insurers when making the final award under Section 168(1).
    • Because Section 168(1) expressly empowers the Tribunal, when making an award, to "specify the amount which shall be paid by the Insurer or owner or driver ... or by all or any of them", the court reads this as leaving scope for the Tribunal, at final determination, to allocate liability and to order restitution where appropriate.
    • The court relies on the Sarmaniya Bai Full Bench decision and the Privy Council authority (Jail Berham v. Kedar Nath) to support the proposition that Claims Tribunals retain inherent jurisdiction (analogous to Civil Courts) to provide restitution and to place parties in the position they should occupy — thereby avoiding forcing insurers to pursue separate suits for reimbursement.
  5. Practical application to the case facts:
    • The impugned interim award of Rs. 7,500 against the insurer and the Corporation substantially conforms to the statutory mandate of Section 140 and is therefore valid despite the omission of the owner's (Bhagwandas') name.
    • The insurer's statutory remedies (to agitate exoneration under Sections 149(2), 170, or to seek restitution) remain available in the same proceedings at the trial stage; the Tribunal must entertain such claims and can pass appropriate orders when making the final award under Section 168(1).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The impugned order passed against the appellant/insurer directing payment of Rs. 7,500/- to the claimant under Section 140(1) is valid and requires no interference. The appellant is directed to deposit the balance sum of Rs. 3,750/- within two weeks for disbursement to the claimant.

Implications:

  • The Tribunal was not legally required to apportion or specify the share of no-fault liability between owners/insurers when passing an interim award under Section 140(1); Section 140's language and its subsections support a statutory, fixed no-fault liability that is not reducible by share of fault at the interim stage.
  • It is, however, desirable and permissible for Claims Tribunals to indicate, where appropriate, that an insurer should discharge the interim obligation so that relief reaches victims quickly. Naming an insurer in the interim order does not deprive the insurer of the statutory right to seek exoneration or restitution later.
  • Claims Tribunals retain inherent jurisdiction (akin to Civil Courts) to adjust equities and to order restitution or reimbursement when making the final award under Section 168(1), and insurers are entitled to agitate those questions in the same proceedings rather than being compelled to sue separately.
  • Direct consequence for the parties in this appeal: the insurer must deposit Rs. 3,750/- within two weeks; upon deposit the amount shall be disbursed to the claimant. The insurer remains entitled to seek adjustment of liability inter se (for example, as against the Corporation) when the final award under Section 168(1) is made.
  • No broader change in statutory interpretation beyond the reasoning in this opinion was proclaimed as a novel rule of law; the opinion applies existing statutory language and earlier authorities to the facts at hand and provides guidance on exercise of Tribunal powers in similar circumstances.

No information beyond the provided opinion has been added. Sections and conclusions above are confined to matters expressly stated in the opinion.

    United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sukhiabai Ramsukhibai And Others

    1. In this appeal Under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act, the Award passed by Claims Tribunal under Section 140 is challenged by the Insurer on a short ground. The question is, if it was incumbent on the said Tribunal to apportion or "specify" in the impugned award the "no fault liability" arising out of accident in which two motor vehicles were used so that the entire amount is not required to be paid by the Insurer who is required to discharge that liability of owner of one of the vehicles only.

    2. When the appeal came up for admission, I entertained doubt if it could be admitted as the appellant is required as per Section 173 to make deposit of Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount awarded, whichever is less. In the instant case, claimant/respondent No. I has been awarded Rs. 7,500/-. Although my attention was drawn to this Court's decision in Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 354, rendered at the Indore Bench and it was pointed out that the impugned award being passed on 10-1-1989, no deposit need be made as the new Act came into force only from 1-7-1989, I failed to persuade myself to accept the law laid down to be correct. Happily, appellant having duly deposited Rs. 3,750/-, being 50% of the amount of the award, I am relieved of the anxiety. Otherwise, it might have been necessary for me to make a reference to Full Bench for reconsideration of the law laid down in the D.B. decision in aforesaid Jaswant Rao's case (AIR 1990 Madh Pra 354). I may, however, still observe that inspiration for that decision came from a chain of other decisions of this Court on the scope of Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897 (referred in Section 217(4) of the Act). But, all those decisions have been overruled recently in Babulal's case AIR 1990 Madh Pra 317 (FB).

    3. On facts, it is undisputed that two vehicles were involved in the accident and the claimant who sustained injury and has got an interim award for that, was travelling in bus No. C.P.H. 8440, owned by respondent No. 3, Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, for short, the "Corporation". The bus collided with truck bearing registration No. CIW 7432 owned by respondent No. 2, but the truck is admittedly insured with the appellant. Shri Johri, appellant's counsel, contended that case of collision prima facie made it a case of contributory negligence of the vehicles involved in the accident and that had to be determined by the Tribunal when passing award finally Under Section 168 of the Act.

    Still, even at the stage of making interim award Under Section 140, the Tribunal was not excused of its duty to apportion "no fault liability" between the owners of the two vehicles involved in the accident and that duty was ingrained in the provision under which the award was passed and that the expression used in Section 140(1), "jointly and severally" explicitly referred to that duty.

    4. Counsel for the Corporation (respondent No. 3), Shri Khot, conceded that he failed to lay hand on any reported decision in regard to the controversy mooted in the appeal. However, he cited certain decisions to which I shall advert in due course. For the present, however, I must state at once that the impugned award follows substantially the statutory mandate. The sum awarded is made payable by non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3, namely, the Insurer and the Corporation; the other non-applicant, Bhagwandas, who was owner of the truck insured with the appellant has been left out. In any case, that minor flaw in the award does not invalidate it for the reason that the owner's liability is passed on statutorily to the Insurer in terms of Section 149(1) of the Act and as such, the Tribunal did not act illegally or arbitrarily or without jurisdiction in naming the Insurer as the person who had to discharge the liability under the award because he had to discharge the same in terms of the said provision.

    5. In my view, there is material difference between the phraseology used by the Legislature in Sections 140 and 168 of the Act; the word "specify" is used in Section 168(1) and that is avoided deliberately in Section 140(1), on the other hand, it is true, the Legislature had in its contemplation "no fault liability" arising from use of more than a single motor vehicle and took care, therefore to state that "the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally be liable to pay compensation...... in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this Section". Reading the subsequent Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4), it is difficult to conceive of any duty on the Tribunal of naming the tortfeaser in the order for payment of the "fixed sum" of Rupees 25,000/ - in case of death and Rs. 12,000/ - in case of permanent disablement as ad hoc compensation on the basis of "no fault liability" to the person or persons entitled. Sub-section (3) clearly states that neither any pleading nor any proof is required of "wrongful act, neglect or delay of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles from or of any person". Sub-section (4) buttresses further that position by envisaging that the quantum of compensation "fixed" and made statutorily "recoverable" cannot be "reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement".

    6. However, I cannot say that the apprehension which Shri Johri has expressed is wholly without any basis in that there will be likelihood of the Insurer losing its entitlement to claiming statutorily envisaged exoneration subsequently in the same proceeding, in terms of Sections 149(2) and 170 of the Act. About that, more later, because in my dissent in Bhagwandas 1990 ACC CJ 495 (Madh-Pra), certain views I expressed on the corresponding provision of the Old Act, Section 96(2). At this stage, however, I must say that the proviso to Section 168(1) also clearly indicates that the provision for payment of ad hoc compensation on the principle of "no fault liability" contemplated Under Section 140 is an independent provision. Section 144 adds to the rigour of the rigid mandate of Section 140. Indeed, Section 141(2) of the same Chapter X embodying Section 140 as well, vests on the Tribunal an inexorable duty of dealing with and disposing of "as expeditiously as possible" the claim for compensation contemplated Under Section 140. Reliance, therefore, of Shri Khot on this Court's decision in Manila Ramdei 1987 ACC CJ 764 : AIR 1988 Madh Pra 98 is most appropriate as this Court has taken the view that the Claims Tribunal is required to exercise Under Section 92-A, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, its jurisdiction suo motu to pass an order the reunder in the absence of an application for the contemplated relief. In Mahila Phoolwati 1986 ACC CJ 106 : AIR 1986 Madh Pra 187, this Court has held that the moment it is found by a Court or Tribunal on material available to it that one or more motor vehicle/motor vehicles is or are involved in an accident, the provisions of section 92-a become alive and generate sufficient power to enable jurisdiction to be exercised the reunder to help the hapless and helpless. Relief, in my view, according to the contemplation of the Legislature, is to be provided to the widows and orphans quickly and instantly to preempt and prevent their destitution and vagrancy and that object of the Legislature can be fulfilled only if the order Under Section 140 is passed imaginatively to ensure the relief to reach quickly, effectively and positively to the destituted. It is indeed, therefore, desirable rather than, as done in the instant case in the impugned award, if any of the two vehicles (in case in which the accident is one of a collision between the two) is an insured vehicle, order Under Section 140 is expeditiously passed specifying that the liability under that order is to be discharged by the Insurer. However, the Claims Tribunals are advised to frame their orders suitably to conform also to the language used in Section 140 to hold primarily the "owners" of both motor vehicles in such a case to be "jointly and severally" liable to discharge the "no fault liability" contemplated Under Section 140(1). By that the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to indicate Insurer's statutory liability contemplated Under Section 149 is not impaired and the Tribunal may still name the Insurer as person liable to discharge the liability in respect of order passed Under Section 140(1) of the Act; but that will leave no doubt at least about the right of the Insurer to agitate subsequently exonerating finally of his liability and to press for an order for reimbursement by way of restitution.

    7. To two recent decisions of this Court rendered by two learned single Judges in the case of National Insurance Co. v. Sadhelal AIR 1990 Madh Pra 383 and United Indian Insurance Co. v. Vijaya Singh (1990 ACC CJ 938 Madh Pra, my attention is drawn. In last mentioned decision, there is an observation that the "insurance company has its remedy open to realise the same from the owner/ insurer of the vehicle". In that case, it was pleaded by the Insurer that only the tractor was insured and the trailor was not which had caused the accident. How and when and what remedy the Insurer can avail is, however, not indicated. In Sadhelal, the view taken is that trial of statutory defences available to the Insurer is to be postponed and held along with other issues and that award of compensation Under Section 92-A against the Insurer along with owner was not illegal. Shri Knot cited also Madras High Court's D.B. decision in United India Insurance Co. v. Lakshmi 1990 ACC CJ 390 : (AIR 1990 Madras 108) but the law laid down therein is of no relevance to the controversy mooted. In that case, it was held that in case of an accident between two trucks, the Insurer had no liability for death of the owner of one of the trucks in which he was travelling even though there was negligence of the driver of that truck resulting in the accident and his employer's death. Because, Insurer's liability Under section 95(1) of the old act was "third party liability" only. In Bhagwandas (1990 ACC CJ 495) (Madh Pra) (supra), I had taken the view that the statutory right of the Insurer to claim exoneration in terms of the exclusionary clause envisaged Under section 96(2), old act, cannot be whittled down by putting a premium in owner's default in pleading and proving that the Insurer was not entitled to enforce the provision in the facts and circumstances of the case. Apex Court's decision in Skandia Insurance Co.'s case 1987 ACC CJ 411 : (AIR 1987 SC 1184), I had analysed carefully and the purport of the decision I had tried to explain therein though I had taken the view also that in an appeal Under Section 110-D, Old Act, jurisdiction of this Court to hold Insurer liable Under section 92-a, old act would be available because of the pendency itself of the appeal despite the fact that the accident had taken place prior to enactment of the new provision.

    8. It does not need reiteration that primary obligating to discharge liability in respect of an order passed Under Section 140(1) as also an award passed Under Section 168(1) is that of the owner or owners of the offending motor vehicle or motor vehicles and that is made vicariously dischargeable by the Insurer in terms of Section 149(1). Section 141(9) deals with two circumstances pertaining to residual liability in respect to which trial takes place in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act culminating finally in the award Under Section 168(1) of the Act. Both Clauses (a) and (b) envisage credit to be given for the compensation already paid by any person Under Section 140(1) when finally his liability is determined on the principle of "fault", but there is no provision in Chapter X to deal with cases and circumstances during trial held in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII for providing any relief to any owner or Insurer subsequently in case it is found that he or they are entitled to any reimbursement because the obligation they had earlier discharged Under Section 140(1) was not his or theirs. Indeed, Section 140(1) explicitly contemplates liability to be discharged not only "jointly" but also "severally", it would be possible evidently to raise that contention subsequently. Evidently, circumstances of a particular case may be such as when there is either a case of contributory negligence or a case of Insurer claiming exoneration in terms of the provisions of Section 149(2) or Section 170 of the Act. In such cases, the Insurer may shift his liability finally to the Insured person, whose vehicle it had insured and in other cases the owner or the insurer himself may claim that in a case of accident involving more than one motor vehicle the entire obligation to discharge "no fault liability" contemplated Under Section 140(1) was that of the other motor vehicle or motor vehicles and not one which he owned or insured. The question is, if in such type of cases either the owner or the insurer had to go to a civil suit or the Claims Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to adjust equities between parties exercising its jurisdiction Under Section 168(1) of the Act.

    9. In this connection, reference may be appropriately made to this Court recent Full Bench decision in Sarmaniya Bai's case 1990 ACC CJ 860 : AIR 1990 Madh Pra 306 wherein the nature of powers and jurisdiction exercised by Claims Tribunal is analysed. The view taken is that the Claims Tribunal, though meant to function as a "Court's substitute", retained inherent jurisdiction exerci-sable by a Civil Court. Such Tribunals do not lose inherent jurisdiction and inherent power traceable to the pre-existing dispensation and in that case, it was held that Claims Tribunals are entitled to execute awards and orders passed under the Act, for payment of compensation to victims of motor accidents applying expressly the provisions of Order 21, CPC despite the said provision not being made explicitly applicable to Claims Tribunals functioning in this State.

    10. According to me, the provisions neither of Chapter X nor of Chapter XII, deprive expressly the Claims Tribunals of their jurisdiction to adjust equities between parties while disposing of finally claim made for compensation arising from motor accident in terms of an "award" passed Under Section 168(1) of the Act. Section 141 of Chapter X, as earlier indicated, does not deal with cases and circumstances when it may be necessary to adjust equities. True, in Section 168(1), the power/ jurisdiction contemplated the reunder is that "in making an award, the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the Insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle insured in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be". It is also true that power is made exercisable to fulfil the object of making "an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it (Tribunal) to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid". About adjustment of equities between owners and Insurers inter se expressly no provision is made. One thing which, however, is crystal-clear is that jurisdiction is not denied explicitly on the other hand to the Claims Tribunal to make such an adjustment. It is in this gap that there will be scope for the Claims Tribunal to exercise its inherent jurisdiction of restitution. Reference, in this connection may be made to Privy Council's decision in Jail Berham v. Kedar Nath AIR 1922 PC 269 from which I find it immensely profitable to extract the following passage:

    ".....It is the duty of the Court Under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved......."

    11. Law being, as stated above, there exists no ground for holding that the Insurer/ appellant would not have adequate remedy to be claimed in the same proceedings in the course of trial of the same lis at the same forum. He would not be driven to a separate suit as would make that remedy ineffective and inefficacious. Indeed, as I have held in Bhagwandas (1990 ACC CJ 495) (Madh Pra) (supra), it is necessary to take care of such fortuitous situations in which an Insurer finds, it saddled with undeserving liability. Because, the national wealth which the Insurance Companies garner as nationalised public undertakings are to be husbanded properly for the common good of all citizens and victims paradoxically of the boon of modern civilisation. I am definitely of the lopinion, therefore that while the indefeasible liability contemplated Under Section 140(1) of the Act is to be discharged instantly by the Insurer when he is ordered to do so by the Claims Tribunal, it shall still be open to him to agitate the question of restitution during trial of the claim made for compensation on the "principle of fault" and it shall be duty then of the Claims Tribunal to deal with that prayer and to pass necessary order in that regard in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, while passing the "award" Under Section 168(1), appropriate order may also be passed by the Claims Tribunal against the person who is liable to reimburse the insurer for any liability that the latter had discharged in terms of the order passed Under Section 140(1) if claim for such relief is properly made and established.

    12. The result evidently is that the appeal has no substance. The impugned order passed against the appellant/Insurer asking him to pay Rs. 7,500/- to claimant/respondent No. 1 Under Section 140(1) is a valid order and that calls for no interference. The balance amount of Rs. 3,750/- shall be deposited by the appellant within two weeks and when that is done, that shall be disbursed to the claimant/respondent. The appellant shall be entitled to claim adjustment of inter se liability vis-a-vis Corporation finally, later, when the award Under Section 168(1) of the Act is passed.

    13. The appeal is dismissed and is disposed of in terms of the above observations. No costs.

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    United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sukhiabai Ramsukhibai And Others
    (May 7, 1991)