The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J.:— The Court: By this writ petition the petitioner has inter alia prayed for a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to set aside the impugned charge-sheet and the order of dismissal, and to forbear from giving any effect or further effect to that and to reinstate the petition in the service with all back wages and for other consequential benefits.
The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed on May 6, 2002 at Basantimata Colliery, Bharat Coking Coal Limited. On September 19, 2005 he found that a list of employees was displayed in the notice board of the respondent no. 2 company, Chanch Victoria area, Barakar. This was an order of dismissal of several employees who were attached to different collieries. The petitioner was one of them. This was on the ground of absenteeism of the petitioner. The petitioner made a representation to the General Manager, Chanch Victoria area; but he received a reply from the Agent of the colliery rejecting the petitioner's prayer for reinstatement. By the present petition the petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal on various grounds.
The respondents have taken a point of the territorial jurisdiction of this court to entertain the petition as a preliminary point of objection about the entertainability of the petition. This point as such was heard as a preliminary point and the affidavit filed by the respondents nos. 2 to 5 are restricted to the question of the preliminary objection alone.
The respondents state that a charge-sheet was issued by the Agent of Basantimata Colliery which is in the state of Jharkhand. The explanation submitted by the petitioner was considered and the Agent being the disciplinary authority was not satisfied and in the regular departmental proceeding that was commenced, continued and concluded at the Basantimata Colliery which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court. The Agent had dismissed the petitioner from service. The respondents have taken the point of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this court to entertain the petition as, according to them, no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.
In reply the petitioner alleged that the Bharat Coking Coal is a subsidiary of Coal India Limited which has its registered office in Kolkata. The respondent no. 2 company is in Bihar, Chanch Victoria area is in Bengal and as such the employees have concurrent jurisdiction both in Calcutta as well as the Jharkhand High Court.
According to the petitioner all the appointments, dismissals, transfers, promotions etc. are totally monitored by the office of the General Manager and the Kolkata office had a very important role in the policy decision and day to day administrative matters of the BCCL. The petitioner has submitted that he was appointed by the General manager of the Chanch Victoria area by the Coal India Limited as a Parent Body.
Undoubtedly the office of the Chairman of the respondent no. 2 company is in Dhanbad where from all decisions were taken. The respondents have strongly submitted that the Bharat Coking Coal Limited has no office at 4, Hungerford Street, Kolkata which has been cited by the petitioner in order to bring this case within the jurisdiction of this court.
The respondents have asserted and the petitioner has not denied that Basantimata Colliery is situated in the state of Jharkhand. The petitioner was admittedly an employee of the said colliery where a charge-sheet was issued from the office of the Basantimata Colliery and it was served upon the petitioner at the Basantimata Colliery itself. Although the respondents have laid great stress on the residence of the petitioner which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court this is not of much significance. But what is important to note is that the enquiry was conducted in the office of the Basantimate Colliery and the petitioner was dismissed from the service by the Agent of the Basantimata Colliery. Thus, according to them, the court clearly lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
The petitioner's sole case, however, appears to be that he was employed in that area where the Chanch Victoria is located is in Bengal. He has also drawn a comparison that the Damodar Valley Corporation (Kalyaneswari Project) which has its administrative office in the state of Jharkhand but the working place of the project is in Bengal and according to the petitioner the jurisdiction of this court is thus, a concurrent one with that of the Jharkhand High Court.
The Supreme Court in the case of Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Company Limited, (2010) 1 SCC 135 has held, in the context of Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, that it is well-settled that the expression ‘cause of action’ means that bundle of facts which gives rise to a right or liability. In that case the fire broke out at Ambala. The insurance policy was taken at Ambala and the claim for compensation was also made at Ambala. As such no part of the cause of action arose in Chandigarh. The Supreme Court had approved the view taken by this court in the case of IFB Automotive Seating and System Limited v. Union of India, reported in AIR 2003 Cal 80. In that case the division bench of this court had held that the relief as prayed for could not be granted by this court. One of the arguments in that case made by the Supreme Court in the case of Sonic Surgical (Supra) was that one of the branch offices was at Chandigarh and hence complaint could have been filed in Chandigarh as well. The Supreme Court while rejecting the contention of the appellant had held that if this contention is to be accepted it would mean that even if the cause of action had arisen in Ambala the complainant can file a claim petition in Tamilnadu or Guwahati or anywhere in India where branch office of the insurance company is situated. The court held that it will lead to absurd consequences and lead to ‘bench-hunting’.
In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 the Supreme Court had held that the expression ‘cause of action’ means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, as if traversed to entitle him to a judgement in his favour by the court. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. The truth or otherwise of the applicants made in the petition being immaterial. Referring to the particular facts of that case the Supreme Court had held that merely because NICCO read the advertisement in Calcutta, submitted its offers in Calcutta or made representations from Calcutta or even received a reply they would not constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. Rejecting the contention that even if the High Court at Calcutta had no jurisdiction the Supreme Court should not interfere with the decision of the High Court in the absence of any proof of prejudice or unless it was otherwise found to be erroneous the Supreme Court held that the discretion cannot be used in favour of a party which deliberately invoke the jurisdiction of a court which has no jurisdiction whatsoever. That would only encourage such type of litigations.
The question of cause of actin also came for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Eastern Coal Fields Limited v. Kalyan Banerjee, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 456 it has been held after consideration of several cases that cause of action for the purposes of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India for all intent and purport must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It mean a bundle of facts which were required to be proved but the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved is the material facts where upon a writ petition can be allowed. In that case the respondent before the Supreme Court was an employee of the Eastern Coal Fields Limited in Mugma area in the district of Dhanbad. The General Manager of the area whose office was also situated there was his appointing and disciplinary authority. The services of the respondents were terminated at Mugma. He filed a writ petition before the High Court at Calcutta. A preliminary objection was raised with regard to the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The division bench by a judgement and order held that the High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition but subsequently on an application for review the division bench had changed its views and held that an employee challenging an order of dismissal cannot get an effective order unless the employer is made party to the litigation and in that case the Eastern Coal Fields Limited having its registered office in the district of Burdwan was a necessary party. The High Court had held that even if the cause of action arose outside the territorial limits of the High Court, High Court could still entertain a writ petition if the persons sought to be bound by the order is stationed within the territorial limits. Reversing the said view the Supreme Court had relied upon its earlier judgement in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited v. Union of India, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 and various other cases the Supreme Court held that in view of the decision of the High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the state of Jharkhand only because the head office of the respondent company is situated within the state of West Bengal the same will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the employee.
In the case of Union of India v. Adani exports Limited, reported in AIR 2002 SC 126 the Supreme Court had clearly held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a Court to entertain a writ petition the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in respect of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause of action so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has at least in part arisen within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded in the application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the courts territorial jurisdiction unless the facts pleaded have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. In the context of that particular case the Supreme Court had held that the fact that the respondents were carrying on the business or they were receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or their documents and payments were sent or made at Ahmedabad has no connection with the dispute involved in the application which was with regard to the entitlement of the respondents to the benefits of the Pass Book Scheme.
It appears that the ratio decided in the case of Eastern Coal Fields Limited v. Kalyan Banerjee (Supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Here also the subject-matter of challenge is the charge-sheet issued by the Agent of a colliery which is in Mugma, Dhanbad in the state of Jharkhand. The petitioners' actions were taken in the state of Jharkhand and the petitioner was dismissed from service after an enquiry which was conducted within the state of Jharkhand. The petitioner was dismissed by an authority in the state of Jharkhand. If we consider the reliefs sought for by the petitioner it appears that he has prayed for an order directing the respondents to set aside the order of dismissal served upon him and restraining the respondents from taking any step in furtherance thereof. He has also prayed for quashing of the charge-sheet and the ex parte enquiry proceedings. Thus one thing is clear that all the directions he had prayed for is with regard to the events occurring within the state of Jharkhand. Whether the respondent no. 2 had any colliery in West Bengal is not material. Merely because the appointment letter was issued from the state of West Bengal will not confer jurisdiction upon this court to entertain the writ petition. We have seen that the Supreme Court and this court has repeatedly stressed that every fact pleaded in the petition will not constitute part of cause of action unless the same has any nexus with the reliefs sought for. The petitioner has made a point that the office of the appellate authority has its area office within the province of West Bengal is inconsequential inasmuch as the petitioner is not challenging the order of the appellate authority and the appellate authority also has their area office within this state. The petitioner's reference to the judgement and order dated June 22, 2007 in the case of Trinath Setthy v. Coal India Limited (WP No. 2458 of 2003) by a division bench of this court does not apply to the facts of this present case. The division bench was of the view that the part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at Calcutta since the office of the appellate authority whose decision was not challenged that positive pleadings and prayers thereof is situated within the state of West Bengal. This principle which was relied upon was accepted by the Supreme Court. Reference may be made to the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited v. Union of India (Supra) where the Supreme Court had held that in a case when the regional authority is constituted at one place and the appellate is in another a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places as the order of the appellate authority consists a part of the cause of action.
Obviously this does not apply to the facts of the present case. The petitioner did not file any appeal and more over as pleaded by the petitioner himself only an area office of the appellate authority is located within the state. As such there is no scope to theoretically apply the judgement relied on by the petitioner to the present case where it factually differs from the one we are concerned with.
In such view of it I hold that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed as not maintainable before this court.
There shall, however, be order as to costs.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.