1. This is a Rule against an order of the Munsif of Asansol in relation to a proceeding under Or. 9, r. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the 30th January, 1950, he passed the following order:—
“That the Miscellaneous case be allowed on contest provisionally. The Petitioner to pay Rs. 35 to the Opposite Party No. 1 by 10th February, 1950, upon which the suit will be restored to file. In default, the Miscellaneous case shall stand dismissed.”
2. On the 10th February, the Petitioner in the Miscellaneous case asked for further time to deposit the amount of Rs. 35.
3. This was refused, the order being, “The Petitioner must pay the money to-day, failing which the Miscellaneous case stands dismissed. The petition is rejected.” Later on, on the same day the Petitioner filed another petition asking for one day's time only to deposit the money. The order is: “Heard pleader. The prayer is considered and time is allowed till 11th February, 1950, for depositing the amount, failing which the Miscellaneous case shall stand dismissed”; in other words, after hearing the parties the Munsif finally granted one day's extra time. He had seisin of the case and, in fact, the parties were present and were heard on the question.
4. The Petitioner here relies on the decision of Edgley, J., in the case of Syed Mohammad Asraf Ali v. Nabijan Bibi(1) for a contention that the order of 30th January, here was a final order and could not be altered by the learned Munsif except by way of formal review. It is to be noted that in the case considered by Edgley, J., the facts were that the application for extension of time was made after the time had expired. It is true that some of the reasonings of the learned Judge in support of his order would also cover a case such as the present where the application for extension of time was made before the expiry of the order.
5. In my opinion, however, it is clear from the order of the 30th January, that it was, in part, of a provisional nature as the learned Munsif himself expressed it. I do not think it can be said that he had entirely by his order divested himself of the power given under Sec. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure to after the form of his provisional order, that is to say, to extend the time. On the 10th February, he first passed the order saying that the amount must be paid within that day and then finally allowed a day, each time repeating that on failure of deposit the suit will stand dismissed.
6. Once the period has expired and the order of dismissal has operated, then clearly it can be said that whatever may be provided in Sec. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after the suit has actually been dismissed, the Court has no jurisdiction to after the order of dismissal, except by way of formal review. With great respect, I think it is going a little too far to say that orders in the form of the order passed by the “Munsif here on the 30th January, are complete final orders. The orders are, as it were, in two parts with a condition and, in my opinion, so long as the actual order of dismissal has not operated, the Court has still seisin of the case and has still jurisdiction to make use of the power given under Sec. 148 to extend the time. No case has been cited before me to which it has been held that an application for extension of time made within time cannot be allowed.
7. The result is that this Rule is discharged. I make no order as to costs.
8. I am asked to point out that the point raised in paragraph 5 of the petition to this Court has not been agitated here and is still open.
N.D.R