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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 5(2) read with Section 5(10)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947) and Sections 409, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (Act
  • Section 5(2) r/w 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act 2 of 1947) and Sections 109 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) or and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988)
  • Section 6 (Central Act 2 of 1947) and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974)
  • SECTION 6 PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • sub-section (1)(b) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act
  • Section 161 or Section 164 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Government of India (1962 KLT 690).10. Rule 12 of the Rules
  • provisions of S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.16.
  • sub-section (2) or subsection (3A) of Section 5 of this Act,
  • SECTION 6 A PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • Sections 409, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • 1947 Act in Central Bureau of Investigation
  • S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • 1988 Act. Section 19(3) of the 1988 Act
  • section 6(1)(b), Kerala State Government
  • Section 5(2) read with Section 5 (1)(c)
  • instrument.11. Rule 4 of the Rules
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
  • section 3 of the High Court Act,
  • Section 19(3) of the 1988 Act
  • section 6(1)(c) of 1947 Act.
  • provisions of article 166
  • Section 6(1)(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5(2) read with Section 5(10)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947) and Sections 409, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (Act
  • Section 5(2) r/w 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act 2 of 1947) and Sections 109 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) or and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988)
  • Section 6 (Central Act 2 of 1947) and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974)
  • SECTION 6 PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • sub-section (1)(b) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act
  • Section 161 or Section 164 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Government of India (1962 KLT 690).10. Rule 12 of the Rules
  • provisions of S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.16.
  • sub-section (2) or subsection (3A) of Section 5 of this Act,
  • SECTION 6 A PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • Sections 409, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • 1947 Act in Central Bureau of Investigation
  • S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • 1988 Act. Section 19(3) of the 1988 Act
  • section 6(1)(b), Kerala State Government
  • Section 5(2) read with Section 5 (1)(c)
  • instrument.11. Rule 4 of the Rules
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
  • section 3 of the High Court Act,
  • Section 19(3) of the 1988 Act
  • section 6(1)(c) of 1947 Act.
  • provisions of article 166
  • Section 6(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A question of law was referred by a learned single Judge asking whether the Secretary of the Vigilance Department can grant sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ("the Act") for taking cognizance of offences alleged to have been committed by public servants who were employed under other departments. In the cases before the Court, charge sheets were issued before the introduction of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and charges were framed under the 1947 Act.

Specific factual details appearing in the opinion include:

  • In C.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1993 (Crl.A Nos. 243 and 244 of 1995), the accused was employed by the Labour Department. The sanction order (Ext.P1) dated 16-7-1992 begins with the heading "Government of Kerala" and contains language stating that "the Government of Kerala doth hereby accord the sanction required under clause (1)(b) of section 6."
  • In C.C. No. 10 of 1992 (Crl.A Nos. 383 and 384 of 1995), the sanction order (Ext.P65) was signed by the Commissioner & Secretary to Government, Vigilance; that order did not include the words "By order of the Governor."
  • In another matter referenced, Accused No. 1 was a Superintending Engineer in the Irrigation Department and Accused No. 2 was a contractor.
  • The appellants contended that the question of sanction was raised before the trial court and was not properly considered. The trial court ultimately found the accused guilty (the opinion notes conviction by the trial court).
  • The single Judge referred the legal question to the Division Bench; the Division Bench answers the referral and directs that the appeals be listed for final hearing on merits the following month because of a limitation in the power to refer a mere question of law under section 3 of the High Court Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Secretary of the Vigilance Department can grant sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for taking cognizance of offences alleged to have been committed by public servants employed in other departments.
  2. Whether a conviction can be set aside solely on the ground of absence of or defects/irregularities in the sanction required under the relevant statutory provisions (i.e., the effect of defective or irregular sanction after conviction).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended that they raised the question of sanction before the trial court and that it was not properly considered by that court.
  • They relied on Section 6(1)(b) of the 1947 Act to argue that the Kerala State Government (in substance, the concerned departmental appointing authority) is the authority competent to grant sanction where the public servant is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable except with the sanction of the State Government.
  • The appellants asserted that sanction orders were issued on behalf of the Government of Kerala but were signed by the Secretary, Vigilance Department, even though the accused were employees of other departments; they argued that, before the Government notification of 23-4-1994, the Vigilance Department had no power to issue such sanction on behalf of the Government for officers of other Departments and therefore such sanctions were invalid.
  • Appellants relied on the Supreme Court decision in Mohandas v. State of Kerala to support the proposition that the Secretary (Vigilance) lacked authority to accord sanction prior to an empowering order, and that such prior sanction orders may be invalid.

State / Respondent (Government) Arguments

  • The Public Prosecutor and State contended that the Secretary, Vigilance Department was vested with power to deal with sanction matters, pointing to the Rules of Business and to items in the First Schedule that allocated vigilance matters to the Vigilance Department.
  • It was argued that the sanction orders were issued "on behalf of the Government of Kerala" and thus were proper orders of the State, and that authentication by the Secretary of the Vigilance Department is the prescribed form of authentication under the Rules of Business (Rule 12).
  • The State placed reliance on earlier single-judge decisions from this Court (e.g., Harshan; Udayakumar) that supported the validity of sanctions signed by the Secretary, Vigilance Department as being issued on behalf of the Government of Kerala.
  • The State also relied upon the principle that, once a trial is concluded and a conviction recorded, defects in sanction may become mere irregularities and do not automatically invalidate a conviction (relying on CBI v. V.K. Sehgal and Section 465 CrPC reasoning).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in the Present Opinion
Mohandas v. State of Kerala (2002 (2) KLT 251 SC) Under the 1988 Act (Section 19), previous sanction by the authority competent to remove the person is required; Secretary (Vigilance) was held not to have been empowered prior to 23-4-1994 in that case and sanction was quashed. The Court acknowledged Mohandas but distinguished it because facts differed and because Rules of Business / First Schedule items had to be considered; Mohandas' observations were to be read in light of Padma Sundara Rao (Constitution Bench) and the records/orders actually placed before the Supreme Court in Mohandas.
State of Kerala v. Mohan Das (review decision) (2004 (1) KLT 402 SC) The review disallowed where no order empowering Secretary (Vigilance) to grant sanction was produced; emphasized need for documentary proof of delegated power. Court noted that in Mohan Das the Government Pleader had not produced Rules/orders and thus the Supreme Court could not be satisfied; this reinforced the need to consider the Rules of Business and notifications when deciding whether Vigilance Secretary could sign sanction orders.
Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu ((2002) 3 SCC 533) Constitution Bench guidance read into the analysis of administrative delegation/competence (cited for interpretive context of Mohandas). The Court said Mohandas must be considered in the light of the observations of the Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao, indicating care in interpreting departmental competence under Rules of Business.
G.V. Nair v. Government of India (1962 KLT 690) Explained effect of executive orders in the name of the constitutional head (article 166 and authentication). Cited to support the proposition that executive actions expressed in the name of the Governor and authenticated by a Secretary are valid and to explain effect of such orders.
Harshan v. State of Kerala (1989 (1) KLT 105) Single-judge decision holding that a sanction order signed by Commissioner & Secretary (Vigilance) "by order of the Governor" was sufficient compliance with Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court relied on Harshan as an earlier authority from this Court where identical contentions were rejected and the sanction signed by the Vigilance Secretary on behalf of Government was held sufficient.
Udayakumar v. State of Kerala (2001 (2) KLT 895) Held that Vigilance Department's duty to deal with all cases of corruption includes consideration of sanction and that a Government Order signed by a Secretary of any department dealing with the subject is valid. The Court cited Udayakumar to support the view that Vigilance Department could grant sanction and that the 1994 amendment primarily removed doubt but did not create power that did not previously exist.
Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay (AIR 1961 SC 1762) Sanction orders lacking the explicit words "By order of [President/Governor]" can still be valid; article 166 is directory and substantial compliance suffices. Used to support the proposition that omission of the exact formula ("By order of the Governor") does not necessarily invalidate a sanction signed by an authorized Secretary.
State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik (AIR 1952 SC 317) Constitution does not require a rigid formula; substance of requirement matters ("no magic incantation"). Cited to reinforce the principle that substance and substantial compliance with constitutional/administrative formalities is what matters, not the use of a precise wording.
Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.K. Sehgal (1999 SCC (Cri) 1494) Absence of sanction or want of competency of authority who granted sanction should not automatically alter or reverse a conviction and sentence under the 1947 Act; sanction is a filtering device to prevent frivolous prosecutions. The Court applied Sehgal to hold that convictions should not be set aside merely for defective sanction, particularly after trial and conviction have been completed; deficiencies may amount to irregularity rather than a vitiating defect.
Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat ((1997) 7 SCC 622) High Court cannot issue mandamus compelling an authority to grant sanction; the authority must independently consider the matter. Cited to confirm the principle that sanction decisions are for the executive authority to make independently; used in framing limits on judicial directions concerning grant of sanction.
P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim ((2001) 6 SCC 704 : AIR 2001 SC 2547) The question of lack of sanction can be raised at any time, including during trial and after judgment (subject to facts of that case). Cited to note that while lack of sanction can be raised at many stages, the effect of such a lack after conviction must be considered in light of other authorities (e.g., CBI v. Sehgal) and was not fully resolved in Pradhan for post-conviction situations.
Nithyanandan v. State of Kerala (1995 (2) KLT 250) After introduction of item No. 8 (23-4-1994), Vigilance Department clearly had power; the earlier item 1 did not negate power prior to amendment. Cited to show that the 1994 amendment clarified but did not necessarily create power that was absent earlier; court used it to support the view that Vigilance Department had competence even prior to the 1994 notification.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory and administrative-law analysis grounded in the text of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Rules of Business of the Government of Kerala, and relevant precedent. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps, as set out in the opinion:

  1. Statutory starting point: The Court quoted Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which requires previous sanction for prosecution of certain offences by public servants and specifies which authority must give that sanction (Section 6(1)(a)–(c) and the tie-breaker in Section 6(2) where doubt arises).
  2. Appellants' factual contention: The appellants argued that under Section 6(1)(b) the State Government is the competent authority and that sanction orders in these matters, though stated to be "on behalf of the Government of Kerala," were signed by the Secretary, Vigilance Department for officers employed in other departments and thus were not properly given.
  3. Examination of the sanction orders: The Court examined exemplar sanction orders (Ext.P12/Ext.P65 etc.). Some orders expressly stated "By order of the Governor" and others omitted that phrase but were signed by the Commissioner & Secretary (Vigilance). The orders set forth that "the Government of Kerala" had considered the evidence and were satisfied that prosecution should be accorded.
  4. Rules of Business and departmental distribution of functions: The Court analysed the Rules of Business:
    • Rule 12: provides that every order or instrument of the State Government shall be signed by a Secretary (or specified officers) and such signature is deemed proper authentication.
    • Rule 4 and the First Schedule: allocate the "Business of the Government" amongst Departments. Item XXXII (Vigilance Department) item (1) assigned "All cases of corruption including cases of complaints or allegations against public servants" to the Vigilance Department.
    • A notification dated 23-4-1994 expressly added item No. 8 under XXXII authorising issuance of orders sanctioning prosecution, suspension and disciplinary actions under specified statutes; the Court treated this amendment as a clarifying measure.
  5. Pre-amendment competence: The Court addressed the appellants' contention that Vigilance lacked power prior to the 1994 amendment. It observed that even before item No. 8 was added, item No. 1 already placed "all cases of corruption" in the Vigilance Department's domain. The Court relied on prior single-judge decisions (Harshan; Udayakumar) that had held that a sanction signed by the Secretary (Vigilance) on behalf of the Government was sufficient and that the Vigilance Department's duty over corruption cases necessarily included consideration of sanction.
  6. Substantial compliance and article 166: The Court invoked precedents (Major E.G. Barsay; State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik) to hold that the constitutional/formal wording (e.g., omission of the explicit phrase "By order of the Governor") is not necessarily fatal; article 166's requirements are, in the Court's view, directory and substantial compliance suffices where the Government in substance has authorized and authenticated the order.
  7. Effect of defective or irregular sanction after trial and conviction: The Court examined the policy and precedent exemplified by CBI v. V.K. Sehgal. It accepted the framing that sanction is intended as a filtering device to prevent frivolous or vindictive prosecutions; however, once a full trial has been conducted and a conviction recorded after judicial consideration of evidence, a defect in sanction often reduces to an irregularity that should not automatically vitiate the conviction. The Court noted Section 465 CrPC and the doctrine in Sehgal to support treating defects in sanction as non-fatal to convictions in these circumstances.
  8. Overall conclusion of analysis: Taking the statutory text, Rules of Business (including Rule 12), First Schedule item XXXII, past decisions of this Court (Harshan; Udayakumar), and Supreme Court authorities into account, the Court concluded that the sanction orders signed by the Secretary, Vigilance Department, on behalf of the Government of Kerala were proper. Even if some irregularity existed, the convictions could not be set aside merely because of defective sanction, particularly given the trial-court findings and applicable precedent.

Holding and Implications

The referred question is answered in the affirmative: the sanction orders signed by the Secretary, Vigilance Department on behalf of the Government of Kerala were proper, and the convictions in these cases cannot be set aside for want of sanction.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Court held that the sanction orders in the matters before it were validly issued on behalf of the Government of Kerala by the Secretary, Vigilance Department; accordingly, the convictions cannot be disturbed merely on the ground of defective or irregular sanction.
  • On administrative/formal requirements: The decision endorses an approach that looks to the substance of governmental authentication (Rules of Business, Rule 12; First Schedule item XXXII) and recognizes that omission of particular formulaic words (e.g., "By order of the Governor") does not necessarily invalidate a sanction if the order in substance represents the Government's action.
  • Precedential scope: The Court applied and followed existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities (notably CBI v. V.K. Sehgal, Harshan, Udayakumar, Major E.G. Barsay) to reach its conclusion. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel principle of law; rather, it resolves the referred question on the facts and authorities considered and indicates the appeals should proceed to final hearing on merits.

Procedural note from the opinion: The Court observed that under section 3 of the High Court Act a mere question of law alone cannot be referred by a single Judge to the Division Bench; consequently the appeals must be decided on merits and were directed to be listed for final hearing the next month.

    Krishna Iyer v. State Of Kerala

    Koshy, J.:— Whether Secretary of the Vigilance Department can grant sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption. Act, 1947 for taking cognizance of offences against officers who are working under other departments is the question of law referred by the learned single Judge in these appeals. In all these cases charge sheets were issued before the introduction of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and charges were framed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

    2. Section 6 of the Act reads as follows:

    “6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.— (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 164 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub-section (2) or subsection (3A) of Section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction,—

    (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affaire of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government;

    (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affaire of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government;

    (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.

    (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.”

    3. It is the contention of the appellants that the question of sanction was raised by them before the trial court and it was not properly considered. In view of Section 6(1)(b), Kerala State Government is the authority to grant sanction. All impugned sanction orders were issued on behalf of the Government of Kerala; but, signed by the Secretary, Vigilance Department, though employees were working in other departments.

    4. The accused in C.C Nos. 1 and 2 of 1993 (Crl.A Nos. 243 and 244 of 1995) was employed by the Labour Department. Ext.P1 sanction order is dated 16-7-1992. It starts with the heading “Government of Kerala” The sanction order Ext.P12 reads as follows:

    “AND WHEREAS, the Government of Kerala, after fully and carefully examining the evidence on record in the above case and considering the same, are satisfied that the said Sri. G. Sasidharan Nair had committed offences punishable under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(10)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947) and Sections 409, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860) for which he should be prosecuted;

    NOW THEREFORE, the Government of Kerala doth hereby accord the sanction required under clause (1)(b) of section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act No. 2 of 1947) for prosecuting Sri. G. Sasidharan Nair for the offences under Section 5(2) read with Section 5 (1)(c) and (d) thereof and also that required under sub-section (1)(b) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. II of 1973) for his prosecution under Sections 409, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and for other offences, if any, punishable under other provisions of any law, in respect of the acts aforesaid, in a court of competent jurisdiction.

    By order of the Governor,

    C.P Nair

    Commissioner & Secretary to Government.”

    5. In Ext. P65 sanction order issued in C.C No. 10 of 1992 (Crl.A Nos. 383 and 384 of 1995), the word “By order of the Governor” is not appearing and it was signed by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Vigilance. The last portion reads as follows:

    “NOW, THEREFORE, the Government of Kerala hereby accord sanction required under Section 6 (Central Act 2 of 1947) and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) to prosecute ………for having committed offences punishable under Section 5(2) r/w 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act 2 of 1947) and Sections 109 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act No. 45 of 1860) before a court of competent jurisdiction.

    M. Mohan Kumar

    Commissioner & Secretary to Government,

    Vigilance.”

    6. Accused No. 1 was working as Superintending Engineer in the Irrigation Department and Accused No. 2 was a contractor.

    7. Appellants mainly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohandas v. State of Kerala (2002 (2) KLT 251 SC). That was a case under the 1988 Act. We quote the entire order of the Supreme Court:

    “Under S. 19 of the Act no Court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Ss. 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the Authority competent to remove the person concerned. In the case in hand, the Secretary (Vigilance) appears to have accorded sanction to prosecute. The appellant's case is that the Secretary (Vigilance) was authorised to grant sanction only on 23-4-1994 and there is no order of the State Government making the Secretary (Vigilance) competent to accord sanction prior to the said date. The learned counsel appearing for the State is not in a position to refute the aforesaid contention and, in fact, is not able to produce any document which confers power on the Secretary (Vigilance) to accord sanction prior to 23-4-1994. The sanction in the present case being prior to the aforesaid date, the date on which the sanction appears to have been given, the concerned Authority had no jurisdiction and, therefore, there is an embargo on the court's power to take cognizance for non-compliance of S. 19 of the Act. We accordingly quash the proceeding.”

    8. Review petition filed before the Apex Court was also dismissed as can be seen from the decision reported in State of Kerala v. Mohan Das (2004 (1) KLT 402 SC). There, it was specifically contended that tile Commissioner and Secretary, Transport Department, refused to issue order of sanction for prosecuting the petitioner and thereafter Commissioner and Secretary, Vigilance Department passed an order of sanction for prosecuting the accused. The learned Government Pleader was not able to point out any order empowering Secretary, Vigilance to grant sanction and on that ground the review petition was rejected. Thereafter, another review petition was filed and that was rejected but making it open to contest the application under Section 19(3) of the 1988 Act in other appropriate cases. It is the contention of the Public Prosecutor that the Vigilance Secretary was vested with power specifically to deal with such matters. The Rules of business and relevant orders were not placed by the Government Pleader before the Apex Court in the Mohandas's cases (supra). Therefore, Hon'ble Apex Court had occasion to consider the effect of item No. 1 under the heading XXXII of First Schedule of the Rules of Business. Therefore, observations in Mohandas's case (supra) have to be considered and understood in the light of the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of Padma Sundara Rao v. State of TN ((2002) 3 SCC 533). Facts in Mohandas's cases were different

    9. In view of Section 6(1)(b) and 6(2) of the Act, State Government has authority to pass orders according sanction. Under article 166(1) of the Constitution, all executive actions of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Clause (2) says that any order or other instrument made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be prescribed. The effect of such orders is detailed by the Apex Court in G.V Nair v. Government of India (1962 KLT 690).

    10. Rule 12 of the Rules of Business prescribed as follows:

    “12. Every order or instrument of the Government of the State shall be signed by a Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a Joint Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, an Under Secretary or by such other officer as may be specially empowered in that behalf and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument.”

    11. Rule 4 of the Rules of Business is as follows:

    “4. The Business of the Government shall be transacted in the Department specified in the First Schedule, and shall be classified and distributed between those departments as laid down therein.”

    12. First schedule, regarding distribution of the business amount departments of the Secretariat, item XXXII is ‘Vigilance Department’. Sub item (1) reads as follows;

    “XXXII VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT

    1. All cases of corruption including cases of complaints or allegations against public servants.”

    13. A notification was published on 23-4-1994 amending the Rules of Business of the Government of Kerala in Part n, First Schedule. Following item under the heading “XXXI Vigilance Department” was added as item No. 8:

    “8. Issuance of orders sanctioning prosecution of a public servant under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) or and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988) placing him under suspension and finalising the disciplinary proceedings against him under the relevant rules and orders in pursuance of a Vigilance Enquiry contemplated/initiated against the public servant”.

    14. It is the contention of the appellants that this was added on 23-4-1994 and, therefore, before 23-4-1994, Vigilance Department had no power to issue order on behalf of Government of Kerala granting sanction for the officers working in other departments. Only the concerned Department Secretary who is the appointing authority can accord sanction. But, such a specific power to grant sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act against employees working in the respective departments was not seen in the items listed in the First Schedule under the various headings detailing powers of other departments. If the contention of the accused is accepted, before 23-4-1994, Government of Keraja cannot exercise powers under Section 6(1)(b) and sanction can be issued only under section 6(1)(c) of 1947 Act. Even before the addition of item No. 8 on 23-4-1994, Vigilance Department had power to deal with all cases of corruption including cases of complaints or allegations against public servants in view of item No. 1 Therefore, Vigilance Department can take action against all public servants, if complaints or allegations of corruption are there. Item No. 8 was introduced only to avoid doubt and specific clarification was issued. This point was considered by a single Judge of this Court very extensively in Harshan v. State of Kerala (1989 (1) KLT 105). In that case, identical contentions raised by the accused in this case are considered in paragraph 5 of the judgment as follows:

    “5. The first point argued was that the prosecution must fail for want of proper sanction. Ext.P22 is the order sanctioning prosecution as enjoined by S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On behalf of the Government, it was signed by the Commissioner and Secretary (Vigilance Department) by order of the Governor. PW9 Deputy Secretary, who was examined to prove Ext.P22, said that the files were not forwarded to Governor, but himself and the sanctioning authority (Government) perused all the relevant papers and the sanctioning authority passed the order after due satisfaction. But the appellant would say that personal satisfaction of the Governor is required. So also, according to him, the PWD Secretary alone is competent to sign the sanction by orders of the Governor. That is because he is an officer of the Public Works Department and the authority competent to remove him is the Government of Kerala. It was also pointed out on his behalf that Ext.P22 does not disclose proper satisfaction on the basis of materials and the materials, on which satisfaction was entered for ordering sanction, were not produced and proved before Court.”

    15. The above question was answered by S. Padmanabhan, J. as follows in paragraph 10:

    “10. Ext.P22 order itself shows that the Government examined the records in Crime No. 3 of 1983 of the Vigilance Police Station placed before me and was satisfied that it is a case fit for sanctioning prosecution. Application of the mind is further evidenced by the detailed facts relating to the offence mentioned in Ext.P22 So also, it is stated that on perusal of the papers, Government of Kerala was satisfied that the appellant committed the offences alleged. Sanction was, therefore, ordered by the Government and it was signed by the Commissioner and Secretary, Vigilance Department by order of the Governor. That is sufficient compliance of the provisions of S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.”

    16. The sanction order in this case was also signed on behalf of the Government of Kerala.

    17. The same view was taken by another single Judge of this court in the decision reported in Udayakumar v. State of Kerala (2001 (2) KLT 895). The amendment issued in 1994 as well as the power existed with the Vigilance Department before its introduction was also considered by M.R Hariharan Nair, J. in that case. In paragraphs 18 and 20 it was observed as follows:

    “18. The Vigilance Department comes as item 31 in the list of departments relating to the distribution of business. Under Clause (1) it is now the duty of the Vigilance Department to deal with “all cases of corruption including cases of complaints or allegations against public servants.” If it is the duty of the Vigilance Department to look after all cases of corruption against public servants it cannot be said that it had nothing to do with the grant of necessary sanction required for prosecution.”

    xxxxxxxxx

    “20. A Government Order will hence be valid if it is signed by Secretary of any Department dealing with the subject unless his authority is barred by any general or special order. At the most what can be said is that after 23-4-1994 it is the duty of the Vigilance Department to deal with question of sanction”.

    18. Even if it is not written that ‘By order of Governor’, it will still be an order passed by the State if it is passed by Secretary on behalf of the Government. In Major E.G Barsay v. State Of Bombay . (AIR 1961 SC 1762), the Apex Court considered the question. The word ‘By order of President of India’ was not mentioned in the sanction order issued for prosecuting the officer under the 1947 Act. The last portion only stated that:

    M. Gopala Menon,

    Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.”

    19. The above order was held to be valid order of the Government of India. After quoting various decisions, the Apex Court also held that provisions of article 166 is also directory and substantial compliance is enough. (See paragraph 25 and 26 of the above judgment). In State Of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik (AIR 1952 SC 317), Bose, J. observed as follows:

    “In our opinion, the Constitution does not require a magic incantation which can only be expressed in a set formula of words. What we have too see is whether the substance of the requirements is there”.

    20. When prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act, sanction is necessary to avoid frivolous litigation and harassment of public servants. When an accused is tried and he was found guilty from the evidence, the question of frivolous litigation will not arise. Therefore, after conviction is entered by the court below, after considering the evidence, question of filing frivolous prosecution will never arise. This aspect was taken care of in 1988 Act. Section 19(3) of the 1988 Act reads as follows:

    “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—

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    (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

    (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

    (b) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

    (c) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.”

    21. The Supreme Court considered the matter in respect of the convictions under the 1947 Act in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.K Sehgal (1999 SCC (Cri) 1494) and held as follows:

    “18. Thus the legal position to be followed, while dealing with the appeal filed against the conviction and sentence of any offence mentioned in 1947 Act is that no such conviction and sentence shall be altered or reversed merely on the ground of absence of sanction, much less on the ground of want of competency of the authority who granted the sanction.”

    22. The Supreme Court also observed that the provision for sanction is made as a filtering check to safeguard public servants from frivolous or malafide or vindictive prosecution on the allegation that they have committed offences in the discharge of their official duties. But, once the judicial filtering process is over on completion of the trial, the purposes of providing for the initial sanction would bog down to a surplusage. This could be the reason for providing a bridle upon the appellant and revisional forums as envisaged under Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The above observation will apply in these cases also. Trial court has found the accused guilty, taking recourse to section 465 CrP.C also. The question of sanction has only become an error or irregularity.

    23. The learned counsel for the appellants cited the decision in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State Of Gujarat ((1997) 7 SCC 622). The Supreme Court in that cases only held that the High Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the concerned authority to grant sanction. An authority has to consider the matter independently. The trial court has observed that the Secretary, Vigilance Department has consulted the concerned Department before giving sanction. But, Government considered the matter and Secretary to Government of Kerala, Vigilance Department is competent to sign sanction order in view of the Rules of Business and orders were passed on behalf of the Government of Kerala. The decision of the Apex Court in P.K Pradhan v. State of Sikkim ((2001) 6 SCC 704 : AIR 2001 SC 2547) was also pointed out by the counsel for the accused. Apex court in the above case held that the question of lack of sanction can be raised at any time including during trial and after judgment. But, in that case, trial was not over. Question of effect of order of sanction after conviction was not considered.

    24. Another decision cited by the counsel appearing for the appellants is Nithyanandan v. State of Kerala (1995 (2) KLT 250). There, a learned single Judge of this Court only held that after introduction of item No. 8 with effect from 23-4-1994 it is very clear that Vigilance Department has got power and after the amendment this question is no more open. That will not show that before the amendment, in view of item No. 1, Part II, First Schedule, Vigilance Department was not the authority.

    25. In view of the discussions above, we are of the opinion that in view of the Rules of Business, item 8 under heading XXXII of Part II, First Schedule, the sanction order issued by the Secretary, Vigilance Department, on behalf of the Government of Kerala, is proper sanction and even if there is any irregularity in view of Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in view of the principle laid by the Supreme Court in CBI v. V.K Sehgal (1999 SCC (Cri) 1494), conviction cannot be set aside merely for defective sanction. In these cases, sanction order issued on behalf of the Government of Kerala was proper also. Therefore, the referred question is answered in the affirmative and conviction cannot be set aside for want of sanction in these cases.

    26. It is pointed out that in view of section 3 of the High Court Act, a mere question of law alone cannot be referred by a single Judge to the Division Bench and the Division Bench has no power to return the matter after answering the reference to the learned single Judge also. Therefore, the appeals have to be decided on merit. List the appeals for final hearing on merit next month.

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    Krishna Iyer v. State Of Kerala
    (Sep 13, 2004)