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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 5-11-1981 a truck (No. JKN 893) owned by respondent No. 3 and insured by the petitioner, driven by respondent No. 2, collided with an army vehicle owned by respondent No. 1 near Talab Kunjwani, Jammu on the Jammu-Pathankote National Highway. The army vehicle sustained severe damage assessed at Rs. 42,000/-. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit in the High Court for recovery of Rs. 42,000/-. The suit was transferred to the Additional District Judge, Jammu. In written statements, a preliminary objection was raised that the civil court lacked jurisdiction because, following application of the Motor Vehicles Act to Jammu & Kashmir, jurisdiction over claims of compensation such as this vested in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (the Tribunal). The trial court framed the preliminary issue: “Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit?” The Additional District Judge decided the preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiff (respondent No. 1). Aggrieved, the petitioner (defendant No. 3) filed this revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to try the plaintiff's suit for Rs. 42,000 in respect of damage to property caused by a motor vehicle accident, or whether jurisdiction vested exclusively in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  2. Whether, where a claim for damage to property exceeds Rs. 2,000, the claimant must first present the claim to the Tribunal and obtain a reference to the civil court, or whether the claimant may directly institute the claim in the civil court at his option, pursuant to the proviso to Section 110(1).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. J.L. Sehgal)

  • Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act bars the jurisdiction of civil courts where a Claims Tribunal has been constituted for the area; therefore questions relating to claims for compensation which may be adjudicated by the Tribunal fall exclusively within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
  • Claims for compensation in respect of damage to property arising from motor accidents are cognizable by the Tribunal under Section 110 (as amended), and the institution of a civil suit was not authorised by law.
  • Even where damage exceeds Rs. 2,000, the claimant should initially institute the claim before the Tribunal and it is the Tribunal which may then “refer” the matter to the civil court for adjudication (i.e., the claimant cannot directly institute the suit in the civil court).

Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments (Mr. J.P. Singh)

  • The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was "applied" to Jammu & Kashmir by the Central Laws (Extension) Act, 1968, and subsequent amendments do not automatically apply to Jammu & Kashmir; since Section 110(1) was amended in 1969 to include damage to property, that amendment is not necessarily applicable to Jammu & Kashmir and therefore the civil court could entertain the suit.
  • Alternatively, by virtue of the proviso to Section 110, where a claim includes compensation for damage to property exceeding Rs. 2,000, the claimant has the option to institute the claim in a civil court; because the plaintiff's damage exceeded Rs. 2,000, he validly exercised his option to sue in the civil court and the suit is cognizable there.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Iqbal Singh v. Jagan Nath, 1980 Kash LJ 362 Held by a single Judge that an owner who has not sustained bodily injury cannot invoke Section 110 (or S.110-A) to recover compensation for damage to property alone; such a person must sue in a civil court. The court recorded this decision but observed it did not take into account the 1978 amendment (insertion of clause (aa) in Section 110-A(1)) specifically entitling the owner of the property to file a claim before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the present court treated the Iqbal Singh view as having been given without regard to that amendment.
Kamal Kusha v. Kirpal Singh, 1987 Srinagar LJ 211; AIR 1988 J & K 11 Division Bench held that a claim petition for damage to property could be filed independently under Section 110-A; the expression “injury” includes injury to property and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide such claims (the case involved a claim of Rs. 1,461). The court noted this decision but observed that the Division Bench likewise did not take notice of the 1978 amendment to Section 110-A. The present court took the position that, in light of the 1969 amendment to Section 110 and the 1978 amendment to Section 110-A, the Tribunal is empowered to entertain property-only claims subject to the proviso limiting the claimant’s option where damage exceeds Rs. 2,000.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a statutory and textual analysis, proceeding in the following steps:

  1. Extension to Jammu & Kashmir: The court examined the Central Laws (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Act, 1968 (the Extension Act) and held that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was "extended" (not merely "applied") to Jammu & Kashmir by the Extension Act. By operation of Section 2(2) of the Extension Act, amendments specified in the schedule also became applicable to the State from the commencement of the Extension Act. Consequently, subsequent amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act which were specified became applicable in Jammu & Kashmir; the submission that post-1968 amendments did not apply in the State was rejected as misconceived.
  2. Statutory framework: The court set out the relevant statutory provisions:
    • Section 110(1) establishes that a State Government may constitute Claims Tribunals to adjudicate claims for compensation arising from motor accidents involving death, bodily injury, or "damage to any property of a third party so arising, or both". The words relating to property damage and the proviso were added by the 1969 Amendment Act.
    • The proviso to Section 110(1) permits a claimant, where the claim includes compensation for damage to property exceeding Rs. 2,000, to elect to refer the claim to a civil court; where such a reference is made, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain questions relating to that claim.
    • Section 110-A(1) lists persons who may make an application for compensation; clause (aa) (inserted by the 1978 Amendment) expressly authorises "the owner of the property" to make a claim before the Tribunal.
    • Section 110-F bars civil courts from entertaining questions relating to claims which may be adjudicated by the Tribunal for that area.
  3. Effect of the 1969 and 1978 amendments: The court explained that prior to 1969, Section 110 did not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to grant compensation for damage to property. The 1969 Amendment enlarged the Tribunal's jurisdiction to include damage to third-party property, with the proviso creating an exception where property damage exceeds Rs. 2,000 and the claimant elects to go to a civil court. The 1978 Amendment to Section 110-A expressly allowed an "owner of the property" to file an application before the Tribunal, resolving previous conflicting judicial interpretations of "injury".
  4. Interpretation of "refer" in proviso to Section 110(1): The court rejected the petitioner's contention that the proviso requires a claimant to present the claim first to the Tribunal and that only the Tribunal may “refer” it to a civil court. Rather, the court read the proviso literally: "the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication." The court interpreted "refer" to be synonymous with "prefer" or "apply" (i.e., to have recourse to) and concluded the claimant may directly institute proceedings in the civil court when the property-damage claim exceeds Rs. 2,000. Had the legislature intended the Tribunal to be the referring body, it would have so stated.
  5. Application to the facts: Applying these interpretations to the present case, the plaintiff-respondent's claimed damage was Rs. 42,000 (well in excess of Rs. 2,000). Under the proviso, the plaintiff had the option to choose the civil court and exercised that option by instituting the suit. Accordingly, the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial court's decision upholding jurisdiction was affirmed, though the appellate court reached that conclusion on statutory interpretation grounds different from those employed by the trial court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the trial court's finding that the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's suit for Rs. 42,000, because the plaintiff validly exercised the option in the proviso to Section 110(1) to institute the claim in a civil court where damage to property exceeds Rs. 2,000.

Direct consequences and orders in the opinion:

  • The revision petition fails and is dismissed.
  • The dismissal was ordered without any costs.
  • Parties through their counsel were directed to appear before the trial court on 30th March, 1988.

Broader implications (as stated or necessarily arising from the court's analysis in the opinion):

  • The court clarified that the Central Laws (Extension) Act, 1968 extended the Motor Vehicles Act and its specified amendments to Jammu & Kashmir; consequently the 1969 and 1978 amendments are applicable in the State.
  • The court interpreted the proviso to Section 110(1) to grant a direct option to claimants (where property damage exceeds Rs. 2,000) to choose between the Tribunal and the civil court; the word "refer" in that proviso was construed to mean that the claimant may "refer" (i.e., prefer or apply) the claim directly to the civil court, and there is no statutory requirement that the Tribunal be approached first.

Note: The court expressly affirmed the trial court's jurisdictional finding "though for different reasons" and did not make any separate order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.

    National Insurance Co. v. Union Of India And Others

    1. On 5-11-1981 truck No. JKN 893 belonging to respondent 3 and insured with the petitioner was being driven by respondent 2, driver of respondent 3, when it hit an army vehicle owned by respondent 1, the Union of India near Talab Kunjwani, Jammu, on the Jammu Pathankote National Highway. As a result of the accident, the army vehicle of respondent 1 was severely damaged and the loss was assessed at Rs. 42,000/-. Respondent 1 accordingly filed a suit in this High Court for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 42,000/-. The suit was transferred for disposal in accordance with law to the file of Addl. District Judge, Jammu. The suit was resisted and in the written statements one of the preliminary objections raised was that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for adjudicating the claims of compensation in respect of damage to any property of a third party arising after the application of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and that the jurisdiction to decide such claim for damages, if any, vests in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). On the basis of the preliminary objection, the following preliminary issue was raised:

    “Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit?

    …O.P.D”

    The learned Addl. District Judge vide his order dt. 8-4-1986 decided the preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant holding that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit filed by respondent No. 1. Aggrieved, the petitioner (defendant No. 3) filed this revision petition.

    2. Mr. J.L Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that since S. 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal after the constitution of that Tribunal for that area, therefore, the jurisdiction to adjudicate claim for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicle or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both are cognizable by the Tribunal under S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, the institution of the suit in the civil court was not authorised by law.

    3. Mr. J.P Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent 1, however, submitted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the Central Laws (Extension) Act, 1968 and there is nothing to show that the subsequent amendments could become automatically applicable to Jammu and Kashmir and since S. 110(1) was amended in 1969, to include the damage to property of a third person as being cognizable by a Tribunal, the claim for such compensation could be preferred only in the civil court. Alternatively he argued that by virtue of the proviso to Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, where a claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding Rs. 2000/-, it is at the option of the claimant that he may institute a claim in a civil court for adjudication and if he does so, the claims tribunal would have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim and that in the instant case, the damage involved having exceeded Rs. 2000/- the plaintiff-respondent 1 had exercised his option correctly and the suit was cognizable by a civil court.

    4. Before considering the controversy on merits as raised at the bar, it would be appropriate to deal with the submission of Mr. J.P Singh relating to the extension of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The said Act had not been extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir till the promulgation of the Central Laws (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Act, 1968. Extension Act, according to the preamble, was enacted to provide “for the extension of certain central laws to the State of Jammu and Kashmir”. By virtue of S. 2 of the Extension Act which came into force on 15-8-1968, the Acts mentioned in the schedule and all rules, orders and regulations made thereunder were “extended to and shall be enforced in the State of Jammu and Kahmir”. Vide sub-sec. (2) of S. 2, it was provided that with effect from the commencement of the Act, the Acts mentioned in the schedule “shall be amended as specified therein”. The plain reading of the provisions of the Extension Act show that the Motor Vehicles Act had been extended to the Jammu and Kashmir State and not that it was “applied” to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as argued by Mr. Singh. Once the Act had been extended to the State, then as provided by sub-sec. (2) of S. 2 of the Act, all the amendments made in the Acts would automatically be applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Amongst the Acts which are contained in the schedule to the Extension Act is included in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The submission of Mr. Singh, that the subsequent amendments made after 15-8-1968 (when the Extension Act came into force) were not applicable in Jammu and Kashmir, therefore, has no basis and is misconceived.

    5. With a view to resolve the main controversy between the parties, it would be desirable to notice the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 110(1) provides as follows:

    “110. Claims Tribunals.— (1) A State Government by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both:

    Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may, at his opinion, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication, and where a reference is so made, the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim.”

    Section 110-A(1) provides further:

    “110-A. Application for compensation.— (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of S. 110 may be made—

    (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or

    (aa) by the owner of the property; or

    (b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

    (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured for all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:

    xxxxxxxx”

    Again, Section 110-F provides:

    “110-F. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts.—

    Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court.”

    6. Section 110(1) provides that the State Government is competent to constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purposes of adjudicating upon the claims of compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles which involve: (a) death or bodily injury to a person; (b) damage to any property of a third party, and (c) death of or bodily injury and damage to any property of a third party. The words “or damage to any property of a third party so arising or both” were added by the Amendment Act of 1969. The proviso to the said sub-section which was also added by the Amendment Act of 1969, lays down that if the compensation in respect of damage to the property exceeds Rs. 2000/-, the claimant at his option may refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication and once a reference has been so made, the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. Plainly it means that in case the claim for compensation for damage to property does not exceed Rs. 2000/-, the claimant has no option to refer the claim for adjudication to the civil court and such a claim is cognizable only by the Claims Tribunal. Section 110(1) before it was amended in 1969 did not confer jurisdiction on the Claims Tribunal to grant compensation on account of ‘damage to property’ of a third party suffered in a motor accident. The Amending Act No. XVI of 1969, enlarged the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal enabling it to deal with the claims for award of compensation for damage to the property also subject to the limitations contained in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 110 of the Act.

    7. Section 110-A specifies the persons who may prefer a claim for compensation and prior to 1978, it provided that the said application for compensation could be made: (a) by the person who sustained the injury, (b) by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased where the accident results in the death of the person injured, and (c) any agent authorised by the agent person injured for all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. However, vide Act No. XLII of 1978, another class of persons was included in S. 110-A by insertion of Cl. (aa) to sub-sec. (1). The said clause reads: “by the owner of the property”. The amendment in 1978 was apparently made to harmonise the provisions, in view of the amendment made in 1969, and to specifically entitle the owner of the property to make a claim for compensation, irrespective of the fact whether he had also suffered a bodily injury or not. It was also aimed at resolving conflict of judicial opinion between various courts in the country as regards the ambit of the expression “injury” within the meaning of S. 110-A(1) of the Act as some High Courts had taken the view that a wider meaning should be given to the expression “injury” occurring in sub-sec. (1) of S. 110-A so as to include ‘injury’ to property also within its fold, while the other courts took the view that the expression ‘injury’ was confined only to those who either die or receive bodily injuries due to accidents and not to the others.

    8. In Iqbal Singh v. Jagan Nath, 1980 Kash LJ 362, a single Judge of this Court laid down that an owner, who has not sustained any bodily injury, cannot take recourse to S. 110 for recovering compensation in respect of the damage to his property only caused in the accident. According to the learned Judge, an application for compensation could only be made by a person who had suffered bodily injury and that a person who had suffered only damage to property in an accident involving motor vehicle, could not maintain an application under S. 110-A of the Act and that he had to take recourse to filing a civil suit only. That judgment came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Kamal Kusha v. Kirpal Singh, 1987 Srinagar LJ 211 : AIR 1988 J & K 11. The Division Bench after referring to some authorities and dictionary meaning of the word “injury” held that a claim petition for damage to property could be filed independently without there being any claim for death or bodily injury. The Division Bench, provided the judgment of the learned single Judge in Iqbal Singh's case (supra) and opined that the injured within the meaning of S. 110A of the Act would include a person who had suffered damage to his property and he could maintain a claim for compensation in respect thereof before the Tribunal. The expression ‘injury’ was interpreted to mean not only bodily injury, but, injury to property as well. Since, the claim in the case before the Division Bench was for an amount of Rs. 1,461/- in respect of damage to property, the Bench held that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

    9. Neither the learned single Judge in Iqbal Singh's case (1980 Kash LJ 362) nor the Division Bench in Kamal Kusha's case (AIR 1988 J & K 11) (supra) took notice of the amendment made to S. 110-A by the insertion of Cl. (aa) to sub-sec. (1) by the Amending Act of 1978, which specifically entitled “the owner of the property” also to file an application before the Tribunal for claiming compensation arising out of an accident in respect of the damage to his property. It appears that the amending Act was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges because had it been brought to their notice, the discussion need not have proceeded to that length. Be that as it may, the fact remains that a claim petition for damages to property only can also be filed before the Tribunal independently by the owner of the property without there being any claim for death or bodily injury, where the damage has been caused by an accident involving the use of motor vehicle subject to the limitations contained in the proviso to S. 110(1). The amendment made in sub-sec. (1) of S. 110 in 1969 read with the amendment made in sub-sec. (1) of S. 110-A in 1978 now enables the Claims Tribunal to entertain an application for award of damages in respect of property only as well.

    10. Section 110-F of the Act bars the jurisdiction of civil court in respect of claims which may be preferred before the Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of the Act. The proviso to sub-sec. (1) which is in the nature of an exception to Section 110F gives option to a claimant to refer his claim to a civil court for adjudication, where the claim relates to damage to property exceeding Rs. 2000/- and where such a reference has been made to the civil court, the Tribunal ceases to have jurisdiction in respect of such a claim. A conjoint reading of the two provisions suggests that it is not each and every claim for compensation which is excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil court but what is excluded is such claims which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal and a claim for compensation for damages to property exceeding Rs. 2000/- can be got adjudicated upon through a civil court at the option of the claimant.

    11. According to Mr. Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, even where the claim relates to damage to property exceeding Rs. 2000/- it should be instituted initially before a Tribunal and the Tribunal may at the request of the claimant “refer” it to civil court for adjudication and that the claimant cannot institute such a claim petition directly before the civil court.

    12. The argument proceeds on the wrong assumption that the expression “refer” as occurring in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 110 implies reference by the Tribunal. The expression “the claimant may at his option, refer to the claim to a civil court for adjudication” occurring in the proviso unmistakably shows that an option has been given to the claimant to take recourse either to the civil court or to the Tribunal, where the claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeds Rs. 2000/-. For exercising his option under the proviso, a claimant does not have to go to the Tribunal first. Had the intention of the legislature been otherwise, it would have provided that the “Tribunal may at the option of the claimant refer the claim….” The legislature did not so word the proviso and, therefore, it would be doing violence to the plain language of the proviso to interpret it to mean that where the damage to property exceeds Rs. 2000/-, the claimant has still first to go to the Tribunal to get his petition referred to a civil court. The expression “refer” in the proviso has to be construed in the light of the words preceding it, i.e “the claimant may, at his option” and when so construed the conclusion is inescapable that the expression “refer” is synonymous with “prefer” or “apply”. According to Webester, Third New International Dictionary, page 1907, one of the meaning of ‘refer’ is “to have recourse to apply” …………… Thus, it is for the claimant to institute the case in the civil court or the Tribunal where the claim for damage to property exceeds Rs. 2000/-. There is thus, no warrant for holding that even in respect of a claim for compensation exceeding Rs. 2000/- in respect of damage to the property caused by a motor vehicle accident, the claimant has first to approach the Tribunal.

    13. In the instant case, the claim for damages as detailed by plaintiff-respondent 1 is to the extent of Rs. 42000/- which exceeds Rs. 2000/- and since, the plaintiff-respondent 1 had an option to seek adjudication of his claim either from the civil court or the Tribunal and had exercised his option by going to the civil court, it is obvious that the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit. The preliminary issue was, under these circumstances, rightly decided by the trial court. The finding of the trial court is accordingly upheld, though for different reasons given hereinabove.

    14. The revision petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Parties through the learned counsel are directed to appear before the trial Court on 30th March, 1988.

    Petition dismissed.

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    National Insurance Co. v. Union Of India And Others
    (Mar 14, 1988)