Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
To
be referred to the Reporter or not ?
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
=================================================
BARODA
CITY CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD - Petitioner(s)
Versus
THE
STATE OF GUJARAT & 4 - Respondent(s)
=================================================
Appearance :
MR
MIHIR THAKORE, SR. ADVOCATE with MR
SP MAJMUDAR for Petitioner(s) : 1 in SCA No.4196 of 2008,
MR SN SOPARKAR, SR. ADVOCATE
with MR AMAR BHATT for Petitioner(s) : 1 in SCA12958 of 2009 MR
FALGUN BRAHMBHATT for Appellant(s) : 1 in LPA No. 1676 of 2009,
MR TARAK DAMANI for Petitioner(s) : 1 IN SCA No. 11615 of 2009
MR
TUSHAR MEHTA, ADDL. ADVOCATE GENERAL with MS TRUSHA PATEL, AGP for
Respondent(s) : 1, 2, 4
DS AFF.NOT FILED (N) for Respondent(s) :
1,
RULE SERVED for Respondent(s) : 1 - 2, 4,
NOTICE SERVED BY
DS for Respondent(s) : 2, 4,
MR HASIT DILIP DAVE for Respondent(s)
: 3,
MR MIHIR H PATHAK for Respondent(s) :
5,
=================================================
CORAM
:
MUKHOPADHAYA)
In
all these cases, as a common question of law is involved, they were
heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The
State of Gujarat through its Commercial Tax Department took steps to
bring the property situated at Plot No. 486/B-2, GIDC, Makarpura,
Vadodara, the assessee having failed to pay the tax. Baroda City
Co-operative Bank Ltd., which is the secured creditor of the very
same property under the Securitization and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ( the
Securitization Act for short), being aggrieved, preferred the writ
petition in SCA No. 4196 of 2009.
Similar
is the grievance of the petitioner in SCA No. 12958 of 2009 with
regard to the property of Survey Nos. 173/1, 174/1, 174/2, 174/3 and
176 situated at Taluaka Sanand, District Ahmedabad purchased by the
said petitioner from Assets Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd.
(ARCIL). A prayer has been made to direct the respondent Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Division I and its officials to
remove the charge on the said property.
The
appellant of LPA No. 1676 of 2009, who was the original petitioner of
SCA No. 35 of 2009, made a grievance against the Mamlatdar, Anand
(Rural), District Kheda against the steps taken under Section 151 of
the Bombay Land Revenue Code ( the BLR Code for short) pursuant
to the recovery certificate issued by the Labour Court, Anand on
21.7.2003.
The
petitioner of SCA No. 11615 of 2009 is the auction purchaser of the
immovable property i.e. plant and machinery of Mahendra
Petrochemicals Ltd. As there is charge created by the Mamlatdar,
Taluka Sanand, District Ahmedabad in favour of the Assistant
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Ahmedabad, the petitioner's name could not
be entered in the revenue record. A prayer has been made to direct
the Mamlatdar to enter the petitioner's name in the revenue record
and to cancel the charge of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax
on the said property and to recover the dues from Mahendra
Petrochemicals Ltd.
3. The
only question arises for determination is whether the respondent
State has first charge over the property in question for taking steps
under Section 151 of the BLR Code.
For
determination of such issue, it is not necessary to look into the
individual facts of each case, but it is desirable to notice
decisions rendered by the Courts including the Supreme Court of India
on such issue.
4. Section
47A of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 empowers sales tax authorities
for recovery of tax as arrears of land revenue and reads as follows
:-
47A. Special
powers of sales tax authorities for recovery of tax as arrears of
land revenue.
(1) For
the purpose of effecting recovery of the amount of tax, penalty or
interest due from any dealer or other person by or under the
provisions of this Act or under any earlier law, as arrears of land
revenue -
the
Commissioner of Sales Tax, the Additional Commissioners of Sales Tax
and the Deputy Commissioners of Sales Tax shall have and exercise
all the powers and perform all the duties of the Collector under the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bom. V of 1879).
the
Assistant Commissioners of Sales Tax shall have and exercise all the
powers (except the powers of arrest and confinement of a defaulter
in a Civil jail) and perform all the duties of the Assistant or
Deputy Collector under the said code.
the
Sales Tax Officers shall have and exercise all the powers (except
the powers of arrest and conferment of a defaulter in a Civil Jail)
and perform all the duties of the Mamlatdar under the said code.
(iiia) the
Sales Tax Inspectors shall have and exercise all the powers of the
Sales Tax Officers specified in clause (iii) (except the powers of
confirmation of Sale).
Every
order passed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)
shall, for the purpose of section 64, 65, 66, 67, 69 and 72 be
deemed to be an order passed under this Act.
5. Section
137 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 stipulates precedence of
State claim over all other claim, which is extracted below :-
137. Claims
of State Government to have precedence over all others.
The claim of the State Government to any moneys recoverable under
the provisions of this Chapter, shall have precedence over any other
debt, demand, or claim whatsoever, whether in respect of mortgage,
judgment-decree, execution or attachment, or otherwise howsoever,
against any land or the holder thereof.
6. Section
151 of the BLR Code restricts recovery of arrears for the current
year as is evident from the said provision and quoted hereunder :-
151. Revenue
demands of former years how recoverable. The said
processes may be employed for the recovery of arrears of former years
as well as of the current year, but the preferences given by sections
137 and 138 shall apply only to demands for the current year :
Provided
that any process commenced in the current year shall be entitled to
the said preferences, notwithstanding that it may not be fully
executed within that year.
7. Sections
137 and 151 of the BLR Code fell for consideration before a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Secretary
of State vs. Vedavyas Venkatesh Bhatta, reported in AIR
1936 Bombay 213. The Court noticed that Section 151 restricts
prerogative of Crown to make demand for current years only. The
Crown has priority claim under common law, but such common law
priority is confined to unsecured debts. In the said case, Vedavyas
Venkatesh Bhatta (Supra), the Court while interpreting Sections 137
and 151 of the BLR Code and the common law priority on Crown,
observed as follows :-
The
view taken by Divatia, J., has been taken by the learned Chief
Justice in 26 Bom LR 1103 (1) where he held that Ss. 137 and 151
should be read together and that they confer priority only in respect
of arrears for the current year and not for arrears of past years.
This is the only decision of our own Court on this point which has
been brought to our notice. It is not disputed that the Crown is
given priority by common law. 5 BHC (OCJ) 23(2) is the leading case
on the subject. There it was held, after an exhaustive survey of the
authorities :-
A
judgment-debt due to the Crown is in Bombay entitled to the same
precedent in execution as a like judgment-debt in English, if there
be no special legislative provision affecting that right in the
particular case.
But
this common law priority is confined to unsecured debts; cf. 45 Cal
653 (3), where it is held :
that
so far as the immoveable properties were concerned including the
fixtures, the Crown was not entitled to priority, that the Alliance
Bank as first mortgagee ranked first, but the Delhi and London Bank
as second mortgagee was not entitled to priority over the Crown.
Priority
is given to the claim of the Government under Section 137 of the BLR
Code both over the secured and unsecured creditors was the finding of
the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid case, relevant portion of
which is quoted hereunder :-
It
follows that the priority given to the claim of Government by S. 137,
Bombay Land Revenue Code, is very much more extensive than that given
by the common law, since it creates on behalf of the Government a
right to priority over all debts of every kind whether secured or
unsecured, and the learned Advocate General contends that S. 151
which restricts the preference given by S. 137 to the demands for the
current year, merely takes away this statutory priority and does not
interfere with that given by common law.
The Court
further held that it includes not only the right of priority over
secured debts which is new, but also declare the right of priority
over debts of all sorts.
8. In
Bank of India vs. John
Bowman, reported in 1955 Bombay 305, Hon ble Mr Justice
Chagla, Chief Justice (as he then was), noticed that the priority
given to the Crown is not on the basis of its debt being a
judgment-debt or a debt arising out of statute, but the principle is
as enunciated by Halsbury that if the debts are of equal degree and
the Crown and the subject are equal, the Crown s right will prevail
over that of the subject. In the said case, the Court held that :-
It
cannot be denied that the Crown had the right of priority in payment
of debts due to it. It s a right which has always existed and has
been repeatedly recognized in India. If the Crown is entitled as it
is, to prior payment over all unsecured creditors, the position of
securing creditors does not arise. I see no reason why the Crown
should not be allowed to apply to the Court for an order directing
its debt to be paid out of moneys in Court belonging to the debtor,
without having to file a suit. Of course it must be a debt which is
not disputed or is indisputable. In this case the debt represents
money due to the Crown under the Income-tax Act and the demand of the
Income-tax Officer is not open to question.
Therefore,
in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice it had never been
disputed in India that the Crown had priority with regard to its
debts over all unsecured debts. No question arose of the debts being
judgment-debts or otherwise. If the other competing debts were
unsecured, then the right of the Crown to priority or precedence
arose.
17. But
even if we come to the conclusion that the State has priority with
regard to this contractual debt over the debt due to the Bank of
India, the two debts being of equal degree, even so the state has no
right to override a decree of a competent Court or an execution taken
out in respect of a decree unless specially empowered by law.
Section 11, Bombay City Land Revenue Act, is an illustration where
the Legislature has empowered the State to override decrees,
judgments and executions of a Court.
9. The
Supreme Court while deliberating the issue in Dena
Bank vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co., reported
in (2000) 5 SCC 694, noticed that the principle of priority of
government debts is founded on the rule of necessity and of public
policy and observed as follows :-
8. The
principle of priority of government debts is founded on the rule of
necessity and of public policy. The basic justification for the
claim for priority of State debts rests on the well-recognized
principle that the State is entitled to raise money by taxation
because unless adequate revenue is received by the State, it would
not be able to function as a sovereign Government at all. It is
essential that as a sovereign, the State should be able to discharge
its primary governmental functions and it order to be able to
discharge such functions efficiently, it must be in possession of
necessary funds and this consideration emphasizes the necessity and
the wisdom of conceding to the State, the right to claim priority in
respect of its tax dues (see Builder Supply Corpn., AIR 1965 SC
1061). In the same case the Constitution Bench has noticed a
consensus of judicial opinion that the arrears of tax due to the
State can claim priority over private debts and that this rule of
common law amounts to law in force in the territory of British India
at the relevant time within the meaning of Article 372(1) of the
Constitution of India and therefore continues to be in force
thereafter. On the very principle on which the rule is founded, the
priority would be available only to such debts as are incurred by the
subjects of the Crown by reference to the State s sovereign power
of compulsory exaction and would not extend to charges for commercial
services or obligation incurred by the subjects to the State pursuant
to commercial transactions. Having received the available judicial
pronouncements their Lordships have summed up the law as under :
1. There
is consensus of judicial opinion that the arrears of tax due to the
State can claim priority over private debts.
2. The
common law doctrine about priority of Crown debts which was
recognized by Indian High Courts prior to 1950 constitutes law in
force within the meaning of Article 372(1) and continues to be in
force.
3. The
basic justification for the claim for priority of State debts is the
rule of necessity and the wisdom of conceding to the State the right
to claim priority in respect of its tax dues.
4. The
doctrine may not apply in respect of debts due to the State if they
are contracted by citizens in relation to commercial activities which
may be undertaken by the State for achieving socio-economic good. In
other words, where the welfare State enters into commercial fields
which cannot be regarded as an essential and integral part of the
basic government functions of the State and seeks to recover debts
from its debtors arising out of such commercial activities the
applicability of the doctrine of priority shall be open for
consideration.
10. However,
the Crown s preferential right to recovery of debts over other
creditors is confined to ordinary or unsecured creditors. The common
law of England or the principles of equity and good conscience (as
applicable to India) do not accord the Crown a preferential right for
recovery of its debts over a mortgagee or pledgee of goods or a
secured creditor. It is only in cases where the Crown s right and
that of the subject meet at one and the same time that the Crown is
in general preferred. Where the right of the subject is complete and
perfect before that of the King commences, the rule does not apply,
for there is no point of time at which the two rights are at
conflict, nor can there be a question which of the two ought to
prevail in a case where one, that of the subject, has prevailed
already. In Giles v. Grover, (1832) 131 ER 563, it has been held
that the Crown has no precedence over a pledgee of goods. In Bank of
Bihar vs. State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCC 196, the principle has been
recognized by this Court holding that the rights of the pawnee who
has parted with money in favour of the pawnor on the security of the
goods cannot be extinguished even by lawful seizure of goods by
making money available to other creditors of the pawnor without the
claim of the pawnee being first fully satisfied. Rashbehary Ghose
states in Law of Mortgage (TLL, 7th Edn., p. 386) It
seems a government debt in India is not entitled to precedence over a
prior secured debt. .
10. Priority
or precedence of Crown debts under the Central Excise Act vis-?-vis
secured debts under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 fell
for consideration before the Supreme Court in Union
of India vs. Sicom Ltd., reported in (2009) 2 SCC
121. In the said case, the Supreme Court while held that a debt
which is secured or which by reason of the provisions of a statute
becomes the first charge over the property having regard to the plain
meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution of India must be held to
prevail over the Crown debt which is an unsecured one, observed as
follows :-
9. Generally,
the rights of the Crown to recover the debt would prevail over the
right of a subject. Crown debt means the debts due to the State
or the King; debts which a prerogative entitles the Crown to claim
priority for before all other creditors . [See Advanced Law
Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (3rd Edn.), p. 1147.] Such
creditors, however, must be held to mean unsecured creditors.
Principle of Crown debt as such pertains to the common law principle.
A common law which is a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the
Constitution is saved in terms of Article 372 thereof. Those
principles of common law, thus, which were existing at the time of
coming into force of the Constitution of India are saved by reason of
the aforementioned provision. A debt which is secured or which by
reason of the provisions of a statue becomes the first charge over
the property having regard to the plain meaning of Article 372 of the
Constitution of India must be held to prevail over the Crown debt
which is an unsecured one.
10. It
is trite that when Parliament or a State Legislature makes an
enactment, the same would prevail over the common law. Thus, the
common law principle which was existing on the date of coming into
force of the Constitution of India must yield to a statutory
provision. To achieve the same purpose, Parliament as also the State
Legislatures inserted provisions in various statutes, some of which
have been referred to hereinbefore providing that the statutory dues
shall be the first charge over the properties of the taxpayer. This
aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in a series of
judgments.
11. In
Central Bank of India vs.
State of Kerala, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 94, the Supreme
Code decided the question whether the Crown debt was in conflict with
any provision of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 ( the RDDB Act for short) and the
Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest Act, 2002. The Court held that the State Act
was not in conflict with the Securitization Act. In the present
case, as in two of the writ petitions, the claim has been made on the
basis of the Securitization Act, it is desirable to quote extensive
the finding of the Supreme Court with regard to such Act vis-?-vis
the claim of State under the statutory Act, relevant portion of which
are quoted hereunder :-
32. & &
The Securitization Act drastically changed the scenario inasmuch as
it enabled banks, financial institutions and other secured creditors
to recover their dues without intervention of the Courts or
Tribunals. The Securitization Act also made provision for
registration and regulation of securitisation/reconstruction
companies, securitisation of financial assets of banks and financial
institutions and other related provisions. However, what is most
significant to be noted is that there is no provision in either of
these enactments by which first charge has been created in favour of
banks, financial institutions or secured creditors qua the property
of the borrower. Under Section 13(1) of the Securitization Act,
limited primary has been given to the right of a secured creditor to
enforce security interest vis-?-vis Section 69 or Section 69A of the
Transfer of Property Act. In terms of that sub-section, secured
creditor can enforce security interest without intervention of the
Court or Tribunal and if the borrower has created any mortgage of the
secured asset, the mortgagee or any person acting on his behalf
cannot sell the mortgaged property or appoint a receiver of the
income of the mortgaged property or any part thereof in a manner
which may defeat the right of the secured creditor to enforce
security interest. This provision was enacted in the backdrop of
Chapter VIII of Narasimhan Committee s 2nd Report in
which specific reference was made to the provisions relating to
mortgages under the Transfer of Property Act. IN an apparent bid to
overcome the likely difficulty faced by the secured creditor which
may include a bank or a financial institution, Parliament
incorporated the non obstante clause in Section 13 and gave primary
to the right of secured creditor vis-?-vis other mortgagees who
could exercise rights under Section 69 and 69A of the Transfer of
Property Act. However, this primary has not been extended to other
provisions like Section 38C of the Bombay Act and Section 26B of the
Kerala Act by which first charge has been created in favour of the
State over the property of the dealer or any person liable to pay the
dues of sales tax, etc. Sub-section (7) of Section 13 which
envisages application of the money received by the secured creditor
by adopting any of the measures specified under sub-section (4)
merely regulates distribution of money received by the secured
creditor. It does not create first charge in favour of the secured
creditor. By enacting various provisos to sub-section (9), the
legislature has ensured that priority given to the claim of workers
of a company in liquidation under Section 529A of the Companies Act,
1956 vis-?-vis secured creditors like banks is duly respected. This
is the reason why first of the five unnumbered provisos to Section
13(9) lays down that in the case of a company in liquidation, the
amount realized from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed
in accordance with the provisions of Section 529A of the Companies
Act, 1956. This and other provisos do not create first charge in
favour of the worker of a company in liquidation for the first time
but merely recognize the existing priority of their claim under the
Companies Act. It is interesting to note that the provisos to
sub-section (9) of Section 13 do not deal with the companies which
fall in the category of borrower but which are not in liquidation or
are not being wound up. It is thus clear that provisos referred to
above are only part of the distribution mechanism evolved by the
legislature and are intended to protect and preserve the right of the
workers of a company in liquidation whose assets are subjected to the
provisions of the Securitization Act and are disposed of by the
secured creditor in accordance with Section 13 thereof.
33. The
non obstante clauses contained in Section 34(1) of the DRT Act and
Section 35 of the Securitization Act give overriding effect to the
provisions of those Acts only if there is anything inconsistent
contained in any other law or instrument having effect by virtue of
any other law. In other words, it there is no provision in the other
enactments which are inconsistent with the DRT Act or Securitization
Act, the provisions contained in those Acts cannot override other
legislations. Section 38C of the Bombay Act and Section 26B of the
Kerala Act also contain non obstante clauses and give statutory
recognition to the priority of State s charge over other debts,
which was recognized by Indian High Courts even before 1950. In
other words, these sections and similar provisions contained in other
State legislations not only create first charge on the property of
the dealer or any other person liable to pay sales tax, etc. but also
give them overriding effect over other laws. & &
38. While
enacting the DRT Act and Securitisation Act, Parliament was aware of
the law laid down by this Court wherein priority of the State dues
was recognized. If Parliament intended to create first charge in
favour of banks, financial institutions or other secured creditors on
the property of the borrower, then it would have incorporated a
provision like Section 529A of the Companies Act or Section 11(2) of
the EPF Act and ensured that notwithstanding series of judicial
pronouncements, dues to banks, financial institutions and other
secured creditors should have priority over the State s statutory
first charge in the matter of recovery of the dues of sales tax, etc.
However, the fact of the matter is that no such provision has been
incorporated in either of these enactments despite conferment of
extraordinary power upon the secured creditors to take possession and
dispose of the secured assets without the intervention of the Court
or Tribunal. & &
39. If
the provisions of the drt act and securitization act are interpreted
keeping in view the background and context in which these
legislations were enacted and the purpose sought to be achieved by
their enactment, it becomes clear that the two legislations, are
intended to create a new dispensation for expeditious recovery of
dues to banks, financial institutions and secured creditors and
adjudication of the grievance made by any aggrieved person qua the
procedure adopted by the banks, financial institutions and other
secured creditors, but the provisions contained therein cannot be
read as creating first charge in favour of banks, etc. If Parliament
intended to give priority to the dues of banks, financial
institutions and other secured creditors over the first charge
created under State legislations then provisions similar to those
contained in Section 14A of the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923,
Section 11(2) of the EPF Act, Section 74(1) of the Estate Duty Act,
1953, Section 25(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1957, Section 30 of the Gift Tax Act, and Section
529A of the Companies Act, 1956 would have been incorporated in the
DRT Act and Securitization Act. Undisputedly, the two enactments do
not contain provision similar to Workmen s Compensation Act, etc.
In absence of any specific provision to that effect, it is not
possible to read any conflict or inconsistency or overlapping between
the provisions of the drt act and securitization act & & &
12. The
judgments of the Supreme Court in Sicom Ltd. [(2009) 2 SCC 121 and
Central Bank of India [(2009) 4 SCC 94 fell for consideration before
a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in M.
Nagarajan vs. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and others in
W.P. No. 10246 of 2007. By its (unreported) judgment dated
12.6.2009, the Court held as follows:-
15. Having
regard to the judicial pronouncements rendered by Courts and noticed
above, we may sum up the law as under :-
Arrears
of tax due to the State can claim priority over unsecured debts.
The
common law doctrine about priority of Crown debts/State debts is
recognized law in force within the meaning of Article 372(1) of the
Constitution of India.
The
doctrine will not apply if first charge by way of priority is not
claimed under the statute.
The
doctrine of first charge/priority of the State over the property
will prevail over the private debts, which is an unsecured debt, but
such doctrine of first charge/priority over the property cannot
prevail over secured debts of a person. If the statute permits to
have first charge/priority over the property having regard to the
plain meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution of India, then only
the State can claim priority over an unsecured debt.
13. In
two cases, first charge claim of the State is based on Section 47A of
the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, which is quoted hereinabove. In the other
case, the claim is based on Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 as quoted hereunder :-
33-C.
Recovery of money due from an employer.-
(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer
under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA
or Chapter VB, the workman himself or any other person authorized by
him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the
workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other
mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government
for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate
Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a
certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to
recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
Provided
that every such application shall be made within one year from the
date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer :
Provided
further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry
of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is
satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the
application within the said period.
(2) Where
any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any
benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if
any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount
at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may,
subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by
such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the
appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months.
Provided
that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it
necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded
in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think
fit.
(3) For
the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour
Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall,
after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to
the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount
after considering the report of the Commissioner and other
circumstances of the case.
(4) The
decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the
appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court
may be recovered in the manner provided for in sub-section (1).
(5) Where
workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from
him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of
money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a
single application for the recovery of the amount due may be made on
behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen.
Explanation.-
In this section "Labour Court" includes any court
constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of
industrial disputes in force in any State."
Under
the aforesaid provisions, the recovery can be effected as arrears of
land revenue.
It
has already been noticed that arrears of land revenue can be
recovered under Section 137 of the BLR Code which is restricted to
the current year under Section 151 of the said Code.
14. The
question of validity of section 137 of the BLR Code fell for
consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in M/s
Surendrabhai & Company vs. State of Gujarat,
reported in 1985 GLH (UJ) 53. Though the judgment was rendered on
26.4.1971, taking into consideration the importance of the judgment,
it was reported after 14 years in 1985. In the said case, this Court
declared Section 137 of the BLR Code as void, relevant portion of
which is quoted hereunder :-
The
provision of Section 137 of the Code does affect the right of citizen
to hold the property and the question is whether the said provisions
which are contained in the pre-existing law stand the test of
reasonability. The question did not detain the Court any longer in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Parchulal and Others, Civil Appeal NO. 485 of 1968
decided on April 22, 1969 (AIR 1969, N.S.C. 86 = 1969 S.C.D. 841)
where a similar question came for consideration. To state the facts
of that case shortly, the property was usufructury mortgaged by one
Onkarlal to his creditor. Onkarlal was running a business in
foodgrains which were supplied to him by the former Holker State on
credit. As he failed to pay up the dues the State started recovery
proceedings again him. The mortgage property belonging to Onkarlal
was attached by the Collector in pursuance of Rule 3 which provided
that the State demand had precedence over any other claim including a
mortgage or judgment-debt whether a Court has issued an attachment or
not. The creditors, i.e. mortgagees filed suit against the State of
Madhya Pradesh and Onkarlal, for a declaration that the mortgaged
property was not subject to auction and for an injunction restraining
the State from selling the property in dispute. The High Court of
Madhya Pradesh came to the conclusion that the provisions of Rule 3
created unreasonable restriction on the right of the citizen to hold
property and, therefore, void. The Supreme Court held this view of
the High Court could not be questioned and, their Lordships observed
:-
The
right of mortgagee of a house partakes of the nature of immovable
properties and law enacted before the Constitution which created
unreasonable restriction would be void under Article 13 of the
Constitution.
On
the same reasoning the provisions of Section 137 of the Code cannot
be sustained. The State cannot be given a right of preference in
respect of its unsecured debt over the debt of the Petitioner No. 2
which is a secured one. The provision of law which gives the State a
right of preference when the debts are unequal cannot also be
sustained under Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees
equality and equal protection of law."
15. The
question of priority of State debt vis-?-vis Securitization Act fell
for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in UTI
Bank Ltd. Vs. The Dy. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai II
Division, reported in 2007 (1) Law Weekly 50. In the said
case, while dealing with the Central Excise Act, 1944, Customs Act,
1962 and the Securitization Act, the Full Bench considered whether
the Crown's debts, for which there is no priority or charge is
created under the statute, should have precedence over the secured
creditors or not. Considering the facts of the said case that the
bank had taken possession of the property under Section 13 of the
Securitization Act and having noticed that there are no specific
provisions under the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act to claim
first charge, as provided under other enactments, the Full Bench held
that generally the dues to the Government i.e. tax, duties, etc.
(Crown's debts) get priority over ordinary debts; only wen there is a
specific provision in the statute claiming first charge over the
property, the Crown's debt is entitled to have priority over the
claim of others and in absence of any such provision to claim first
charge, the Government cannot claim precedence over the claim of the
secured creditor under the Securitization Act.
16. From
the judgments referred to above, it will be evident that -
The
arrears of tax due to the State can claim priority over the
unsecured debt.
If
first charge by way of priority is not claimed under the statute,
the said doctrine is not applicable.
Normally,
the doctrine of first charge/priority of State will prevail over the
private debt which is an unsecured debt.
In
normal course, the doctrine of first charge/priority cannot prevail
over secured debts, but if first charge of the State is over the
secured debts, both debts being equal, the State can claim priority
even over the secured debts, and
The
secured debts under the Securitization Act or debt under the RDDB
Act has no first charge and thereby cannot compete with first
charge/priority claim of the State if made under the statute.
17. Taking
into consideration the aforesaid provisions of law, judgments
rendered by the Courts and the observations made by us in the
preceding paragraphs, we will have to decide in this case whether the
State can recover its dues of tax under Section 47A of the Gujarat
Sales Tax Act, 1969 and the dues of the workmen under Section 33-C
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as arrears of land revenue
under Section 137 of the BLR Code.
18. In
the present case, as we have noticed that Section 137 has been
declared void, we hold that the State Government cannot recover the
dues under Section 137 of the BLR Code.
19. For
the reasons aforesaid, while we answer the issue in favour of the
appellants - petitioners, allow the prayers made in their appeal and
the writ petitions, but there shall be no order as to costs. The
Civil Application also stands disposed of.
[S.J.
MUKHOPADHAYA, CJ.]
[ANANT
S. DAVE, J.]
sundar/-
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