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  • Section 256(1) of the IT Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act')
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  • Section 256(1) of the IT Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act')
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference made by the Commissioner of Income Tax to the court under Section 256(1) of the Income‑tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'B' referred the following question of law: Whether the Tribunal was right in law and on facts in setting aside the order passed by the Income‑tax Officer (ITO) under Section 155(4A) whereby the investment allowance allowed at the time of the original assessment stood withdrawn?

The assessee is a private limited company which, for assessment year 1977‑78, was allowed investment allowance of Rs. 56,716 in respect of an item of plant and machinery described as "Reduction Gear Box". During the accounting period relevant to assessment year 1981‑82 that plant and machinery was scrapped because it was not functioning efficiently and caused frequent production stoppages. The ITO issued a notice indicating his intention to rectify under Section 155(4A) and proposed withdrawal of the earlier investment allowance. The assessee resisted the proposed action. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that the assessee had not transferred the plant and machinery itself but had sold steel produced by converting the scrap of the defective plant and machinery. The CIT(A) had, prior to the Tribunal, upheld the ITO's action. The present reference arises from that factual and procedural matrix.

At the hearing before the court, Mr. M.R. Bhatt, learned senior standing counsel, appeared for the Revenue; there was no appearance for the respondent‑assessee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, the Tribunal is right in law and on facts in setting aside the order passed by the ITO under Section 155(4A) whereby the investment allowance allowed at the time of the original assessment stood withdrawn?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant‑Revenue's Arguments

  • Section 155(4A) provides that if, within eight years from the end of the previous year in which plant and machinery was installed, the plant and machinery was sold or otherwise transferred, the investment allowance originally granted shall be deemed to have been wrongly allowed; therefore the ITO was right to recompute income by withdrawing the allowance.
  • The phrase "otherwise transferred" includes not only the original plant and machinery but also any other item obtained on conversion of the original plant and machinery (i.e., the converted form of the asset).
  • Before the Tribunal reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in CIT v. Vania Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (1977) 107 ITR 300 (Guj), but that decision was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court in Vania Silk Mills (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income‑Tax, Ahmedabad. (1991) 191 ITR 647 (SC).
  • The Supreme Court reiterated the same position in Marybong and Kyel Tea Industries Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 224 ITR 589 (SC).

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee argued (and the Tribunal accepted) that the plant and machinery itself was not transferred; what was sold was steel produced by converting the scrap of the defective plant and machinery.
  • Because the original asset no longer existed (having been scrapped), Section 155(4A)(a) could not be invoked to withdraw the investment allowance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT v. Vania Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (1977) 107 ITR 300 (Guj) This decision was relied upon before the Tribunal. The court noted that this decision was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court and therefore could not be treated as supportive of the Revenue's position.
Vania Silk Mills (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income‑Tax, Ahmedabad. (1991) 191 ITR 647 (SC) The Supreme Court stated that existence of the asset is a sine qua non before it can be said that the asset was transferred; when an asset is destroyed, there is no question of transferring it to others. The court applied this ratio to conclude that because the plant and machinery no longer existed (it had been scrapped), Section 155(4A)(a) could not be invoked to withdraw the investment allowance.
Marybong and Kyel Tea Industries Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 224 ITR 589 (SC) The Supreme Court reiterated the same position of law regarding the necessity of the asset's existence for a transfer. The court treated this decision as reinforcing the principle applied from Vania Silk Mills (1991) and as supporting the conclusion that the converted material (steel) does not amount to a transfer of the original plant and machinery.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the factual premise that the plant and machinery in question had been scrapped because it was not functioning efficiently, and that the scrap was utilized as raw material to manufacture steel which was subsequently sold.

The court considered the Revenue's contention that the phrase "otherwise transferred" in Section 155(4A) should cover converted forms of the asset. It rejected that contention, holding that the clear and unambiguous language of Section 155(4A)(a) does not support treating converted material as the "plant and machinery" that was originally allowed investment allowance.

The court relied on the apex Court's decision in Vania Silk Mills (1991), which declared that the existence of the asset is a prerequisite to a finding of transfer; an asset that has been destroyed cannot be said to have been transferred. Applying that ratio, the court observed that the plant and machinery on which investment allowance had been granted no longer existed; what was sold was steel recovered from the scrap. Consequently, Section 155(4A)(a) could not be applied.

Holding and Implications

The Tribunal's decision was upheld: the ITO could not invoke Section 155(4A)(a) to withdraw the investment allowance.

Direct consequences: The question referred was answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue; the reference is disposed of accordingly and there shall be no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The court applied existing Supreme Court authority to the facts; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle beyond applying those precedents.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Star Steel Pvt. Ltd.

    1. This is a reference at the instance of the CIT and the following question of law has been referred to us by the Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'B' under Section 256(1) of the IT Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') :

    Whether, the Tribunal is right in law and on facts in setting aside the order passed by the ITO under Section 155(4A) whereby the investment allowance allowed at the time of the original assessment stood withdrawn ?

    2. The assessee is a private limited company and for asst. yr. 1977-78 it was allowed investment allowance of Rs. 56,716 on an item of plant and machinery known as "Reduction Gear Box". During the accounting period relevant to asst. yr. 1981-82 the said plant and machinery was scrapped since it was not functioning efficiently resulting in frequent stoppages of production. In light of this accepted position, the AO issued notice indicating intention to rectify under Section 155(4A) of the Act, The assessee resisted the proposed action. However, according to the AO, in light of the definition of "transfer" within the meaning of Section 2(47) of the Act, there was extinguishment of rights of the assessee and hence, the condition of the plant and machinery being "otherwise transferred" is satisfied. Therefore, according to the AO, the investment allowance of Rs. 56,716 granted during asst. yr. 1977-78 was required to be withdrawn. The assessee failed in its appeal before the CIT(A). However, the Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee that the assessee had not transferred the plant and machinery but steel which was converted from scrap of the defective plant and machinery.

    3. Heard Mr. M.R. Bhatt, learned senior standing counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant-Revenue. Though served there is no appearance on behalf of the respondent.

    4. It was contended by Mr. Bhatt that Section 155(4A) specifically lays down that if at any time before the expiry of eight years from the end of the previous year in which plant and machinery was installed, the plant and machinery was sold or otherwise transferred, the investment allowance originally granted shall be deemed to have been wrongly allowed and the AO was, therefore, right in passing the necessary order recomputing the total income by withdrawing such investment allowance. It was submitted that the term "otherwise transferred" would take within its sweep not only the original plant and machinery but also any other item which would be obtained on conversion of the original plant and machinery. Mr. Bhatt also, at the same time, invited our attention to the fact that before the Tribunal reliance was placed on decision of this Court in case of CIT v. Vania Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (1977) 107 ITR 300 (Guj), but the said decision has subsequently been reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of Vania Silk Mills (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Ahmedabad. (1991) 191 ITR 647 (SC). It was also submitted that the apex Court has reiterated the same position of law once again in the case of Marybong and Kyel Tea Industries Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 224 ITR 589 (SC).

    5. It is an admitted position that in this case what has happened is that the asset in question was scrapped and the scarp was utilized as raw material for the manufacture of steel and the steel was subsequently sold. In light of this peculiar factual position the Tribunal was right in law in holding that neither machinery nor plant on which investment allowance had been granted was sold or otherwise transferred. The contention on behalf of the Revenue that the term otherwise transferred would take within its sweep and other converted form of asset cannot be accepted in light of the clear and unambiguous language employed in Section 155(4A)(a) of the Act.

    6. In the case of Vania Silk Mills (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Ahmedabad. (supra), the apex Court has stated that in light of the various words and expressions used in the definition of "transfer" in Section 2(47) of the Act the existence of the asset is a sine qua non before it could be stated that the asset was transferred. It was further laid down that when an asset is destroyed, there is no question of transferring it to others.

    7. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the facts of the case it is apparent that the plant and machinery on which investment allowance was granted was not in existence and what was sold was steel recovered from the scrap of plant and machinery. Hence, in absence of the plant and machinery, there is no question of application of Section 155(4A)(a) of the Act.

    8. In the result, we hold that the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the AO could not have invoked Section 155(4A)(a) of the Act so as to withdraw investment allowance allowed at the time of original assessment.

    9. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative i.e., in favour of assessee and against the Revenue.

    10. This reference is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Star Steel Pvt. Ltd.
    (Sep 4, 2003)