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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.K. Sikri, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as a "Palledar" by respondent No. 2, Super Bazaar Cooperative Stores Limited. On 20 July 1991 he was suspended pending disciplinary proceedings and on 5 August 1991 a departmental enquiry was ordered. The sole allegation was that on 21 May 1991 the petitioner, in connivance with another worker (Mr. Madho Singh), attempted to pilfer a 40 kg bag of sugar (valued at Rs. 386/-) while loading it into vehicle No. DHG-5068.

The enquiry officer held the charge proved and, by order dated 6 July 1992, the petitioner was removed from service. The petitioner filed a statutory appeal which was rejected on 19 September 1992. He then filed Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1995 in the High Court to quash the punishment; that writ petition was dismissed by this Court by order dated 21 March 1995. The High Court's order noted the Supreme Court's decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar & Others regarding supply of enquiry reports and held that the petitioner had not shown prejudice from non-supply of the enquiry report.

Subsequently, on 19 June 1995 the petitioner raised an industrial dispute (statement of claim) before the Conciliation Officer. Conciliation failed and the Conciliation Officer reported. On 5 March 1997 the Secretary (Labour), Government of NCT of Delhi, refused to refer the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, giving as the reason that the workman had already agitated his dismissal before the High Court (Civil Writ No. 2376 of 1995) which had been dismissed on 21 March 1995. The petitioner’s review petition against that refusal was rejected on 18 November 1997 on the ground that no fresh facts warranted review. The petitioner then challenged the orders dated 5 March 1997 and 18 November 1997 by filing the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appropriate government was justified in refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication on the ground that the petitioner had already challenged the same order (removal) before the High Court and that the writ petition had been dismissed.
  2. Whether, having elected to challenge the order of removal by filing a writ petition (which was dismissed on merits), the petitioner was precluded from thereafter invoking the Industrial Disputes Act to seek adjudication of the same substantive grievance (i.e., the punishment of removal) — in other words, whether the doctrines of election and/or constructive res judicata preclude raising the industrial dispute after the writ dismissal.
  3. Whether a summary or in limine dismissal of a writ petition operates as a bar (res judicata or otherwise) to raising an industrial dispute regarding the same order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The dismissal of Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1995 did not operate as a bar to raising an industrial dispute — res judicata does not apply and the writ dismissal (characterized by counsel as “in limine” or summary) does not preclude another forum.
  • The grounds raised in the writ petition (failure to supply copy of enquiry report before imposing penalty) were different from the grounds relied on in the industrial dispute (that the enquiry was improper, findings were not based on evidence and were perverse); therefore the cause of action for the industrial dispute was different and the petitioner could proceed notwithstanding the writ dismissal.
  • The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Union of India & Another v. Ranchi Municipal Corporation to support the proposition that summary dismissal does not create res judicata or preclude other remedies.
  • It was also pointed out that respondent No. 2 itself had taken the position in its counter affidavit in the writ petition that the writ was not maintainable and that the petitioner had an efficacious remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, implying that the petitioner could validly raise an industrial dispute.

Respondent / State Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Secretary (Labour) and respondent maintained that the petitioner had already agitated his dismissal before this Court and that the writ petition was dismissed; accordingly the appropriate government refused reference as the matter had been concluded inter partes by the High Court order.
  • The opinion records that respondent No. 2, in its counter affidavit to the writ petition, had contended that the writ petition was not maintainable and that the petitioner had an efficacious remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act (this was relied upon by the petitioner, but the Court noted it as part of the procedural history).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Others v. B. Karunakar and Others (1993 (4) SCC 727) Before awarding punishment a show cause notice proposing the penalty and a copy of the enquiry report should be given; but non-supply of enquiry report will not vitiate penalty unless prejudice is shown. The High Court's earlier order (dismissing the writ) invoked this principle and found the petitioner had not shown prejudice from non-supply of the enquiry report; the present Court accepted that aspect of the earlier order as part of the background.
Union of India & Another v. Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Ranchi & Others (1996 (7) SCC 542) Cited by the petitioner in support of the submission that summary dismissal does not constitute res judicata (as relied upon by counsel). The Court recorded that the petitioner relied on this judgment but concluded that the cited authorities were not applicable on the facts of the present case (i.e., the Court rejected the petitioner's reliance upon it).
Beepathuma v. Shankararayana (AIR 1965 SC 241) Illustration of the application in India of the doctrine of election (a person cannot approbate and reprobate simultaneously). The Court cited this decision (among others) to show that the doctrine of election has been applied in India and to support the principle that electing one remedy may preclude pursuing another for the same cause of action.
R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir (1992 (4) SCC 683) Another instance of the doctrine of election/related principles applied by Indian courts. The Court cited this decision as part of the authorities demonstrating the application of the doctrine of election in India.
Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapal (1969 (2) SCC 74) Case cited in relation to the doctrine of election / related equitable principles. Used as supporting authority to show that election principles have been applied by Indian courts and are grounded in public policy.
Secretary, India Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat and Others (2000 LLR 506) Clarifies that the appropriate government acts in administrative capacity when deciding whether to refer an industrial dispute; it may evaluate whether a dispute exists and need not itself adjudicate factual issues reserved for tribunals. The judgment set out several guiding propositions on the nature and reviewability of such administrative orders. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the appropriate government is entitled to refuse a reference if satisfied administratively that no referable industrial dispute exists (and that the government's order is administrative in nature and not to be undercut by treating it as an adjudicatory decision). The Court quoted and adopted the summary of principles from this decision.
Abad Dairy Oudh Vitran Kendra Sanchalak Mandal v. Abad Dairy & Others (1990 (60) FLR 282 (SC)) Illustrates that where voluminous evidence and factual disputes exist, the question whether a person is a "workman" may require detailed investigation by a tribunal (and thus not suitable for administrative determination). The Court distinguished this authority on the facts, observing that the cited case required detailed fact-finding unlike the present matter, and therefore it was not relevant to defeat the Secretary's administrative decision.
National Engineering Industries Limited v. State of Rajasthan and Others (JT 1999 (9) SC 377) Example of striking down a reference order where the subject matter was covered by a prior tripartite agreement, and therefore no industrial dispute existed for adjudication. The Court referred to this decision as an instance where a reference was struck down because there was no industrial dispute due to prior settlement; it was cited to illustrate limits on making references where other conclusive circumstances exist.
Nedungadi Bank Limited v. K.P. Madhavan Kuttly (2000 LLR 340) Observation that not every individual grievance raised by a workman becomes an industrial dispute and that the appropriate government should not mechanically refer every such matter for adjudication. The Court quoted this decision to support the proposition that the appropriate government must exercise discretion and cannot make mechanical references; it reinforced the conclusion that refusal to refer may be justified where no referable industrial dispute is shown.
Prem Kumar (referred to as "supra" in the opinion) Referred to by the Court for its ratio that supported the view that the State Government did not take into account irrelevant or foreign material in refusing to make a reference (as applied by the Court). The Court invoked the ratio in Prem Kumar to say that the present case was covered by that authority because there was no indication that the appropriate government relied on irrelevant considerations in refusing reference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a multi-step analysis grounded in procedural law and settled principles:

  1. Election of forum and scope of challenge: The Court observed that when multiple fora are available to challenge a single order (here, the order of removal) the litigant may elect one remedy (writ before the High Court under Article 226 or a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act). Having elected and litigated in one forum (the writ), the petitioner could not thereafter, by pursuing another forum, attempt to litigate the same order on fresh grounds — doing so would permit repeated litigation and defeat finality.
  2. Constructive res judicata / Explanation IV, Section 11 CPC: The Court relied on Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (constructive res judicata) to show that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in the former suit is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue. The Court reasoned that the petitioner, having failed in the writ forum, could not achieve the same end by invoking a different remedy and asserting new grounds that could and should have been raised earlier.
  3. Doctrine of Election: The Court applied the equitable doctrine of election — that a person cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time — citing Indian authorities where this doctrine has been applied. The Court used this to reinforce that an election of one remedy precludes later electing another inconsistent remedy to challenge the same order.
  4. Nature of the appropriate government's decision: The Court emphasized that the appropriate government, when deciding whether to refer a dispute under Section 10 (or otherwise), acts in an administrative capacity. It does not adjudicate the dispute in the manner of a tribunal. The Court relied on Secretary, India Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat to state that the government may, as part of its administrative function, determine whether an industrial dispute exists that merits reference and that courts should not treat such administrative orders as if they were judicial adjudications.
  5. Application of the administrative principle to the facts: Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the appropriate government legitimately refused to make a reference because the petitioner had already litigated and lost in the High Court. The Court found no indication that the government had taken into account irrelevant or extraneous material in reaching its administrative conclusion. The Court distinguished cases relied upon by the petitioner (for example, Abad Dairy) on their facts where detailed factual investigation was required, which the present case did not present.
  6. Final policy consideration: The Court observed that allowing the petitioner to re-open the matter before another forum after losing in one would lead to multiplicity of proceedings and be contrary to public policy; hence, finality and orderly conduct of litigation favour concluding the matter.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the orders dated 5 March 1997 (refusal to refer the industrial dispute) and 18 November 1997 (rejection of the review petition). The Court held that the petitioner, having previously challenged the order of removal by way of a writ petition which was dismissed, was precluded from seeking to re-challenge the same order before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court by raising an industrial dispute on fresh grounds.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner remains excluded from re-litigating the same order of removal before the labour adjudicatory forum, because he had already elected the writ forum and the writ challenge was dismissed on merits; the appropriate government's refusal to refer was upheld.
  • Procedural principle reaffirmed: The opinion reinforces that a litigant who elects one remedy and litigates it to conclusion may be precluded from invoking an alternative forum thereafter to challenge the same substantive order — this is supported by the doctrines of election and constructive res judicata (Explanation IV, Section 11 CPC).
  • No broader new precedent announced: The Court applied existing principles and precedents (as cited) to the facts of the case; the opinion does not purport to create a new legal rule beyond the application of those established doctrines and the administrative-law principle concerning the appropriate government's role in deciding on references.

Note: All statements in this summary are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text. No information has been added beyond what appears in that text.

    Ramaswamy Palledar v. Secretary To The Government Of Nct Of Delhi And Another

    A.K Sikri, J.— Petitioner in this case was working as “Palledar” with respondent No. 2 namely, Super Bazaar Cooperative Stores Limited. On 20th July, 1991 he was suspended in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings against him thereafter on 5th August, 1991 departmental enquiry was ordered. Only allegation levelled against the petitioner was that he alongwith another worker named Mr. Madho Singh, in connivance with each other attempted to pilfer one bag of 40 kg of indigenous sugar then valued at Rs. 386/-, from the store of R.D.C, I.N.A branch on 21st May, 1991, while loading the bag of sugar in vehicle No. DHG-5068. Enquiry was held. Enquiry Officer returned his findings holding that charges stood proved against the petitioner and on that basis of order dated 6th July, 1992 was passed imposing penalty of removal from service. Petitioner filed statutory appeal which was also rejected vide order dated 19th September, 1992. Thereafter, petitioner filed Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1995 in this Court praying for quashing of order of punishment. This petition was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 21st March, 1995. The said order reads as under:—

    “The counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice the judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Others v. B. Karunakar and Others (1993 (4) SCC 727) wherein it has been laid down that before awarding of punishment a show cause notice proposing the penalty is to be given to the delinquent officer alongwith a copy of the enquiry report. But the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also laid down that punishment awarded in the disciplinary proceedings where no copy of the enquiry report has been supplied would not be set at naught unless and until the delinquent officer shows that some prejudice has been caused to such person by non-supply of the copy of the enquiry report.

    In the present case the petitioner has not given any facts which could show that non-supply of copy of the enquiry report has caused him any prejudice. Moreover, we have perused the grounds of appeal and we find that even in the grounds of appeal it was not mentioned that non-supply of enquiry report by the disciplinary authority before imposing the penalty has caused him any prejudice. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that from the allegation of conspiracy the Court should infer that unless and until copy of the enquiry report had been supplied to the petitioner the petitioner could not have met the findings of the enquiry officer and it should be further inferred that prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. We do not agree with this submission of learned counsel for the petitioner.

    The writ petitioner is dismissed in limine. Parties to bear their own costs.”

    After the aforesaid order was passed petitioner raised industrial dispute challenging the impugned order of punishment of removal from service and filed statement of claim dated 19th June, 1995 before the Conciliation Officer. The conciliation proceedings ended in failure and Conciliation Officer submitted his report. Thereafter, Secretary (Labour) to the Government of NCT of Delhi sent communication dated 5th March, 1997 informing that it was not a fit case for reference to Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. Following reasons were forwarded for refusing to make reference in the impugned order.

    “The workman has already agitated his dismissal before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by way of Civil Writ No. 2376 of 1983 which has been dismissed vide order dated 21.3.95”

    Petitioner filed review petition which was also rejected by order dated 18th November, 1997 on the ground that no new facts had been brought to the notice which warranted review of the order dated 5th March, 1997. Petitioner filed this petition challenging order dated 5th March, 1997 by which reference is rejected and order dated 18th November, 1997 rejecting petitioner's review application.

    Assailing the aforesaid order, Mr. Rakesh Tikku as well as Mr. V. Manohar. learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner argued that filing of the writ petition and dismissal thereof constituted no bar to raise industrial dispute as no res judicata applied in the case. It was further submitted that writ petition No. 2376 of 1995 was dismissed in limine and summary dismissal does not constitute res judicata. In support of their submission, petitioner relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another v. Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Ranchi & Others. 1996 (7) SCC 542. It was also submitted that the writ petition was based on different cause of action that the cause of action on which industrial dispute was founded inasmuch as in Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1995 the penalty of removal was challenged on the ground that respondent No. 2, the disciplinary authority had not supplied the copy of the enquiry report before imposing the penalty whereas the industrial dispute was raised on the ground that proper enquiry was not held and the findings of the Enquiry Officer in the enquiry report were not based on evidence and were perverse. Thereafter, according to the petitioner, he could raise the industrial dispute notwithstanding dismissal of this writ petition. It was further argued that respondent No. 2 itself in the counter affidavit filed in Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1995 had taken the objection that writ petition was not maintainable and petitioner had efficacious remedy under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and in this view of the matter it was permissible for the petitioner to raise industrial dispute.

    The arguments raised by the petitioner may look attractive in first blush. However a little scrutiny thereof in the light of legal position on this aspect, would expose the hollowness of the arguments raised by the petitioner which are without any merit and thus this petition warrants to be dismissed. The facts narrated above clearly demonstrate that the petitioner had challenged order of removal by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1993 in which he was unsuccessful. Same removal order was sought to be challenged by raising industrial dispute thereafter. Respondent No. 1 has therefore, rightly refused to make the reference on the ground that petitioner had already agitated his dismissal before this Court by way of Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1993. It is a farcical contention raised by the petitioner that the ground on which the order of penalty was challenged in the writ petition was different from the grounds on which the same order was sought to be challenged by invoking the machinery provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. After the petitioner was awarded the punishment, petitioner had more than one forum available to challenge that order. He could either file a writ petition before High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India or raise industrial dispute. Petitioner elected to file writ petition. In this writ petition, it was permissible for the petitioner to challenge the order of punishment on any or all the grounds available to him. Merely because he chose to impugn the order of punishment on a particular ground and having lost in the same does not give him the right to challenge that very order on fresh grounds. If this is permitted, there would be no end to litigation. Infact Explanation IV of Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure which is a facet of constructive res judicata is meant to curb such practices only. Explanation IV reads as under:—

    Explanation IV:

    Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.

    Thus when the petitioner could not be permitted to file writ petition again, challenging his dismissal, on fresh grounds he could not be permitted to achieve this by invoking some other remedy. What can not be done directly would not be permitted to be done indirectly. Matter can be looked into from another angle also. When more than one fora are available to the petitioner to challenge a particular order and he elects to choose one forum, thereafter he is precluded from choosing other fora for same cause of action. This is popularly known as ‘Doctrine of Election’ which is based on the maxim “that a person cannot approbate or reprobate at the same time”. This same principle is stated in White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity Vol. 1 and Eds. at page 444 as follows:—

    “Election is the obligation imposed upon a party by Courts of equity to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims in cases where there is clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both.”

    This doctrine has been applied in India also, based on sound public policy (refer Beepathuma v. Shankararayana AIR 1965 SC 241, R.N Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir 1992 (4) SCC 683, Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapal 1969 (2) SCC 74).

    In the present case this Court had dismissed the writ petition by passing speaking order. It is a matter of common knowledge that many a times Courts dispose of the writs at admission stage by passing detailed order. Once the petitioner challenged the order of punishment by filing writ petition and the said writ petition was dismissed on merits the effect of that is to conclude the matter inter parties. The matter having thus concluded cannot be agitated again before other forum stating that the ground taken now is different. As already pointed out, it was for the petitioner to choose one of the remedies available before him. Once he opted for a particular remedy, he did so with all the limitations attached to it. It was his own volition without any imposition. Thus various judgments cited by the petitioner are not applicable on the facts of this case.

    It is now well settled that the appropriate government while deciding as to whether the dispute is to be referred for adjudication or not, acts in administrative capacity and the order which is passed is of administrative nature. While passing such an order the appropriate government is not supposed to decide the questions which are to be decided by the Labour Court and/or Industrial Tribunal by way of adjudication. However, it is open for the appropriate government to determine as to whether any Industrial Dispute exists which needs reference to the Labour Court and/or Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.

    In the present case the appropriate government while refusing to make the reference gave valid reason in support of the same, namely, petitioner had already agitated his dismissal before this Court by way of Civil Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1995 which was dismissed vide order dated 21st March, 1995. While doing so appropriate government was not delving into the arena of adjudication. Recent judgment of the apex Court in the case of Secretary, India Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat and Others 2000 LLR 506 clears the cloud and clarifies the position in law on this aspect. In that case appropriate government had refused to make the reference on the ground that the employee who sought to raise industrial dispute was not a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Upholding this decision of the appropriate government, it was held by Supreme Court that it was permissible for the appropriate government t to undertake this exercise and the argument that this aspect could only be decided by Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal on reference being adjudicatory function was repelled in the following words:—

    Mr. Bharat has urged that the question whether he was a workman is a disputed question of fact and can be decided only by the Industrial Tribunal and not by the State Government. In this connection, he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Abad Dairy Oudh Vitran Kendra Sanchalak Mandal v. Abad Dairy & Others, 1990 (60) FLR 282 (SC. This Court observed as follows:

    “Having regard to the facts and voluminous evidence sought to be adduced by both parties, the question whether the appellants are workmen requires detailed investigation of facts. The issue requires detailed examination and can be satisfactorily adjudicated upon only by a Tribunal.”

    Thus, it appears in that case the question required detailed investigation in view of voluminous evidence sought to be adduced but it is not so, in the case in hand. Therefore, the above decision is not relevant for our purpose. The ratio laid down by this Court in Prem Kumar (supra) squarely covers this appeal as it does not appear from the order that the State Government took into consideration any irrelevant or foreign material.”

    The Court summarised the position in law in the following words:—

    1. The appropriate Government would not be justified in making a reference under Section 10 of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or apprehended and if such a reference is made it is desirable wherever possible, for Government to indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference;

    2. The order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi judicial one and the Court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi judicial order;

    3. An order made by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative order no list is involved, as such an order made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government;

    4. If it appears from the reasons given that the appropriate Government took into account any consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the Court may in a given case consider the case for a writ of mandamus and;

    5. It would, however, be open to a party to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act;

    One may also refer to the judgment of National Engineering Industries Limited v. State of Rajasthan and Others JT 1999 (9) SC 377 wherein the Court struck down the reference order on the ground that the matter referred was covered by the Tripartite Agreement arrived at among the Management, labour union and the staff union and in view of such settlement it could not be said that “industrial dispute” exists which needed to be referred for adjudication.

    Another judgment of relevance is the case of Nedungadi Bank Limited v. K.P Madhavan Kuttly 2000 LLR 340 and it would be apt to quote the following observations relevant to this context:

    “In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raised some dispute it does not become industrial dispute and appropriate government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming as industrial dispute.” (Emphasis added).

    It is totally misconceived on the part of the petitioner to contend that the remedies are based on two different causes of action. Cause of action is same namely, punishment of removal from service which was challenged by filing the writ petition and which was again sought to be challenged by raising the industrial dispute. It is the ground taken which may be different. Different grounds taken by the petitioner are confused as different causes of action. However, as pointed out above, it is not permissible for the petitioner to invent new grounds and elect new forum after having failed once in one particular forum. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.

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    Ramaswamy Palledar v. Secretary To The Government Of Nct Of Delhi And Another
    (May 12, 2000)